Monday, October 27, 2014

Supplier Fixed Costs and Retail Market Monopolization

Stephane Caprice, Toulouse School of Economics, Vanessa von Schlippenbach, DIW and Christian Wey, DICE theorize on Supplier Fixed Costs and Retail Market Monopolization.

ABSTRACT: Considering a vertical structure with perfectly competitive upstream firms that deliver a homogenous good to a differentiated retail duopoly, we show that upstream fixed costs may help to monopolize the downstream market. We find that downstream prices increase in upstream firms' fixed costs when both intra- and interbrand competition exist. Our findings contradict the common wisdom that fixed costs do not affect market outcomes.

October 27, 2014 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

A model of firm exit under inefficiency and uncertainty

Simone Pieralli, Silke Huttel, and Martin Odening (all Humboldt-Universitat Berlin) provide A model of firm exit under inefficiency and uncertainty.

ABSTRACT: Analyzing the dynamics of structural change of an industry is a fundamental but challenging issue in economics. Accordingly, many attempts have been made to rationalize entry and exit decisions of firms, which, in total, appear as structural change of a sector. Among the most often hypothesized determinants of entry and exit behavior are (in)efficiency and uncertainty in conjunction with sunk costs of irreversible investments. According to the efficient market hypothesis competitive superiority discriminates among firms (Demsetz 1973). In the long run inefficient firms should be driven out of the market. In fact, inefficiency seems to increase the probability of exit. Among others, Wheelock and Wilson (2000) have shown that there exists a correlation between inefficiency and exit. However,many firms that are found inefficient persist in the market (Emvalomatis, Stefanou, and Lansink 2011). Another relevant strand of literature is the real options approach. Uncertainty and irreversibility generate a value of waiting which, in turn, leads to (dis)investment reluctance and economic inertia (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). Empirical evidence of the presence of real options effects has been provided, for example by Hinrichs, Musshoff, and Odening (2008). Both aforementioned explanations of firm’s entry and exit behavior have received extensive attention in the literature, but only separately. A joint treatment of these two aspects is the topic of this paper. We derive a model of firm exit under output price risk allowing for inefficiency of firms. To the best of our knowledge the interaction of inefficiency and uncertainty has not been analyzed so far in the framework of dynamic firm models. The consideration of inefficiency into the real options approach requires to introduce a production function. We do not impose a priori specific functional forms on the production function. We derive the properties inherited to the instantaneous profit function from the original production function by using a dual Legendre transformation. This allows deriving flexibly the substitution properties of the production function among multiple inputs and multiple outputs in a general setting. We derive two classes of profit functions imposing structure on the primal technology. The difference among the classes depends on how the inefficiency is considered. In the first class, inefficiency is considered separately from inputs and outputs, and acts as a shifter. In the second case inefficiency modifies the production function, directly interacting with inputs and outputs. Specific calculations to simulate the exit trigger prices are carried out on the particular case of a Cobb-Douglas production function. In both the separable and the non-separable classes inefficiency causes firms to exit from the market earlier compared with more efficient firms. Higher volatility of output price makes more reluctant the firms to decide to exit irreversibly the market. Higher unit costs, as well as a higher salvage value, decrease the reluctance to exit the market. Calculations are done for different hypothetical returns to scale cases, a higher and a lower one without qualitative difference in the findings. But these results show that, for the same price, it is possible to have a range of firms of different levels of efficiency and different returns to scale present in the market. Our model results generate a rich set of hypothesis that can be empirically tested, for example, in the case of German dairy sector.

October 27, 2014 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, October 24, 2014

Connecting the Antitrust Dots: In Praise of Herb Hovenkamp

DOJ has posted the fabulous speech of Bill Baer on Herb Hovenkamp that he gave last night in Iowa City called Connecting the Antitrust Dots: In Praise of Herb Hovenkamp.  I will have a recap over the weekend but it is an amazing conference to honor Hovenkamp. The Iowa Law Review has done a spectacular job.

October 24, 2014 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Limited Deposit Insurance Coverage and Bank Competition

Oz Shy (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston), Rune Stenbacka (Hanken School of Economics) and Vladimir Yankov (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)) explore Limited Deposit Insurance Coverage and Bank Competition.

ABSTRACT: Deposit insurance schemes in many countries place a limit on the coverage of deposits in each bank. However, no limits are placed on the number of accounts held with different banks. Therefore, under limited deposit insurance, some consumers open accounts with different banks to achieve higher or full deposit insurance coverage. We compare three regimes of deposit insurance: No deposit insurance, unlimited deposit insurance, and limited deposit insurance. We show that limited deposit insurance weakens competition among banks and reduces total welfare relative to no or unlimited deposit insurance.

October 24, 2014 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Screening instruments for monitoring market power in wholesale electricity markets: Lessons from applications in Germany

Marc Bataille, Monopolkommission and DICE, Alexander Steinmetz, Monopolkommissionand Susanne Thorwarth, Monopolkommission offer Screening instruments for monitoring market power in wholesale electricity markets: Lessons from applications in Germany.

ABSTRACT: While liberalization in energy markets has been a widely successful process all over the world, incumbents often still hold a dominant position. Thus, electricity wholesale markets are subject to market surveillance. Nevertheless, consolidated findings on abusive practices of market power and their cause and effect in wholesale electricity markets are scarce and non-controversial market monitoring practices fail to exist. Our application of the established measure of market concentration RSI shows that it serves as a decent indicator for the rents that can be gained in the market but also reveals considerable weaknesses of the RSI. Therefore, we propose and apply the "Return on Withholding Capacity Index" (RWC) representing a measure of the firms' incentive of withholding capacity as a complementary index to the RSI.

October 24, 2014 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Examining the Number of Competitors and the Cost of Medicare Part D

Andrew Stocking, CBO, James Baumgardner, CBO, Melinda Buntin, Vanderbilt, and Anna Cook, CBO are Examining the Number of Competitors and the Cost of Medicare Part D.

ABSTRACT: Most beneficiaries of Medicare's Part D prescription drug insurance choose among private drug plans to receive their coverage. This paper is the first to examine the relationship between the number of competing plan sponsors and the cost of Part D during the program's first five years. Over the period from 2006 to 2010, regional Part D markets contained between 16 and 22 plan sponsors offering stand-alone plans. Consistent with economic theory, we find that increases in the number of plan sponsors within a market were associated with lower bids and lower overhead and profits of plans in that market. For example, among stand-alone plans that were not eligible to be assigned low-income beneficiaries, we find that each additional plan sponsor entering an 18-firm market was associated with a reduction in bids for a month of basic coverage to a beneficiary of average health of 0.4 percent—or $0.33 for a plan that bid $85— which corresponds to an elasticity of -0.071. (That result is an arithmetic average across six specifications in which estimates range from $0.20 to $0.50.) Because bids are used to directly determine government spending, we estimate that an additional plan sponsor nationwide was associated with a reduction in government spending of $7 million to $17 million each year.

October 24, 2014 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, October 23, 2014

Fixed and mobile broadband; Are they substitutes or complements?

Jong-Hee Hahn (Yonsei University), Yun Jeong Choi (Yonsei University) and Jinsoo Bae (Ohio State University) ask Fixed and mobile broadband; Are they substitutes or complements?

ABSTRACT: This paper investigates whether fixed and mobile broadband services are substitutes or complements using firm-level panel data obtained from three major telecommunications operators in South Korea. We employ a multi-level demand model based on Hausman et al. (1994), which allow for the possibility of complementarity between differentiated services. The estimated price elasticities of demand indicate that mobile broadband is a (week) substitute for fixed broadband while fixed broadband is complementary to mobile broadband. This is in contrast with the previous studies based on logit models which essentially assume substitution between different technologies. This result implies that fixed and mobile internet services constitute distinctive antitrust markets at least in the early stage of mobile broadband development.

October 23, 2014 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

10th Annual Conference of the GCLC - 10 Years of Regulation 1/2003: challenges and reform

    10th Annual Conference of the GCLC        

    Event date:
    Thursday 6/11/2014 to Friday 7/11/2014
    Residence Palace
    155 Rue de la Loi
    1000  Brussels

    10 Years of Regulation 1/2003: challenges and reform


    This conference is dedicated to Regulation 1/2003 and its first ten years of implementation. It explores the various issues that arise over the life cycle of cases falling within the scope of Article 101 and 102 TFUE. This event will build on the series of decentralized Lunch talks organized in France, Italy and Poland throughout 2013 and 2014, which have allowed the gathering of empirical data on the implementation of Regulation 1/2003 at national level.


    Global Competition Law Centre

    College of Europe, Bruges



    October 23, 2014 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

    The Impact of Mergers on Quality Provision: Evidence from the Airline Industry

    Jeffrey T. Prince (Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, Indiana University Kelley School of Business) and Daniel H. Simon (School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University) explain The Impact of Mergers on Quality Provision: Evidence from the Airline Industry.

    ABSTRACT: We examine how mergers affect quality provision by analyzing five U.S. airline mergers, focusing on on-time performance (OTP). We find mild evidence that merging carriers’ OTP worsens in the short run. However, we find consistent evidence that in the long run, their OTP improves. Subsequent analyses indicate efficiency gains, not reduced load factor or passenger volume, underlie our long-run result. Additional analyses of quality provision (e.g., flight cancellations) show no long-run worsening in these areas by merging firms. In the long run, airline mergers do not result in worsening performance, at least along several measures, and provide some time-saving efficiencies.

    October 23, 2014 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

    Firms’ Heterogeneity and Incomplete Pass-Through

    STEFANIA GARETTO (Department of Economics, Boston University) explores Firms’ Heterogeneity and Incomplete Pass-Through.

    ABSTRACT: A large body of empirical work documents that prices of traded goods change by a smaller proportion than real exchange rates between the trading countries (incomplete pass-through). The wedge between exchange rates and relative prices also varies a cross countries (pricing-to-market). I present a model of trade and international price-setting with heterogeneous firms, where firms’ strategic behavior implies that: 1) firm-level pass-through is incomplete and a U-shaped function of firm market share; 2) exchange rate fluctuations affect both the prices of traded goods and the prices of goods sold domestically; and 3) firm-level pass-through varies across destination countries. Estimates from a panel data set of cars prices support the predictions of the model.

    October 23, 2014 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

    Deterrence Effects of Korean Antitrust Enforcement on Producer Prices and Profit Margins

    Robert M. Feinberg, American University and Minsoo Park, Sungkyunkwan University and CERK analyze Deterrence Effects of Korean Antitrust Enforcement on Producer Prices and Profit Margins.

    ABSTRACT: Antitrust enforcement is by now well-established in Korea, yet there has been little study of its effectiveness. Connor (2008), however, noted that “the Korean FTC has the best record of anti-cartel enforcement in Asia” and Jeong and Masson (1990) found evidence of market structure impacts on industry performance in Korea. In this paper we examine several datasets to investigate whether antitrust enforcement in Korea, especially anti-cartel activity, has had desirable price-limiting impacts over the past couple of decades.

    October 23, 2014 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

    Wednesday, October 22, 2014

    Antitrust-IP Mixer in the Bay Area - Hike Tennessee Valley November 2, 2014

    The ABA Intellectual Property Section Antitrust Committee presents the best ever networking mixer (I really mean it). Multi-task and join us at 1pm on Sunday, November 2 for a beautiful hike in the lovely Marin headlands – families welcome! Join fellow antitrust and intellectual property attorneys for an afternoon of networking, hiking and relaxing on the beach. Please RSVP to Meet at the Tennessee Valley trailhead.

    For details, see the link to the pdf for the activity. Download Nov 2 Bay Area Mixer

    October 22, 2014 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

    Measuring competition in banking: A critical review of methods

    Florian LEON, Clermont Universite is Measuring competition in banking: A critical review of methods.

    ABSTRACT: Many studies have attempted to investigate the determinants and implications of competition in the banking industry. The literature on the measurement of competition can be divided between the structural and non-structural approaches. The structural approach infers the degree of competition from the structure of the market. The non-structural approach, based on the New Empirical Industrial Organization, assesses the degree of competition directly by observing behavior of firms in the market. This paper reviews the most frequently-used structural and non structural measures of competition in banking. It highlights their strengths and weaknesses, especially for studies based on a limited number of observations.

    October 22, 2014 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

    Antitrust Professor Letter to the FCC in Opposition to the Comcast/Time Warner Cable Merger

    On Monday I filed a letter to the FCC* in opposition to the Comcast/Time Warner Cable merger. Over 30 professors of law and economics signed the letter. From the filing:

    In this letter, we analyze four issues that, when taken together, require the Commission to block the merger:

    -- First, we address important market definition issues. We consider the critically important national market for broadband distribution of content, and in so doing, we draw upon a highly relevant precedent: the AT&T/MediaOne transaction in 2000, in which the Department of Justice prevented the merging parties from combining broadband assets that would, like the current transaction, have given them roughly 40 percent of the national market for broadband distribution of content. On the consumer-facing side of the market, we address issues of switching costs and potential entry into local broadband access markets, and establish that neither competition from existing DSL providers nor credible entry threats would be effective to discipline the merged firm from engaging in anti-competitive behavior. We also reject claims that either mobile or satellite-based broadband should be included in the relevant market. And we point out that the parties’ “no overlap, no problem” argument, if accepted, would lead to the conclusion that the antitrust laws would permit one party to own the dominant cable provider in every local market in the United States. Such a notion, with no limiting principle, simply cannot stand.

    -- Second, we address the long-term competitive threat to the merging parties’ cable business presented by online video distributors (“OVDs”), and show that the merger would significantly enhance the Applicants’ power to foreclose this important competition, resulting in fewer choices for consumers.

    -- Third, we examine the parties’ claimed efficiencies and conclude that they are inadequate under case law and the 2010 DOJ Antitrust/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“2010 Merger Guidelines”) to offset the competitive harm threatened by the merger.

    -- Finally, we explain why behavioral remedies are insufficient to prevent harm to competition and consumers and conclude that the merger should be blocked in its entirety under the Clayton Act and the Communications Act of 1934.


    * All professors filed in their individual capacity and their affiliations are listed for identification purposes only.  In addition to my full time job as a law professor, I am also Senior Of Counsel at Wilson Sonsini in a part time capacity.  In my Wilson Sonsini capacity, I was compensated for my work in writing the letter.  I made note of this compensation in the letter to the FCC and do so in this blog post as well.  

    October 22, 2014 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

    Noncooperative Market Allocation and the Formation of Downtown

    Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Hebrew University and Moshe Tennenholtz, Microsoft Research and Technion address Noncooperative Market Allocation and the Formation of Downtown.

    ABSTRACT: Can noncooperative behaviour of merchants lead to a market allocation that prima facie seems anticompetitive? We introduce a model in which service providers aim at optimizing the number of customers who use their services, while customers aim at choosing service providers with minimal customer load. Each service provider chooses between a variety of levels of service, and as long as it does not lose customers, aims at minimizing its level of service; the minimum level of service required to satisfy a customer varies across customers. We consider a two-stage competition, in the first stage of which the service providers select their levels of service, and in the second stage --- customers choose between the service providers. (We show via a novel construction that for any choice of strategies for the service providers, a unique distribution of the customers' mass between them emerges from all Nash equilibria among the customers, showing the incentives of service providers in the two-stage game to be well defined.) In the two-stage game, we show that the competition among the service providers possesses a unique Nash equilibrium, which is moreover super strong; we also show that all sequential better-response dynamics of service providers reach this equilibrium, with best-response dynamics doing so surprisingly fast. If service providers choose their levels of service according to this equilibrium, then the unique Nash equilibrium among customers in the second phase is essentially an allocation (i.e. split) of the market between the service providers, based on the customers' minimum acceptable quality of service; moreover, each service provider's chosen level of service is the lowest acceptable by the entirety of the market share allocated to it. Our results show that this seemingly-cooperative allocation of the market arises as the unique and highly-robust outcome of noncooperative (i.e. free from any form of collusion), even myopic, service-provider behaviour. The results of this paper are applicable to a variety of scenarios, such as the competition among ISPs, and shed a surprising light on aspects of location theory, such as the formation and structure of a city's central business district.

    October 22, 2014 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

    Economic replicability tests for next-generation access networks

    Laure Jaunaux (EUI) and Marc Lebourges (EUI) discuss Economic replicability tests for next-generation access networks.

    ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the relevant cost standard for the economic replicability test for Next-Generation Access (NGA) networks, described in the Recommendation on Costing and Non-discrimination adopted by the European Commission. According to the Recommendation itself, in order to reconcile investment and competition, wholesale prices should have nonlinear characteristics and be only partly variable with the number of accesses. We demonstrate that a cost standard for the economic replicability test that implies fully fixed and variable cost recovery for the access seeker, including the total wholesale price, would be incompatible with the economics of NGA networks and that such a test would deter NGA investment. Therefore the cost standard for the economic replicability test should include only the variable part of the wholesale prices. However, we underline that during a transition phase, until competitors have secured access to NGA infrastructure, a temporary second test called the “competition migration test” should be added to ensure incumbent NGA retail prices do not foreclose copper-based efficient entrants. The tests we propose surpass the limits of the “ladder of investment” theory by including the “business migration effect” developed by Bourreau et al. (2012).

    October 22, 2014 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

    Tuesday, October 21, 2014

    Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence

    Marc Blatter, Winand Emons, and Silvio Sticher analyze Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence.

    ABSTRACT: An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. Unlike in most of the earlier literature, our firms have imperfect cumulative evidence of the collusion. That is, cartel conviction is not automatic if one firm reports: reporting makes conviction only more likely, the more so, the more firms report. Furthermore, the evidence is distributed asymmetrically among firms. Asymmetry of the evidence can increase the cost of deterrence if the high-evidence firm chooses to remain silent. Minimum-evidence standards may counteract this effect. Under a marker system only one firm reports; this may increase the cost of deterrence.

    October 21, 2014 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

    Fight Cartels or Control Mergers? On the Optimal Allocation of enforcement Efforts within Competition Policy

    Andreea Cosnita (EconomiX - CNRS) and Jean-Philippe Tropeano (CES) ask Fight Cartels or Control Mergers? On the Optimal Allocation of enforcement Efforts within Competition Policy.

    ABSTRACT: This paper deals with the optimal enforcement of competition law between merger and anti-cartel policies. We examine the interaction between these two branches of antitrust, given the budget constraint of the public agency, and taking into account the ensuing incentives for firms in terms of choice between cartels and mergers. To the extent that a tougher anti-cartel action triggers more mergers and vice-versa, we show that the two antitrust branches are complementary. However, if the merger's coordinated effect is taken into account, then for a sufficiently large such effect the agency may optimally have to refrain from controlling mergers and instead spend all resources on fighting cartels.

    October 21, 2014 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

    CPI Antitrust Chronicle - Protectionism and Merger Control

    CPI Antitrust Chronicle - Protectionism and Merger Control

    In this issue:

    Protectionist sentiments are becoming more significant in merger control considerations, especially in Europe. Can public interest exemptions or other protectionist considerations bring benefits that would justify potentially harmful side-effects from overriding competition-based analyses? Our first four papers, led by the U.K.'s new CMA, look to answer just that question. And the first paper in our Of Special Interest section also concerns protectionism as David S. Evans explains how the EU's proposed payments legislation can harm consumers. Finally, Neale Mahoney, André Veiga, & Glen Weyl close with interesting food for thought involving cream-skimming: Can there be too much competition in selection markets?

    Protectionism and Merger Control
    1. Alex Chisholm, Nelson Jung, Oct 15, 2014

      The Public Interest and Competition-Based Scrutiny of Mergers: Lessons from the Evolution of Merger Control in the United Kingdom

      In light of the recent, increasingly vocal demand for new or wider public interest considerations, it is time to take stock and explore what implications a shift or reversal in policy of this type may have. Alex Chisholm & Nelson Jung (U.K. Competition and Markets Authority)

    2. Rachel Brandenburger, Mark Jones, Oct 15, 2014

      Protectionism or Legitimate National Interest? A European Perspective on the Review of Corporate Acquisitions by Foreign Purchasers

      It has shown that, although there may be debate about the merits or otherwise of intervention against corporate acquisitions by foreign acquirers, there are in reality significant constraints on the ability of EU governments to intervene in pursuit of such objectives. Rachel Brandenburger* & Mark Jones (Hogan Lovells)

    3. Timothy Cowen, Oct 15, 2014

      Protectionism in Merger Control: Is the Process of Merger Control Adequate to Consider Wider Public Interest Issues? Is it Now Time for CFIEU?

      A case can be made for a more coordinated EU system of parallel oversight. Timothy R. W. Cowen

    4. David Reader, Oct 15, 2014

      Pfizer/AstraZeneca and the Public Interest: Do U.K. Foreign Takeover Proposals Prescribe an Effective Remedy?

      There is often a fine line to be drawn between measures that seek to protect the national interest and those that go further to promote economic patriotism. David Reader (Centre for Competition Policy, Univ. of East Anglia)

    October 21, 2014 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

    AAI 8th Annual Private Enforcement Conference and Awards Dinner Dec 02, 2014

    AAI 8th Annual Private Enforcement Conference and Awards Dinner

    Date: Dec 02, 2014
    Location: National Press Club, Washington D.C.

    On Tuesday, December 2, 2014, the American Antitrust Institute will host its 8th Annual Private Antitrust Enforcement Conference at the National Press Club in Washington D.C. Since 2007, this event has served as a vehicle for the antitrust community to come together to network and obtain an updated and comprehensive profile of private enforcement as a business.

    The day kicks off early with a Young Lawyers Breakfast. At this breakfast session, targeted to the young practitioners who will be the future of our sector, a panel composed of both junior lawyers and legendary veterans will give a variety of perspectives on tightened pleading standards, restricted admissibility of expert opinions, increased roadblocks to class certification, and the proliferation of mandatory arbitration with class action bans.  Among other things, panelists will discuss how problems like those facing our practices have been overcome in the past, and offer reasons to expect that private antitrust enforcement may well have a vibrant future.  The panel will consider practical solutions, and how young lawyers in particular can take part. All conference attendees are welcome to attend but they must RSVP for this special event in advance via the registration form.

    The Private Enforcement Conference begins at 9 a.m. with a continental networking breakfast and the first panel beginning at 10 a.m.  The conference includes a luncheon at which Tim Wu will give the keynote address. The Conference Agenda will be available soon.

    The 2014 Antitrust Enforcement Awards will be presented at a gala dinner following the conference. Cocktails begin at 5 p.m. at the JW Marriott followed by dinner and the awards program at 6:30 p.m.

    Six (6) CLE credits have been awarded by the Pennsylvania Continuing Legal Education Board.

    Tuition covers all three events (young lawyers breakfast, conference and awards dinner).  Please select which events you plan to attend on your registration form.

    • $300.00 All Day Tuition
    • $150.00 Government and Academic All Day
    • $75.00 Government Conference Only
    • $0 Advisory Board, Guest or Media All Day



    • 8:30 a.m. – Young Lawyers Breakfast: The Future of Private Antitrust Enforcement: A Brainstorming Session With Lessons From History - Sponsored by Econ One Research
    • 9:30 a.m. – Continental Breakfast - Sponsored by KCC
    • 10:00 a.m. – Welcome
    • 10:15 a.m. – Proving and Defending Section 1 Claims With Little Direct Evidence of Conspiracy
    • 11:15 a.m. – Best Practices in Prosecuting and Defending Antitrust Class Actions in the Age of Comcast
    • 12:15 p.m. – Networking Break - Sponsored by Rust Consulting/Kinsella Media
    • 12:45 p.m. – Luncheon and Keynote Address
    • 2:00 p.m. – Antitrust Issues Arising out of Multiple Recent Class Actions by Merchants and Consumers Against Payment Card Networks
    • 3:30 p.m. – Antitrust Implications of the Financial Crisis: Financial Instruments, Derivatives, and Commodities.
    • 4:45 p.m. – Closing
    • 5:00 p.m. – Cocktail Reception at JW Marriott - Sponsored by Heffler Claims Group
    • 6:30 p.m. – Antitrust Enforcement Awards Dinner at JW Marriott
    • 8:30 p.m. – Champagne Reception - Sponsored by Nathan Associates

    Outstanding Antitrust Litigation Achievement in Economics Finalists

    Orley C. Ashenfelter

    Princeton University


    Richard Gilbert

    University of California at Berkeley

    United States of America v. Apple Inc., et al. (e-books)


    Edward Leamer, Ph.D.

    University of California, Los Angeles

    In Re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation


    Leslie M. Marx, Ph.D.

    Bates White Economic Consulting

    United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) et al.


    Carl Shapiro

    University of California at Berkeley

    United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc.



    Outstanding Antitrust Litigation Achievement in Private Law Practice Finalists

    Jay N. Fastow

    Ballard Spahr LLP

    ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corporation


    Kenneth L Steinthal

    King & Spalding

    United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) et al.


    K. Craig Wildfang

    Robins Kaplan Miller & Ciresi LLP

    In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Litigation



    Outstanding Antitrust Litigation Achievement in Private Law Honorable Mentions

    Eric L. Cramer

    Berger & Montague, P.C.

    Marchbanks Truck Service Inc., et al. v. Comdata Network, Inc., et al.


    K. Craig Wildfang

    Robins Kaplan Miller & Ciresi LLP


    Christopher Burke

    Scott & Scott

    Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC et al.



    Outstanding Antitrust Litigation Achievement by a Young Lawyer Finalists

    Andrew C. Curley

    Berger & Montague, P.C.

    Marchbanks Truck Service Inc., et al. v. Comdata Network, Inc., et al.


    Matt Duncan

    Fine, Kaplan and Black, R.P.C.

    In re Steel Antitrust Litigation


    Meegan F. Hollywood

    Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P.

    In re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation



    The judging committee is comprised of:

    · Daniel E. Gustafson, Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Chair

    · Hollis Salzman, Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P., Vice Chair

    · Jonathan Baker, American University's Washington College of Law

    · Ellen S. Cooper, Office of the Attorney General of Maryland

    · Harry First, New York University School of Law

    · Kathleen E. Foote, California Department of Justice Antitrust Section

    · Warren Grimes, Southwestern Law School

    · Thomas Horton, South Dakota School of Law

    · Ellen Meriwether, Cafferty Clobes Meriwether & Sprengel LLP

    · Dianne Nast, NastLaw, LLC

    · Roger Noll, Stanford University

    · Linda Nussbaum, Grant & Eisenhofer, P.A.

    · Christopher Sagers, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law

    · Bonny Sweeny, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP

    · Richard O. Zerbe, University of Washington     

    October 21, 2014 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)