Wednesday, September 24, 2014
Vasiliki Brisimi, Koutalidis Law Firm discusses The Interface between Competition and the Internal Market. Market Separation under Article 102 TFEU.
BOOK ABSTRACT: This book explores the interface between competition law and market integration in the application of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), focusing on the notion of ?market separation??namely conduct that may hinder cross-border trade. The discussion reviews, among other things, the treatment of geographic price discrimination and exclusionary abuse, by which out-of-state competitors are affected. ?Market separation? cases are treated in the book as a case study for appraising the interface between competition and the Internal Market. On this basis, the book provides a comparative analysis of the Treaty requirements under Article 102 TFEU when applied in ?market separation? cases and the Treaty requirements under the free movement provisions. In addition, it utilises ?market separation? cases as a springboard for advancing an informed reformulation of the application of Article 102 TFEU when state action comes into play. All in all, the analysis presented in the book deconstructs the elements for establishing ?market separation? as an abuse of the dominant position. It shows that there is nothing that would justify a distinctive treatment of ?market separation? under Article 102 TFEU, other than a principled understanding of Internal Market law as a whole: whatever understanding one reaches about the proper shape of the Internal Market, interrogation of the proper application of competition law comes after that and thus should be informed by this understanding.
Suzanne Rab, Serle Court Chambers and Alison Sprague, Competition Economists Group have a new book on Media Ownership and Control, Law, Economics and Policy in an Indian and International Context.
BOOK ABSTRACT: Competition and diversity in media and communications are fundamental to a healthy economy and democracy. In India and internationally there is no consensus on the exact manner and scope of interventions that are appropriate to protect competition and pluralism in media markets. Many emerging economies including India are seeking to adopt their own regulation in this area taking their lead from the UK. The issues have been brought into sharp focus in India in recent years. First, the enactment and implementation of modern - but sector neutral - competition law under the Competition Act 2002 has caused a step change in regulation towards an economics and effects-based approach. Second, in 2013 the India telecoms regulator launched controversial reform proposals to apply a media-specific approach to ownership regulation. As academics, lawyers, businesses, regulators and policy-makers in India cast a glance at the international experience, this book examines the legal, economic and policy issues relating to regulation of ownership and control of media markets. The focus of comparative assessment is on examples from the European Union, EU Member States and the US.
Tuesday, September 23, 2014
Stephen P. King, Monash University - Department of Economics; Centre for International Finance and Regulation (CIFR); Economic Regulation Authority of Western Australia (ERA) and Rodney Maddock, Monash University - Faculty of Business and Economics; Centre for International Finance and Regulation (CIFR); Victoria University analyze Regulation, Competition and Banking Markets.
ABSTRACT: Banks use a mix of wholesale and deposit funds to finance lending. If a country is a net importer of wholesale funds, then a financial crisis in a foreign country can 'infect' the banking system by raising the cost of wholesale funds. Indeed, countries such as Australia imported a crisis through the wholesale funding market in the recent global financial crisis. We present a model to show how a rise in the costs of wholesale funding can trigger a crisis in an otherwise healthy banking sector. We also consider a range of government policies, such as 'bailouts', minimum equity requirements, entry restrictions and limits on wholesale funding, that may be deployed to prevent such a crisis. In particular, we focus on the implications of such policies for the structure and level of competition in banking and the rates paid by borrowers and received by depositors, in 'normal times'. We show that some policies, such as minimum equity requirements, can stabilise the banking sector, while ad hoc policies, such as debt guarantees or bailouts, destabilise the banking sector. Other policies, such as licensing, can limit competition but have ambiguous implications for bank stability.
Marc Winerman discusses International Issues in the FTC's First Decade (1915-1925) — And Before.
ABSTRACT: The Federal Trade Commission’s Office of International Affairs was created in 2007, and its component parts and functions had roots that extend back as far as the 1980s. But the Commission’s international work extends back much further. International concerns played a role, albeit indirectly, in the FTC’s origin. Then, once the Commission opened its doors, it quickly undertook international functions and, in its first decade, even had two separate international divisions. Further, some (though far from all) of the agency’s early international work has strong similarities to the work of today’s Office of International Affairs.
Ramiro Losada, Comision Nacional del Mercado de Valores is Measuring Market Power in the Spanish Mutual Funds Industry for Retail Investors.
ABSTRACT: The mutual fund industry is characterized by high concentration and a high number of offered funds. During last year, the Spanish management companies have reported for the whole market a margin, measured by the Lerner index, of between 25 and 28 per cent. By using an econometric structural model of competition among management companies, it is shown how mutual fund elasticities are low in the retail market. This result casts doubts about the effectiveness of the fee-caps at work. Moreover, a simple model of monopolistic competition pricing is assumed, what it provides estimations of their actual margins above 40 per cent in that market. In order to address this lack of competition, some regulatory measures are proposed.
Corinna Hentschker, Rhine-Westphalia Institute for Economic Research (RWI-Essen), Andreas Schmid, University of Bayreuth, and Roman Mennicken, Landschaftsverband Rheinland; Rhine-Westphalia Institute for Economic Research (RWI-Essen) are Defining Hospital Markets – An Application to the German Hospital Sector.
ABSTRACT: The correct definition of the product market and of the geographic market is a prerequisite for assessing market structures in antitrust cases. For hospital markets, both dimensions are controversially discussed in the literature. Using data for the German hospital market we aim at elaborating the need for differentiating the product market and at investigating the effects of different thresholds for the delineation of the geographic market based on patient flows. Thereby we contribute to the scarce empirical evidence on the structure of the German hospital market. We find that the German hospital sector is highly concentrated, confirming the results of a singular prior study. Furthermore, using a very general product market definition such as “acute in-patient care” averages out severe discrepancies that become visible when concentration is considered on the level of individual diagnoses. In contrast, varying thresholds for the definition of the geographic market has only impact on the level of concentration, while the correlation remains high. Our results underline the need for more empirical research concerning the definition of the product market for hospital services.
Monday, September 22, 2014
Competition Law Review - Volume 10 Issue 1
Editorial - ‘Competition law and the Courts’ in view of the Interface between Law and Economics
One of the criticisms against the new rules applicable to the granting of State aid to finance the provision of services of general economic interest (SGEI) in the ‘Almunia package’ is that enforcement is likely to be their weakest point. Similarly, in the more general setting of the ‘private’ enforcement of State aid rules, the 2006 Study on the Enforcement of State Aid Law at National Level recommended that the European Commission create a common minimum standard of remedies applicable in all EU jurisdictions, stressing that ‘one possible means of creating such a standard would be to adopt a remedies directive for State aid cases, which could be modelled on the remedies directive for procurement cases’. Building upon these considerations, the extent to which the existing remedies within the system for the enforcement of EU public procurement rules provide an effective platform to enforce EU State aid rules, particularly those for the financing of SGEI, before public procurement review bodies and courts is assessed. The paper describes the main groups of cases where public procurement litigation ‘phagocytises’ State aid considerations. It then proceeds to explore the viability, from an EU law perspective, of configuring public procurement review bodies and courts as ‘State aid courts’ for the purposes of the simultaneous enforcement of both sets of rules in a single setting of ‘private’ litigation. It also submits that using the public procurement system in this way provides effective remedies for the enforcement of the Almunia Package for the financing of SGEI, and adds consistency in terms of harmonisation of the material rules to be applied.
EU competition law decisions and enforcement structures at both the supranational and national levels have increasingly been subject to intensified judicial scrutiny by the Court of Justice of the European Union. As a result, different and comprehensive supranational judicial review standards, both guiding and structuring EU competition law, have simultaneously emerged across several enforcement levels. This paper identifies those different standards and relates their simultaneous emergence to modernisation debates in, and the developing more economic approach towards, EU competition law enforcement. In particular, the paper argues that differentiated comprehensive standards better allow the Court to construct the legal boundaries within which economic arguments can effectively be translated into justiciable claims as a matter of EU competition law.
The recovery remedy as administered by the European Commission in case of incompatible but already granted state aid is currently understood and substantiated in a way that allows Member States to fulfill its recovery obligations by merely asking a refund of the state aid amount plus interest from the aid beneficiary. However, it is argued that “recovery” in this current one-dimensional interpretation and substantiation falls short in contributing to the achievement of the economic outcome pursued by EU state aid law. It is argued that “recovery” should be perceived as a multi-dimensional remedy, leaving room to tailor this remedy in view of the situation in order to achieve the economic outcome pursued by EU state aid law, which is efficiency and welfare.
The problems of defining the limits to the application of national procedural rules and the alternate emergence of public and private enforcement of EU competition law lie at the root of the strand of case law of the Court of Justice of the EU regarding antitrust damages actions. While this case-law seems to encourage private claimants and to call national judges to take on new and delicate responsibilities, the new package presented by the Commission, which should be aimed at strengthening private enforcement, is based on a rather conservative approach, privileging the role of public enforcers. It has to be admitted that in a number of cases the latter are in a better position to detect and deal with competition law infringements; moreover, the evolution of the case-law of the Court of Justice, in line with the basics of the EU legal system, paves the way for a step-by-step approach to a greater role for public enforcement, including collective litigation (thus only partially and gradually imitating the US model). Integrating public and private enforcement seems the best way forward and hopefully the draft Directive on antitrust damages actions will be amended in the course of the legislative process with a view to favouring such an integration.
Case Comment – Case C-557/12 Kone AG and Others v ÖBB Infrastruktur AG
S Vande Walle, Private Antitrust Litigation in the European Union and Japan (Maklu, 2013); D McFaden, The Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Ireland (Hart Publishing, 2013); and, D Ashton & D Henry, Competition Damages Actions in the EU (Edward Elgar, 2013)
Martin C. Byford, RMIT University - School of Economics, Finance and Marketing and Joshua S. Gans, University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management; NBER have a wonderful paper on Exit Deterrence. Recommended!
ABSTRACT: This paper is the first to provide a general context whereby potential entry can lead incumbent firms to permanently reduce the intensity of competition in a market. All previous results found that potential entry would lead to lower prices and greater competition. Examining markets where entry occurs by the acquisition of access rights from an existing incumbent, we demonstrate that, where competitive choices are strategic complements, a more efficient entrant may be unable to acquire those rights from a less efficient incumbent due to the unilateral accommodating behavior of the efficient incumbent. Similarly, such accommodating behavior may deter efficient investment by an incumbent. These results have implications as to how economists view potential entry and its benefits.
Cung Truong Hoang, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Kai Huschelrath, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Ulrich Laitenberger, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) - Competition and Regulation Research Group; KU Leuven - Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy, and Innovation, and Florian Smuda, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) have an interesting paper on Determinants of Self-Reporting Under the European Corporate Leniency Program.
ABSTRACT: We empirically investigate the determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program. Applying a data set consisting of 442 firm groups that participated in 76 cartels decided by the European Commission between 2000 and 2011, we find that the probability of a firm becoming the chief witness increases with its character as repeat offender, the size of the expected basic fine, the number of countries active in one group as well as the size of the firm’s share in the cartelized market. Our results have important implications for an effective prosecution of anti-cartel law infringers.
Philippe Chone, National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - Center for Research in Economics and Statistics (CREST) and Laurent Linnemer, National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - Laboratory of Industrial Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) address Nonlinear Pricing and Exclusion: II. Must-Stock Products.
ABSTRACT: We adapt the exclusion model of Chone and Linnemer (2014) to reflect the notion that dominant firms are unavoidable trading partners. In particular, we introduce the share of the buyer’s demand that can be addressed by the rival as a new dimension of uncertainty. Nonlinear price-quantity schedules allow the dominant firm to adjust the competitive pressure placed on the rival to the size of the contestable demand, and to distort the rival supply at both the extensive and intensive margins. When disposal costs are sufficiently large, this adjustment may yield highly nonlinear and locally decreasing schedules, such as "retroactive rebates".
Philippe Chone, National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - Center for Research in Economics and Statistics (CREST) and Laurent Linnemer, National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - Laboratory of Industrial Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) discuss Nonlinear Pricing and Exclusion: I. Buyer Opportunism.
ABSTRACT: We study the exclusionary properties of nonlinear price-quantity schedules in an Aghion-Bolton style model with elastic demand and product differentiation. We distinguish three regimes depending on whether and how the price of the incumbent good is linked to the quantity purchased from the rival firm. We find that the supply of rival good is distorted downwards. Moreover, given the quantity supplied from the rival, the buyer may opportunistically purchase inefficiently many units from the incumbent to pocket quantity rebates. We show that the possibility for the buyer to dispose of unconsumed units attenuates the opportunism problem and limits the exclusionary effects of nonlinear pricing.
Sunday, September 21, 2014
A Chambers ranking suggests excellence in the field for antitrust (and other areas of practice). The skill set for Chambers inclusion is not necessarily the same as for being a "thought leader" in academic circles. Which Chambers USA ranked antitrust practitioners have the greatest academic credibility in terms of citations counts (using the westlaw JLR database)? Note that citations are probably higher for former senior government officials as they may get mentioned in articles for policy initiatives divorced from their writing. More experienced practitioners (I am not going to use the word "old") also should have a longer trail of citations.
This week we start with the largest Chambers ranked group - DC.
James F Rill (Baker Botts LLP) - 332 citations
Michael N Sohn (Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP) - 26 citations
George S Cary (Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP) - 2 citations
Susan A Creighton (Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati) - 102 citations
Mark Leddy (Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP) - 42 citations
Richard G Parker (O'Melveny & Myers LLP) - 72 citations
Charles F Rule (Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP) - 315 citations
Joe Sims (Jones Day) - 456 citations
Steven C Sunshine (Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP & Affiliates) - 132 citations
Thomas O Barnett (Covington & Burling LLP) - 229 citations
Paul T Denis (Dechert LLP) - 348 citations
Kathryn M Fenton (Jones Day) - 79 citations
Deborah A Garza (Covington & Burling LLP) - 84 citations
Jonathan Gleklen (Arnold & Porter LLP) - 30 citations
Roxann E Henry (Morrison & Foerster LLP) - 10 citations
Joseph Kattan (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP) - 226 citations
William J Kolasky (Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP) - 353 citations
Janet L McDavid (Hogan Lovells US LLP) - 141 citations
Timothy J Muris (Kirkland & Ellis LLP) - 1,073 citations
John M Nannes (Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP & Affiliates) - 62 citations
Steven A Newborn (Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP) - 22 citations
Phillip A Proger (Jones Day) - 51 citations
Richard L Rosen (Arnold & Porter LLP) - (difficult to disaggregate because there is a crim law prof who is also Richard L Rosen-- maybe the A&P people can filter this and send me a proper citation count)
Scott Sher (Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati) - 76 citations
Joseph J Simons (Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP) - 112 citations
Stephen Smith (Morrison & Foerster LLP) - 181 citations
Wm Randolph Smith (Crowell & Moring LLP) - 74 citations
Paul Yde (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP) - 42 citations
Margaret Zwisler (Latham & Watkins LLP) - 17 citations
D Jarrett Arp (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP) - 44 citations
Sean F X Boland (Baker Botts LLP) - 3 citations
C Benjamin Crisman Jr (Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP & Affiliates) - 11 citations
Paul H Friedman (Dechert LLP) - 3 citations
Kenneth A Gallo (Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP) - 4 citations
J Mark Gidley (White & Case LLP) - 19 citations
H Stephen Harris Jr (Winston & Strawn LLP) - 109 citations
Bruce Hoffman (Hunton & Williams LLP) - 50 citations
Raymond A Jacobsen Jr (McDermott Will & Emery LLP) - 1 citation
Mark L Kovner (Kirkland & Ellis LLP) - 12 citations
Ann Malester (Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP) - 15 citations
MJ Moltenbrey (Paul Hastings LLP) - 12 citations
Thomas Mueller (WilmerHale) - 46 citations
Mark W Nelson (Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP) - 12 citations
Bernard Nigro (Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP) - 6 citations
Mark Popofsky (Ropes & Gray LLP) - 91 citations
Marc Schildkraut (Cooley LLP) - 53 citations
Bob Schlossberg (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP) - 47 citations
John Taladay (Baker Botts LLP) - 12 citations
Alan Wiseman (Covington & Burling LLP) - 44 citations
Michael Antalics (O'Melveny & Myers LLP) - 7 citations
Robert B Bell (Kaye Scholer LLP) - 28 citations
Steven K Bernstein (Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP) - 19 citations
Leah Brannon (Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP) - 31 citations
Jeffrey W Brennan (McDermott Will & Emery LLP) - 33 citations
Brian Byrne (Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP) - 15 citations
Jeremy Calsyn (Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP) - 13 citations
Michael P A Cohen (Paul Hastings LLP) - too many Michael Cohens in the database. Michael, can you help me out? I cannot imagine what it is like to be you going to the dry cleaners. Somehow I doubt that Tad Lipsky has a probem at the dry cleaners - my bet is that there is no other Tad in the DC area.
Christopher M Curran (White & Case LLP) - 96 citations
Richard J Favretto (Mayer Brown LLP) - 20 citations
Kent A Gardiner (Crowell & Moring LLP) - 0 citations
Leon B Greenfield (WilmerHale) - 39 citations
Jonathan Kanter (Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP) - 3 citations
Donald C Klawiter (Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP) - 80 citations
Joseph G Krauss (Hogan Lovells US LLP) - 23 citations
Daryl A Libow (Sullivan & Cromwell LLP) - 18 citations
Abbott (Tad) Lipsky (Latham & Watkins LLP) - 197 citations
Michael McFalls (Ropes & Gray LLP) - 31 citations
David L. Meyer (Morrison & Foerster LLP) - 95 citations
Robert J. Robertson (Hogan Lovells US LLP) - 25 citations
Jeffrey Schmidt (Linklaters) - 13 citations
Craig Seebald (Vinson & Elkins LLP) - 2 citations
Douglas Wald (Arnold & Porter LLP) - 4 citations
David Wales (Jones Day) - 13 citations
Joseph F Winterscheid (McDermott Will & Emery LLP) - 17 citations
Robert G Abrams (Baker & Hostetler LLP) - 0 citations
Robert E Bloch (Mayer Brown LLP) - 85 citations
William Blumenthal (Sidley Austin LLP) - 141 citations
Mark Botti (Squire Patton Boggs) - 17 citations
John DeQ Briggs (Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider LLP) - 46 citations
Terry Calvani (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP) - 268 citations
Steven F Cherry (WilmerHale) - 44 citations
Kenneth P Ewing (Steptoe & Johnson LLP) - 17 citations
James A Fishkin (Dechert LLP) - 12 citations
Kenneth L Glazer (Sidley Austin LLP) - 96 citations
Claudia R Higgins (Kaye Scholer LLP) - 5 citations
Neil W Imus (Vinson & Elkins LLP) - 9 citations
Michael Knight (Jones Day) - 13 citations
Robert F Leibenluft (Hogan Lovells US LLP) - 43 citations
Joshua Lipton (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP) - 23 citations
James W Lowe (WilmerHale) - 0 citations
Christopher J MacAvoy (Baker Botts LLP) - 8 citations
Bruce McDonald (Jones Day) - 59 citations
M Howard Morse (Cooley LLP) - 98 citations
Christopher Ondeck (Proskauer Rose LLP) - 2 citations
Joseph A Ostoyich (Baker Botts LLP) - 3 citations
Sharis Pozen (Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP & Affiliates) - 30 citations
Matt Reilly (Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP) - 6 citations
Robert P Reznick (Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP) - 3 citations
Jonathan M. Rich (Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP) - 12 citations
John Roberti (Allen & Overy LLP) - 14 citations
Grace Rodriguez (King & Spalding LLP) - 2 citations
Jon R Roellke (Bingham McCutchen LLP) - 2 citations
Mark Rosman (Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati) - 2 citations
John E Scribner (Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP) - 8 citations
William Sherman (Latham & Watkins LLP) - (too many miss-hits due to the famous same name of a certain Civil War General)
Ian Simmons (O'Melveny & Myers LLP) - 47 citations
Bruce D Sokler (Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky and Popeo PC) - 9 citations
Joshua Soven (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP) - 6 citations
Scott A Stempel (Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP) - 32 citations
William R Vigdor (Vinson & Elkins LLP) - 18 citations
Hill B. Wellford (Bingham McCutchen LLP) - 23 citations
Christine Wilson (Kirkland & Ellis LLP) - 43 citations
Up and Coming
Logan M Breed (Hogan Lovells US LLP) - 41 citations
Eric Grannon (White & Case LLP) - 3 citations
Joel Grosberg (McDermott Will & Emery LLP)- 0 citations
C Scott Hataway (Paul Hastings LLP) - 1 citation
Amanda Reeves (Latham & Watkins LLP) - 61 citations
John Terzaken III (Allen & Overy LLP) - 21 citations
Saturday, September 20, 2014
Guinter Kahn may be the most important doctor not to be known by name for those who are involved in the practice of antitrust law and economics around the world. He invented minoxidil - better known as Rogaine. Rogaine seems to have been eclipsed by propecia and was a little too late to come on the market for some of my college friends and roommates but for those who used Rogaine (particularly before marriage), it was probably the most important medical breakthrough for my generation. I think more about my hair now that I am 40 and the only new hair growth that my somewhat older friends tell me that I will see is out of my nose, ears and back (query whether these people are really "friends" when they tell you such news - these are the same people who like to share stories of prostate growth rates and colonoscopy preps). Yes, my hair is thinning and yes, at the office my age cohort talks about this issue a lot.
Kahn lived an interesting life. According to the obituary in the NY Times:
Dr. Kahn was born in Trier, Germany, on May 11, 1934. His family, which was Jewish, fled Germany in 1938 to escape the Nazi terror and immigrated to the United States. The family settled in Omaha. Despite knowing little English at first, he graduated from high school in three years. He then graduated from what is now the University of Nebraska at Omaha in three years.
Dr. Kahn earned his medical degree from what is now the University of Nebraska Medical Center in 1958. He was an Army emergency room doctor in Germany in 1959-60. After training at the University of Miami’s medical school, he became acting head of the University of Colorado’s dermatology department.
In 1989, the Intellectual Property Owners Foundation named Dr. Kahn and Dr. Chidsey “distinguished inventors.”
Dr. Kahn later maintained a private dermatology practice in Miami. His philanthropy included financing a new addition to the library at the University of Nebraska. He also lectured in the United States and Europe about the part doctors had played in the Holocaust.
Dr. Kahn was a graduate of Omaha Central High School (1951), the same high school that has produced two Nobel prize winners so far (Lawrence Klein – Economics, 1980; Alan Heeger – Chemistry, 2000), an Oscar award winner (Henry Fonda), an NFL Hall of Fame player (Gale Sayers), and at least one billionaire (Charlie Munger, Warren Buffet’s partner), a Medal of Honor winner, cabinet secretaries, politicians, many other noteworthy people, as well as one Chambers ranked antitrust lawyer - name him. Hint: I may have a chance to meet his mother in October.
Every once in a while scholars (mostly from developing countries) ask about books on antitrust and international trade. I recommend the following books:
F.M. Scherer, Competition Policies for an Integrated World Economy (Integrating National Economies: Promise & Pitfalls) (1994)
Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger The Economics of The World Trading System, MIT Press, 2002. (chapter 9)
Josef Drexl , Mor Bakhoum , Eleanor M. Fox , Michal S. Gal , David J. Gerber, Competition Policy And Regional Integration In Developing Countries (Elgar 2012)
Andrew Guzman, Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy (Oxford University Press 2010).
There are also many wonderful articles but for some reason, people tend to ask about books.
Friday, September 19, 2014
Thursday, October 23
5:30 p.m. Keynote Address
Friday, October 24
8:00 – 9:00 a.m. Breakfast 9:00 – 10:30 a.m. Panel One 10:30 – 10:45 a.m. Break 10:45 – 12:15 p.m. Panel Two 12:15 – 1:30 p.m. Lunch 1:30 – 3:00 p.m. Panel Three 3:00 – 3:15 p.m. Break 3:15 - 4:45 p.m. Panel Four
Honoring the Work of Professor Herbert Hovenkamp
To celebrate its 100th volume, the Iowa Law Review is proud to host a Centennial Symposium honoring the work of Professor Herbert Hovenkamp on October 23-24, 2014.
Dean Gail Agrawal, The University of Iowa College of Law
Assistant Attorney General William Baer (Department of Justice)
Panel One: Rethinking Framework
Moderator: Willard Boyd III (Nymaster Goode PC) Professor Keith Hylton (Boston University) Professor Christine Durrance (UNC Chapel Hill) Professor Daniel Sokol (University of Florida) Professor Roger Blair (University of Florida) Professor Barak Orbach (University of Arizona)
Panel Two: Dealing with Tough Antitrust Issues in Conduct and Mergers: How Do Law and Scholarship Matter?
Moderator: Andrew Aubertine (Aubertine Law Group PC) Andrew Gavil (Federal Trade Commission) James Fishkin (Dechert LLP) Rosie Lipscomb (Google) Ronald Mueller (John Deere) Assistant Attorney General Layne Lindebak (Iowa Department of Justice)
Panel Three: Rethinking Litigation
Moderator: Professor Maya Steinitz (University of Iowa College of Law) Professor Mark Lemley (Stanford University) Professor Christopher Leslie (University of California, Irvine) Professor Alan Meese (College of William and Mary) Professor Matthew Sag (Loyola University Chicago) Professor Spencer Walker (Loyola University Chicago)
Panel Four: Structural Shifts in Antitrust
Moderator: Professor John Solow (University of Iowa) Professor Daniel Crane (University of Michigan) Professor Rebecca Haw Allensworth (Vanderbilt University) Professor Daniel Sokol (University of Florida) Professor Hillary Greene (University of Connecticut) Professor John Connor (Purdue University)
List of Participants
Dean Gail Agrawal, The University of Iowa College of Law Andrew Aubertine (Aubertine Law Group PC) Assistant Attorney General William Baer (Department of Justice) Professor Roger Blair (University of Florida, Warrington College of Business) Willard Boyd III (Nyemaster Goode PC) Professor John Connor (Purdue University) Professor Daniel Crane (University of Michigan) Professor Christine Durrance (UNC Chapel Hill) James Fishkin (Dechert LLP) Andrew Gavil (Federal Trade Commission) Professor Hillary Greene (University of Connecticut) Professor Rebecca Haw Allensworth (Vanderbilt University) Professor Keith Hylton (Boston University) Professor Mark Lemley (Stanford University) Professor Christopher Leslie (University of California, Irvine) Assistant Attorney General Layne Lindebak (Iowa Department of Justice) Rosie Lipscomb (Google) Professor Alan Meese (College of William and Mary) Ronald Mueller (John Deere) Professor Barak Orbach (University of Arizona) Professor Matthew Sag (Loyola University Chicago) Professor Daniel Sokol (University of Florida) Professor John Solow (University of Iowa) Professor Maya Steinitz (University of Iowa College of Law)
Inessa Love (University of Hawaii) and Maria Soledad Martinez Peria (World Bank) explain How Bank Competition Affects Firms' Access to Finance.
ABSTRACT: Using multi-year, firm-level surveys for 53 countries, this paper explores the impact of bank competition on firms’ access to finance. We find that low competition, as measured by high values on the Lerner index or Boone indicator, diminishes firms’ access to finance. In addition, the impact of competition on access to finance depends on the quality and scope of credit information sharing mechanisms, and better credit information mitigates the damaging impact of low competition. Overall, our paper offers consistent international evidence that supports the market power hypothesis, which argues that market power reduces access, and rejects the information hypothesis, which suggests that low competition improves access because it allows banks to internalize the investment in building firm-specific relationships.
Screening Instruments for Monitoring Market Power in Wholesale Electricity Markets – Lessons from Applications in Germany
Marc Bataille, Monopolies Commission, Alexander Steinmetz, Monopolies Commission, and Susanne Thorwarth, Monopolies Commission provide Screening Instruments for Monitoring Market Power in Wholesale Electricity Markets – Lessons from Applications in Germany.
ABSTRACT: While liberalization in energy markets has been a widely successful process all over the world, incumbents often still hold a dominant position. Thus, electricity wholesale markets are subject to market surveillance. Nevertheless, consolidated findings on abusive practices of market power and their cause and effect in wholesale electricity markets are scarce and non-controversial market monitoring practices fail to exist. Our application of the established measure of market concentration RSI shows that it serves as a decent indicator for the rents that can be gained in the market but also reveals considerable weaknesses of the RSI. Therefore, we propose and apply the "Return on Withholding Capacity Index" (RWC) representing a measure of the firms’ incentive of withholding capacity as a complementary index to the RSI.
Patrice Bougette. University of Nice Sophia Antipolis - Law, Economics, and Management Research Group (UMR CNRS 7321 GREDEG). Marc Deschamps. Université de Lorraine; University of Strasbourg - Bureau of Economic Theory and Application (BETA), and Frederic M. Marty, Research Group on Law, Economics and Management (UMR CNRS 7321 GREDEG) describe When Economics Met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law.
ABSTRACT: In this article, we use a history of economic thought perspective to analyze the process by which the Chicago School of Antitrust emerged in the 1950s and became dominant in the US. We show the extent to which economic objectives and theoretical views shaped antitrust laws in their inception. After establishing the minor influence of economics in the promulgation of U.S. competition laws, we then highlight U.S. economists' very cautious views about antitrust until the Second New Deal. We analyze the process by which the Chicago School developed a general and coherent framework for competition policy. We rely mainly on the seminal and programmatic work of Director and Levi (1956) and trace how this theoretical paradigm was made collective, i.e. the 'economization' process took place in US antitrust. Finally, we discuss the implications, if not the possible pitfalls, of such a conversion to economics-led competition law enforcement.
Thursday, September 18, 2014
In this issue:
In Motorola Mobility, the Seventh Circuit is readying to rehear a lawsuit that will (hopefully) clarify the extent of U.S. antitrust law’s reach outside of the United States. The issue concerns the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, which was ostensibly passed to clarify the reach and limits of the Sherman Act for U.S. companies doing business abroad. However, given divergent court opinions, matters have become quite messy. This issue will bring you up to date on the history, the issues, and the significant ramifications at stake. As Eleanor Fox writes in her article, this situation raises the possibility that "U.S. law is in danger of creating a void in the reach of U.S. antitrust law to reprehend anticompetitive acts by foreigners abroad destined to raise the price of goods and services to U.S. consumers."
- The FTAIA and the Sherman Act: Motorola Mobility and Other Cases
- Joseph Harrington, Sep 17, 2014
Potentially even more detrimental to the cause of preventing harm to U.S. commerce, the Seventh Circuit’s definition of “direct” effect would seem to provide a vertical disintegration loophole for avoiding liability. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. (Wharton, Univ. of Pennsylvania)
- Eleanor Fox, Sep 17, 2014
Extraterritoriality and Input Cartels: Life in the Global Value Lane—The Collision Course with Empagran and How to Avert It
There is a looming danger that judge-made exceptions from U.S. antitrust law for foreign conduct are swallowing the proscriptions of the Sherman Act against modern-style international cartels. Eleanor Fox (NYU School of Law)
- Randy Stutz, Sep 17, 2014
Why is it unreasonable to apply [the antitrust] laws to foreign conduct insofar as that conduct causes domestic harm that is dependent on the foreign harm that gives rise to the plaintiff’s claim? Randy M. Stutz (American Antitrust Institute)
- David Barth, Sep 17, 2014
A ruling benefiting defendants would increase the incentives foreign firms have to engage in cartel behavior, and it would create new incentives to change otherwise efficient supply chain behavior. David Barth (Bates White Economic Consulting)
- James Martin, Sep 17, 2014
The much simpler, and mathematically sensible, approach would be to acknowledge that the cartelists’ guilty pleas and jury verdict already established that the Sherman Act applies to the conduct. James R. Martin (Dickstein Shapiro)
- Robert Connolly, Sep 17, 2014
- Joseph Harrington, Sep 17, 2014
Alexei Alexandrov, CFPB discusses PASS-THROUGH RATES WHEN FIRMS CAN VARY PACKAGE SIZES.
ABSTRACT: I show that when firms can change the quantity of product offered in each package, the standard pass-through rate calculations need to be adjusted. In particular, if a firm's cost increases, the firm decreases the quantity of the product offered and the price of the package, resulting in a negative pass-through rate. Calculating the pass-through rate using the per-unit quantity price restores the expected positive pass-through rate. The results are confirmed by many observations from the industry and continue to hold when firms offer a product line and engage in second-degree price discrimination.