Monday, June 30, 2014

Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare?

Andreea Cosnita, Universite Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne - Maison des Sciences Economiques and Lars Sorgard, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH); Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics ask Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare?

ABSTRACT: This paper deals with the enforcement of merger policy, and aims to study how merger remedies affect the deterrence accomplished by controlling mergers. We determine the optimal frequency of investigations launched by the agency, and identify situations where the introduction of remedies can lead to a lower welfare. We find that the potential for remedies can make it less likely that the worst mergers are deterred. Even if the worst mergers are deterred, the potential for remedies can lead to more mergers with a negative impact to be proposed, and eventually to more decision errors by the antitrust authorities.

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2014/06/enforcement-vs-deterrence-in-merger-control-can-remedies-lead-to-lower-welfare.html

| Permalink

TrackBack URL for this entry:

https://www.typepad.com/services/trackback/6a00d8341bfae553ef01a3fd06bc7a970b

Listed below are links to weblogs that reference Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare?:

Comments

Post a comment