Monday, December 23, 2013

Network Neutrality under ISP duopoly: on the ability to assign capacity

Duarte Brito (Universidade Nova de Lisboa and CEFAGE-UE), Pedro Pereira (Autoridade da Concorrencia and CEFAGE-UE) and Joao Vareda (CEFAGE-UE) analyze Network Neutrality under ISP duopoly: on the ability to assign capacity.

ABSTRACT: We analyze the impact of network neutrality regulation on: (i) competition between CPs, and on (ii) ISPs. incentives to invest. We consider both competition between ISPs and between CPs and show that, if ISPs can offer network services of different quality to CPs, they prefer to sell the highest quality network services to the CP that collects the highest advertising revenues. We further show that the impact of network neutrality regulation on the investment in the quality of network services is potentially ambiguous and depends on: (i) whether ISPs are symmetric, and (ii) the ISPs' ability to assign networks capacity to CPs. If ISPs are symmetric and have full discretion on how to allocate the level of quality of network services among CPs, investment and welfare are higher under the discriminatory regime.

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2013/12/network-neutrality-under-isp-duopoly-on-the-ability-to-assign-capacity.html

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