Wednesday, September 18, 2013

Mixed Duopoly, Product Differentiation and Competition

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Minoru Kitahara, University of Tokyo - Faculty of Economics and Toshihiro Matsumura, University of Tokyo - Institute of Social Science discuss Mixed Duopoly, Product Differentiation and Competition.

ABSTRACT: We examine the relationship between the equilibrium price and the degree of product differentiation in a mixed duopoly in which a welfare‐maximizing public enterprise competes against a profit‐maximizing private firm. Existing works on private economy show that increased product differentiation mitigates price competition. We find that, in a mixed economy, increased product differentiation can accelerate competition when the demand is elastic. The private firm chooses to locate itself too close to the public firm (and thus makes the resulting degree of product differentiation too low) for social welfare, which never appears in the private economy.

September 18, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Competition in Retail Gasoline Markets

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Mariano E. Tappata, University of British Columbia - Sauder School of Business, Strategy and Business Economics Division and Jing Yan, University of British Columbia - Sauder School of Business investigate Competition in Retail Gasoline Markets.

ABSTRACT: We study the relationship between prices and market structure in geographically isolated markets that are exposed to large demand shocks. The temporal variation in market size allows us to overcome the classical endogeneity bias in standard concentration-performance regressions. We find evidence of local market power in gasoline markets due to product differentiation. Additionally, the high margins that characterize concentrated markets dissipates quickly with the number of competitors. Ignoring market structure endogeneity leads to underestimating the effect of market concentration on prices between 55 and 70 percent.

September 18, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)


6° Coloquio ForoCompetencia

18 de octubre de 2013 - Pilar, Buenos Aires,

8:30 –

Bienvenida. Julián PEÑA

Palabras de Apertura. Humberto GUARDIA (Vice-Presidente, CNDC,

Tema I – Política
industrial y defensa de la competencia

Panelista. Gesner OLIVEIRA (GO Associados, Brasil)

Comentarista. Nicole NEHME (Ferrada Nehme, Chile)

Comentarista. Alejandro FALLA (Bullard y Asociados, Perú)

Comentarista.  Lucas GROSMAN (Universidad de San Andrés,

Moderador.  Miguel DEL PINO

10:45 –
Receso para café

11:15 – 13:00                     
Tema II. Ganancias de

Panelista. Arthur BARRIONUEVO (Fundação Getulio Vargas, Brasil)

Comentarista. Guillermo SABBIONI (Universidad Católica,

Comentarista. Walter CONT (Fundación FIEL, Argentina)

Moderador. Marcelo CELANI

13:00 –
Almuerzo (Salón Las Vasijas)

15:00 –
Tema III. Negativa de
venta y facilidades esenciales

Panelista. Juan Cristobal GUMUCIO
(Cariola Abogados, Chile)

Comentarista. Francisco NEGRÃO (Magalhães
e Dias, Brasil)

Comentarista.  Martín ATAEFE
(CNDC, Argentina)

Moderadora. Victoria DIAZ VERA

16:30 –
para café

17:00 –
IV. Participaciones minoritarias en competidores

Panelista. Miguel RATO (Shearman
& Sterling, Bélgica)

Comentarista. Jorge DE LOS RIOS (Posse Herrera, Colombia)

Comentarista. Diego ORIBE (CNDC, Argentina)

Moderador. Marcelo DEN TOOM

18:30 –
Cierre.  Germán COLOMA


Sheraton Pilar Hotel and Convention Center.

Panamericana Km. 49,5, Pilar, Buenos Aires.

Valor de la Inscripción

AR$ 1000/U$D 200 


1°. Registrar sus datos on line en el siguiente link:

2°. Coordinar pago con:

Marina Bidart ( o
  Viviana Guadagni (


Cocktail de bienvenida

El jueves 17 de octubre, a las 19:00hs., se
realizará un cocktail de bienvenida en La Cava de El Querandí (Perú 322, Buenos
Aires). Para inscribirse por favor contactarse con Diego Oribe (
o al 4349-4156). El precio del cocktail (AR$ 100) no está incluido en el precio
de inscripción al Coloquio.

IMPORTANTE: Se considerará inscripto quien efectivice el
correspondiente pago.

Comité Organizador

Luis BARRY, Marina BIDART, Bernardo CASSAGNE, Marcelo
CELANI, Germán COLOMA, Walter CONT, Miguel DEL PINO, Marcelo DEN TOOM, Victoria

September 18, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Impact of Initial Market Competitiveness on the Factors Affecting the Value of Shelf Space

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Joo Hwan Seo, George Washington University - School of Business - Department of Marketing and Bumsoo Kim, Sogang University - Sogang Business School - Department of Management Science discuss The Impact of Initial Market Competitiveness on the Factors Affecting the Value of Shelf Space.

ABSTRACT: This study generalizes the empirical model for shelf-space variables such as advertising, R&D, and firm characteristics to account for firm-specific heterogeneity. Our empirical results indicate that there is substantial firm-specific heterogeneity in shelf-space variables, and this heterogeneity is associated with differences in initial market competitiveness. Sales incentives constitute a large part of the marketing budgets of consumer grocery firms. Despite over three decades of research, confusion persists about the causes and consequences of sales incentives. One part of the problem is due to the lack of data regarding the dollar value of sales incentive payments made by firms. A second part of the problem is determining whether sales incentives are explained by market power and efficiency theories. This paper addresses both of these problems.

We found that sales incentives are associated with industry concentration. It analyzes data on sales incentives disclosed by firms pursuant to the FASB requirements in 2001. It looks beyond industry competitiveness, signaling and channel arguments to include managerial considerations. It also uses analytical models that allow for parameter heterogeneity, thus incorporating a measure of diversity for situations faced by firms in their industries.

September 18, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

A Random Coefficients Logit Analysis of the Counterfactual: A Merger and Divestiture in the Australian Cigarette Industry

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Vivienne Pham (School Economics, La Trobe University) and David Prentice (School of Economics, La Trobe University) describe A Random Coefficients Logit Analysis of the Counterfactual: A Merger and Divestiture in the Australian Cigarette Industry.

ABSTRACT: In this paper we empirically analyse two counterfactual situations facing an antitrust authority following the merger of two of the largest international cigarette companies. First we estimate a random coefficients model of demand for cigarettes. The implied elasticity of demand for smoking and implied marginal costs are consistent with the independent estimates available. We then use the model to simulate the proposed merger and the partial divestiture that was accepted by the Australian antitrust authority. A comparison of the relative price changes predicted by the divestiture simulation with the actual post-divestiture price changes shows that the model is partially successful in predicting the ranking of price changes across companies following the divestiture. This suggests structural econometric analysis using a random coefficients model can provide information for antitrust authorities assessing the implications ! of a potential merger and partial divestiture.

September 18, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, September 17, 2013

Merger Simulation with Nested Logit Demand - Implementation using Stata

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Jonas Bjornerstedt (Swedish Competition Authority) and Frank Verboven (University of Leuven) discuss Merger Simulation with Nested Logit Demand - Implementation using Stata.

ABSTRACT: In this article we show how to implement merger simulation in Stata after estimating an aggregate nested logit demand system with a linear regression model. We also show how to implement merger simulation when the demand parameters are not estimated, but instead calibrated to be consistent with outside information on average price elasticities and profit margins.

September 17, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Crime and punishment: When tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overcharge

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Sissel Jensen (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics), Ola Kvaloy (UiS Business School, University of Stavanger), Trond Olsen (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics) and Lars Sorgard (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics) analyze Crime and punishment: When tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overcharge.

ABSTRACT: The economics of crime and punishment postulates that higher punishment leads to lower crime levels, or less severe crime. It is however hard to get empirical support for this rather intuitive relationship. This paper offers a model that can contribute to explain why this is the case. We show that if criminals can spend resources to reduce the probability of being detected, then a higher general punishment level can increase the crime level. In the context of antitrust enforcement, the model shows that competition authorities who attempt to fight cartels by means of tougher sanctions for all offenders may actually lead cartels to increase their overcharge when leniency programs are in place.

September 17, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Barcelona GSE Intensive Course on Quantitative Methods for Competition Analysis - October 23-26, 2013

Barcelona GSE Intensive Course on Quantitative Methods for Competition Analysis - October 23-26, 2013

Course overview

The Intensive Course on Quantitative Methods for Competition Analysis will provide participants (economists, lawyers and practitioners working for firms or in agencies) with a thorough understanding of recent empirical methods to measure market power and competition, with applications to market definition, merger analysis and damages from anticompetitive conduct. The program’s faculty includes some of the leading academic economists in the area of industrial
organization and competition policy, and practitioners with extensive experience on quantitative methods in competition cases.

Key benefits:

  • Review established and recent quantitative methods for competition analysis, with a proper balance between techniques and interpretation also accessible to non-economists.
  • Learn about the practical considerations to apply techniques, based on the lessons from various recent cases where quantitative techniques have been applied.
  • Learn to interpret and critically evaluate the empirical results from different approaches.
  • Develop a good common sense of the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches, and the circumstances under which they are (not) suitable.
  • Acquire a thorough understanding of the data requirements for applying various techniques.
  • Illustrate how to implement merger simulation with standard software (Stata)

Course Schedule

Session Time    Professor
Wednesday, 23 October 2013
Registration 14:00-14:30
Participant introductions and presentation of the Barcelona
Introduction to Market Definition:
SSNIP tests other
tools, and applications
15:00-17:00 Miguel de la
Coffee break
Market Definition:
Critical loss analysis and
econometric applications
17:30-19:00 Frank Verboven
Welcome dinner
Thursday, 24 October 2013
Demand Estimation 9:30-11:00 Frank Verboven
Merger Simulation 11:30-13:30 Frank Verboven
Mergers: Diversion Ratio, UPP, IPR and Related Approaches 15:00-16:30 Miguel de la Mano
Applications of methods: recent merger cases 17:00-18:30 Miguel de la Mano
Friday, 25 October 2013
Price – Concentration Studies:
Mergers and Market
9:00-11:00 Benoit Durand
Other Non-Structural Approaches and Applications 11:30-13:30 Benoit Durand
Parallel Sessions:
Screening for Collusion 15:00-17:00 Massimo Motta
Stata Session on Merger Simulation 15:00-17:00 Helena Perrone
Saturday, 26 October 2013
Estimating Damages: Introduction 9:30-11:00 Benoit Durand
Estimating Price Overcharges, and the Passing-on
11:30-13:30 Benoit Durand




Massimo Motta
(ICREA-UPF and Barcelona GSE), course director and instructor PhD, LSE and Université Catholique de Louvain

Massimo Motta is ICREA Research Professor at Universitat Pompeu Fabra and the Dean of the Barcelona GSE. He founded the School's master program in Competition and Market Regulation and still teaches in the program. He is Fellow of the European Economic Association, a member of the Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy at the European Commission, and advises the South Africa’s Competition Commission.

His research papers have been published in the top international economic journals, and his book, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2004), is the standard international reference on the economics of antitrust, and is used by teachers, scholars, and practitioners.


Frank Verboven (University of Leuven), course director and instructor PhD, University of Toronto

Frank Verboven is Professor of Economics at the University of Leuven. He is Fellow of the CEPR (London) and a member of the Economy Advisory Group on  Competition Policy at the European Commission. His research focuses on industrial organization and competition policy, with applications to the automobile market, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals and other sectors. He has advised the European Commission, several national competition authorities and leading companies on various cases, including mergers, cartels and damages, and vertical agreements. He has taught quantitative methods of competition policy at various universities.


Miguel de la Mano (UK Competition Commission)
PhD, Oxford University

Miguel de la Mano joined the European Commission in late 2000. He joined the Chief Economist Team at DG Competition shortly after its creation in 2003. In early 2009, he was appointed Deputy Chief Economist. From October 2011 to April 2012 he was Acting Chief Economist at the UK Competition Commission. He carries out economic analysis of mergers and commercial practices by dominant companies and their impact on the competitive structure of markets. He has co-drafted various guidelines setting out the European Commission's analytical framework in
all of these areas. Over the last decade he has been closely involved in dozens of in-depth merger and antitrust investigations, both during the administrative and court proceedings and has co-drafted multiple prohibition decisions. He has written extensively in particular for internal policy development.


Benoit Durand (RBB Economics)
PhD, Boston College

Benoit Durand is a partner at RBB Economics, which he joined in 2008. He has extensive experience in competition economics, particularly in applying quantitative techniques in the context of competition law investigation. Prior to joining RBB, he was Director of Economic Analysis at the UK’s Competition Commission. Before that he was also a member of the Chief Economist Office at the Directorate General for Competition at the European Commission. He was
previously based in Washington DC, USA, where he worked in private practice. He has given oral evidence before the European Commission, the OFT and the French Competition Authority. He has also advised the Competition Commission of Singapore on various investigations.


Helena Perrone (UPF and Barcelona GSE)
PhD, Toulouse School of Economics

Helena Perrone is Assistant Professor at Universitat Pompeu Fabra and a Barcelona GSE Affiliated Professor. Her research work is in Applied Econometrics, and she is a recognized expert in structural demand models applied to Industrial Organization and Competition Policy.

September 17, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Role of the 'Equally Efficient Competitor' in the Assessment of Abuse of Dominance

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Martin Mandorff (Swedish Competition Authority) and Johan Sahl (Swedish Competition Authority) explain The Role of the 'Equally Efficient Competitor' in the Assessment of Abuse of Dominance.

ABSTRACT: In a series of recent cases - most notably in TeliaSonera and Post Danmark - the equally efficient competitor principle has been explicitly recognised by the Court of Justice of the EU; more clearly so than by courts in the US, where the principle originates. However the exact scope of application of the principle in the EU remains to be defined. While its use in cases concerning predatory pricing and margin squeeze appears to be settled, it is still unclear to what extent the standard applies to other price-based forms of exclusion. And is the principle at all useful in the assessment of non-price-based exclusionary conduct? This article discusses the conceptual basis for the equally efficient competitor principle, and attempts to define its role in the assessment of exclusionary abuse in the EU.

September 17, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Competition and the Efficiency of Markets for Technology

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Marie-Laure Allain (Ecole Polytechnique and CNRS), Emeric Henry (Sciences Po) and Margaret Kyle (Toulouse) describe Competition and the Efficiency of Markets for Technology.

ABSTRACT: The sale of R&D projects through licensing facilitates the division of labor between research and development activities. This vertical specialization can improve the overall efficiency of the innovative process. However, these gains depend on the timing of the sale: the buyer of an R&D project should assume development at the stage at which he has an efficiency advantage. We show that in an environment where the seller is overconfident about the value of the project, she may delay the sale to the more efficient firm in order to provide verifiable information about its quality, though this delay implies higher total development costs for the project. We obtain a condition for the equilibrium timing of licensing and examine how factors such as the intensity of competition between potential buyers influence it. We show that a wide array of different explanations, based on differences in information, beliefs or risk! profiles, lead to the same qualitative results. We present empirical evidence from pharmaceutical licensing contracts that is consistent with our theoretical predictions.

September 17, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, September 16, 2013

Empire‐building and Price competition

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Antoine Pietri (ENS and University Paris 1, CES), Tarik Tazdait (CNRS, EHESS, CIRED) and Mehrdad Vahabi (University Paris 8, CES) discuss Empire‐building and Price competition.

ABSTRACT: This paper is among the first to theoretically examine the relevance of price competition in the protection market by focusing on the competition between empires. By distinguishing absolute and differential protection rents, we first define coercive rivalry and price competition among empires and then establish three types of empires: early empires of domination (like Akkadian empire), territorial empires (like Russian empire), and merchant empires (like Venetian empire). Empires are structured on the basis of two types of hierarchies that determine their protection costs: ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up.’ We systematically study the impact of asymmetrical protection costs on price competition in the light of Bertrand equilibria. We provide an economic rationale for the use of violence throughout history in conformity with the findings of economic historians.

September 16, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Public Policy Conference on Competition Among Online Platforms - Thursday, October 10, 2013

LEC Public Policy Conference on Competition Among Online Platforms

                Law & Economics Center           


On the morning of October 10, the Law & Economics Center will host a public policy conference on Competition Among Online Platforms.

Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google each began by offering vastly different services and products:  online shopping, computers, social networking, and search.  Today, however, these companies compete with one another across a variety of dimensions.  This public policy conference will explore the extent of this competition, and topics such as defining markets and assessing market power, lock-in, and the competitive implications of open versus closed platforms.

A second panel will also explore the role that data collection plays for online platforms, including how data collection and privacy policies should enter into antitrust analysis, and the extent to which privacy regulation affects competition.



September 16, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Managerial delegation in monopoly under network effects

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Trishita Bhattacharjee (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research) and Rupayan Pal (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development ResearchInstitute of Economic Growth) address Managerial delegation in monopoly under network effects.

ABSTRACT: This paper examines the possibility of emergence of incentive equilibrium in the case of monopoly, without relying on agency theory based arguments. It shows that, when there is network effect of consumption, it is optimal for a monopolist to offer sales-oriented incentive scheme to her manager. The extent of sales-orientation of the optimal incentive scheme is higher in the case of stronger network effect. It also shows that both the monopolist and consumers are better off under managerial delegation than in case of no delegation, unlike as in the case of usual oligopoly without network effect.

September 16, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Price vs. Quantity in duopoly with strategic delegation: Role of network externalities

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Trishita Bhattacharjee (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research) and Rupayan Pal (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research) examine Price vs. Quantity in duopoly with strategic delegation: Role of network externalities.

ABSTRACT: This paper examines the implications of network externalities on equilibrium outcomes in a differentiated products duopoly under strategic managerial delegation through relative performance based incentive contracts. It shows that Miller and Pazgal (2001)'s equivalence result does not go through in the presence of network externalities. Instead, Singh and Vives (1984)'s rankings of equilibrium outcomes under Cournot and Bertrand hold true under relative performance based delegation contracts as well, if there are network externalities. However, when firms can choose whether to compete in price or in quantity, there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria and one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Interestingly, in pure strategy Nash equilibria asymmetric competition occurs, where a firm competes in price and its rival firm competes in quantity. Further, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium probability of a firm to compete in ! terms of price increases with the strength of network effects and is always greater than the probability to compete in terms of price.

September 16, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Reputation and Entry

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Jeffrey V. Butler (EIEF),
Enrica Carbone, (Second University of Naples "SUN"), Pierluigi Conzo (University of Turin) and Giancarlo Spagnolo (Stockholm School of Economics - SITE, University of "Tor Vergata" & CEPR) scrutinize Reputation and Entry.

ABSTRACT: There is widespread concern among regulators that favoring suppliers with good past performance, a standard practice in private procurement, may hinder entry by new firms in public procurement markets. In this paper we report results from a laboratory experiment exploring the relationship between reputation and entry in procurement. We implement a repeated procurement model with reputation for quality and the possibility of entry in which the entrant may start off with positive reputation. Our results suggest that while some past-performance based reputational mechanisms can reduce the frequency of entry, appropriately designed mechanisms significantly stimulate it. We find that our reputational mechanism increases quality but not prices, so that the introduction of this kind of mechanism may generate large welfare gains for the buyer.


September 16, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, September 13, 2013

Merger Regulation Under Ethiopian Competition Law: A Comparative Overview

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Hussein Ahmed Tura, Wolaita Sodo University has posted Merger Regulation Under Ethiopian Competition Law: A Comparative Overview.

ABSTRACT: Most countries in the world have enacted competition laws to protect their free market economies and have thereby developed an economic system in which the allocation of resources is determined mainly by demand and supply. In the case of Ethiopia, competition law was introduced in 2003. However, the earlier completion law, Proc No. 329/2003, was not only inadequate but also obsolete in certain respects; particularly, in light of merger regulation as it neglected the issue altogether. To overcome such shortcoming, the Ethiopian government has enacted the Competition and Consumers’ Protection law in 2010. This enactment is seen as the country’s response to the opening up of its economy, removing controls and resorting to liberalization. The law sought to ensure fair competition by prohibiting trade practices which cause appreciable adverse effects on the competition in market within the country.

This Article provides a comparative picture of the Ethiopian Competition Law with respect to merger regulation with those of the United States of America (US), European Union (EU), United Kingdom (UK) and South Africa. It will at the beginning tries to explain the meaning and different types of mergers; and will elaborate on effects and consequences of these merger transactions. Then it will highlight the major merger laws and addresses the conceptual underpinning of merger in these jurisdictions. It will then attempt to elucidate on significant aspect of threshold limits in different jurisdictions and point out ways in which Ethiopia deals with mergers above and below the threshold limits. Moreover, the Article will importantly explain substantive tests used for assessment of mergers in these jurisdictions and the factors considered by competition authorities before deciding the fate of mergers. It will also look into the much debated aspect of control of joint ventures under merger laws and will examine how different jurisdictions have dealt with the same. Finally, the Article concludes on certain issues which could be considered in improving the Ethiopian competition merger regime.

September 13, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Institutional Advantage in Competition and Innovation Policy

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Herb Hovenkamp (Iowa) discusses Institutional Advantage in Competition and Innovation Policy.

ABSTRACT: In the United States responsibility for innovation policy and competition policy are assigned to different agencies with different authority. The principal institutional enforcers of patent policy are the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the International Trade Commission (ITC), and the federal district courts as overseen by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and ultimately the Supreme Court. While competition policy is not an explicit part of patent policy, competition issues arise frequently, even when they are not seen as such.

On the competition law side, since early in the twentieth century antitrust courts have had to confront practices that implicate patent law. Over the next century patent/antitrust policy veered between extremes, from periods characterized by heavy deference to patent practices, even where they seemed obviously anticompetitive, to periods in which the courts viewed patents as little more than a competitive nuisance and used every opportunity to apply the antitrust laws against them.

This brief essay addresses the question of relative institutional advantage in cases where both competitive harm and harm to innovation are relevant but patent and antitrust approaches differ widely and are likely to reach different conclusions.

September 13, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, September 12, 2013

Still-Unpopular Sanctions: Developments in Private Antitrust Enforcement In Poland after the 2008 White Paper

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Anna Piszcz, University of Bialystok - Faculty of Law discusses Still-Unpopular Sanctions: Developments in Private Antitrust Enforcement In Poland after the 2008 White Paper.

ABSTRACT: The European Commission published a White Paper on 2 April 2008 on damages actions for breach of EU antitrust rules. The content of the White Paper is since then being prepared to be converted into EU legislation on private antitrust enforcement. This paper presents the developments in private antitrust enforcement in Poland after 2 April 2008. It commences with an outline of EU actions in this field which act as an introduction to the more detailed analysis of recent jurisprudential and legislative developments in Poland. The latter part of the paper covers, in particular, the 2009 Act on the Pursuit of Claims in Group Proceedings and the 2011 Act Amending the Civil Procedure Code and Some Other Acts which abolishes all specific elements of commercial proceedings, including the statutory ‘non-admission of evidence’ principle. These two legal acts are assessed in order to establish whether their introduction is likely to help facilitate private antitrust enforcement in Poland and to consider to what an extent are these developments responding to the challenges outlined by the European Commission.

September 12, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

EU Concerted Practices & US Concerted Actions: Beyond William H. Page’s Proposal

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Federico Ghezzi, Bocconi University - Department of Law and Mariateresa Maggiolino, Bocconi University - Department of Legal Studies have written EU Concerted Practices & US Concerted Actions: Beyond William H. Page’s Proposal.

ABSTRACT: The recent analysis developed by professor William H. Page on the US notion of concerted actions raised the idea to develop an article that exams in-death the EU meaning of concerned practices and that skein of US doctrines that focus on several phenomena running from facilitating practices to invitations to collude, plus factors and agreements to exchange information. According to professor Page, the current definition of concerted actions misses the opportunity to use inter-firm communications as the discriminating factor between cases of collusive pricing practices and cases of interdependent parallel behaviors that result in the same market price. To the contrary, the current EU definition of concerted practices accomplishes this purpose. By characterizing strategic inter-firm contacts as one of its building blocks, this notion supplies antitrust enforcers with a theoretical tool that tells lawful oligopolistic interdependence apart from unlawful collusive conduct. Yet, the current EU definition of concerted practices does something more. By encompassing a very strong presumption — that firms exchanging strategic information cannot do anything else but accordingly shape their internal decisions as to prices — this notion catches cartels that appear only from these strategic inter-firm contacts, regardless of their price market conduct. Therefore, the current EU notion of concerted practices is a very powerful prosecuting tool that, as such, deserves to dialog with the US antitrust tradition. Having analyzed the US case law about interdependence, parallelism and exchanges of information, we hence discus whether and how to bridge the EU and US experiences.

September 12, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Pricing and Efficiency in the Market for IP Addresses

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Benjamin G. Edelman, Harvard University - HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit and Michael Schwarz, Yahoo! Research Labs, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) analyze Pricing and Efficiency in the Market for IP Addresses.

ABSTRACT: We consider market rules for the transfer of IP addresses, numeric identifiers required by all computers connected to the Internet. Excessive fragmentation of IP address blocks causes growth in the Internet's routing table, which is socially costly, so an IP address market should discourage subdividing IP address blocks more than necessary. Yet IP address transfer rules also need to facilitate purchase by the networks that need the addresses most, from the networks that value them least. We propose a market rule that avoids excessive fragmentation while almost achieving social efficiency, and we argue that implementation of this rule is feasible despite the limited powers of central authorities. We also offer a framework for the price trajectory of IP addresses. In a world without uncertainty, the unit price of IP addresses is constant until all addresses are in use and begins to decrease at that time. With uncertainty, the price before that time is a martingale, and the price trajectory afterwards is a supermartingale. Finally, we explore the role of rental markets in sharing information about address value and assuring allocative efficiency.

September 12, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)