Thursday, April 25, 2013

Search Costs, Demand-Side Economies and the Incentives to Merge Under Bertrand Competition

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Jose-Luis Moraga-Gonzalez, University of Amsterdam and Vaiva Petrikaite, University of Groningen study Search Costs, Demand-Side Economies and the Incentives to Merge Under Bertrand Competition.

ABSTRACT: We study the incentives to merge in a Bertrand competition model where firms sell differentiated products and consumers search sequentially for satisfactory deals. In the pre-merger symmetric equilibrium, consumers visit firms randomly. However, after a merger, because insiders raise their prices more than the outsiders, consumers start searching for good deals at the non-merging stores, and only when they do not find a satisfactory product there they visit the merging firms. As search costs go up, consumer traffic from the non-merging firms to the merged ones decreases and eventually mergers become unprofitable. This new merger paradox can be overcome if the merged entity chooses to stock each of its stores with all the products of the constituent firms, which generates sizable search economies. We show that such demand-side economies can confer the merging firms a prominent position in the marketplace, in which case their price may even be lower than the price of the non-merging firms. In that situation, consumers start searching for a satisfactory good at the merged entity and the firms outside the merger lose out. When search economies are sufficiently large, a merger is beneficial for consumers too, and overall welfare increases.

April 25, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Selling to a Cartel of Retailers: A Model of Hub-and-Spoke Collusion

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Nicolas Sahuguet, HEC Montreal - Institute of Applied Economics and Alexis Walckiers have posted Selling to a Cartel of Retailers: A Model of Hub-and-Spoke Collusion.

ABSTRACT: This model describes the working of hub-and-spoke collusion that has been discussed recently by competition policy authorities. We develop a model of tacit collusion between a manufacturer and two retailers, competing a la Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). The best collusive equilibrium between retailers is inefficient and it is in the interest of the supplier to help retailers reach a more efficient collusive equilibrium. The hub and spoke conspiracy reduces double marginalization, but raises the ability of retailers to collude. The impact of a hub-and-spoke cartel on consumer's welfare depends on the bargaining power in the relationship. If the supplier has the bargaining power, the agreement, comparable to a vertical restraint, can be welfare improving in reducing double marginalization. When retailers have the bargaining power, the agreement is closer to an horizontal agreement in which retailers use the supplier to improve their collusive scheme, which leads to a loss of welfare. The result has important implications for competition policy and antitrust enforcement which are further developed in our companion paper Sahuguet and Walckiers (2013).

April 25, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, April 24, 2013

The Antitrust-Busters With Gavels

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Daniel Crane (University of Michigan) and D. Daniel Sokol (University of Florida) have an op-ed on Eaton in the Wall Street Journal.  We hope that the Supreme Court takes the case.  See here.

April 24, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

R&D Competition Versus R&D Cooperation in Oligopolistic Markets with Evolving Structure

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Herbert Dawid, University of Bielefeld - Department of Business Administration and Economics, Peter M. Kort, Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) and Michael Kopel, University of Graz R&D discuss Competition Versus R&D Cooperation in Oligopolistic Markets with Evolving Structure.

ABSTRACT: This paper considers investment behavior of duopolistic firms subject to technological progress. It is assumed that initially both firms offer a homogeneous product, but after a stochastic waiting time they are able to realize a product innovation. Production capacities of both firms are product specific. It is shown that firms anticipate a future product innovation by under-investing (if the new product is a substitute to the established product) and higher profits, and over-investing (in case of complements) and lower profits, compared to the corresponding standard capital accumulation game. This anticipation effect is stronger in the case of R&D cooperation. Furthermore, since due to R&D cooperation firms introduce the new product at the same time, this leads to intensified competition and lower firm profits right after the new product has been introduced. In addition, we show that under R&D competition the firm that innovates first, overshoots in new-product capacity buildup in order to exploit its temporary monopoly position. Taking into account all these effects, the result is that, if the new product is neither a close substitute nor a strong complement of the established product, positive synergy effects in R&D cooperation are necessary to make it more profitable for firms than R&D competition.

April 24, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Antitrust Law as Public Interest Law

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Christopher R. Leslie, University of California, Irvine School of Law explains Antitrust Law as Public Interest Law.

ABSTRACT: Definitions of “public interest” abound. One could make the case for antitrust law as public interest law using political or economic arguments. For some, one’s definition of the public interest reflects one’s political viewpoint. To avoid the risk of using a loaded description of public interest, the Essay will employ a narrow conception of public interest: providing access to affordable food and medicine. With this principle as my guide, this Essay reviews some of the ways that antitrust law helps make food and medicine more accessible to the public.

Antitrust law is the law of competition. Competition in the marketplace generally improves the lives of consumers by expanding output and reducing the price of products and services, as well as by increasing quality and innovation. Monopolies and cartels distort competitive markets by reducing output in order to create artificial scarcity, which allows sellers to raise prices. As a result, some consumers will not be able to acquire the product or service at all because of the contrived shortages. Those consumers who continue to purchase the product or service are forced to pay elevated prices. Thus, all consumers are made worse off.

Antitrust law provides the legal rules for free market economies. At first glance, antitrust law may not seem like public interest law. In antitrust litigation, economists define markets using economic concepts like cross-elasticity of demand and cross-elasticity of supply; they debate issues of marginal cost versus average variable cost, and which costs are, in fact, variable. As antitrust law has come to rely more on economics, it has become less populist. Looking past the economic concepts and jargon, however, one discovers a body of law devoted to the public interest. This Essay is anecdotal by design; it is intended to give a sense of the many ways that anticompetitive behavior can distort access to food and healthcare.

April 24, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Copyright and Competition Policy

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Ariel Katz (Toronto) explores Copyright and Competition Policy.

ABSTRACT: This Chapter discusses the tensions between copyright law and competition and some of the ways through which copyright law itself works to advance competition policy goals. It shows how competition policy goals and anti-monopoly measures shaped the design of copyright since the Statute of Anne, and the notion of limited exclusive rights operating within a competitive market system is crucial to copyright law’s design.

The Chapter offers a three-dimensional framework, consisting of considering incentive sufficiency, relative capacity to innovate, and transaction costs, to explain some key elements of copyright law: the limited term of copyright, limitations on subject matter, fair use, and the first-sale doctrine. It shows how these limitations on copyright can ensure that the copyright may not result in excessive static losses resulting from unconstrained market power, and how they can minimize dynamic losses by ensuring that copyright is not used to hinder future innovation.

April 24, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

What Consensus? Ideology, Politics and Elections Still Matter

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Steven C. Salop, Georgetown University Law Center states What Consensus? Ideology, Politics and Elections Still Matter.

ABSTRACT: This article, which was prepared for an ABA Antitrust Section Panel, discusses the role of ideology and politics in antitrust enforcement and the impact of elections in the last twenty year on enforcement and policy at the federal antitrust agencies. The article explains the differences in antitrust ideologies and their impact on policy preferences. The article then uses a database of civil non-merger complaints by the DOJ and FTC over the last three Presidential administrations to analyze changes in the number, type and other characteristics of antitrust enforcement. It also discusses change in vertical merger enforcement and other antirust policies such as amicus briefs, reports and guidelines. The article concludes that elections do matter and that the impact of elections on the DOJ and FTC has differed significantly.

April 24, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Competition Law Remedies in Europe: Which Limits for Remedial Discretion?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Ioannis Lianos (UCL) asks Competition Law Remedies in Europe: Which Limits for Remedial Discretion?

ABSTRACT: The fragmentation of EU competition law enforcement in various institutions (competition authoritires, courts) and legal provisions (Articles 101, 102 TFEU, merger control) have led to the development of ad hoc remedial action without this being backed up by a solid theory of competition law remedies. This study aims precisely to fill this gap by providing the first systematic theoretical analysis of competition law remedies in Europe, including conduct and structural remedies, voluntary and coercive remedies, in the areas of merger control and antitrust. The study challenges the optimal enforcement theory that seems to have provided so far the intellectual backbone of the remedial action of EU competition authorities, although this influence has not been exercised in a systematic and uniform way in all cases. Such theory does not provide an adequate understanding of the remedial discretion of competition authorities and consequently the necessary boundaries of such discretion. The study provides a novel analytical framework integrating both economic and legal principles, taking the view that although deterrence (and economic efficiency) constitutes an important objective of EU Competition law enforcement, this should be achieved in the context of established legal understandings of the concept of remedy. More specifically, the paper examines the impact of the economic approach on the linkage between the competition law wrong and remedies as the foundation for an economically inspired but still respectful to legal tradition concept of remedial discretion in EU Competition Law.

April 24, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, April 23, 2013

Some Reflections on the Question of the Goals of EU Competition Law

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Ioannis Lianos, University College London - Faculty of Laws offers Some Reflections on the Question of the Goals of EU Competition Law.

ABSTRACT: The study first takes a normative perspective and examines the various goals that have been advanced by competition law literature on the objectives of EU competition law. A critical analysis of this literature shows the weaknesses of an economic welfare approach and the difficulties, as well as some normative objections, to incorporating non-welfare goals in the implementation of EU competition law. The normative perspective is then followed by an analysis of positive EU competition law arriving to the conclusion that the case law of the EU Courts is ambiguous as to the existence of a hierarchy of objectives in EU competition law and that the drafting of the Lisbon Treaty opens the door to a more holistic competition law, in congruent co-existence with the other Treaty provisions and policies instituted by the EU Treaties. The final part criticizes the literature on the goals of EU competition law for its monotonous emphasis on goals. I argue that the choice of a general objective as an enforcement criterion tells us little about whether any particular institution, for example the adjudicative process, should be charged with implementing that criterion. Comparative institutional analysis emphasizes the connections between issues of institutional choice and goals. The question of goals should follow and not precede that of institutional choice. Institutional choice should, however, be comparative and not proceed to choosing an institution without a proper analysis of the weaknesses of the alternative institutions on offer. The conceptualization of the role of courts, and other institutions in a holistic competition law, using comparative institutional analysis, is one of the major challenges faced by EU competition law, and new competition law regimes, in the future.

April 23, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

UPP Merger Screens: Incorporating Efficiencies and Feedback Effects into the Value of Diverted Sales

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Bertram Neurohr, Compass Lexecon addresses UPP Merger Screens: Incorporating Efficiencies and Feedback Effects into the Value of Diverted Sales.

ABSTRACT: This paper extends the conventional UPP merger screen (i) to account for merger-specific marginal cost efficiencies for both merging firms, and (ii) to account for feedback effects between the merging firms. What emerges is a test that is algebraically equivalent to the test developed by Werden (1996), and yet as intuitive and transparent as UPP. Given the extremely widespread use of UPP in recent years, one of the objectives of this paper is to encourage the use of a more accurate test by fully illuminating its underlying economic logic. To this end this paper shows that accounting for additional effects does not lead to a significant increase in complexity while at the same time having a profound impact on the explanatory power of the merger screen. This follows from the fact that the value of diverted sales naturally depends on both efficiencies and feedback. Besides making the increased accuracy of Werden’s test accessible to policy makers in the form of a more intuitive test, this paper brings closure to the debates surrounding the roles of efficiencies and feedback effects in UPP. It is shown that the proposed test is difficult to improve upon within the class of local tests, which do not require assumptions about the shape of the demand curve. The increased logical consistency of the test is exploited to illustrate its close connection to price changes using a linear demand example.

April 23, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Economics in state aid – essential or nice-to-have? Wednesday 8 May 2013

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

UK State Aid Law Association invites you to: Economics in state aid – essential or nice-to-have? Wednesday 8 May 2013

Speakers – Vincent Verouden, CET, DG Comp; James Kavanagh, Oxera; and Carsten Grave, Linklaters

Chair – Luis Correia da Silva, Oxera

Registration and drinks: 6.00 pm

Start: 6.30 pm

Finish and drinks: 7.30 pm

The discussion

"Most of the analysis in the practice of European state aid control is not firmly rooted in economic principles"

(The Handbook of Antitrust Economics, 2007).

At a time when state aid control is on the threshold of 'modernisation', this UK SALA seminar will explore the present and future role of economics in state aid. Why has economics in state aid been so far behind mergers and antitrust? What problems has this caused? Does economics have a growing role in state aid assessment, and what practical implications does this have for cases today and looking forward?

Eminent speakers from the Chief Economist Team and private practice will give their views, followed by an open discussion with the audience.

In this session we will examine:

Modernisation expand the role of economics? (Vincent Verouden)

What economic evidence is being submitted in state cases? How can state aid move in the direction of mergers/antitrust in terms of economic rigour? (James Kavanagh)


Is economics a “one trick pony” in state aid cases, only used for determining the existence of aid? Or is there more room for an effects-based approach? (Carsten Grave)

UKSALA is a new association of lawyers, academics, students, economists and others with an interest in State aid law. Its President is Judge Christopher Vajda, judge of the Court of Justice of the EU.

UKSALA promotes education and knowledge in State aid law, by organising speaker events, preparing papers on State aid topics, engaging with UK and EU institutions responsible for State aid issues as well as maintaining a website with materials useful to State aid practitioners. For details, and free membership, please visit

Please RSVP to the following email address:

April 23, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Failure of Corporate Governance Standards and Antitrust Compliance

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Jesse W. Markham Jr., University of San Francisco School of Law discusses The Failure of Corporate Governance Standards and Antitrust Compliance.

ABSTRACT: This article explores the interplay between corporate governance law and antitrust law, and concludes that fiduciary standards should be strengthened. Part I explains the need for powerful incentives to comply with antitrust laws, given the economic rewards from violations. Part II explores recent trends in antitrust law enforcement to show that violations continue more or less unabated despite major improvements in detection and prosecution of violations. Part III argues why monetary sanctions imposed on corporations should be abandoned as the primary enforcement tool, given that they merely place economic burdens on shareholders who are powerless to intervene ex ante, or even later, to prevent or rectify violations. Part IV argues that fiduciary duty law fails to provide incentives to comply with antitrust law, and that whatever weak incentives may residually exist are inadequate in the face of more powerful economic incentives to violate the law. Finally, Part V argues for the imposition of criminal and civil sanctions on boards of directors and senior managers who fail implement take strenuous and robust compliance programs. It is urged that fiduciary duty law needs reform in order to place responsibility for violations on those who have the power to prevent them; and the criminal sanctions for knowing or reckless board failures is both necessary and supported by workable precedents in other areas of vicarious liability law.

April 23, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Methods for Setting Fines for Cartels in Russia and the Deterrence Effect as Compared to the United States and the European Union

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Alexander Egorushkin (New York University) suggests Methods for Setting Fines for Cartels in Russia and the Deterrence Effect as Compared to the United States and the European Union.

ABSTRACT: Over the last 10-20 years, the regulation of fines for antitrust violations has been amended several times in the United States and the European Union, significantly increasing the amount of imposed fines. Within the same time period, antitrust regulation and policy have spread across the globe and, as an enforcement tool, antitrust fines have also been introduced in many jurisdictions. Russia is not an exception; in 2006 the new Russian Competition Law was enacted and in 2007 turnover-based fines for antitrust violations were introduced.

Combating cartels is one of the main motivations for further developing antitrust policy, as collusion among competitors is one of the most egregious antitrust violations. Currently we are seeing antitrust authorities all over the world impose huge fines for cartels. In 2008, Saint Gobain was fined EUR 896 million by the European Commission for participation in a car glass cartel. The U.S. Department of Justice conducted a "vitamin investigation," which resulted in a $500 million fine imposed on F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd, a major participant in the vitamin cartel. The largest fine for a cartel agreement in Russia was imposed in 2011 on JSC United Trading Company, a leading chemicals trader, for participation in the caustic soda cartel in the amount of RUB 912,033,950 (approximately $30 million).

At first, the amount of these fines seems incredible and one can conclude that they are sufficient to deter any potential cartelists. However, the monetary size of a fine alone cannot be an objective indicator of whether or not such fine deters competitors from entering into cartel agreements and, therefore, is the optimal sanction for a cartel. The mechanisms for calculating fines and enforcement policy also play significant roles in the assessment of deterrence effect of fines.

This article focuses on analyzing the deterrence effect of the Russian fining system based on theoretical and practical approaches used in the United States and the European Union. The antitrust fines in the United States and the European Union, and comparison of their deterrence effect have been widely discussed, while there have been almost no studies on Russian anti-cartel fines and their deterrence effect.

April 23, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Competition and Unconscionability

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Ezra Friedman, Northwestern University - School of Law explores Competition and Unconscionability.

ABSTRACT: Conventional legal doctrine holds that courts should be more willing to find unconscionability in contracts when either one party has monopoly power or the other party was not given a choice of contract terms. This paper suggests that this doctrine is misguided on both points. I argue that the unconscionability doctrine should be used primarily to protect unsophisticated customers from exploitation, and show that when a seller has significant market power and offers one contract to all customers, fear of alienating sophisticated customers can discourage the seller from using inefficient contracts to exploit the unsophisticated. In contrast, in a more competitive industry, sellers may actually lose money on the sophisticated customers, and be willing to sacrifice sophisticated customers in order to more fully exploit the unsophisticated. Likewise, when a monopolist offers a choice of contracts, it is more attractive for it to exploit the unsophisticated while offering an efficient contract to the sophisticated. This paper presents a formal model showing that exploitation tends to increase with competition. Although competition leads to more inefficient exploitation, it also leads to lower prices, and the welfare effects on the unsophisticated are ambiguous.

April 23, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, April 22, 2013

Webinar: Detecting Cartels and Collusive Behavior - May 1, 2013

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Bob Marshall - Penn State and Leslie Marx - Duke (recently named one of the GCR Women in Antitrust) are among the very top cartel experts in the world. Their writing on collusion has been path breaking. I also note with great pride that they are authors of a chapter in my forthcoming Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics (Oxford University Press, Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, forthcoming). Their consulting firm, Bates White, is hosting an event that is worth an hour of your time.

Webinar: Detecting Cartels and Collusive Behavior

  • May 1, 2013
  • 1:00 pm —2:00 pm

In this webinar, Professors Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx offer an examination of specific economic actions, called “super plus factors,” and how they can be used as indicators of collusion among a collection of firms. They will demonstrate how successful collusion requires three different types of enforcement structures among the colluding firms to prevent secret deviations and how these structures generate “super plus factors” that are consistent with explicit collusive actions.

Drawing from their extensive experience as consulting experts they use examples from cases, and from their recent book, The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding Rings, to help lawyers understand how they can detect collusive behavior in a company’s divisions, among competitors, or within a market. Understanding “super plus factors” and the mechanics of establishing collusion through “economic circumstantial evidence” equips lawyers with information to proactively monitor pricing activity and potentially detect aberrant, anti-competitive behavior in the market.

To register for the webinar, please click here.


William Kovacic, Professor of Law, George Washington University (Moderator)

Robert Marshall, Bates White Partner and Professor of Economics, Penn State University 

Leslie Marx, Bates White Partner and Professor of Economics, Duke University

The Economics of Collusion 

To read more about Drs. Marshall and Marx’s book, including links to book reviews, please click here

For a short and readable summary of some of Bob and Leslie's ideas on the meaning of an "agreement, see their excellent work on super "plus factors" here.

April 22, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

All-Units Discounts and Double Moral Hazard

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Daniel P. O'Brien, Federal Trade Commission - Bureau of Economics has written on All-Units Discounts and Double Moral Hazard.

ABSTRACT: An all-units discount is a price reduction applied to all units purchased if the customer's total purchases equal or exceed a given quantity threshold. Since the discount is paid on all units rather than marginal units, the tariff is discontinuous and exhibits a negative marginal price at the threshold that triggers the discount. Why would suppliers offer such tariffs? This paper shows that all-units discounts can arise in optimal contracts between upstream and downstream firms with market power who make non-contractible investments that enhance demand. I present conditions under which all-units discounts dominate two-part tariffs and other continuous tariffs. I also examine these tariffs when the upstream market faces a threat of entry. In the cases considered, continuous tariffs are a more profitable device for managing entry than all-units discounts. These findings begin filling the gap in economists' understanding of the equilibrium effects of all-units discounts in intermediate markets in which contract design affects incentives for pricing, investment, and competitive entry.

April 22, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

ACCC Competition Policy Workshop – Infrastructure Access Workshop Comments by Rod Sims

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Austrialia's ACCC has posted a transcript of Rodd Sims' comments at the Infrastructure Access Workshop.

April 22, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Competition Policy and Poverty Reduction: A Holistic Approach

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Robert D. Anderson, World Trade Organization and Anna Mueller, WTO Secretariat explain Competition Policy and Poverty Reduction: A Holistic Approach.

ABSTRACT: This paper examines the role of competition law and policy as tools for poverty reduction and development. The authors put forward five related principles, building upon the important work on related issues that has been done by the OECD, the International Competition Network (ICN), UNCTAD and civil society organizations such as CUTS in recent years, in addition to the earlier work done on these topics in the WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy when that body was active from 1997 through 2003. Together, these principles comprise the "holistic approach" to competition law and policy which is referenced in the title of the paper:

•First, the focus of policy makers in using competition policy as tool for poverty reduction should be on approaches that are relatively easy to implement but have a track-record of being effective and economically sound.

•Second, for competition policy reforms and legislation to be successful, public acceptance and support is critical and must be an essential focus of related initiatives.

•Third, to serve as an effective tool of poverty reduction, competition policy needs to address the needs of the citizens of poorer societies in their capacities as producers (and, therefore, as users of extensive input goods and services, including public infrastructure), in addition to their capacities as final consumers/households.

•Fourth, it is posited that "competition policy" is more than just "what competition agencies do" and includes the full spectrum of measures that governments employ to enhance competition and improve the performance of markets.

•Fifth, in order to address the challenges posed by the changing landscape of competition policy worldwide, new forms of international co-operation may need to be considered.

The paper then develops the application of these principles with respect to five specific areas in which competition policy can contribute to poverty reduction, namely: (i) the reform of public and business infrastructure sectors, particularly in the context of developing and transition economies; (ii) the complementary roles of competition law enforcement and market liberalization in public procurement markets; (iii) various related dimensions of competition policy as they relate to public health objectives; (iv) the addressing of possible monopsonistic practices in international supply chains that may affect the ability of developing country producers to reap gains from participation in international markets; and (v) measures to address the enduring problem of international cartels which, despite an impressive record of prosecutions by developed jurisdiction competition agencies over the past decade, continue to impose substantial costs on developing economies. The paper concludes with some observations regarding the future of international co-operation in the competition policy sphere.

April 22, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

ICC unveils Antitrust Compliance Toolkit

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The ICC has unveiled an Antitrust Compliance Toolkit.

From the press release:

This global Toolkit has been produced by the ICC Task Force on Antitrust Compliance and Advocacy following suggestions by the OFT, DG COMP and other antitrust agencies. The Toolkit seeks to complement materials produced by antitrust agencies and other sources of guidance, by focusing on practical steps companies can take internally to embed a successful compliance culture.

The ICC Antitrust Compliance Toolkit benefited from contributions from antitrust specialists closely associated with in-house efforts around the world.

April 22, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Licensing: A Conceptual Framework for EU Guidance to the Member States

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Marco Ricolfi, University of Turin - Faculty of Law offers Licensing: A Conceptual Framework for EU Guidance to the Member States.

ABSTRACT: This memo intends to identify and link together a number of crucial topics concerning the licensing for the purpose of re-use of Public Sector Information under the Directive 2003/98/EC on the re-use of public sector information (the PSI Directive) and in connection with the draft Proposal for a Directive amending the Directive unveiled December 2011. The purpose of the document is threefold: first, to assist in the design of exercises concerning PSI licensing that might be launched in the near future, such as the preparation of a multi-level conference on the issue, aimed at bringing together stakeholders, scholars, the open data community, policy makers and the general public; second, to provide the conceptual terms of reference for the setting up of research projects, thematic networks or other cooperative initiatives in the area; and third to prepare the ground for the discussion of possible components of guidance by the Commission to the Member States in specific connection with “recommended licensing conditions and formats” as provided by Recital 18 of the draft Proposal.

April 22, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)