Tuesday, March 19, 2013

GCR Women in Antitrust 2013

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The Global Competition Review has listed its 100 most important women in global antitrust in its special issue GCR Women in Antitrust 2013. Making the list are:

ASTRID ABLASSER-NEUHUBER

MELANIE AITKEN

SOFIA ALVES

KALA ANANDARAJAH

MARIANA TAVARES DE ARAUJO

ELIZABETH AVERY

KELYN BACON

ANITA BANICEVIC

MARGARET BLOOM

MOLLY BOAST

ANNE-SOPHIE BODIN

SONYA BRANCH

JULIE BRILL

PATRICIA BRINK

LUCIA OJEDA CARDENAS

FIONA CARLIN

ELSA CHEN

KIM DIETZEL

TAMARA DINI

NINETTE DODOO

KAREN DYEKJÆR

KIRSTEN EDWARDS-WARREN

TAL EYAL-BOGER

ANNE FEDERLE

DEBORAH FEINSTEIN

KATHRYN FENTON

CANI FERNÁNDEZ

AMELIA FLETCHER

ELEANOR FOX

JOY FUYUNO

MICHAL GAL

DEBORAH GARZA

AGNETE GERSING

ISOLDE GOGGIN

ILENE KNABLE GOTTS

NIAMH GROGAN

DOROTHY HANSBERRY-BIEGUNSKA

CATRIONA HATTON

ROXANN HENRY

RENATA HESSE

JANET HUI

BOJANA IGNJATOVIC

AIMEE IMUNDO

HEATHER IRVINE

DIANA JACKSON

CLAIRE JEFFS

HELEN JENKINS

MEGAN JONES

PAMELA JONES-HARBOUR

NICOLE KAR

KATHERINE KAY

SARAH KEENE

HELEN KELLY

MARLEEN VAN KERCKHOVE

MAŁGORZATA KRASNODEBSKA-TOMKIEL

ELIZABETH KRAUS

JENNI LUKANDER

LYNDA MARSHALL

ANA PAULA MARTINEZ

LESLIE MARX

CHRISTINE MEYER

SAMANTHA MOBLEY

SOPHIE MOONEN

FIONA SCOTT MORTON

LINSEY McCALLUM

JANET McDAVID

NICOLE NEHME

EE KIA NG

SUSAN NING

MAUREEN OHLHAUSEN

ANNETJE OTTOW

STEPHANIE PAUTKE

ANNE PERROT

LISA PHELAN

VERONICA PINOTTI

SHARIS POZEN

SHILA DORAI RAJ

BARBARA ROSENBERG

MARGARET SANDERSON

ANNETTE SCHILD

EMILY SMITH

JULIE SOLOWAY

DOMINIQUE SPEEKENBRINK

MARIANA TAVARES

NICOLA THERON

MÉLANIE THILL-TAYARA

MARIA TRABUCCHI

DEIRDRE TRAPP

ANNY TUBBS

VANESSA TURNER

INGRID VANDENBORRE

SUZANNE WACHSSTOCK

CLARA GUZMÁN ZAPATER

CRISTIANNE SACCAB ZARZUR

ELENA ZOIDO

MARGARET ZWISLER

March 19, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)

Some Recent Developments in ASEAN Competition Law

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

R. Ian McEwin (Competition Consulting Asia & Chulalongkorn University) provides Some Recent Developments in ASEAN Competition Law.

ABSTRACT: All countries in Southeast Asia are hierarchical and authoritarian to some degree, which has implications for competition. All countries are marked by considerable inequalities in status, wealth, and education. With the exception of Singapore, corruption and cronyism are widespread. Big business in Southeast Asia is mainly dominated by ethnic Chinese families, originally brought in during the 18 and 19th centuries as cheap labor or with skills as traders, tax farmers, miners, and artisans-skills lacking among the indigenous population (who were mainly farmers). To protect against property expropriation, taxes, and limited ability to enforce contracts, they developed their own financial networks and relationships based on family and clan groups-perhaps best described as closed shops that sought to limit competition. At the same time, self-serving political elites awarded monopoly privileges.

Nevertheless, economic necessities now drive public policy in this region. While patronage is still important, competition is now increasingly seen as necessary for economic development-but competition upsets traditional monopoly privileges that form the basis of much elite wealth and is resisted politically by governments of all ideological persuasions. Using competition law to improve economic outcomes, if properly enforced, disrupts pre-existing monopoly privileges.

March 19, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

GCR Awards 2013: Finalists announced & voting open

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

GCR Awards 2013: Finalists announced & voting open

Global Competition Review is pleased to publish the shortlist of nominations for its GCR Awards 2013.

Please click here to vote. Voting closes at midnight on Tuesday 26 March.

The winners will be announced at GCR's 3rd Annual Awards Dinner on 9 April in Washington, DC. Click here for more information on the awards dinner.

All nominations link to the relevant GCR news article on the matter in question. If you feel you or your organisation have not been properly represented on a case, please email editorial@globalcompetitionreview.com .

Team awards

Matter of the Year

FTC investigation of Google

Sony/EMI & Universal/EMI

UTC/Goodrich

Defence of Chunghwa in global CRT and LCD cartel investigations

Watson/Actavis

Merger Control Matter of the Year – Americas

Opposition to Tervita/Complete Environmental, Canada

Camargo Corrêa’s acquisition of CIMPOR, Brazil

Rockstar acquisition of Nortel patent portfolio, US

Dollar Thrifty/Hertz, US

Fresenius/Liberty Dialysis, US

Merger Control Matter of the Year – Asia-Pacific, Middle East & Africa

Eaton/Cooper, China

UTC/Goodrich, China

Nestlé/Pfizer

Toshiba’s acquisition of Western Digital’s 3.5 inch HDD business

Pannar/Pioneer, South Africa

Merger Control Matter of the Year – Europe

Orange Austria/Hutchison 3G Austria

IAG/BMI

Lafarge/Anglo American

Glencore/Xstrata

Interveners in UPS/TNT

Behavioural Matter of the Year – Americas

FTC standard essential patent investigation of Google

FTC v Watson Pharmaceuticals

DoJ e-books investigation

FTC v WL Gore

CADE v Philip Morris

Behavioural Matter of the Year – Asia-Pacific, Middle East & Africa

Coca-Cola retail display investigation, Singapore

Cement cartel case, India

First case from a leniency application, Pakistan

The North Face resale price maintenance case, Korea

Behavioural Matter of the Year – Europe

Defence of British Airways in OFT fuel surcharge case

EU e-book settlement

Nexans and Prysmian v DG Comp dawn raids

E.ON and GDF Suez v DG Comp

DG Comp v Tomkins

Litigation of the Year

National Grid v Gas-insulated switchgear cartelists, UK

2Travel Group plc v Cardiff City Transport Services Limited (Cardiff Bus) before the CAT, UK

Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan in antitrust class actions, US

In RE Live Concert Antitrust Litigation, US

Defence of Toshiba in TFT-LCD Antitrust Litigation, US

In RE Southeastern Milk Antitrust Litigation, US

Individuals' awards

Lawyer of the Year

Susan Creighton – Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati

David I Gelfand – Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton

Clifford Aronson – Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom

Christopher Curran – White & Case

Jon Lawrence – Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer

Arthur J Burke – Davis Polk & Wardwell

Lawyer of the Year - 40 and under

Casey Halladay – McMillan

Eric Stock – Hogan Lovells

Leah Brannon – Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton

Ingrid Vandenborre – Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom

Rafique Bachour – Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer

Economist of the Year

Parker Normann – Edgeworth Economics

Andrea Lofaro – RBB Economics

Gunnar Niels – Oxera

Cristina Caffarra – Charles River Associates

Zoltan Biro – Frontier Economics

Corporate Counsel of the Year

Mark Allen, FedEx

Juliusz Komorek, Ryanair

Marceline Tournier, Nestlé SA

Michael Sosso, BP America

Christoph Feddersen, UTC

Academic Excellence Award

Daniel Sokol – University of Florida

Joshua Wright, George Mason University (current FTC commissioner)

Damien Geradin, Tillburg University

Fiona Scott Morton, Yale University (Charles River Associates)

Mark Lemley, Stanford Law School

Speech or Conference Session of the Year

Ali Nikpay, senior director at the OFT, “UK cartel enforcement: past, present, future”

GCR Live: Litigation 2012, “Does competition economics need an overhaul?”

William E. Kovacic, Centre of European Law, London, July 2012

Enforcement awards

Agency of the Year – Americas

Brazil’s CADE

US Department of Justice’s antitrust division

Mexico’s Federal Competition Commission

Canada’s Competition Bureau

US Federal Trade Commission

Agency of the Year – Asia-Pacific, Middle East & Africa

India’s Competition Commission

Japan’s Fair Trade Commission

Pakistan’s Competition Commission

Turkey’s Competition Authority

Agency of the Year – Europe

Germany’s Federal Cartel Office

European Commission’s Directorate General of Competition

France’s Competition Authority

Spain’s National Competition Commission

Norway’s Competition Authority

Enforcement Matter of the Year

Court of Appeal of England & Wales in Ryanair Holdings plc v Office of Fair Trading

Acquisition of TPS and CanalSatellite’s sole control by Vivendi Universal and Canal Plus - France's Competition Authority

European Commission CRT cartel fine

DoJ v AUO

Commissioner of Competition v CCS Corporation/Commissioner of Competition v Tervita Corporation

 

March 19, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Pass-Through as an Economic Tool

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

E. Glen Weyl, University of Chicago; University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics and Michal Fabinger, Pennsylvania State University discuss Pass-Through as an Economic Tool.

ABSTRACT: We extend five principles of tax incidence under perfect competition to a general model of imperfect competition. The principles cover 1) the independence of physical and economic incidence, the 2) qualitative and 3) quantitative manner in which taxes are split between consumers and producers, 4) the determinants of tax pass-through and 5) the integration of local incidence to determine the overall division of surplus. We show how these principles can be used to simplify and generalize the analysis of a range of economic questions such as the optimal procurement of new markets and the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination.

March 19, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Does a hospital’s quality depend on the quality of other hospitals? A spatial econometrics approach to investigating hospital quality competition

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Hugh Gravelle (Centre for Health Economics, University of York, UK), Rita Santos (Centre for Health Economics, University of York, UK) and Luigi Siciliani (Centre for Health Economics and Department of Economics & Related Studies, University of York, UK ask Does a hospital’s quality depend on the quality of other hospitals? A spatial econometrics approach to investigating hospital quality competition.

ABSTRACT: We examine whether a hospital's quality is affected by the quality provided by other hospitals in the same market. We first set out a theoretical model with regulated prices which specifies conditions on demand and cost functions which determine whether a hospital will have higher quality when its rivals have higher quality. We then apply spatial econometric methods to a sample of English hospitals in 2009-10 and a set of 16 quality measures including mortality rates, readmission, revision and redo rates and three patient reported indicators to examine to examine the relationship between the quality of hospitals. We find that a hospital's quality is positively associated with the quality of its rivals for seven out of the sixteen quality measures and that in no case is there a negative association. In those cases where there is a positive association, an increase in rivals' quality by 10% increases a! hospital's quality by 1.7% to 2.9%.

March 19, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Product Market Predatory Threats and the Use of Performance-sensitive Debt

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Einar Kjenstad and Xunhua Su (Norwegian University of Science and Technology) describe Product Market Predatory Threats and the Use of Performance-sensitive Debt.

ABSTRACT: We use a variant of the Hotelling (1929) model to illustrate that, when a firm faces hard payment constraint(s), financially strong rivals may adopt predatory strategies to drive the firm out of the product market and hence to obtain extra profit from enhanced market power later on. Predation is more likely to occur if the payment constraint is contingent on the firm’s performance. The model predicts that higher predatory threats in the product market reduce firm’s use of performance-sensitive debt and this effect should be more pronounced for small firms with large growth opportunities. Through a sample of over 16,000 bank loans to U.S. borrowers in 1997-2008, we find empirical evidence to support these model predictions.

March 19, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, March 18, 2013

Lateral Move: Judge Douglas Ginsburg from NYU to George Mason

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Judge Douglas Ginsburg (NYU Law and the DC Circuit) has decided to make a lateral move from NYU Law to George Mason Law. Judge Ginsburg served as the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust under Reagan and also served as Judge on the DC Circuit. He has continued to write on antitrust issues over the years and will teach antitrust at George Mason this fall. I also believe that between Judge Ginsburg and Tim Muris (former Chairman of the FTC), George Mason will be the only school in law school history to have agency heads of both antitrust agencies on the same faculty. See the press release here. This is a major lateral move.

March 18, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Competition, Equity and Quality in Healthcare

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka, University of Bristol - Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO) and Carol Propper, University of Bristol - Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO) have written on Competition, Equity and Quality in Healthcare.

ABSTRACT: In this paper we focus on the implications of consumer heterogeneity for whether competition will improve outcomes in health care markets. We show that competition generally favours the majority group as higher quality for the majority is an effective way to increase the quality signal and attract patients. A regulator who is concerned about equity may protect the minority group by not introducing competition. Alternatively, if the minority group is favoured by the providers under monopoly, competition can improve equity by forcing the providers to increase quality for the majority group.

March 18, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

George Mason Third Annual Conference on Competition Policy in Search and Social Media

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

George Mason Third Annual Conference on Competition Policy in Search and Social Media

Event Date: Wednesday, May 15 to Wednesday, May 15, 2013

Location: Founders Hall Auditorium 3351 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22201

The Henry G. Manne Program in Law & Economics Studies presents its Third Annual Conference on Competition Policy in Search and Social Media to be held at George Mason University School of Law, Wednesday, May 15th, 2013. The conference will run from 8:30 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.

Search and social media are increasingly important parts of the economy. They are also relatively young industries.  Understanding the technology and economics of search and social networks is necessary to facilitate sensible policies in this area.  The Third Annual Conference on Competition Policy in Search and Social Media seeks to address these issues by inviting experts in the field to present their views and engage in a vibrant discussion about competition policy in these dynamic industries.

REGISTRATION:

You must pre-register for this event.  To register, please complete the Cvent survey instrument:

If you have questions, please contact Jeff Smith at jsmithq@gmu.edu or 703.993.8382.

AGENDA:

Wednesday, May 15, 2013:   

PANEL 1: The FTC’s Google Investigation: Implications for the States and Other Countries

The opening panel will delve into the FTC’s decision to close its investigation into Google’s search practices, and will examine the implications for the remaining state and international investigations.

PANEL 2: Search, Social Media, and the First Amendment

The second panel will consider the role of the First Amendment in regulation of online information platforms.

PANEL 3: The Intersection of Copyright and Antitrust

The FTC considered, but did not bring, an action against Google for its practice of “scraping” content from other websites. The third panel will consider the copyright and antitrust implications of this practice.

PANEL 4: The State of Competition in Search and Social Media

The conference will conclude with a panel examining the state of competition in search and social media, including issues of market definition and market power in these industries.

CONFIRMED PANELISTS (as of March 8, 2013):

•Marvin Ammori, Founder, The Ammori Group and Bernard L. Schwartz Fellow, New America Foundation
•Jane Y. Bambauer, Associate Professor of Law, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona
•Michael R. Baye, Bert Elwart Professor of Business and Professor of Business Economics & Public Policy, Indiana University Kelley School of Business
•Julie Brill, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission
•Eric K. Clemmons, Professor of Operations and Information Management, The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania
•Stephen D. Houck, Of Counsel, Menaker & Herrmann LLP
•Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission
•Frank Pasquale, Schering-Plough Professor in Health Care Regulation and Enforcement, Seton Hall University School of Law
•Mark R. Patterson, Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law
•Randal C. Picker, Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law, University of Chicago Law School and Senior Fellow, The Computation Institute of the University of Chicago and Argonne National Laboratory
•Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Robert L. Bridges Professor of Law and Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley
•Gigi Sohn, President and Co-Founder, Public Knowledge
•Ilya Somin, Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law
•Spencer Weber Waller, Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago School of Law

VENUE:

Founders Hall Auditorium

George Mason University School of Law

3351 Fairfax Drive

Arlington, VA 22201

For More Information, Contact: Jeff Smith
Coordinator, Henry G. Manne Programs
703.993.8382
jsmithQ@gmu.edu

March 18, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Antitrust Fines in Times of Crisis

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Natalia Fabra, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Departamento de Economia and Massimo Motta, Universitat Pompeu Fabra have an interesting paper on Antitrust Fines in Times of Crisis.

ABSTRACT: In a model in which firms can go bankrupt because of adverse market shocks or antitrust fines, we find that even large corporate fines may not be able to induce deterrence. Managerial penalties are thus needed. If the policy may be changed according to the state of the business cycle, then the optimal outcome can always be achieved through antitrust fines that are more severe in good times and more lenient in bad times. A time-independent policy may result in either too many bankruptcies or under-deterrence as compared to the optimal policy.

March 18, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Market Power, Governance and Innovation: OECD Evidence

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Mehmet Ugur, University of Greenwich discusses Market Power, Governance and Innovation: OECD Evidence.

ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between market power, governance and patenting activity in a sample of 25 OECD countries from 1988-2007. Controlling for a wide range of innovation predictors, we report that governance quality is related positively with patenting activity in the full sample and in samples of countries with higher-than-average per-capita GDP, governance scores and economic openness. Secondly, the relationship between market power and innovation has a U-shape in the full sample, but inverted-U shape in split samples. Third, when interacted with governance, market power tends to have an offsetting effect that weakens the positive relationship between governance and innovation. These findings are robust to a range of control variables such as per-capita GDP, income inequality, depth of equity markets, labour share in national income, economic globalization and military expenditures. Our findings indicate that governance is a significant factor that explain innovation and that blanket statements about the relationship between competition and innovation as well as the kind of reforms necessary to foster innovation can be misleading.

March 18, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Enhancing Financial Benchmarks: Comments on the OICU-IOSCO Consultation Report on Financial Benchmarks

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Global Economics Group, LLC; New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics and David S. Evans, University of Chicago Law School; University College London; Global Economics Group offer Enhancing Financial Benchmarks: Comments on the OICU-IOSCO Consultation Report on Financial Benchmarks.

ABSTRACT: In this Comment we advance a number of guiding principles on matters of benchmark formation, administrative governance, screening, transparency and regulation, in response to the OICU-IOSCO Consultation Report on Financial Benchmarks dated January 2013 (“Report”). We are looking for practical solutions which discourage, to the extent possible, attempts at manipulation or fraud while providing the most useful information to the market.

March 18, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, March 15, 2013

Exclusionary pricing in a two-sided platform : some insights from the industrial organization theory in the Google case

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Estelle Malavolti and Toulouse School of Economics /ENAC-LEEA and Frederic Marty, OFCE-Sciences-Po describe Exclusionary pricing in a two-sided platform : some insights from the industrial organization theory in the Google case.

ABSTRACT: Firms operating in two-sided markets have to integrate in their optimal pricing structure the existence of indirect externalities across groups of consumers. Beyond direct externalities (network effects), such markets are characterized by the increasing value of the platform for the users on one side with the number on the other side. As for Internet search platforms such as Google, their value for advertisers depends on the number of users and especially of precisely targeted ones. As a consequence, the optimal price structure in a two-sided market cannot be symmetrical. In other words, the price structure is not neutral and has to take into account such linkages between these two groups of users. From an economic point of view, it may make sense to impose no charge for the group that generates the most valuable externalities. With antitrust inquiries, such specificity imposes to consider simultaneously both sides of the markets. Otherwise, the risk of false negative decisions may arise. On one side the pricing strategy might be interpreted as a predatory practice and on the other side as an exploitative abuse. As the number and the loyalty of users on one side is an essential input to competition between platforms on the other side, it might be rational to subsidize them by acquiring exclusive rights on some valuable contents and to implement bundling and tying strategies. The main risk lies in some market foreclosure. The market might evolve towards vertically integrated ecosystems, e.g. a silos model of competition. Furthermore, competition authorities have to define a sound economics-based theory of harm to disentangle practices that reduce consumer welfare (by increasing switching costs) from ones that might be finally welfare-enhancing. The issue of remedies arises inexorably from this point. Our paper sheds light on these industrial economics and competition law issues.

Download Marty

March 15, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Mind the Gap: Economic Costs and Innovation Perils in the Space between Patent and Competition Law

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

George Addy, Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP and Erika Douglas, Davies Ward Phillips and Vineberg LLP ask readers to Mind the Gap: Economic Costs and Innovation Perils in the Space between Patent and Competition Law.

ABSTRACT: This article considers a gap between patent law and competition law that is being profitably exploited by "patent trolls", firms whose business is the acquisition and assertion of patents against parties who are already using the patented technology. First, we frame the discussion by considering the interaction of competition law and patent law and how the interaction can, in theory, impact innovation. Then we look at the example of patent trolls and how they are taking advantage of an absence of competition or patent law enforcement: what they are, the reasons for their recent emergence and the main arguments in defence of patent trolling. Next, we examine the economic cost and harm to innovation caused by patent trolls as they relate to wider issues in competition and patent law and policy, including asymmetry of litigation risk, the hold-up problem and the growing valuation of patents based on the right to exclude rather than the economic value of the underlying invention. Finally, we survey the efforts to stem patent abuse, including patent trolling, through market, judicial, legislative and regulatory means. Regardless of the source of the solution, be it patent or competition, law or policy, patent trolling highlights a clear need for reform to achieve the innovation goals of both the competition and patent regimes. Law makers, enforcement agencies, regulators and the courts need to bridge the ever-widening gap.

March 15, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Impact of Liberalization on the Production of Electricity in Japan

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Miyuki Taniguchi (Graduate School of Economics, Keio University) summarizes The Impact of Liberalization on the Production of Electricity in Japan.

ABSTRACT: This study aims to measure the impact of liberalization on the efficiency of electricity production in Japan, and to examine whether or not economies of scope exist between electricity generation and transmission. Since 1995, liberalization of the electricity market in Japan has been phased in and regulations on entry have been relaxed three times. One motivation for these regulatory changes has been to improve the efficiency of electricity production by introducing competition. Using a panel data set on the nine main power companies in Japan over the period 1970-2010, fixed-effects and stochastic frontier estimates of the cost function are obtained and compared. Estimates of the cost function show that liberalization has improved cost efficiency. Economies of scope are found to exist for all firms.

March 15, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, March 14, 2013

Intermodal competition on some routes in transportation networks: The case of inter urban buses and railways

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Marc Bataille (Monopolkommission) and Alexander Steinmetz (Monopolkommission) explore Intermodal competition on some routes in transportation networks: The case of inter urban buses and railways.

ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes the effect of inter urban buses competing on a few routes against trains within an established railway network. In line with expectations, we show that this can lead to unprofitable train service on these routes. However, within an established railway network with every track being pro table, competition on just some tracks can result in a collapse of the entire network. External e ects of individual routes on the railway network are fundamental for the profitability of the network. Hence, weakening these network effects might be crucial. As a result, efficient intermodal competition on some routes might cause the abandoning of other routes that are not facing any competition. This effect has to be taken into account by political actors when liberalization of inter urban bus travel is considered.

March 14, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Compulsory licensing, price controls, and access to patented foreign products

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Eric Bond (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University) and Kamal Saggi (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University) analyze Compulsory licensing, price controls, and access to patented foreign products.

ABSTRACT: Motivated by existing multilateral rules regarding intellectual property, we develop a North-South model to highlight the dual roles price controls and compulsory licensing play in determining Southern access to a patented Northern product. The Northern patent-holder chooses whether and how to work its patent in the South (either via entry or voluntarily licensing) while the South determines the price control and whether to issue a compulsory license. The threat of compulsory licensing benefits the South and also increases global welfare when the North-South technology gap is significant. The price control and compulsory licensing are complementary instruments from the Southern perspective.

March 14, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Competition in Posted Prices With Bargaining

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

David Gill (Oxford) and John Thanassoulis (Oxford) analyze Competition in Posted Prices With Bargaining.

ABSTRACT: In this paper we study price competition between firms when some consumers attempt tobargain while others buy at the public list or posted prices. Even though bargainers succeed innegotiating discounts off the list prices, their presence dampens competitive pressure in the marketby reducing the incentive to undercut a rival's list price, thus raising all prices and increasingprofits. Welfare falls because of the uncertainty in the bargaining process, which generates somemisallocation of products to consumers. We also find that the bargainers facilitate collusion byreducing the market share that can be gained from a deviation.

March 14, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Call for Papers: Sixth Annual Searle Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy, Friday, September 20, 2013-Saturday, September 21, 2013

Posed by D. Daniel Sokol

Call for Papers: Sixth Annual Searle Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy. Friday, September 20, 2013-Saturday, September 21, 2013

Submission Deadline: May 13, 2013

The Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth is issuing a call for original research papers to be presented at the Sixth Annual Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy at Northwestern University School of Law. This year's conference will run from approximately 9:00 AM on Friday, September 20, 2013 to 12:30 PM on Saturday, September 21, 2013. The conference is co-sponsored by the Center for the Study of Industrial Organization at Northwestern University.

The goal of this conference is to provide a forum where leading scholars from across the country can gather together with Northwestern's own distinguished faculty to present and discuss high quality research relevant to antitrust economics and competition policy. Both theoretical and empirical submissions are welcome. Papers in industrial organization or applied microeconomic theory that address issues relevant to antitrust policy are welcome even if they do not directly focus on particular antitrust policy issues or institutions.

TOPICS: While papers on all topics are welcome, we especially encourage submissions related to the following topic areas:

- open vs. closed platforms

- standard essential patents

- vertical contracting and vertical integration

- cloud computing

- antitrust and copyright

FURTHER DETAILS: We hope to involve leading thinkers from the government, non-profit, and private sector, as well as leading academics from economics departments, business schools, law schools and public policy schools. While most of the conference will be devoted to presentation and discussion of original academic research, we also expect to schedule a small number of panels on important current topics or policy issues.

Paper authors will receive an honorarium of $1,000.00 to cover transportation expenses; if more than one author presents at the symposium, the honorarium will be divided equally between the presenters. Government employees and non-US residents may be reimbursed for reasonable travel expenses up to the honorarium amount. Authors and discussants are expected to attend and participate for the full duration of the symposium. Also, the Searle Center will make hotel reservations and pay for rooms for Thursday, September 19th and Friday, September 20th, 2013. The conference will also include a dinner reception and Keynote Dinner Address (speaker TBA) on Friday evening, presenters should plan to attend.

Papers prepared for the Sixth Annual Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy will be permanently hosted on the Searle Center website as part of our Working Papers Series: http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter

Authors will be free to publish their work in other venues (with appropriate acknowledgement of the Searle Center).

RESEARCH PROPOSALS: SUBMISSION, REVIEW PROCEDURE AND TIMELINE: Research Proposals should include an abstract (300 words maximum) and c.v.

Proposal Submission Deadline: Research Proposals should be submitted to searlecenter@law.northwestern.edu by May 13, 2013.

Notification Deadline: Research Proposals will be reviewed by a committee. Authors will be notified of the committee's decisions by June 10, 2013.

Discussion Draft Deadline: Authors should plan to submit a paper suitable for distribution to discussants and other conference participants no later than September 4, 2013.

Potential Discussants or panel members should send a message indicating their interest to searlecenter@law.northwestern.edu

ABOUT THE SEARLE CENTER: The Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth at Northwestern University School of Law was established in 2006 to research how government regulation and interpretation of laws and regulations by the courts affect business and economic growth. Information on the Searle Center's activities may be found at: http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter

March 14, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Google, Facebook, Amazon, eBay: Is the internet driving competition or market monopolization?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Justus Haucap and Ulrich Heimeshoff (Dusseldorf Institute for Competition Economics, Heinrich-Heine-University of Dusseldorf) ask Google, Facebook, Amazon, eBay: Is the internet driving competition or market monopolization?

ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the general characteristics of online markets from a competition theory perspective and the implications for competition policy. Three important Internet markets are analyzed in more detail: search engines, online auction platforms, and social networks. Given the high level of market concentration and the development of competition over time, we use our theoretical insights to examine whether leading Internet platforms have non-temporary market power. Based on this analysis we answer the question whether any specific market regulation beyond general competition law rules is warranted in these three online markets.

March 14, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)