What Remedies for Abuses of Dominant Positions? An Economic Analysis of the EC's Decisions

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Patrice Bougette, University of Nice-Sophia Antipolis - Law, Economics, and Management Research Group (GREDEG CNRS), LAMETA CNRS and Frederic M. Marty, Research Group on Law, Economics and Management (UMR CNRS 7321 GREDEG) analyze What Remedies for Abuses of Dominant Positions? An Economic Analysis of the EC's Decisions.

ABSTRACT: Among other factors, one can assess the efficacy of a competition authority by its ability to choose and implement its remedies. Up until now, a dense economic literature has emerged on retrospective merger studies to measure the efficacy of merger control. Yet, little attention has been given to remedies in the other major pillar of competition policy, i.e. abuses of dominant position. In this paper, we try to fill the gap by first highlighting what is at stake and second analyse the most emblematic cases. We focus on the European Commission, while U.S. cases serve us as benchmark.