Tuesday, August 28, 2012

More on the Rabbi Cartel - A Mini Symposium

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Based on the NY Times article and the response by the Conservative Movement's RA on antitrust liability (they think there isn't any), a number of academics will share their thoughts on the Rabbi cartel and the RA statement later this week.  

August 28, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Implications of Behavioral Antitrust

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Maurice Stucke ponders The Implications of Behavioral Antitrust.

ABSTRACT: Behavioral economics is now mainstream. It is also timely. The financial crisis raised important issues of market failure, weak regulation, moral hazard, and our lack of understanding about how many markets actually operate.

As behavioral economics (with its more realistic assumptions of human behavior) goes mainstream in academia and the business world, one expects lawyers and economists to bring the current economic thinking to the competition agencies. How should the competition agencies respond?

This paper examines how competition authorities can consider the implications of behavioral economics on four levels: first as a gap filler, i.e., to help explain “real world” evidence that neoclassical economic theory cannot explain; second to assess critically the assumptions of specific antitrust policies, such as merger review and cartel prosecutions; third to revisit three fundamental antitrust questions, namely what is competition, what are the goals of competition law, and what should be the legal standards to promote those goals; and fourth, to assess how behavioral economics will affect the degree of convergence/divergence of competition law among the over 100 jurisdictions with competition laws today.

August 28, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, August 27, 2012

DOJ Antitrust Economic Analysis Group (EAG) Fall Seminar Schedule

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Economics Seminars

The Economic Analysis Group (EAG) presents a seminar series to advance recent economic analyses in the fields of industrial organization, antitrust, and applied microeconomics. Schedules are organized in the spring and fall.

Location: Seminars are held in  the Liberty Square Building at 450 Fifth St. NW, 9th floor. The closest Metro stop is Gallery Place/Chinatown.
Time: Seminars take place 2:00 to 3:30 p.m. on Tuesdays unless otherwise noted.
Attendance: Seminars are free and open to the public, but prior arrangements must be made in order to pass through building security.
Contact: For more information or to arrange attendance, contact Nathan Miller (nathan.miller@usdoj.gov or 202-307-3773) or Gloria Sheu (gloria.sheu@usdoj.gov or 202-532-4932).
Sept 6
            (Thurs 2-3:30)

Severin Borenstein
Berkeley  Haas

What  Happened to Airline Market Power?
Sept 18

Nathan Wilson

For-Profit  Status and Industry Evolution in Health Care Markets: Evidence from the  Dialysis Industry
Sept 25

Judy Chevalier
Yale  SOM

Promotional  Reviews: An Empirical Investigation of Online Review Manipulation (joint  with Dina Mayzlin and Yaniv Dover)
Oct. 9

Steve Salop
Georgetown  Law

vGUPPI:  Scoring Unilateral Pricing Incentives in Vertical Mergers (joint with Serge  Moresi)
Oct. 16

Allan Collard-Wexler
NYU  Stern

Reallocation  and Technology: Evidence from the U.S. Steel Industry (joint with Jan De  Loecker)
Oct. 23
            (Tues 12-1)

Charles Taragin
              Antitrust  Division

Calibrating Demand Systems and Simulating Mergers: The  Antitrust R Package (brownbag)
Nov. 6

Kevin Murphy
Chicago  Booth

Direct Licensing, PROs and Competition
Nov. 13

Kate Ho

Hospital Choices, Hospital Prices and Financial Incentives  to Physicians (joint with Ariel Pakes)
Nov. 27

Leslie  Marx
Duke  Fuqua

To Be Determined

August 27, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Chilean Agency Offers ‘Practical Guidance’ on Competition

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Javier Tapia, Centre for Regulation and Competition, Universidad de Chile notes that Chilean Agency Offers ‘Practical Guidance’ on Competition.

ABSTRACT: This note briefly describes the Chilean competition authority’s (FNE) new guide on competition law compliance programs. It highlights the focus of the Guidance on the elements of an effective program and observes that the FNE considers companies’ compliance programs in its recommendations relating to fines and in its willingness to settle cases. Remarkably, the FNE approach is an important reminder to competition authorities worldwide that there is a better strategy than the antagonistic approaches of the US Antitrust Division and DG Comp. The note also comments on related case law.

August 27, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

vGUPPI: Scoring Unilateral Pricing Incentives in Vertical Mergers

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Serge Moresi, Charles River Associates (CRA) and Steven C. Salop, Georgetown University Law Center explore vGUPPI: Scoring Unilateral Pricing Incentives in Vertical Mergers.

ABSTRACT: One key concern in vertical merger cases is input foreclosure. Input foreclosure involves raising the costs of competitors in the downstream market, which could in turn increase the sales and profits of the downstream merger partner. In this article, we explain how the upward pricing pressure resulting from unilateral incentives following a vertical merger can be scored with vertical Gross Upward Pricing Pressure Indices (“vGUPPIs”). These vGUPPIs are derived from an economic model where upstream firms sell differentiated inputs to downstream firms which in turn sell differentiated products. There are separate vGUPPIs for the upstream and downstream merging firms and, in addition, vGUPPIs for the rivals of the downstream firm whose costs are raised. Our model also explains how the vGUPPIs can account for potential input substitution and merger-specific elimination of double marginalization. These vGUPPIs are analogous to the horizontal GUPPIs commonly used for the evaluation of unilateral effects in horizontal mergers. Like the horizontal GUPPIs, the vGUPPIs provide more direct evidence on unilateral pricing incentives than other metrics commonly carried out in vertical merger cases, such as concentration indices and vertical arithmetic. They also are simpler to implement and require less data than merger simulation models.

August 27, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

On the Welfare Effects of Exclusive Distribution Arrangements

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Jurgen Eichberger, University of Heidelberg - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics and Frank Mueller‐Langer, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law provide their thoughts On the Welfare Effects of Exclusive Distribution Arrangements.

ABSTRACT: The regulation of vertical relationships between firms is the subject of persistent legal and academic controversy. The literature studying vertical trade relationships seems to assume that an upstream monopolist prefers downstream competition over exclusive distribution arrangements. We derive precise conditions for when an upstream monopolist prefers competing distribution systems over exclusive distribution in the downstream market. We also show that the welfare effects of downstream competition are ambiguous. A downstream oligopoly may have negative welfare properties compared to a downstream monopoly.

August 27, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Competition Within Intellectual Property Regimes - The Instance of Patent Rights

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Rudolph J.R. Peritz, New York Law School has authored Competition Within Intellectual Property Regimes - The Instance of Patent Rights.

ABSTRACT: This chapter describes an emergent jurisprudence and a residual economics that converge to support the reconceptualization of U.S. patent policy as a competition regime. Its approach is inspired by an opinion that Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote for a unanimous Supreme Court some twenty years ago. The Court’s recent patent jurisprudence sounds an echo of the opinion, which described the foundation of patent policy this way: “[F]ree exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the protection of a federal patent is the exception.” There is, Justice O’Connor explained, a “baseline of free competition upon which the patent system's incentive to creative effort depends.”

The chapter develops this proposition in three sections. The first explicates the economics of incentive theory, both its limits and its residual value. The second analyzes the jurisprudence of recent decisions by the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit Court of Appeals – the speciality court for patent and trademark. The third section presents some instances of progressive change that would come of extending the re-conception of the patent system as fundamentally a competition regime, an extension inspired by Justice O’Connor’s image but informed by the failure of incentive theory as the economic logic for patent protection.

August 27, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Entry Time Effects and Follow-on Drugs Competition

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Luiz Flavio Andrade (Gate-Groupe d'analyse theorique et economique) discusses Entry Time Effects and Follow-on Drugs Competition.

ABSTRACT: Pharmaceutical firms have been criticized for concentrating their efforts of R&D on the so called “me-too” or “follow-on” drugs. There have been many comments against and favourable to the dissemination of these incremental innovations but few papers have broached the subject from an empirical point of view, possibly because identification of “me-too” is not so obvious. This paper focuses on the impact of entry order on “follow-on” drugs competition in the French market between years 2001 and 2007. More precisely, this study examines the effects on market share of first entrants in the follow-on drug market and how this possible competitive advantage changes over time. Our results are coherent with theoretical microeconomic issues concerning the importance of being first. We find evidence that first movers in the follow on drug market have the ability to capture and maintain greater market share for a! long period of time. The hierarchical market position of follow on drugs does not seem to be affected by generic drugs emergence. From a dynamic perspective, our analysis shows that market share is positively correlated with the ability of follow on drugs to set prices higher than the average follow-on drug price in a specific therapeutic class (ATC) which means that market power remains considerably important for first movers. Finally we found that the optimum level of innovation to maximize market share is the highest one.

August 27, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Sunday, August 26, 2012

NY Times Coverage of Barak Richman's Crusade Against the Rabbi Cartel in Judaism

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Four words that normally don't go together: Richman, Crusade, Rabbi and Cartel. However, Duke's Barak Richman has waged a crusade (or perhaps jihad) against what he identifies as a cartel in the hiring of Rabbis. Oy vey! The NY Times has coverage here.

August 26, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Saturday, August 25, 2012

Call for papers: "The evolution of antitrust public enforcement"

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The Italian annual journal "Concorrenza e mercato" (Giuffre Publ.), whose 2012 issue has just been published, invites submission of full papers for publication in the next issue (forthcoming 2013). Contributions are invited on the topic: "The evolution of antitrust public enforcement". Completed papers should be submitted by December 31, 2012. The Journal also welcomes, by the same deadline, contributions on competition law and economics dealing with issues other than that above mentioned.

August 25, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Reach Out to a Wide Audience

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The Taiwan FTC makes an effort to Reach Out to a Wide Audience.

ABSTRACT: Although the FTC has received individual satisfactory surveys from key audience members after each competition advocacy activity, and has published annual performance evaluations of its outreach program, it was concerned that the effectiveness of its competition advocacy intervention might not be completely reflected due to diverse evaluation criteria. In this context, the FTC called on an external expert in 2011 to assess the effectiveness of its competition advocacy and a survey was conducted, focusing on regulatory agencies that have received advices from the FTC as well as firms that have participated in advocacy events for competition in the past two years. The results of this survey are as follows:

1. 89 percent of target respondents from other governmental agencies agreed that suggestions and advices provided by the FTC are helpful for future decisions. 87 percent of respondents agreed that they would take FTC's advices into account when reviewing current policies, or use them as references for developing future policies.

2. 77 percent of target respondents from the business sector replies that they have a better understanding of competition laws after attending competition advocacy activities. More than 90 percent of respondents recognized that the outreach program could effectively assist business in building a corporate image of integrity and reducing the risk of competition law infringement. In response to this survey it is suggested that it would be of help if the outreach could be held in cooperation with business associations or industrial sectors.

Advocacy has been among the FTC's most important functions apart from law enforcement. The results of this outside report expressly show that the current outreach and competition advocacy programs have delivered a clear and consistent message to regulators, business, and consumers -that competition plays such a vital role in the market economy.

August 25, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, August 24, 2012

The Impact of Telecommunication Technologies on Competition in Services and Goods Markets: Empirical Evidence

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Vahagn Jerbashian and Anna Kochanovay (CERGE-EI) offer The Impact of Telecommunication Technologies on Competition in Services and Goods Markets: Empirical Evidence.

ABSTRACT: In this paper we empirically show that a more intensive use and wider adoption of telecommunication technologies significantly increases the level of product market competition in services and goods markets. Our result is consistent with the view that the use of telecommunication technologies can lower the costs of entry. This finding is robust to various measures of competition and a range of specification checks.

August 24, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Does Multimarket Contact Facilitate Tacit Collusion? Inference on Conduct Parameters in the Airline Industry

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Federico Ciliberto, University of Virginia and Jonathan W. Williams, University of Georgia ask Does Multimarket Contact Facilitate Tacit Collusion? Inference on Conduct Parameters in the Airline Industry.

ABSTRACT: We provide empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that multimarket contact facilitates tacit collusion in the US airline industry using two complementary approaches. First, we show that the more extensive is the overlap in the markets that the two firms serve, i) the more firms internalize the effect of their pricing decisions on the profit of their competitors by reducing the discrepancy in their prices, and ii) the greater the rigidity of prices over time. Next, we develop a flexible model of oligopolistic behavior, where conduct parameters are modeled as functions of multimarket contact. We find i) carriers with little multimarket contact do not cooperate in setting fares, while we cannot reject the hypothesis that carriers serving many markets simultaneously sustain almost perfect coordination; ii) cross-price elasticities play a crucial role in determining the impact of multimarket contact on collusive behavior and equilibrium fares; iii) marginal changes in multimarket contact matter only at low or moderate levels of contact; iv) assuming that firms behave as Bertrand-Nash competitors leads to biased estimates of marginal costs.

August 24, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Bargaining, vertical mergers and entry

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Geza Sapi (Dusseldorf Institute for Competition Economics) discusses Bargaining, vertical mergers and entry.

ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes vertical integration incentives in a bilaterally duopolistic industry where upstream producers bargain with downstream retailers on terms of supply. In the applied framework integration does not affect the total output produced, but it affects the distribution of rents among players. Vertical integration incentives depend on the strength of substitutability or complementarity between products and the shape of the unit cost function. I demonstrate furthermore that in contrast to the widely prevailing view in competition policy, vertical integration can under particular circumstances convey more bargaining power to the merged entity than a horizontal merger to monopoly. The model is applied to analyze strategic merger incentives to influence entry decisions. Mergers can facilitate and deter entry. While horizontal mergers to deter entry are never profitable, firms on different market levels may strategi! cally choose to integrate vertically to keep a potential entrant out of the market. I provide conditions for such entry-deterring vertical mergers to occur.

August 24, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, August 23, 2012

Kovacic on Robert C. Marshall & Leslie M. Marx, The Economics of Collusion – Cartels and Bidding Rings

Posted by William E. Kovacic

No modern development in antitrust law is more striking than the global acceptance of a norm that condemns cartels as the market’s most dangerous competitive vice.  As the 1990s began, only the United States and a few other jurisdictions actively challenged horizontal price-fixing, bid-rigging, and market allocations.  By the decade’s end, lysine, leniency, and vitamins had changed all of that. Today, more and more antitrust systems treat cartels as serious offenses.  

Expanded prosecution of cartels with increasingly powerful sanctions has inspired an abundance of excellent books about collusion.  Recent superb volumes include collections of essays on the operation, detection, and punishment of cartels.[1]  With Economics of Collusion, Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx have surpassed a formidable field.[2]  Economics of Collusion is the best single volume yet written about the formation and operation of cartels and bidding rings.  It is destined to be an indispensable text for enforcement officials, academics, business procurement officials, and practitioners in law firms and economic consultancies.

Three features of the book stand out.  First, in examining how cartels function, Marshall and Marx combine a state-of-the-art distillation of economic theory with a comprehensive reading of publicly
available accounts of prosecuted cartels, especially the cartel decisions of the European Commission. In several chapters, the authors present the material with first person narration from the perspective of a fictional business manager who instructs managers from rival companies about the best ways to design and implement collusive schemes.  By setting out the gains that conspirators can realize, the narrative underscores why firms strive (and will continue to strive) to find inventive means of coordination to counteract enhancements in anti-cartel enforcement.  The portrayal of coordination problems and their solutions is highly instructive -- and so well-informed and powerfully realistic that it has a how-to-build-a-nuclear-weapon quality for prospective cartel participants.

A second valuable feature of The Economics of Collusion is its pathbreaking analysis of what cartels must do to succeed. Marshall and Marx model cartels as two-stage mechanisms whose effectiveness often requires the application of collusive and exclusionary tactics.  In the first stage participants reach a consensus about how they will restrict output or, in the case of a bidding ring, depress the price to be offered at an auction.  In an especially important contribution to the literature, Marshall and Marx illuminate what happens next.  Not only must the cartel cope with cheating and defections within its own ranks, it must neutralize challenges posed by entrants, suppliers, customers, substitute products, and rivals which chose not to join the conspiracy.  Marshall and Marx adapt Michael Porter’s “five forces” model to identify the external threats to the cartel and to examine how successful cartels cope with them.  In many instances, cartels address stage-two threats with exclusionary tactics that individual dominant firms use to chasten rivals.  Among other means of exclusion, cartels engage in predatory pricing, file vexatious patent infringement suits, and form exclusive dealing contracts with upstream suppliers.  By analyzing cartels as two-stage mechanisms, Marshall and Marx show how successful collusion often requires recourse to exclusionary behavior, as well.

In a third important contribution, this volume draws upon experience with cartels to suggest refinements in the approaches that antitrust law uses to define concerted action and to analyze horizontal mergers.  Marshall and Marx propose a reformulation of the assessment of “plus
factors” as tools to distinguish concerted action from unilateral behavior.  They identify a category of
“super plus factors” entitled to special weight based upon their importance to the operation of a cartel.  The authors also describe how close study of past cartels (especially the vitamins cartel)
provides lessons for the analysis of possible coordinated effects from a horizontal merger.

One useful addition to the book would have been a concluding chapter that drives home more expressly and completely the interconnections among what often are seen as the distinct subject areas of cartels, dominant firm misconduct, and mergers.  The analysis of cartels as two-stage mechanisms and the application of cartel experience to the treatment of coordinated effects in merger enforcement go a great distance to discourage the traditional tendency to study cartels, mergers, and single-firm conduct in airtight compartments.  A final chapter that emphasized the conceptual links across these previously discrete areas of analysis would have made a great book even more impressive.

[1] Examples include Criminalising Cartels (Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi, eds., Hart, 2011); John Connor, Global Price Fixing (2d edition, Springer, 2008); Handbook of Procurement (Nicola Dmitri, Gustavo Piga & Giancarlo Spagnolo eds., Cambridge, 2006). European Competition Law Annual 2006: Enforcement of Prohibition of Cartels (Claus Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu eds., Hart, 2007).

[2] In offering this opinion, I am not an entirely disinterested observer.  I have co-authored papers with Marshall and Marx and have worked with them on various projects involving antitrust law and procurement policy.

August 23, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Ten Years of Pros and Cons Conferences

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Arvid Fredenberg (Swedish Competition Authority) describes Ten Years of Pros and Cons Conferences. As a participant in one of these conferences, I should add that I think that the Swedish Competition Authority really does a nice job in putting together good themes and a lively debate.

ABSTRACT: It could have started better. Einar Hope, former Director-General of the Norwegian Competition Authority and Professor of Energy Economics at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration phoned in on September 5, 2002 to say that he had sprained his ankle and was unable to attend the conference. He was supposed to be the moderator of the Swedish Competition Authority's first Pros and Cons conference, the Pros and Cons of Merger Control. When Director-General Ann-Christin Nykvist next day entered the stage in the meeting room Trafalgar in a hotel in the Old Town of Stockholm she did not know that it marked the beginning of a now ten-year old tradition of organizing Pros and Cons conferences....Among the research seminars we arrange, the series of Pros and Cons conferences are our success story. We have covered numerous topics throughout the years. We always try to set a timely topic in order to stimulate discussions and let the input from the researchers influence the agenda. A timely topic is one of the keys to our success in organizing conferences. Finding the best mix of researchers and discussants to get a thought-provoking discussion is another.

August 23, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

American Needle Inc. v. NFL

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Matt Mitten, Marquette University - Law School has written on American Needle Inc. v. NFL.

ABSTRACT: In American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, a 2010 case, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that the National Football League (NFL) clubs’ centralized and exclusive licensing of their individual trademarks through a wholly owned league subsidiary is not immune from judicial scrutiny under §1. This landmark decision has broad implications because its rationale suggests that all collective decisions by a U.S. professional sports league’s member clubs that reduce intrabrand economic competition among themselves (e.g., joint decisions regarding the ownership, number, and geographical location of teams, restrictions on the sale of broadcasting rights, labor relations issues, etc.) are subject to §1. Before describing and analyzing American Needle, this chapter explains how U.S. major professional sports leagues are structured and governed and briefly surveys the rulings of lower courts, which generally rejected the single entity defense. It concludes by reviewing how lower courts have applied American Needle to subsequent sports antitrust litigation and scholarly commentary regarding its future application to professional sports leagues.

August 23, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Looking at the Monopsony in the Mirror

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Maurice E. Stucke, University of Tennessee College of Law is Looking at the Monopsony in the Mirror.

ABSTRACT: Although still a distant second to monopoly, buyer power and monopsony are hot topics in the antitrust community. Despite the increasing interest in monopsony and buyer power, relatively few cases have actually been brought. Given the relatively few antitrust cases, the legal standards for monopsony claims are less developed than for monopoly claims. In recent years, courts, competition agencies, and scholars in addressing monopsony begin with a simple premise: monopsony is the mirror image of monopoly. But as this Article contends, courts and agencies should be careful when importing monopolization standards for monopsony cases. What works for monopolization claims may not necessarily work for monopsony claims.

This Article discusses two key issues: first, how much market share must defendant possess to be a monopsony? If courts and agencies assume that monopsony is the mirror image of monopoly, should the agencies and courts use the same market share thresholds for monopsonization claims as in monopolization claims? Second, should agencies and courts use consumer harm as a threshold screen for monopsony claims?

August 23, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Baby and the Bathwater - The Relationship in Competition Law between Private Enforcement, Criminal Penalties, and Leniency Policy

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Angus MacCulloch, Lancaster University - Law School and Bruce Wardhaugh, Newcastle University - Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences have posted an interesting paper on The Baby and the Bathwater - The Relationship in Competition Law between Private Enforcement, Criminal Penalties, and Leniency Policy.

ABSTRACT: Across the EU we have witnessed the development of numerous programmes to eradicate cartel activity. Some of the significant developments have been increasing administrative fines, the development of leniency policy, the introduction of criminal sanctions, and the encouragement of private actions for compensation. This paper examines the interaction of criminal sanctions and leniency, and the interaction between private enforcement and leniency. The paper highlights the tensions and conflicts which arise between leniency policy and these new enforcement tools and suggests that these new polices should be seen as adjuncts to mainstream administrative enforcement. Where conflicts arise between public enforcement, as supported by corporate leniency, and criminal or private enforcement we suggest that maintaining the effectiveness of public enforcement should prioritised.

August 23, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)


Posted by D. Daniel Sokol


ABSTRACT: As antitrust becomes more complex, so do its remedies. While access and disclosure remedies have been a part of antitrust law since the very earliest days of the Sherman Act, they have become a vital part of litigated cases and settlements only recently in both the United States and the European Union. This has been particularly true for cases involving network industries, telecommunications, broadcasting, software platforms, and other high-technology industries at the forefront of antitrust enforcement. Interestingly, these cases and settlements constitute an informal revival of the essential facilities doctrine and an acknowledgement that the doctrine (and its equivalents) remain an important and needed part of the antitrust toolkit. This article will examine the growing use of complex behavioral remedies in both merger and monopolization cases, which suggest antitrust enforcement has moved far beyond any stated preference for structural remedies. Among the examples I use are the Microsoft and Intel litigation in the United States and the European Union, as well as more recent merger consent decrees involving Google-ITA, Comcast-Universal, and Livenation-Ticketmaster to illustrate these important changes in competition law enforcement and what they portend for the future.

August 23, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)