Tuesday, January 26, 2010

CARTEL SANCTIONS AND THE BALANCE OF OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Jevons Forum 2010: Cartel Sanctions and the Balance of... Logo

The UCL Jevons Institute for Competition Law and Economics is pleased to announce its Fifth Annual  Forum on Antitrust and Regulation:


CARTEL SANCTIONS AND THE BALANCE OF OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT


to be held on 4 February 2010  from 5.30 - 8.00pm, at University College London
accredited with 2 CPD hours by the Bar Standards Board and the Solicitors Regulation Authority


About this event:

Use of cartel sanctions and the effectiveness of public and private enforcement against cartels is coming under renewed scrutiny.  Some of the issues that are being considered in Europe include: enhanced penalties for recidivism, full waivers for leniency applicants who are also ringleaders, co-operation outside the leniency process, the role of private damages and the issue of parent-company liability.  The issue of criminal sanctions is being considered at national level.  The incoming Commissioner Almunia and DG Comp will have to tackle all these issues in the coming months.  These themes have implications also national level for both national authorities and courts, particularly in the UK where private damages are taking off and cartelists can be exposed to criminal prosecutions.  Judge Douglas Ginsburg of US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit will discuss some of those issues from a US and international perspective and the Jevons Forum will include contributions from John Fingleton of the OFT, Ewatt Sakker of the European Commission and a judge from the newly-renamed EU General Court.  Sir Christopher Bellamy a former CFI judge and President of the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal will chair the debate.

To book your place at this event please click on the link below.

 

You are invited to the following event:
Jevons Forum 2010: Cartel Sanctions and the Balance of Optimal Enforcement

Date:
Thursday, February 04, 2010 from 5:30 PM - 8:00 PM (GMT)

Location:
UCL Gustave Tuck Lecture Theatre
Gower St
London
United Kingdom

 

 

Can you attend this event?  Respond Here

 


January 26, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Antitrust and Competition Policy Blog Online Symposium on Competition in Agriculture Coming Soon

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The week of February 8, 2010, we will host an online symposium of a number of professors on competition in agriculture, which will include some discussion of antitrust/IP issues.  More details to follow once we have confirmation of all of the participants.

January 26, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Submarket Dynamics and Innovation: The Case of the U.S. Tire Industry

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Guido Buenstorf and Steven Klepper write on Submarket Dynamics and Innovation: The Case of the U.S. Tire Industry.

ABSTRACT: Beginning in 1922, the rate of exit of U.S. tire producers increased sharply and the industry began a severe and protracted shakeout. Just five years earlier, the tire industry experienced a surge in entry that led to a rise of over 80% in the number of producers. We propose an explanation for this episode based on the idea of industry submarkets, which we incorporate in a model of shakeouts. We test this theory and alternative explanations for the surge in entry and exit and the shakeout using a novel data set on patenting in tires and production in the early 1920s of the cord tire, a key innovation we feature in our theory. Our analysis suggests that the development of a new submarket can open up opportunities for entry but also stimulate innovation and in the process reinforce the advantages of the leading incumbents, accentuating the shakeout of producers.

January 26, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, January 25, 2010

It is Not too late to register for the NYU/AALS/ABA Antitrust conference this Friday

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

I have read a number of the papers already. The Next Generation of Antitrust Scholarship Conference will be a very worthwhile conference to attend.  You can still register for free (and with free lunch and CLE credits no less!) here.

January 25, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Organization of Professional Sports Leagues: A Comparison of European and North-American Leagues from the Perspective of Platform Organization

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Helmut Dietl (Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich) and Tobias Duschl (Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich) ponder The Organization of Professional Sports Leagues: A Comparison of European and North-American Leagues from the Perspective of Platform Organization.

ABSTRACT: In this paper, we compare European and North-American sports leagues from the perspective of platform organization. We find that European leagues can be characterized as open, not only in the sense of promotion and relegation, but also in the sense of attenuated/dispersed property rights and free access on all market sides. North American leagues, on the other hand, are organized as closed platforms with exclusive/concentrated property rights and high entry barriers on all market sides. This difference explains why European clubs outperform their North American counterparts in terms of revenue generation, i.e. value creation, and why North American clubs are much more profitable than most European clubs. European leagues are organized as open platforms, which invite and facilitate participation from all relevant market sides. The absence of concentrated property rights and the possibility of free market entry, however, limit the opportunities of value appropriation.

January 25, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

A dynamic analysis of consolidation in the broadcast television industry

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Jessica C. Stahl (Federal Reserve) addresses A dynamic analysis of consolidation in the broadcast television industry.

ABSTRACT: This paper estimates a dynamic oligopoly model in order to separately identify the demand-side and cost-side advantages of consolidation in the broadcast television industry. I exploit an exogenous change in regulation that led to significant industry consolidation. Using revenue and ownership data for broadcast stations over the past ten years, I estimate the effect of ownership changes on revenue. I recover costs by examining patterns in ownership changes that are left unexplained by revenue estimation. I model firms' purchasing decisions as a dynamic game, and estimate the game using a two-step estimation method recently developed by Bajari, Benkard & Levin (2007). This is the first paper to estimate a model of merger activity in a dynamic, strategic setting. I find that there are both revenue and cost advantages to consolidation, but they operate through different mechanisms. Access to a wider audience enables firms to increase per-station advertising revenue, while simply owning more stations enables firms to reduce per-station operating costs. A firm's ability to realize these benefits is affected by its stations' network affiliations, locations and viewers.

January 25, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Multisided Media Markets: Applying the Theory of Multisided Markets to Media Markets

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Nadine Lindstädt (Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark) undertakes Multisided Media Markets: Applying the Theory of Multisided Markets to Media Markets.

ABSTRACT: Media markets recently have been identified as multisided markets. The application of the theory of multisided markets provides a better understanding of such markets. It enriched the hitherto economic approach and led to new insights and perspectives especially for the antitrust authorities when evaluating competition constraints and mergers. This paper reviews the theory of multisided markets and subsequently applies it to media markets. Finally the paper draws attention to the new perspectives and insights the theory provides but also brings open research questions to light.

January 25, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Interaction between Antitrust and Intellectual Property: the Interoperability Issue in the Microsoft Europe Case

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Alessandro Diego Scopelliti (Department of Economics, University of Warwick) explains The Interaction between Antitrust and Intellectual Property: the Interoperability Issue in the Microsoft Europe Case.

ABSTRACT: The present work analyzes the interaction between antitrust policy and intellectual property protection, with particular reference to the cases of refusal to supply, when it concerns ideas or inventions protected by an IP right. For this purpose, the paper preliminarily discusses the governing principles of antitrust policy on abuse of dominance and refusal to deal, as they have been implemented in the decisions of the EU Competition Authority, and it presents the specific issues related to the implementation of antitrust policy in the innovative industries. Then, the paper examines in particular the Microsoft Europe Case, as decided by the European Commission in 2004, focusing on the issue of the interoperability between the operating systems for personal computers and the operating systems for work group servers. The theoretical model, developed as an extension of the framework proposed by Choi and Stefanadis (2001) to! the case of refusal to deal, suggests an explanation of the case, alternative to the one adopted by the Commission, if not necessarily in the final outcome of the decision, at least in the analytical arguments and in the dynamics of the market structure. In particular, we show that the refusal to supply the compatibility between the two complementary products was determined not only by the intention to leverage its dominant position to the adjacent market of server operating systems, but especially by the concern for keeping the monopoly on its core market, that is the one of PC operating system, given the future evolution of the software market, due to the diffusion of cloud computing.

January 25, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Sunday, January 24, 2010

For Readers of the Blog - Make Some Connections

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

I have created a networking site for readers of the blog on linkedin, which from what I can tell is Facebook but for professionals.  You can access it here.

January 24, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Saturday, January 23, 2010

DOJ Files Complaint Against Dean Foods in Consumated Merger Case

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The complaint is here.  It should be an interesting case.

January 23, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, January 22, 2010

The Impact of Mergers on the Degree of Competition in the Banking Industry

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Vittoria Cerasi (Bicocca University), Barbara Chizzolini (Bocconi University) and Marc Ivaldi (Toulouse School of Economics) have written on The Impact of Mergers on the Degree of Competition in the Banking Industry.

ABSTRACT: This paper analyses the relation between competition and concentration in the banking sector. The empirical answer is given by testing a monopolistic competition model of bank branching behaviour on individual bank data at county level (départements and provinces) in France and Italy. We propose a measure of the degree of competiveness in each local market that is function also of market structure indicators. We then use the econometric model to evaluate the impact of horizontal mergers among incumbent banks on competition and discuss when, depending on the pre-merger structure of the market and geographic distribution of branches, the merger is anti-competitive. The paper has implications for competition policy as it suggests an applied tool to evaluate the potential anti-competitive impact of mergers.

January 22, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Google Book Settlement Conference

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

HALF-DAY CONFERENCE ON THE AMENDED GOOGLE BOOK SETTLEMENT
THE CHALLENGE OF BUILDING A DIGITAL LIBRARY THAT BENEFITS ALL
Brussels, Friday, 12 February 2010

PROGRAMME
13:45 – 14:00 Registration and Coffee
14:00 – 14:10 Welcoming Remarks
Nicolas Petit, Lecturer, ULg, Co-director, IEJE
SESSION 1 – IMPLICATIONS OF THE GOOGLE BOOK SETTLEMENT – THE ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVE
CHAIR Nicolas Petit, Lecturer, ULg, Co-director, IEJE
14:10 – 14:30 The Google Book Settlement: Towards a True Digital Library or an Online
Billboard?
Alain Strowel, Professor, FUSL and ULg, Attorney
14:30 – 15:00 How to Fix the Google Book Settlement?
James Grimmelmann, Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School
15:00 – 15:30 How Fair is the Google Book Settlement?
Pamela Samuelson, Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley
(videoconference)
15:30 – 16:00 Discussion
16:00 – 16:30 Coffee Break
SESSION 2 – CONSEQUENCES OF THE GOOGLE BOOK SETTLEMENT IN EUROPE – THE STAKEHOLDERS’
PERSPECTIVE
CHAIR Alain Strowel, Professor, FUSL and ULg, attorney
16:30 – 16:45 The View of Google
Philippe Colombet, Head of Google Books France [TBC]
16:45 – 17:00 The View of the European Commission
Grazyna Piesiewicz-Stepniewska, European Commission, DG Information
Society
17:00 – 17:15 The View of the Libraries
Harald Mueller, Librarian, Max Planck Institute (Heidelberg), speaking for the
International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions (IFLA)
17:15 – 17:30 The View of the Publishers
Kurt Van Damme, Association of Flemish Publishers
17:30 – 17:45 The View from a Competition Lawyer
Ian Forrester, Partner, White & Case LLP
17:45 – 18:15 Roundtable Discussion and Conclusions by the Chair

Download Conference Programme - Google Book Settlement - 12 February 2010 - Brussels

January 22, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Quantifying antitrust damages: Towards non-binding guidance for courts

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The EU has released a study on Quantifying antitrust damages: Towards non-binding guidance for courts.

Study prepared for the European Commission
Oxera
and a multi-jurisdictional team of lawyers led by Dr Assimakis Komninos
With economic assistance from
Dr Walter Beckert, Professor Eric van Damme,
Professor Mathias Dewatripont,
Professor Julian Franks, Dr Adriaan ten Kate
and Professor Patrick Legros
December 2009

January 22, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Does Intellectual Monopoly Help Innovation?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Michele Boldrin (Minnesota- Econ) and David K Levine (UCLA- Econ) ask Does Intellectual Monopoly Help Innovation?

January 22, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, January 21, 2010

Job Opportunity for JDs - Legal Economics in Boston

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

From Einer Elhauge (Harvard Law):

  • The firm with which I consult, Legal Economics, is looking to hire a JD with economics background to work on consulting matters related to the application of economics to legal issues for me and other Harvard professors. The person would have to be brilliant, hardworking, and interested in working in Harvard Square. It generally pays more than law firms for comparable seniority. If you know anyone who might be interested, please ask them to send me a resume.

 

January 21, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

NYU Annual Survey of American Law Symposium "Critical Directions in Antitrust"

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

NYU Annual Survey of American Law Symposium "Critical Directions in Antitrust"

Greenberg Lounge
Vanderbilt Hall
40 Washington Square South
Friday, February 19, 2010
9:30 AM – 4:00 PM

Please join us for this symposium, which will bring together academics and practitioners in the field of antitrust law. The symposium’s three panels will explore recent developments in antitrust and potential new directions for enforcement. CLE credit is available to attendees. Please register here.

Schedule

9:30 am REGISTRATION AND BREAKFAST
10:00 am

OPENING REMARKS
HARRY FIRST
Charles L. Denison Professor of Law, New York University School of Law

RICHARD REVESZ
Dean, New York University School of Law

10:15 am PANEL 1: GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT

Government enforcement agencies play a key role in enforcing the antitrust laws. The FTC, DOJ, and FCC all review mergers and challenge anticompetitive behavior. This panel reviews recent changes and developments in government enforcement and discusses what the role of government enforcement should be.

Moderator: HARRY FIRST
Charles L. Denison Professor of Law, New York University School of Law
Panelists:

KEVIN ARQUIT
Partner, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, LLP

JONATHAN BAKER
Chief Economist, Federal Communications Commission

HOWARD SHELANSKI
Deputy Director for Antitrust, Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics

PHILIP WEISER
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for International, Policy, and Appellate Matters, United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division

ROBERT WILLIG
Professor of Economics and Public Affairs, The Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs at Princeton Universtiy

11:45 am COFFEE BREAK
12:00 pm PANEL 2: ANTITRUST AND INNOVATION

One of the most important questions facing antitrust practice in the coming decades is that of how antitrust should encourage and interact with innovation. There is a tension between policies that encourage innovation, such as granting temporary monopolies to innovators, and the antitrust laws that foster competition. How should these interests be balanced?

Moderator: ELEANOR FOX
Walter J. Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation, New York University School of Law
Panelists:

HERBERT HOVENKAMP
Ben and Dorothy Willie Chair, University of Iowa School of Law

JANUSZ ORDOVER
Professor of Economics, New York University

ROBERT PITOFSKY
Dean Emeritus, Joseph and Madeline Sheehy Professor of Antitrust and Trade Regulation Law, Georgetown Law

MARIUS SCHWARTZ
Professor of Economics, Georgetown University

1:15 pm LUNCH BREAK
2:30 pm PANEL 3: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT

This panel will discuss developments in private antitrust suits, including class actions following government investigations and suits brought by competitors over harm to competition.    

Moderator: ILENE GOTTS
Partner, Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz
Panelists:

JONATHAN JACOBSON
Partner, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, LLP

STACEY ANNE MAHONEY
Partner, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, LLP

J. DOUGLAS RICHARDS
Managing Partner of the New York Office, Cohen Milstein

DANIEL RUBINFELD
Robert L. Bridges Professor of Law, Professor of Economics, University of California Berkeley

3:45 pm CLOSING REMARKS


January 21, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Net Neutrality on the Internet

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

UCL: Net Neutrality on the Internet (Economides) Logo

UCL Centre for Law and Economics (Public Policy Section) invites you to a lecture on 


Net Neutrality on the Internet


Speaker: 
Professor Nick Economides, NYU Stern Business School


Thursday 21 January, 3-5pm 
Room L103 at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Charles Clore House, Russell Square, London WC1


About this lecture:
The presentation will discuss net neutrality regulation in the context of a two-sided  market model. Platforms sell Internet access services to consumers and  may set fees to content - and application providers on the Internet.  When access is monopolized, for reasonable parameter ranges, net  neutrality regulation (requiring zero fees to content providers)  increases the total industry surplus as compared to the fully private  optimum at which the monopoly platform imposes positive fees on  content providers. However, there are also parameter ranges for which total industry surplus is reduced. Imposing net neutrality in duopoly with multi-homing content providers and single-homing consumers  increases the total surplus as compared to duopoly competition with  positive fees to content providers. The speaker will also discuss the desirability, from an economic welfare perspective, or not of net neutrality regulation

About the speaker:
Professor Nicholas Economides is an internationally recognized academic authority on network economics, electronic commerce and public policy. His fields of specialization and research include the economics of networks, especially of telecommunications, computers, and information, the economics of technical compatibility and standardization, industrial organization, the structure and organization of financial markets and payment systems, antitrust, application of public policy to network industries, strategic analysis of markets and law and economics.

Professor Economides has published more than 100 articles in top academic journals in the areas of networks, telecommunications, oligopoly, antitrust, product positioning and on the liquidity and the organization of financial markets and exchanges. He holds a PhD and MA in Economics from the University of California at Berkeley, as well as a BSc (First Class Honors) in Mathematical Economics from the London School of Economics. Previously, he taught at Columbia University (1981-1988) and at Stanford University (1988-1990). He is editor of the Information Economics and Policy, Netnomics, Quarterly Journal of Electronic Commerce, the Journal of Financial Transformation, Journal of Network Industries, on the Advisory Board of the Social Science Research Network, editor of Economics of Networks Abstracts by SSRN and former editor of the International Journal of Industrial Organization. His website on the Economics of Networks has been ranked as one of the top four economics sites worldwide by The Economist magazine.

 

Professor Economides is Executive Director of the NET Institute, http://www.NETinst.org, a worldwide focal point for research on the economics of network and high technology industries. He is advisor to the US Federal Trade Commission, the governments of Greece, Ireland, New Zealand and Portugal, the Attorney General of New York State, major telecommunications corporations, a number of the Federal Reserve Banks, the Bank of Greece and major Financial Exchanges. He serves on the Advisory Board of the Economist Intelligence Unit. He has commented extensively in broadcast and in print on high technology, antitrust and public policy issues.

You are invited to the following event:
UCL: Net Neutrality on the Internet (Economides)

Date:
Thursday, January 21, 2010 from 3:00 PM - 5:00 PM (GMT)

Location:
Room L103, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies
Charles Clore House
Russell Square
WC1 London
United Kingdom

 

 

Can you attend this event?  Respond Here

 

January 21, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Merger Failures

Posted D. Daniel Sokol

Albert Banal-Estañol (Department d’Economia i Empresa, Universitat Pompeu Fabra) and Jo Seldeslachts (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin) discuss Merger Failures.

ABSTRACT: This paper proposes an explanation as to why some mergers fail, based on the interaction between the pre- and post-merger processes. We argue that failure may stem from informational asymmetries arising from the pre-merger period, and problems of cooperation and coordination within recently merged firms. We show that a partner may optimally agree to merge and abstain from putting forth any post-merger effort, counting on the other partner to make the necessary efforts. If both follow the same course of action, the merger goes ahead but fails. Our unique equilibrium allows us to make predictions on which mergers are more likely to fail.

January 21, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Foreclosing Competition through Access Charges and Price Discrimination

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Ángel L. López (IESE Business School) and Patrick Rey (Toulouse School of Economics) explain Foreclosing Competition through Access Charges and Price Discrimination.

ABSTRACT: This article analyzes competition between two asymmetric networks, an incumbent and a new entrant. Networks compete in non-linear tariffs and may charge different prices for on-net and off-net calls. Departing from cost-based access pricing allows the incumbent to foreclose the market in a profitable way. If the incumbent benefits from customer inertia, then it has an incentive to insist in the highest possible access markup even if access charges are reciprocal and even in the absence of actual switching costs. If instead the entrant benefits from customer activism, then foreclosure is profitable only when switching costs are large enough. 

January 21, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, January 20, 2010

Exclusive Dealing: The Interaction between Foreclosure and Investment Promotion

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Chiara Fumagalli (Bocconi University), Massimo Motta (Bologna University), and Thomas Rønde (Copenhagen Business School)  analyze Exclusive Dealing: The Interaction between Foreclosure and Investment Promotion.

ABSTRACT: This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be the very reason why a contract that forecloses a more efficient supplier is signed. Absent the effect on investment, the contract would not be signed and foreclosure would not be a concern. For this reason, considering potential foreclosure and investment promotion in isolation and then summing them up may not be a suitable approach to assess the net effect of ED. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defence for ED.

January 20, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)