Thursday, December 17, 2009

Are All Mergers Equally Delay-Averse? An Empirical Analysis of Procedural Delay in European Commission Merger Cases (1999-2008)

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Peter L. Ormosi, ESRC Centre for Competition Policy has a nice empirical piece on Are All Mergers Equally Delay-Averse? An Empirical Analysis of Procedural Delay in European Commission Merger Cases (1999-2008).

ABSTRACT: This article looks at the distribution of two EC merger procedural events and examines the effect of the indefinite-length suspension of merger investigations. Although the ECMR refers to the suspension of investigations as an exceptional instrument, it is used in a high proportion of cases. As the ECMR does not set a time limit for suspension, it can lead to significant delay in the assessment of mergers. To understand the causes of delay, this article relies on the fact that the suspension of the investigation is a consequence of merging parties’ failure to provide the necessary information to the Commission. Two main causes of this behaviour are identified. Firstly, merging parties may decide to intentionally withhold information in order to cause the suspension of the investigation, which allows them more time to do whatever is necessary to avoid a lengthy second phase investigation. Secondly, failure to provide the required information to the Commission may be a result of merging parties’ negligence towards the regulatory assessment of their merger. Whereas the first case may be socially beneficial, identifying the second type of behaviour may help in filtering out inefficient mergers.

December 17, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Real Knowledge is to Know the Extent of One's Own Ignorance: On the Consumer Harm Approach in Innovation-Related Competition Cases

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Josef Drexl, Max Planck Institute has posted Real Knowledge is to Know the Extent of One's Own Ignorance: On the Consumer Harm Approach in Innovation-Related Competition Cases.

ABSTRACT: Modern economics advocates an assessment of competition law cases in light of the effects of firm conduct on the relevant market. In many instances, law enforcers and also firms that have to assess the legality of their business models in advance will often have to predict the “likely” effects in the future. This obviously creates a problem of uncertainty. This article reviews this problem for the assessment of competition law cases in innovation-related markets. Thereby, three specific sets of cases are discussed: (1.) the GlaxoSmithKline cases in Europe, where the question was whether R&D intensive pharmaceutical companies should be allowed to restrain parallel trade between Member States in order to enhance their ability to invest in innovation, (2.) the European Microsoft case, and (3.) “pay-for-delay” settlements of patent litigation proceedings that involve a so-called “reverse payment” by the patent holder to the generic drugs producer for delaying the market entry of the generic drug. Thereby, the article aims to identify the most appropriate standard of liability against the background of the problem of uncertainty. It rejects the consumer harm standard which is accepted by the courts in the U.S. and traditionally rejected by the EU courts in favor of a concept of protecting the process of dynamic competition which focuses on the elements of rivalry, openness of the market, and consumer choice.

December 17, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, December 16, 2009

Competition Law, Innovation And Antitrust: An Analysis of Tying and Technological Integration

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Hedvig Schmidt (University of Southampton Law) has a book out on Competition Law, Innovation And Antitrust: An Analysis of Tying and Technological Integration.

BOOK ABSTRACT: Contents: 1. Introduction 2. Tying from an Economic Perspective 3. Tying Arrangements under Article 82 EC 4. Tying Arrangements under US Antitrust Law 5. Intellectual Property Law and Tying – An Alternative Approach 6. Alternative Solutions, the Development of a New Regulatory Model 7. Conclusion Bibliography Index

December 16, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Breaking News II: Intel Sued by FTC

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

What a big day!  First Microsoft settles in Europe and now the FTC sues Intel.  One thing that I hope that US antitrust enforcers have learned from Microsoft is that you should not bring such a case unless you can have effective remedies. 

December 16, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Breaking News I: The End is Here - EU Settles With Microsoft

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The expected Microsoft settlement is now official.  It will take years for academics to figure out the true costs of the Microsoft litigation.  I recommend the many articles and book by my colleague Bill Page on the topic.  For an alternative viewpoint, there is the forthcoming book by Harry First and Andy Gavil.

The Commission's press release is here while the Microsoft one is here.

This should be a quiet Christmas for Microsoft.  Last week the DOJ concluded that Microsoft’s documentation of its protocols was “substantially complete.” 

December 16, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Economics And The Enforcement Of European Competition Law

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Christopher Decker, Regulatory Policy Institute and University of Oxford has written on Economics And The Enforcement Of European Competition Law.

BOOK ABSTRACT: Recent years have seen a trend toward an ‘economics-based’ approach to the enforcement of European competition law. But what is meant by ‘economics-based’, and how does this approach sit with legal and enforcement practice? This book explores these issues by examining how economic expertise features in the enforcement activity of the European Commission and Courts in relation to co-ordinated effects. The role of economics is examined in the entire enforcement process, from the decision to initiate an investigation to the assessment of remedies. The conclusions have relevance to all areas of competition law.

Contents: Preface 1. Introduction 2. The Enforcement Context 3. The Law and Economics of Tacit Coordination 4. A Review of Collective Dominance Decisions 5. Economics in the Enforcement Process 6. The Contribution of Economics to Enforcement 7. Towards a More Economic Approach Appendix: The Economics of Tacit Collusion Bibliography Index

December 16, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Fines Against Parent Companies in EU Antitrust Law - Setting Incentives for "Best Practice Compliance"

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Karl Hofstetter, University of Zurich - School of Law and Melanie Ludescher, Legal Counsel - Schindler Group focus their research on Fines Against Parent Companies in EU Antitrust Law - Setting Incentives for "Best Practice Compliance".

ABSTRACT: Antitrust fines imposed by the European Commission have reached record levels and have scratched or passed the one billion Euro mark in several cases. This expansion was, inter alia, made possible by the Commission's practice to not only sanction responsible subsidiaries, but their parent companies as well. As a result, the fine cap which Community law sets at 10% of the annual sales of responsible undertakings has been ratcheted up significantly. This article maintains that the current practice of the European Commission, which finds at least partial support in the jurisprudence of the Community courts, ignores the fundamental concept of limited liability for subsidiary corporations. It also lacks a sound basis in EU antitrust law. Perhaps most important, the fining practice of the Commission does not do justice to its pursued goal of effectively preventing antitrust violations by corporate managers and employees. Antitrust fines against corporations, be they subsidiaries or parent companies, should primarily be aimed at deterrence and thereby take into account the principle of fault as embodied in Council Regulation No. 1/2003. Absent any direct involvement in the antitrust violations of the top representatives of a corporation, “fault” on the part of the company should primarily be defined as a deficiency in its compliance organisation. “Best Practice Compliance” should, therefore, take centerstage in an optimally designed antitrust fining policy. As a result, the amount of fines against companies, but also the question of whether a parent company should be coresponsible for antitrust violations by its subsidiaries, should primarily hinge on whether and to what extent “Best Practice Compliance” standards had been implemented.

December 16, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, December 15, 2009

Research Topics in Unilateral Effects Analysis

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Jonathan B. Baker, American University - Washington College of Law and David Reitman, Charles River Associates, Inc. have drafted a great resource in Research Topics in Unilateral Effects Analysis.

ABSTRACT: This chapter has been prepared for inclusion in the RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW (Einer Elhauge, ed.). It first explains why unilateral effects may result from horizontal mergers, and then describes several key models that have been developed to gauge the likelihood and/or magnitude of unilateral effects, focusing on mergers in differentiated product Bertrand markets. The remaining sections discuss extensions to these models and measurement issues that arise when implementing unilateral effects analysis in practice, highlighting ongoing and potential future topics for research.

December 15, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

9th Global Forum on Competition, 18-19 February 2010, Paris

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

9th Global Forum on Competition
18-19 February 2010, Paris

The 9th OECD Global Forum on Competition will focus on Competition, State aids and Subsidies, as well as on Collusion and Corruption in Public Procurement. Participants will also discuss a peer review of competition law and policy in Brazil.

Please note that participation to the Forum is by invitation only. It is restricted to government representatives and selected invitees from the business community and civil society. For further information on this aspect and on the Forum in general, please access our Practical information website.

Preliminary Agenda

Opening session

Opening remarks by Mr. Angel GURRIA
OECD Secretary General

Introductory comments by Mr. Frédéric JENNY
Chairman of the Competition Committee

Session I

Roundtable on Competition, State aids and Subsidies

[Call for CountributionsAppel à contributions]

Session II

Peer review of Competition Law and Policy in Brazil

[Open only to country representatives and intergovernmental organisations]

Session III

Breakout sessions on Collusion and Corruption in Public Procurement

  • Value of Certificates of Independent Bid Determination (“CIBD”) and similar tools
  • Discussion on the usefulness of guidelines in Public Procurement
  • Experiences on working with other parts of government to fight bid rigging
Session IV

Fifth anniversary of the OECD-Hungary Regional Centre for Competition

Session V

Roundtable on Collusion and Corruption in Public Procurement

[Call for CountributionsAppel à contributions]

Final session

Evaluation and Future work

December 15, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Static and Dynamic Merger Effects: Evidence from the Divestiture of Texaco's Canadian Assets

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Mikko Packalen, University of Waterloo - Department of Economics and Anindya Sen, University of Waterloo - Department of Economics examine Static and Dynamic Merger Effects: Evidence from the Divestiture of Texaco's Canadian Assets.

ABSTRACT: Dynamic merger effects from potential efficiencies created by mergers are a core concept in standard merger theory and merger policy. While these efficiencies will likely arrive mostly in the long run, empirical merger analyses have generally focused on short-run effects. We estimate merger effects from the divestiture of Texaco's Canadian assets. Our main emphasis is on estimating short and long-run merger impacts on market shares. Standard merger theory predicts that merger efficiencies will be reflected in market shares: the presence of merger efficiencies determines whether the merged firm regains market share in the long run. Results from two difference-in-difference specifications show that the short-run merger impact on the merging firms' combined market share was small but in the long run the merged firm experienced a large decline in its market share. These results demonstrate both that dynamic merger effects can be important, and that dynamic merger effects do not necessarily arise from efficiencies created by a merger.

December 15, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Network Effects, Market Structure and Industry Performance

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Rabah Amir (Department of Economics, University of Arizona) and Natalia Lazzati (Department of Economics, University of Arizona) have a paper on Network Effects, Market Structure and Industry Performance.

ABSTRACT: This paper provides a thorough analysis of oligopolistic markets with positive demand-side network externalities and perfect compatibility. The minimal structure imposed on the model primitives is such that industry output increases in a firm's rivals' total output as well as in the expected network size. This leads to a generalized equilibrium existence treatment that includes guarantees for a nontrivial equilibrium, and some insight into possible multiplicity of equilibria. We formalize the concept of industry viability and show that it is always enhanced by having more firms in the market. We also characterize the effects of market structure on industry performance, with an emphasis on departures from standard markets. As per-firm profits need not be monotonic in the number of competitors, we revisit the concept of free entry equilibrium for network industries. The approach relies on lattice-theoretic methods, which a! llow for a unified treatment of various general results in the literature on network goods. Several illustrative examples with closed-form solutions are also provided.

December 15, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Waiting to imitate: on the dynamic pricing of knowledge

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Emeric Henry (Sciences Po - Econ), Carlos Ponce (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Econ) explain Waiting to imitate: on the dynamic pricing of knowledge.

ABSTRACT: We study the problem of an inventor who brings to the market an innovation that can be legally copied. Imitators may 'enter' the market by copying the innovation at a cost or by buying from the inventor the knowledge necessary to reproduce and use the invention. The possibility of contracting affects the need for patent protection. Our results reveal that: (i) Imitators wait to enter the market and the inventor becomes a temporary monopolist; (ii) The inventor offers contracts which allow resale of the  knowledge acquired by the imitators; (iii) As the pool of potential imitators grows large, the inventor may become a permanent monopolist.

December 15, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, December 14, 2009

Switching Costs in Network Industries

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Jiawei Chen (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine) explains Switching Costs in Network Industries.

ABSTRACT: In network industries, switching costs have two opposite effects on the tendency towards market tipping. First, the fat-cat effect makes the larger firm price less aggressively and lose consumers to the smaller firm. This effect tends to prevent tipping. Second, the network-solidifying effect reinforces network effects by making a network size advantage longer-lasting and hence more valuable, thus intensifying price competition when networks are of comparable size. This effect tends to cause tipping. I find that when switching costs are high, the fat-cat effect dominates and an increase in switching costs can change the market from a tipping equilibrium to a sharing equilibrium. When switching costs are low, the network-solidifying effect dominates and an increase in switching costs can change the market from a sharing equilibrium to a tipping equilibrium. Policy intervention to remove switching costs in network industri! es may substantially reduce the likelihood of market tipping.

December 14, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

China’s Antimonopoly Law—One Year Down: Part 3. The AML As a Protectionist Tool?

Posted by Wentong Zheng

In my last two posts on this space, I provided a summary of the new developments of China’s Antimonopoly Law (“AML”) (see here) and an analysis of China’s new merger review regime under the AML (see here).  One concern that is often voiced about the AML is that the AML may become or may have become a protectionist tool against foreign investment.  This concern was first raised when the AML was still being drafted.  It was magnified less than one year after the AML went into effect, when MOFCOM issued its controversial decision to block Coca-Cola’s acquisition of Huiyuan Juice Group, China’s largest fruit juice maker, in March 2009.


In its brief decision in Coca-Cola/Huiyuan (see herefor the decision in Chinese), MOFCOM stated that it decided to block the proposed deal for three reasons.  First, the deal would allow Coca-Cola to leverage its dominant position in the carbonated soft drink market to lessen competition in the fruit juice market.  Second, the deal would allow Coca-Cola to own two popular fruit juice brands in China and therefore would significantly raise the barrier to market entry.  Finally, the deal would severely limit the ability of China’s small- and medium-sized fruit juice companies to engage in innovation and competition in the fruit juice market.


MOFCOM’s decision in Coca-Cola/Huiyuan is troubling.  Although MOFCOM did not conduct an explicit market definition analysis, apparently it believed that carbonated soft drink and fruit juice belong to different product markets.  A merger between firms that do not compete with each other in the same market—or a conglomerate merger—does not usually raise antitrust concerns.  Especially, when the products of the merging firms are complementary, as seems to be the case in Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, the merger would actually lead to lower prices according to the “Cournot effect” and thus would benefit consumers.  Therefore, if the goal of antitrust is to protect competition and enhance consumer welfare, a conglomerate merger should not be viewed as anticompetitive merely if it will lead to elimination of some competitors.


Many commentators, understandably, have suspected that the real reason behind MOFCOM’s decision is protectionism and nationalism.  Huiyuan Juice is a household name in China, and given the rising economic nationalist sentiments in China in recent years, it would not be surprising if MOFCOM blocked the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan deal out of nationalist concerns.  Furthermore, it is widely known that China’s domestic fruit juice industry, which would stand to lose if the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan deal went through, lobbied hard against the deal before MOFCOM.


However, absent direct evidence of MOFCOM’s protectionist intent in blocking the deal, proving the protectionism charge would be very difficult, as it would entail proving the negatives, i.e., that MOFCOM did not block the deal for any other reasons.  Could MOFCOM have blocked the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan deal out of genuine antitrust concerns, even if its rationales do not comport with the “correct” view of conglomerate mergers?  As the Chinese business media reported (see herefor the report in Chinese), MOFCOM’s Coca-Cola/Huiyuan decision is indeed modeled after a 2003 decision by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission to block the proposed acquisition of Australia’s largest fruit juice maker by Coca-Cola’s subsidiary in Australia (the Australian decision can be found here).  And as my co-author Sun Su pointed out here, MOFCOM’s rationales in Coca-Cola/Huiyuan are similar to some of the rationales upheld by the United States Supreme Court in FTC v. Proctor & Gambleback in 1967.  And of course, another famous—or infamous, depending on your point of view—example of a conglomerate merger being blocked is the European Union’s rejection of the GE/Honeywell merger in 2001.  Certainly, the fact that there are close parallels between MOFCOM’s rationales and rationales employed in other jurisdictions does not necessarily make MOFCOM’s rationales any less protectionist.  But it does show that MOFCOM’s decision joins a line of merger decisions by world’s major antitrust authorities that indicate differences of opinion as to the anticompetitive effects of conglomerate mergers.


In addition, one has to look beyond one specific case to determine whether there is a pattern or trend of protectionism under the AML.  There may be strong suspicions, if not strong evidence, that MOFCOM acted out of protectionist concerns in the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan case.  But suspicions of protectionism will become less strong if the frame of reference is extended to all of the mergers that have been reviewed by MOFCOM so far.  As we know, of all of the mergers for which review has been concluded, MOFCOM approved the vast majority of them without conditions.  We do not know the identity of the parties to those approved mergers, because MOFCOM did not publish its merger decisions for them.  However, there is indication that a significant number of mergers reviewed by MOFCOM—if not all of them—involve foreign investors.  Domestic Chinese enterprises that are large enough to meet the merger notification thresholds are typically state-owned-enterprises.  As I will lay out in more details in a future post, mergers between China’s state-owned-enterprises likely do not undergo formal merger review by MOFCOM.  The Coca-Cola/Huiyuan merger turns out to be the only blocked foreign-related merger out of many that have been reviewed by MOFCOM.


The picture becomes even more favorable for the argument of little or no protectionism if the frame of reference is extended to all aspects of the AML, not just merger review.  Before the AML took effect, the fears of the international business community were largely about proactive enforcement actions against multinational corporations such as Microsoft under the new law (see herefor a report of a possible investigation against Microsoft one month before the AML took effect).  More than one year later, however, none of the feared enforcement actions has taken place.  The Chinese media reported that certain disgruntled consumers have filed lawsuits against Microsoft or petitioned government agencies to launch investigations into Microsoft.  But as of now, the courts and the government have not acted on any of such lawsuits or petitions.


As conclusion, a final point that will help us keep things in perspectives is that whether the AML itself harbors a protectionist agenda does not tell the whole story in a country like China where numerous government restraints on competition exist outside of the purview of formal antitrust law.  The Chinese government has so many ways to limit foreign competition that in many situations it does not even need to resort to the AML to keep unwelcome foreign investors away.  Chief among the non-AML hurdles to foreign competition are market entry prohibitions in various industries.  Although China made commitments at the World Trade Organization to ease some of its market entry restrictions, many of them are not affected and will be here to stay.  Furthermore, the Chinese government can always call off a proposed merger between a foreign investor and a state-owned-enterprise through exercising its power as the owner and as the political superior of that state-owned-enterprise.  It is no coincidence that the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan merger—the only merger that has been blocked under the AML so far—involves a private Chinese company in an industry that has no market entry restrictions.  It is an irony that in this sense, a rejection of a merger under the AML—meaning there are no other ways for the government to reject the merger—perhaps should be viewed as a sign of progress.


Next, we will survey the scene of China’s dominance law more than one year after the AML went into effect.  Stay tuned.




December 14, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust: an Experiment

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Maria Bigoni, University of Padua - Department of Economics, Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Chloe Le Coq, Stockholm School of Economics, and Giancarlo Spagnolo, University of Tor Vergata, Stockholm School of Economics discuss Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust: an Experiment.

ABSTRACT: This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schemes for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments. Leniency further increases deterrence, but stabilizes surviving cartels: subjects appear to anticipate harsher times after defections as leniency reduces recidivism and lowers post-conviction prices. With rewards, cartels are reported systematically and prices finally fall. If a ringleader is excluded from leniency, deterrence is unaffected but prices grow. Differences between treatments in Stockholm and Rome suggest culture may affect optimal law enforcement.

December 14, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

It's Coming - 3rd Annual Best Antitrust and Competition Policy Article of the Year

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The annual tradition is back.  We will announce winners at 11:00am EST on December 26, 2009.  For previous winners see the 2008 and 2007 lists.

December 14, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

A Simple Theory of Predation

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Chiara Fumagalli (Istituto di Economia Politica - Econ) and Massimo Motta (EUI - Econ) propose A Simple Theory of Predation.  This paper is worth a read.

ABSTRACT: We propose a simple theory of predatory pricing, based on scale economies and sequential buyers (or markets). The entrant (or prey) needs to reach a critical scale to be successful. The incumbent (or predator) is ready to make losses on earlier buyers so as to deprive the prey of the scale it needs, thus making monopoly profits on later buyers. Several extensions are considered, including markets where scale economies exist because of demand externalities or two-sided market effects, and where markets are characterised by common costs. Conditions under which predation may take place in actual cases are also discussed.

December 14, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Antitrust in a Globalized Economy: The Unique Enforcement Challenges Faced by Small and by Developing Jurisdictions

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Michal Gal (Haifa, Law) has posted the interesting Antitrust in a Globalized Economy: The Unique Enforcement Challenges Faced by Small and by Developing Jurisdictions.

ABSTRACT: The increase in global trade has intensified the challenges involved in regulating anti-competitive conduct that takes place, in whole or in part, outside one's borders. While much has been written on international antitrust, not much scholarship has focused on the unique enforcement challenges faced by small and by developing jurisdictions in such a globalized world. This article addresses this challenge. It analyzes the near-futility of the current regime of unilateral enforcement and limited national vis

December 14, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Saturday, December 12, 2009

Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

David Cooper, Florida State University - Econ and Kai-Uwe Kühn, University of Michigan - Econ address Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion.

ABSTRACT: We use experiments to analyze what type of communication is most effective in achieving cooperation in a simple collusion game. Consistent with the existing literature on communication and collusion, even minimal communication leads to a short run increase in collusion. However, in a limited message-space treatment where subjects cannot communicate contingent strategies, this initial burst of collusion rapidly collapses. When unlimited pre-game communication is allowed via a chat window, an initial decline in collusion is reversed over time. Content analysis is used to identify multiple channels by which communication improves collusion in this setting. Explicit threats to punish cheating prove to be by far the most important factor to successfully establish collusion, consistent with the existing theory of collusion. However, collusion is even more likely when we allow for renegotiation, contrary to standard theories of renegotiation. What appears critical for the success of collusion with renegotiation is that cheaters are often admonished in strong terms. Allowing renegotiation therefore appears to increase collusion by allowing for an inexpensive and highly effective form of punishment.

December 12, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Brand Protection and Competition

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

IBIL & OFT Seminar: Brand Protection and Competition Logo

The Office of Fair Trading and UCL’s Institute of Brand and Innovation Law would like to invite you to an early evening event entitled


Date:      27 January 2010
Time:      4.30pm (registration), 5.00 to 7.30 pm,
               followed by a drinks reception.
Venue:    University College London, Gower Street, WC1E 6BT

The aim of the event is to bring together competition and IP specialists and industry experts to stimulate discussion on:

  • the protection of brand value under the competition rules;
  • the interaction of the competition rules with intellectual property law; and
  • L’Oreal v Bellure and other recent developments in the law.

 Confirmed speakers include:

  • Philip Collins (Chairman, OFT)
  • The Rt Hon Lord Justice Jacob
  • Deborah Majoras (Procter & Gamble)
  • Michael Miller (Amazon)
  • Ali Nikpay (Senior Director, OFT)
  • The Hon Mr Justice Roth
  • Dr Christopher Stothers (UCL & Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy)

This seminar is accredited with 2.5 CPD hours by the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA - our course provider reference is IU/UCL) and the Bar Standard Board. It is also accredited by ITMA and constitutes relevant CPD for CIPA Fellows.

This event is free of charge.

Places are strictly limited at this event so please secure your place by clicking on the link below.


You are invited to the following event:
IBIL & OFT Seminar: Brand Protection and Competition

Wednesday, January 27, 2010 at 4:30 PM (GMT)

UCL Jeremy Bentham Room
UCL Central Campus
Gower Street
London, London WC1
United Kingdom



Can you attend this event?  Respond Here



December 12, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)