Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Price and quality in spatial competition

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Kurt R. Brekke (Department of Economics and Helth Economics Bergen, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration), Luigi Siciliani (Department of Economics and Centre for Health Economics, University of York, Heslington), Odd Rune Straume (Universidade do Minho - NIPE) address Price and quality in spatial competition.

ABSTRACT: We study the relationship between competition and quality within a spatial competition framework where firms compete in prices and quality. We generalise existing literature on spatial price-quality competition along several dimensions, including utility functions that are non-linear in income and cost functions that are non-separable in output and quality. Our main message is that the scope for a positive relationship between competition and quality is underestimated in the existing literature. If we allow for income effects by assuming that utility is strictly concave in income, we find that lower transportation costs always lead to higher quality. The presence of income effects might also reverse a previously reported negative relationship between the number of firms and equilibrium quality. This reversal result is further strenghtened if there are cost substitutabilities between output and quality. Equilibrium quality provision is always less than socially optimal in the presence of income effects.

Quick - Somebody Call Amnesty International! Intel Says EU Antitrust Fine Violated Human Rights

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Bob Lande (Baltimore - Law) opines in the EU Intel case with his piece Quick - Somebody Call Amnesty International! Intel Says EU Antitrust Fine Violated Human Rights.

ABSTRACT: This articles discusses Intel's claim that the EU's fine against it for a competition law violation was so large that its human rights' were violated.

The Law and Economics of the NCAA’s Claim to Monopsony Rights

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Jeffrey Lynch Harrison, University of Florida - Fredric G. Levin College of Law and Casey C. Harrison, University of Florida have authored The Law and Economics of the NCAA’s Claim to Monopsony Rights.

ABSTRACT: This article considers the legal and economic implications of the NCAA monopsony power with respect to players in the two most financially lucrative college sports - football and basketball. The principal means of doing so is through the evaluation of three recent legal challenges to the NCAA. Those challenges are to limits on payments to players, limits on the number of players receiving payment, and the rights of players under scholarship with respect to payments for commercial use of their images. The focus is on two questions. First, under current interpretations of the antitrust laws, what would the likely results of these cases be if they reached a final substantive resolution based on the strict application of these interpretations? More generally, what are the limits to the NCAA’s use of monopsony power? The second question is whether there should be liability under the antitrust laws. This is a more complex question with the answer depending, in part, on whether the antitrust laws are to be applied to affect allocative or distributive outcomes.

Whole Foods Market and Wild Oats Merger

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

L. Jay Bourgeois, University of Virginia - Darden Graduate School of Business Administration has prepared a case study on the Whole Foods Market and Wild Oats Merger.

ABSTRACT: Whole Foods and Wild Oats were both natural- and organic-food stores that competed for similar customers on values such as high-quality and healthy products, excellent customer service, knowledge of products, and an enjoyable shopping experience. In February 2007, Whole Foods announced that it would purchase a smaller, yet formidable competitor, Wild Oats. There was tremendous geographic complementarity involved: The merger would give Whole Foods the largest footprint within the natural- and organic-grocery industry in North America.

Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good Performance?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Bill Kovacic (FTC) asks Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good Performance?

ABSTRACT: What is a good competition agency? Among competition policy specialists, this topic often emerges in casual conversation and scholarly debate. For all the attention the subject receives, discussions about agency quality rarely focus carefully on what constitutes good performance. In sport, we use clear, generally accepted scoring rules to determine which side is ahead in an individual contest and to sort out good teams from the bad. The field of competition policy lacks such standards, yet the absence of well-defined, generally accepted scoring rules does not inhibit commentators from providing confident assessments of how well specific competition agencies are doing their jobs.

Politics and the Pursuit of Efficiency in New Zealand

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Bronwyn E. Howell, NZ Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation Inc. and Victoria Management School, Victoria University of Wellington writes on Politics and the Pursuit of Efficiency in New Zealand.

ABSTRACT: Economic analysis takes as its defining performance benchmark the pursuit of increases in efficiency.  Competition law and industry-specific regulation provide two competing means of intervention whereby the pursuit of efficiency can be enhanced.  Ultimately, legislators decide how governance of industry interaction will be allocated between these two institutional forms.  Whilst competition law can govern interaction in most industries, where the underlying economic conditions are sufficiently different, industry-specific regulation offers advantages.  However, its weakness is the risk of capture, leading to the subjugation of the efficiency end to the pursuit of other objectives.  But if the regulatory institution could be bound in some way to pursue an efficiency objective, could the risk of capture be averted?  New Zealand's 'light-handed' regulation, instituted in 1987, attempted to enshrine the pursuit of efficiency into statute, firstly by relying solely upon competition law and contractual undertakings, and subsequently creating a regulatory body with an explicit legislated efficiency directive.  In practice, however, the inability of a government prioritising efficiency to bind its successors to pursue the same objective renders sector strategy, and hence the efficiency objective, subject to political capture.  Consequently, inherent systemic instability attends the pursuit of the efficiency objective and the institutions overseeing its enforcement.

Cartels as Two-Stage Mechanisms: Implications for the Analysis of Dominant-Firm Conduct

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Randal D. Heeb (Bates White), William E. Kovacic (FTC), Robert C. Marshall (Penn State Econ), and Leslie M. Marx (Duke - Fuqua) explain Cartels as Two-Stage Mechanisms: Implications for the Analysis of Dominant-Firm Conduct.

Download Cartels as two-stage mechanisms 2009

ABSTRACT: Apart from selling finished products made from carbon, such as carbon brushes, members of the cartel also sold “blocks” of carbon, which have been pressed but not yet cut and tooled into brushes or other products. A number of third-party “cutters” purchase these blocks of carbon, cut and work them into final products and sell them to customers. These cutters, while customers of the cartel members, also represent competition to them for finished products. Such cutters are typically located in the Middle East or Eastern Europe, but a number of them are located in the EEA [European Economic Area]. The policy of the cartel consisted in fixing the prices of carbon blocks sold to cutters in such a way that competition from them for the finished products made out of those blocks would be limited. As a result, cutters would usually only obtain small customers that were of no interest to the large suppliers. Ideally, at least in the view of some members, cutters should be eliminated altogether by refusing to supply to them.

The effectiveness of competition authorities: prioritization, market inquiries and impact

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Competition Commission Chairman Peter Freeman recently gave a speech titled The effectiveness of competition authorities: prioritization, market inquiries and impact at the Third Annual Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal and Mandela Institute Conference on Competition Law, Economics and Policy in South Africa.

Criminalising Cartels - A Critical Interdisciplinary Workshop on an International Regulatory Movement

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Criminalising Cartels - A Critical Interdisciplinary Workshop on an International Regulatory Movement

Thursday 12 November 2009

Venue: Centre for Competition Law & Policy

Organised by Centre for Competition Law & Policy

The aim of the roundtable is to generate discussion about the political, economic, regulatory and social dimensions of the criminalisation of cartel conduct with a view to better understanding the challenges associated with the design and enforcement of a criminal regime, as well as exploring the wider implications of criminalisation for competition policy, nationally and internationally.

Programme:

12h30 Registration and light refreshments

13h25Introduction Ariel Ezrachi, Oxford Centre for Competition Law and Policy

13h30 Cartel Enforcement and Criminalisation: An Overview Wouter Wils, European Commission Legal Service & King's College London

14h00 Does Cartel Criminalisation Have a Future Outside of the United States? Insights from the United Kingdom Experience Julian Joshua, Howrey

14h20 Practical issues arising from concurrent criminal prosecutions in the UK and overseas Michael OKane, Peters and Peters

14h40 Discussion

15h00 Tea and Coffee

15h20 Milestone or Roadblock? The Role of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission in Criminalising Cartels Caron Beaton-Wells, University of Melbourne

15h40 Criminalisation and Compliance: The Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality Christine Parker, University of Melbourne

16h00 Recidivism, Criminalisation and the Growth of the Anti-Cartel Enforcement Industry Christopher Harding, University of Aberystwyth

16h20 Discussion

16h40 Tea and Coffee

17h00 Criminalisation in the Context of Negotiated Regulation Stephen Wilks, University of Exeter

17h20 Cartel Criminalisation: The Role of the Media in the ?Battle for Hearts and Minds? Andreas Stephan, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy

17h40 Discussion

18h10 Closing remarks Caron Beaton-Wells, University of Melbourne

17h40 Close of workshop

Places for this session are limited. If you wish to attend please register with the Centre in advance.

Mom-and-Pop Meet Big-Box: Complements or Substitutes?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

John C. Haltiwanger (U Maryland Econ), Ron S. Jarmin (Census Bureau), C. J. Krizan (Census Bureau) explain Mom-and-Pop Meet Big-Box: Complements or Substitutes?

ABSTRACT: In part due to the popular perception that Big-Boxes displace smaller, often family owned (a.k.a. Mom-and-Pop) retail establishments, several empirical studies have examined the evidence on how Big-Boxes' impact local retail employment but no clear consensus has emerged. To help shed light on this debate, we exploit establishment-level data with detailed location information from a single metropolitan area to quantify the impact of Big-Box store entry and growth on nearby single unit and local chain stores. We incorporate a rich set of controls for local retail market conditions as well as whether or not the Big-Boxes are in the same sector as the smaller stores. We find a substantial negative impact of Big-Box entry and growth on the employment growth at both single unit and especially smaller chain stores - but only when the Big-Box activity is both in the immediate area and in the same detailed industry.

Second Annual Searle Center Research Symposium on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Second Annual Searle Center Research Symposium on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy
Friday, September 25th - Saturday, September 26th

The Second Annual Searle Center Research Symposium on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy will be held, September 25th-26th, 2009.

The goal of this Research Symposium is to provide a forum where leading scholars from across the country can gather together with Northwestern's own distinguished faculty to present and discuss high quality research relevant to antitrust economics and competition policy.

The Symposium is co-sponsored by the Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth and the Center for the Study of Industrial Organization at Northwestern University.

Attendance at the symposium is by invitation only. To request an invitation, please send an email to [email protected].

Preliminary Agenda (as of July, 15, 2009)

Friday, September 25th

7:45-8:15 Continental Breakfast (WB 112)

8:15-8:30 Welcome and Introduction (WB 147)
David E. Van Zandt, Dean and Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law
Henry N. Butler, Executive Director, Searle Center, Northwestern University School of Law
William Rogerson, Northwestern University

8:30-9:30 Session One
Competition Policy and Property Rights
John Vickers, Professor of Economics and Warden, All Souls College, Oxford University
Discussant: Scott Stern, Associate Professor of Management and Strategy, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

9:30-10:00 Break

10:00-11:00 Session Two
Toward a Test for Price Fixing - Social Objective, Detection, and Sanctions
Louis Kaplow, Finn M. W. Caspersen and Household International Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School
Discussant:  Timothy Bresnahan, Landau Professor in Technology and the Economy, Stanford University Department of Economics

11:00-11:30 Break

11:30-12:30 Session Three
Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges?  The Impact of Complexity & Judicial Training on Appeals
Michael R. Baye, Bert Elwert Professor of Business, Kelley School of Business, University of Indiana
Joshua D. Wright, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law
Discussant: Henry N. Butler, Searle Center, Northwestern Law

12:30-2:00 Lunch
Keynote Address: The Relationship Between Antitrust and Regulation in Light of Trinko              
Howard Shelanski, Deputy Director for Antitrust, Bureau of Economics, FTC, and UC Berkeley
 
2:00-3:00 Session Four
Dynamic Merger Review
Michael Whinston, Robert E. and Emily H. King Professor of Business Institutions Department of Economics, Northwestern University
Discussant: Michael Riordan, Laurans A. and Arlene Mendelson Professor of Economics, Columbia University

3:00- 3:30 Break

3:30-4:30 Session Five
Competition Policy and Financial Distress
Ezra Friedman, Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law
Marco Ottaviani, Professor of Management and Strategy, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
Discussant: Jonathan Baker, Professor of Law, American University's Washington College of Law

4:30- 5:00 Break

5:00-6:00 Session Six
The CC’s margin-concentration analysis in the UK Groceries Inquiry
Jerry Hausman, John and Jennie S. MacDonald Professor, MIT, Department of Economics
Discussant: Aviv Nevo, Professor of Economics and Marketing, Northwestern University, Department of Economics

6:00-7:00 Cocktail Reception (WB 440)

7:00- 9:00 Dinner (WB 540)
Keynote Address: Microeconomic Policy and Competition Policy
Joseph Farrell, Director, Bureau of Economics, FTC and UC Berkeley

Saturday, September 26th

8:00-8:30 Continental Breakfast (WB 112)

8:30-9:30 Session Seven 
The Effect of Insurance Plans on Hospital Competition
Michael Katz, Harvey Golub Professor of Business Leadership and Professor of Management, New York University Stern School of Business and UC Berkeley
Discussant: David E.M. Sappington, Lanzillotti-McKethan Eminent Scholar, University of Florida, Department of Economics

9:30-10:00 Break

10:00-11:00 Session Eight
Not Good Enough for Government Work: Geographic Market Definition and The FTC’s Case Against Chicagoland Physician Associations
Fred S. McChesney, Class of 1967 James B. Haddad Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law
Discussant: John Simpson, FTC

11:00-11:30 Break

11:30-12:30 Session Nine
Industry Dynamics, Sunk Costs, and Spatial Demand Shifts
Thomas Hubbard, John L. and Helen Kellogg Professor of Management and Strategy, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
Discussant: Steven T. Berry, James Burrows Moffatt Professor of Economics, Yale Department of Economics

12:30 Adjourn (Box Lunch Available)

Location
Northwestern University School of Law
Wieboldt Hall
340 E. Superior Street
Chicago, IL 60611

Contact
For more information regarding this conference or other initiatives of the Searle Center, please call (312) 503-1811 or send an email to [email protected] .

Competition and Innovation in the Microprocessor Industry: Does AMD spur Intel to innovate more?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Ronald Goettler University of Chicago and Brett Gordon Columbia University ponder Competition and Innovation in the Microprocessor Industry: Does AMD spur Intel to innovate more?

ABSTRACT: We propose and estimate a model of dynamic oligopoly with durable goods and endogenous innovation to examine the relationship between market structure and the evolution of quality. Firms make dynamic pricing and investment decisions while taking into account the dynamic behavior of consumers who anticipate the product improvements and price declines. The distribution of currently owned products is a state variable that affects current demand and evolves endogenously as consumers make replacement purchases. Our work extends the dynamic oligopoly framework of Ericson and Pakes (1995) to incorporate durable goods. We propose an alternative approach to bounding the state space that is less restrictive of frontier firms and yields an endogenous long-run rate of innovation. We estimate the model for the PC microprocessor industry and perform counterfactual simulations to measure the benefits of competition. Consumer surplus is 2.5 percent higher ($5 billion per year) with AMD than if Intel were a monopolist. Innovation, however, would be higher without AMD present. Counterfactuals reveal that consumer surplus can actually increase as the market moves toward monopoly, which suggests policymakers ought to consider the dynamic trade-off of lower current consumer surplus from higher prices for higher future surplus from more innovation. Comparative statics reveal that competition does induce higher innovation if consumers have sufficiently high preferences for quality and low price sensitivity.

New Directions in Antitrust Enforcement

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

New Directions in Antitrust Enforcement
Washington, DC
22 September 2009
Hosted by NERA Economic Consulting

The antitrust enforcers of the Obama administration have settled into their offices and antitrust practitioners are seeing green shoots of their own: new directions in enforcement have begun to emerge. In this seminar, NERA Special Consultant Dr. Michael Baye, until recently Director of the Bureau of Economics at the US Federal Trade Commission, will discuss the role economics is playing in the evolution of thinking about merger review at the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. Vice President Dr. Elizabeth Bailey, until recently an award-winning economics faculty member at the W.P. Carey Business School, will discuss how the emerging field of behavioral economics can advance modern antitrust analyses. Senior Vice President Dr. Ramsey Shehadeh will moderate. To learn more or to attend this free event, please contact Angela McLean at [email protected] or +1 416 868 2521.

Competition Policy and Financial Crises Lessons Learned and the Way Forward

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The Nordic competition authorities have published the interesting Competition Policy and Financial Crises Lessons Learned and the Way Forward.

ABSTRACT: In their semi-annual meeting in Helsinki in March 2009, the Directors General of the Nordic competition authorities discussed the financial crisis, its economic impact on the real economy as well as how the crisis had affected the respective Nordic competition authorities.

The directors unanimously agreed and stressed the importance of not weakening competition policy in times of crisis. Furthermore, they underlined the importance of adhering to public procurement law and regulations. This applies to state aid as well. The crisis must not be used as an excuse for measures lessening or distorting competition and trade, neither within the internal market nor internationally. At the same time, and as evidenced by history, this view has and will expectedly be challenged further as the crisis evolves. Thus, the Directors General acknowledged the need to substantiate why competition policy is important for fast economic recovery from the crisis.

This is the background for this report. The mandate outlined by the Directors General asks for a review of how the crisis has affected the economies of the Nordic countries, and the respective measures imposed to counteract the negative effects. The working group was also asked to take a historical perspective on previous crises, and briefly review the lessons learned from a competition point of view. Yet another issue to be covered is how competition policy has been challenged so far during the crisis. In this regard, a presentation of the Icelandic experience would be particularly relevant and important. The mandate also stated that before concluding with specific recommendations, the working group should review experience on the connection between competition, innovation and economic growth.

The members of the working group have been:
• Niels Enemærke ([email protected])
• Tom Björkroth ([email protected])
• Martin Hasforth Harms ([email protected])
• Þórólfur Heiðar Þorsteinsson ([email protected])
• Valgerður H. Kristinsdóttir ([email protected])
• Kjell Jostein Sunnevåg ([email protected]) (head)
• Arvid Fredenberg ([email protected])

Procedural Fairness

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Christine Varney (DOJ) recently gave a speech on Procedural Fairness in Fiesole at the 13th Annual Competition Conference of the International Bar Association.

The Analysis of Market Dominance and Restrictive Practices Under German Antitrust Law in Light of EC Antitrust Law

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Anca Daniela Chiriţă Europa-Institut, University of Saarland has a recent article on The Analysis of Market Dominance and Restrictive Practices Under German Antitrust Law in Light of EC Antitrust Law.

ABSTRACT: This article analyses key features of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition (section 19), including the more severe provisions of section 20, and aims to discuss the economic freedom of competition approach to the abuse of a dominant market position. Furthermore, the article details with specific examples of abuse in cases heard by the Federal Cartel Office, with particular focus upon predatory pricing, cross-subsidisation, rebates, exclusive contracts, tying and bundling, refusal abuses, hindrance and abuse of economic dependence. Emphasis is placed upon differences in the implementation of antitrust law and upon answering the question of whether more severe rules bring about greater compliance. Finally, the article aims to examine both the differences in substance between German and European antitrust law, and the similarities and potential for convergence and harmonisation of the two.

Competition and Consumer Regulation for Australian Banks

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Shyam Singh Bhati explains Competition and Consumer Regulation for Australian Banks.

ABSTRACT: This paper provides an overview of the legal and regulatory framework that affects banks and financial institutions in Australia. As a first step, a description of the regulatory responsibilities of the major financial regulators, such as Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA), Australian Securities and Investment Corporation (ASIC) and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), are described. Next, the legislation such as, Banking Act, 1959, Financial Sector (Shareholdings) Act, 1998 and Financial Sector (Business Transfer and Group Structure) Act, 1999, applicable to banks are discussed. After that, the role of industry regulatory initiatives, such as Banking Ombudsman Scheme and Code of Banking Practice, in providing services to customers are discussed. Lastly, various requirements of the Code of Consumer Practice, as applicable to Australians, are discussed and an opinion is provided on the effectiveness and functioning of the Code and its ability to provide protection to the Australian consumer. It is concluded that the financial regulatory institutions in Australia have been successful so far in avoiding any systemic risk to the Australian Financial System. Industry initiatives, such as Banking Ombudsman and Code of Banking Practice have fallen short of providing the mechanisms necessary to address the consumer issues, as they tend to favor the industry players who fund these organizations.

Joseph Farrell Brownbag Discussion

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association
Economics Committee

Presents a Brown Bag Panel Discussion with

Joseph Farrell
Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics

Tuesday, September 29, 2009
12:00 to 1:30 PM EDT

Recently named Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics, Joseph Farrell is Professor of Economics and an Affiliated Professor in the Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley. His research has centered on competition policy, compatibility standards, and innovation. Professor Farrell has previous experience putting economic theory into practice in the government, having served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics at the Antitrust Division in 2000 and 2001. He was also Chief Economist at the Federal Communications Commission in the mid-1990s. Professor Farrell has published extensively on competition policy. In particular, he has co-authored several papers with Professor Carl Shapiro, who was recently appointed the Chief Economist at the Antitrust Division. Their papers include “Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition.” In the first part of the program, Professor Farrell and our panelists will discuss his views on antitrust enforcement and his plans for the Bureau of Economics, and he will answer questions from the audience. Dial-in access will also be available.

Moderator:                   Bruce R. Snapp, Micra, Inc.

Panelists:                      David A. Argue, Corporate Vice President, Economists Incorporated

                                    Thomas J. Lang, Partner, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP

                                    Lynda K. Marshall, Partner, Hogan & Hartson LLP

Location:                      American Bar Association
740 15th Street, N.W. (John Marshall Conference Room, 9^th floor)
Washington, DC 20005

 

Register now by email to [email protected] or by phone to Laura Burns at 202-467-2500. Please indicate whether you plan to attend in person or to dial-in. We will distribute the call-in number by e-mail to all registrants in advance. There is no charge.

 

The Section will post a downloadable recording of this program in MP3 format in the Members-Only area of its website, http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-bb/bb-audio.shtml.

Antitrust Litigation Course: Preparing and Trying an Antitrust Case Against the Government

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Antitrust Litigation Course
October 15-16, 2009
The Blackstone Hotel
Chicago, IL

Preparing and Trying an Antitrust Case Against the Government

In the past few years, the government has challenged several mergers in court, and the new administration has indicated its intention to be even more aggressive in the future. As a result, antitrust trial practitioners as well as merger lawyers should be prepared to meet the challenges associated with trying to persuade the government not to sue, and trying the case when the government's concerns cannot be resolved in a manner acceptable to the client. The Section of Antitrust is pleased to offer the 2009 Antitrust Litigation Course: Preparing and Trying an Antitrust Case Against the Government, which will bring together some of the leading antitrust trial lawyers to demonstrate - on the basis of a fictitious merger of two companies in a high technology industry - the complex interplay of substance, strategy, negotiations, and remedies that is essential not only to merger litigation, but to antitrust litigation in general. We kindly invite you to participate in this special event on October 15 and 16 at the Blackstone Hotel in Chicago. For more information see here.

Most Downloaded Antitrust Law Professors of the Past Year

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Here is the list based on SSRN downloads within the past one year.  I include only professors who have uploaded an antitrust work in the past year.

1. Mark Lemley, Stanford 10,577
2. Damien Geradin, Tilburg 6,020
3. David Evans, UCL, Chicago 5,116
3. Herb Hovenkamp, Iowa 4,377
4. Wouter Wils, Kings College 2,652
5. Josh Wright, George Mason 2,413
6. Spencer Waller, Chicago Loyola 2,377
7. Keith Hylton, BU 2,285
8. Randy Picker, Chicago 2,188
9. Phil Weiser, Colorado 1,876
10 Maurice Stucke, Tennessee, 1683
11. Marc Edelman, Barry University 1,593
12 Bruce Kobayashi, George Mason 1,485
13. Einer Elhague, Harvard 1,379
14. Danny Sokol, Florida 1,301
15. Scott Hemphill, Columbia 1,203
16. Bill Page, Florida 1,154
17. Barak Richman, Duke 1,108
18. Thom Lambert, Missouri 985
19. Dan Crane, Michigan 836
20. Steve Semeraro, Thomas Jefferson