Thursday, December 27, 2007

The Political Economy of Antitrust

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Out this year is a new and excellent book edited by Vivek Ghosal of Georgia Tech's School of Economics titled  The Political Economy of Antitrust.

Contents include:

Chapter 1:  Issues in Antitrust Enforcement,  Vivek Ghosal (Georgia Institute of Technology), Joseph Harrington (Johns Hopkins University) and Johan Stennek (Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm). Chapter 2:  Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of Industrial Economics.  Stephen Martin (Purdue University). Chapter 3:  The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path.  Joe Chen (University of Tokyo) and Joseph Harrington (Johns Hopkins University). Chapter 4:  Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers: Should Price Fixers Still go to Prison   Paolo Buccirossi (Laboratory of Economics, Antitrust and Regulation, Rome) and Giancarlo Spagnolo (Stockholm School of Economics). Chapter 5:  Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests.  Cecile Aubert (Universite Paris IX Dauphine). Chapter 6:  Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins Cartel.  William Kovacic (George Washington University), Robert Marshall (Pennsylvania State University), Leslie Marx (Duke University) and Matthew Raiff (Bates White). Chapter 7:  Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels  John Connor (Purdue University). Chapter 8:  The Economics of Tacit Collusion in Merger Analysis.  Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright and Jean Tirole (University of Toulouse). Chapter 9:  The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforcement: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger.  Jay Pil Choi (Michigan State University). Chapter 10:  The Political Economy of EU Merger Control: Small versus Large Member State Interests.  Henrik Horn (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm) and Johan Stennek (Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm). Chapter 11:  A Consumers  Surplus Defense in Merger Control.  Sven-Olof Fridolfsson (Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm). Chapter 12:  EU Merger Remedies: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment.  Tomaso Duso (Humboldt University and WZB), Klaus Gugler (University of Vienna) and Burcin Yurtoglu (University of Vienna). Chapter 13:  The Significant Impediment of Effective Competition Test in the New European Merger Regulation: In Theory and Practice.  Jerome Foncel (GREMARS, University of Lille), Marc Ivaldi (University of Toulouse) and Valerie Rabassa (DG Competition, European Commission). Chapter 14:  Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal Mergers.  Luke Froeb (Vanderbilt University), Steven Schantz (Vanderbilt University) and Gregory Werden (U.S. Department of Justice). Chapter 15:  Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator.  Antoine Faure-Grimaud (London School of Economics) and David Martimort (University of Toulouse). Chapter 16:  Saving Section 2: Reframing U.S. Monopolization Law.  Timothy Brennan (University of Maryland, Baltimore). Chapter 17:  Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive   Preston McAfee (California Institute of Technology), Hugo Mialon (Emory University) and Sue Mialon (University of North Dakota). Chapter 18:  Antitrust in Open Economies.  Joseph Francois (Tinbergen Institute) Henrik Horn (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm).

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