Agricultural Law and Taxation Blog

Developments in Ag Law and Ag Tax

Overview

In recent weeks, a number of important and interesting developments have occurred in the realm of agricultural law and taxation.  The subjects include various tax issues; oil and gas; state taxation issues; IRS information; and farm program payments.

Recent developments in ag law and tax – it’s the topic of today’s post.

Revised Form I-9

Form I-9 is an important document for ag employers hiring workers.  It verifies the identity and employment authorization of farm employees and protects the employer from penalties associated with improper hires.  A new version of the Form became available on August 1 and it’s this version that must be used starting November 1.   

All U.S. employers must ensure proper completion of Form I-9 for each individual hired, and whether the employment involves citizens or noncitizens. While agriculture is often treated differently under the law in many situations, that’s not the case when it comes to Form I-9.  There is no exception based on size of the farming operation or for family owned farming businesses.

The Form applies to employment situations.  It doesn’t apply when a farmer hires custom work or work to be done as an independent contractor.

A revised version of Form I-9 became available on August 1.  The Form has been condensed in some instances and it clarifies the difference between “noncitizen national” and “noncitizen authorized to work.”  Also, the revised Form can be filled out on tablets and mobile devices, and a checkbox has been added for employers to indicate when they have remotely examined Form I-9 documents.  Certain other revisions have been made and the Instructions for the Form have also been updated. 

Both employees and employers must complete the Form within three days of the hire.  Employers must retain the Form and make it available for inspection. 

You can access the new version here:  https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/forms/i-9.pdf  The government’s summary of the revised Form is here:  https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/fact-sheets/FormI9SummaryofChangesFactSheet.pdf

Florida Foreign Ownership Law in Effect – Injunction Denied

Ownership of U.S. land, specifically agricultural lands, by foreign persons or entities has been an issue that traces to the origins of the United States. Today, approximately fourteen states specifically forbid or limit nonresident aliens, foreign businesses and corporations, and foreign governments from acquiring or owning an interest in agricultural land within their state. Although these states have instituted restrictions, each state has taken its own approach. In other words, a uniform approach to restricting foreign ownership has not been established because state laws vary widely.

Currently, the following states restrict (in one fashion or another) foreign ownership of agricultural land.  about one-half of the states restrict agricultural land acquisition by aliens.  AL, AR, FL, HI, ID, IN, IA, KS, KY, LA, MN, MS, MO, MT, NE, ND, OH, OK, PA, SC, SD, TN, UT, VA, WI,   

The states with the most restrictive laws are IA, KY, MN, MO, NE, ND, OK, SD and WI.  The other 16 states have minor restrictions on foreign ownership of agricultural land. 

Recently, the issue of restricting foreign investment in and/or ownership of agricultural land has been raised in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Each of these states have proposed, or planned to propose, legislation restricting foreign ownership and/or investment in agricultural land to varying degrees.  Several high-profile events have spurred this renewed interest including a Chinese-owned company acquiring over 130,000 acres near an Air Force base in Texas and a 300-acre purchase by another Chinese company near a different Air Force base in North Dakota.  Also, the slow “fly-over” of a Chinese spy balloon from Alaska to South Carolina, mysterious damages to many food processing facilities, pipelines and rail transportation have contributed to the growing interest in national security and restrictions on ownership of U.S. farm and ranchland by known adversaries.

The Florida provision limits landownership rights of certain noncitizens that are domiciled either in China or other countries that are a “foreign country of concern.”  Fla. Stat. §§692.201-.204.   The countries considered as a FCOC under the law include China; Russia; Iran; North Korea; Cuba; Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro regime; and Syria. Four Chinese citizens living in Florida, along with a real estate brokerage firm, claimed that the law violated their equal protection rights because it restricts their ability to purchase real property due to their race. They also claimed that the law violated the Due Process Clause and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution and the Fair Housing Act (FHA). Under the law, Chinese investors that are not U.S. citizens that hold or acquire and interest in real property in Florida on or after July 1, 2023, must report their interests to the state or be potentially fined $1,000 per day the report is late.  Chinese acquisitions after July 1, 2023, are subject to forfeiture to the state with such acquisitions constituting a third-degree felony.  The seller commits a first-degree misdemeanor for knowingly violating the law.

The plaintiffs sought an injunction against the implementation of the law before it went into effect on July 1, 2023.  However, the law went into effect on July 1, with the litigation pending.

On August 17, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for an injunction.   Shen v. Simpson, No. 4:23-cv-208-AW-HAF, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152425 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2023).  The court determined that the Florida provision classified persons by alienage (status of an alien) rather than by race because it barred landownership by persons who are not lawful, permanent residents and who are domiciled in a “country of concern” while exempting noncitizens domiciled in countries that were not “countries of concern.”  Thus, the restriction was not race-based (it applied equally to anyone domiciled in China, for example, regardless of race) and was not subject to strict scrutiny analysis which would have required the State of Florida to prove that the law advanced a compelling state interest narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling interest.  Strict scrutiny, the court noted only applies to laws affecting lawful permanent aliens, and the Florida provision exempts nonresidents who are lawfully permitted to reside in the U.S.  Thus, the law was to be reviewed under the “rational basis” test.  See, e.g., Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).

The court held that the State of Florida did have a rational basis for enacting the ownership restrictions – public safety and to “insulate [the state’s] food supply and…make sure that foreign influences…will not pose a threat to it.”  This satisfied the rational basis test for purposes of the plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge and the FHA challenge (because the law didn’t discriminate based on race) and also meant that the court would not enjoin the law because the plaintiffs’ challenge on this basis was unlikely to succeed. 

The Florida law, the court concluded, also defined “critical military infrastructure” and “military installation” in detail which gave the plaintiffs sufficient notice that they couldn’t own ag land or acquire an interest in ag land within 10 miles of a military installation or “critical infrastructure facility,” or within five miles of a “military installation” by an individual Chinese investor.  Thus, the court determined that the plaintiffs’ due process claim would fail. 

The plaintiffs also made a Supremacy Clause challenge claiming that federal law trumped the Florida law because the Florida law conflicted with the manner in which land purchases were regulated at the federal level.  They claimed that federal law established a procedure to review certain foreign investments and acquisitions for purposes of determining a threat to national security.  The court disagreed, noting the “history of state regulation” of alien ownership” and that the Congress would have preempted state foreign ownership laws conflicted with the federal review procedure. 

USDA Payments Nontaxable?

Partisan legislation has been introduced into the U.S. House (no bill number yet) that would make numerous farm program benefits nontaxable.  Identical legislation was introduced into the Senate in late 2022.  The law, known as The Family Farmer and Rancher Tax Fairness Act of 2023, would make payments to “distressed” borrowers tax-free, as well as certain payments to “underserved” farmers in high poverty areas and payments to farmers that have allegedly been discriminated against by the USDA. Specifically, the payments covered by the bill are defined as any payment described in section 1066(e) of the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (as amended by section 22007 of Public Law 117–169) or section 22006 of Public Law 117–169.  It should be noted that none of the USDA program payments that the bill makes nontaxable are associated with the virus.  While the bill could end up being included in the Farm Bill (which will likely not be passed this year).  However, the bill makes little tax or economic sense (it would create perverse economic incentives) and will likely face stiff opposition. 

Conclusion

These are just a few recent developments in the world of ag law and tax.  More will be forthcoming in another post.

Current Developments and Issues in Agricultural Law and Taxation

Overview

The legal, tax and economic issues are many and varied that face farmers and ranchers as well as the businesses and other professionals that work in the agricultural industry.  In today’s blog article, I look at some recent developments and issues of importance.

Adverse Possession/Prescriptive Easement

Easement issues arise frequently in agriculture.  Often the easement involves access to a landlocked parcel.  In those situations, the law will imply an easement from prior use or necessity, or by prescription.  An implied easement may arise from prior use if there has been a conveyance of a physical part of the grantor's land (hence, the grantor retains part, usually adjoining the part conveyed), and before the conveyance there was a usage on the land that, had the two parts then been severed, could have been the subject of an easement appurtenant to one and servient upon the other, and this usage is, more or less, “necessary” to the use of the part to which it would be appurtenant, and “apparent.”  An easement implied from necessity involves a conveyance of a physical part only of the grantor's land, and after severance of the tract into two parcels, it is “necessary” to pass over one of them to reach any public street or road from the other.  No pre-existing use needs to be present.  Instead, the severance creates a land-locked parcel unless its owner is given implied access over the other parcel.

Acquiring an easement by prescription is analogous to acquiring property by adverse possession.  If an individual possesses someone else's land in an open and notorious fashion with an intent to take it away from them, such person (known as an adverse possessor) becomes the true property owner after the statutory time period (typically anywhere from 10 to 21 years) has expired.  For an easement by prescription to arise, the use of the land subject to the easement must be open and notorious, adverse, under a claim of right, continuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period.  But, unlike adverse possession, there is no exclusivity requirement (except for the usage of the easement that is unique to the claimant) for acquiring a prescriptive easement.  That’s because the claimant is not claiming ownership of the property involved, just use.  Others may also be able to use the eased area without interfering with the claimant’s prescriptive easements. 

That last point is one that I have harped on for years – particularly in Kansas because the Kansas courts, frankly, have confusingly blurred the lines between adverse possession and prescriptive easement.  I have always tried to point out to my law students the difference between the two concepts and why the difference matters for farm clients.  Well, finally, the Kansas Supreme Court has cleared the mess up in Kansas by issuing an opinion as if it were straight from my books, seminars, extension meetings, classes and all. 

Here's a summary of the case:

Pyle v. Gall, 531 P.3d 1189 (Kan. 2023)

The parties disputed the location of the property line between their tracts.  The plaintiff routinely planted crops up to what the plaintiff believed to be the property line, but that planting interfered with the crop farming plans of the defendant’s tenant.  The plaintiff also regularly used a portion of the defendant’s field as a road to access the plaintiff’s crops.  In 2015, the defendant offered to sell the disputed area to the plaintiff and told the plaintiff to stop accessing the plaintiff’s crops via the defendant’s field.  Each party hired surveyors, but the surveyors reached different conclusions as to the property line. In March of 2016, the defendant built a fence based on the property line that the defendant’s surveyor found, which was 17 feet beyond what the plaintiff believed to be the property line. In March 2017, the plaintiff sued to quiet title to the field up to the crop line he farmed to by adverse possession and sought either a prescriptive easement or easement by necessity. 

The trial court held that the plaintiff had adversely possessed the land in dispute and had acquired a prescriptive easement across the defendant’s property.  On appeal, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s determination that the plaintiff had acquired the strip in question by adverse possession.  The plaintiff had used the property for the statutory timeframe in an open, exclusive and continuous manner upon belief of true ownership.  Use by others for recreational purposes, the appellate court reasoned, did not negate the exclusivity requirement because the use was infrequent compared to the plaintiff’s farming activity on the disputed land.  However, the appellate court reversed the trial court on the prescriptive easement issue because both the plaintiff and the defendant used the alleged area on which a prescriptive easement was being asserted.  Thus, the plaintiff had not used the easement exclusively.  The appellate court remanded to the trial court the issue of whether an easement by necessity had arisen because the trial court had not considered the issue.  Pyle v. Gall, No. 123,823, 2022 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 242 (Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2022).

Note:  The appellate court’s opinion last year gave me more fodder for criticism of the blurring of prescriptive easement and adverse possession concepts/requirements.  There simply is no exclusivity requirement with respect to a prescriptive easement except what is unique to the party claiming a prescriptive easement.  A prescriptive claimant is not asserting ownership, but a particular usage of a portion of the owner’s property.  Others may also assert usage that is unique to themselves that doesn’t conflict with the claimant’s usage.

On further review, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed.  The Court clarified that there is no exclusivity requirement as an element for claiming a prescriptive easement (other than what is unique to the claimant).  The Court noted that the other elements for establishing a prescriptive easement are that the usage must be open, continuous for a statutory period (15 years in Kansas) and adverse to the true owner’s exclusive right of possession.  The Court stated that, “Exclusivity in the context of adverse possession is different than exclusivity in the context of prescriptive easements.”  So, a prescriptive easement exists if the landowner doesn’t substantially interrupt the prescriptive claimant’s use of the land during the statutory (15 years in Kansas) timeframe.  It doesn’t matter if the claimant failed to exclude all others from the contested area. 

Based on the facts of the case, while others used the subject area no one who owned or possessed the area in question substantially interrupted the plaintiff’s access to his field.  The easement area was being used by multiple people each for their own unique purposes. No one else used it as a corridor to access the plaintiff’s field.  How the contested area was used was the key.  The plaintiff successfully asserted a prescriptive easement for access to his field.

Texas Adverse Possession Case

Parker v. Weber, No. 10-16-00446-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 2210  (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2023)

This case involved adjoining property owners and a disputed 20.62 acres.  The defendant acquired his tract in 1958 and the plaintiff bought the adjoining tract and the 20.62 acres in 2014.  The seller of the 20.62 acres would not convey the tract via a warranty deed because of his understanding that there was some dispute about ownership of the acreage.  The plaintiff knew that there was a dispute about the title of the 20.62 acres, but claimed he didn’t know the defendant claimed title to it.  The defendant claimed title by adverse possession, pointing out that he had rebuilt and maintained the existing fence (which was first built in 1903), and had grazed cattle on his ranch and the disputed 20.62-acre tract. 

The appellate court determined that the evidence was sufficient to conclude that the fence was a “designed enclosure” rather than simply a “casual fence” (one that existed before either adjoining owner owned their tract).  The court also noted that the 20.62 acres was contiguous with the defendant’s larger ranch property, and he operated both tracts as a single cattle grazing unit.  The defendant had continued this usage since 1959 (which easily satisfied the applicable 25-year requirement) and made the fence his own by rebuilding and maintaining it.  Neighbor testimony established that the general view of the community was that the defendant owned the 20.62-acre property.  The appellate court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant could not adversely possess the property because he didn’t pay taxes on the disputed tract.  The failure to pay taxes, the appellate court noted, lacked probative value.     

Grain Storage Costs

The cost of storing grain at an elevator could be at an all-time high in the near future.  How might it impact your farming business and what can you do about it? According to a report from CoBank’s Knowledge Exchange, higher grain storage costs caused by higher interest rates, an inverted futures market and higher labor, insurance and operational costs could also mean lower cash grain bids and wider basis levels.  The elevators’ cost of borrowing has risen, and crop prices are high, so to alleviate the pressure, elevators raise storage costs.  Based on USDA’s marketing year average prices, the interest-related cost of storing grain is up 21 percent for corn, 42 percent for soybeans, and 50 percent for wheat.  The situation is especially tough for co-op elevators because their business is to buy and market their members’ grain – they must carry inventory even if the cost has gone up.  And all of this is going on while farmers are facing higher input costs.  So, lower bids for outputs and higher costs for inputs is not a good scenario for farmers. 

So, what can you do to minimize risk?  One thing is to examine your strategy for using forward and deferred payment contracts. Another is to see whether you are optimizing your depreciation alternatives and your use of the commodity futures market.

Update on Proposition 12 Fallout (the EATS Act)

In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the California Proposition 12 case, legislation has been introduced in both the U.S. House and Senate entitled the “Ending Agricultural Trade Suppression Act (EATS Act).  The EATS Act attempts to limit the power of states to establish their own standards for agricultural products. The primary objective of the law is to prevent states from enforcing regulations on animal products that are produced outside their borders and then imported for sale within the state.  The law is the current version of a bill introduced several years ago by Congressman Steve King.  The King legislation and the EATS Act are designed to prioritize economic incentives for the production of agricultural products and avoid states from legislating their ”morals” on other states and let consumers decide the ag products they wish to purchase (assuming products are appropriately labeled).

 It is possible that the legislation could be included in the next Farm Bill.  Animal rights groups oppose the legislation.   

Recent Happening in Ag Law and the Courts

Overview

The field of agricultural law is broad and dynamic.  There is always something happening.  That’s a function of the many varied ways that the law intersects with land ownership, land use, economics and the production of food and fiber.  Below is my commentary on a few recent cases involving farmers and ranchers – farm bankruptcy; veterinarian’s lien; confined animal feeding operations and an injury sustained while assisting a downed heifer.

Some recent court cases involving ag – it’s the topic of today’s post.

Chapter 12 Plan Could Be Modified – Substantial Change in Circumstances Must be Shown

In re Swackhammer, 650 B.R. 914 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 2023)

Chapter 12 bankruptcy is exclusively for family farmers.  A creature of the farm crisis of the 1980s, it became a permanent part of the bankruptcy code in 2005.  A key feature is the ability to restructure debt and put together a reorganization plan that allows the farm debtor to pay off creditors over time.  But a significant question is whether that reorganization plan can be modified and, if so, how many times it can be modified.  A recent case shed some light on those questions. 

In Swackhammer, the debtors filed Chapter 12 bankruptcy in 2018, and a second modified plan was confirmed in 2019.  In 2020, the debtors move to modify their confirmed plan to extend the time to make payments to secured creditors based on changed circumstances such as weather, equipment failure, employee illness or losses due to delayed financing.  Each time the creditors objected, but each time the court allowed the modification.  In 2022, the debtors motioned to approve a third modified plan to extend the deadline for payments to creditors because of unforeseen revenue loss from the 2021 crops.  The debtors, for the first time, claimed that nothing in 11 U.S.C. §1229 required them to prove changed circumstances.  The creditors objected, claiming that the court had plenty of evidence that none of the debtors’ plans were feasible.  The creditors also asserted that the debtors had to prove that their revenue loss was due to a substantial and unanticipated change in circumstances.  The creditors motioned to dismiss the debtors’ Chapter 12 case. 

The bankruptcy court directed the parties to discuss whether they could agree to the terms of a fourth modified plan.  Ultimately, a fourth modified plan was approved with the bankruptcy court noting that this would be the last modification allowed.  A secured creditor appealed on the basis that 11 U.S.C. §1229 required a debtor to show “unanticipated, substantial change in circumstances” before confirming a proposed modified plan.  The appellate court noted that the circuit courts of appeal were split on the issue and that it had not yet addressed the issue.  The appellate court held that 11 U.S.C. §1229(a) requires a showing, at a minimum of a “substantial change in circumstances” but that it didn’t need to take a position on the issue in the case because the evidence illustrated that the debtors had met the burden.  Accordingly, the bankruptcy court had not erred in allowing the fourth modification because, in any event, the evidence showed an unanticipated substantial change in circumstances. 

Veterinarian’s Lien Fails for Lack of Proof. 

In re Kern, No. 22-40437-12, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 1392 (Bankr. D. Kan. May 26, 2023)

Every state has numerous statutory liens that, when properly “perfected” can beat out a prior perfected secured lien.  Common ones include a mechanic’s lien, an agister’s lien, and a landlord’s lien.  Some states, including Kansas, also have a statutory veterinarian’s lien.  That lien was at issue in a recent case.

In In re Kern, the debtor had pastured cattle for third parties until February of 2022.  During that time, a veterinarian provided medications and veterinary care for the cattle.  After shipping the cattle at the direction of the owner, the third party’s check was dishonored, and the debtor couldn’t pay the veterinary bill.  Ultimately, the veterinarian came into possession of some of the debtor’s cattle and the veterinarian cared for the cattle for slightly over two months.  It was unclear and disputed how the veterinarian came into possession of the cattle.  The veterinarian filed a veterinary lien under Kan. Stat. Ann. §47-836 with the local county Register of Deeds and a copy of the lien from mailed to the debtor and printed in the local newspaper.  The debtor’s primary lender then intervened, claiming a first-priority lien on the cattle.  The county Sheriff sold the cattle for $18,714.83.  That amount was deposited with the county court. 

The veterinarian then sought payment pursuant to the lien, and the primary lender objected.  The debtor then filed Chapter 12 bankruptcy.  The parties stipulated that the primary lender held a valid perfected lien in the cattle and cattle proceeds, that could be beat out by a valid veterinarian’s lien.  The debtor claimed that he didn’t request veterinary services for the cattle, but that the cattle owner must have.  Ultimately, the court concluded that the veterinarian could only establish that someone with lawful possession of the cattle delivered them to him for veterinary services, but that it couldn’t be established that it was the debtor.  Thus, the veterinarian couldn’t establish it was the debtor that requested his services and the veterinarian failed to meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and the veterinarian’s lien was invalid. 

Court Vacates Medium-Sized CAFO Rule

Dakota Rural Action v. United States Department of Agriculture, No. 18-2852 (CKK), 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58678 (D. D.C. Apr. 4, 2023)

The plaintiff, a non-profit organization that was initially formed during the farm debt crisis of the 1980s to provide various forms of assistance to smaller-sized family farming operations, acting on behalf of various farm and animal rights groups, challenged a rule promulgated by the Farm Service Agency (FSA) in 2016.  That rule exempted medium-sized confined animal farming operations (CAFOs) from environmental review for FSA loans.  A medium-sized CAFO can house up to 700 dairy cows, 2,500 55-pound hogs or up to 125,000 chickens.  The plaintiff challenged the rule as being implemented without complying with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) [42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C)] which requires all federal agencies to undertake a certain degree of environmental review before effecting an agency decision or policy.  In addition, the NEPA specifies that “an agency will inform the public that it has indeed considered environmental concerns in its decision-making process.”  Alternative, an agency can provide an environmental impact statement (EIS).  An EIS requires agency review before any action is taken that will “significantly affect the quality of the human environment.”  Another alternative is for an agency to prepare an “environmental assessment” (EA) when environmental impact is not clearly established, an EIS is not necessary and there will not be any significant environmental impact.  But, no analysis need be made public is the agency determines that its proposed action will not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.  The FSA concluded that it didn’t need to do any environmental analysis before making loans to medium-sized CAFOs, categorically exempting them from NEPA review.  The court disagreed and vacated the rule.  The court noted that FSA had provided no rationale for the exemption or the data upon which it relied except a 2013 discussion of a proposed categorical exemption.  FSA conceded that it made no finding as to environmental impact.  The court determined that to be fatal, along with providing no notice that it was going to categorically exempt all loan actions to medium-sized CAFOs.  Thus, the rule was procedurally defective.  The court vacated the rule and remanded to the FSA. 

Domesticated Animal Activity Act Doesn’t Provide Immunity for Feedlot Operator

Vreeman v. Jansma, No. 22-1365, 2023 Iowa App. LEXIS 492 (Iowa Ct. App. Jun. 21, 2023)

The defendant operated a feedlot and discovered a downed heifer in an area where he couldn’t get tractor or equipment to assist the heifer in getting up.  He called the plaintiff to come and help him with the task, something the plaintiff has assisted with in the past.  While trying to get the heifer to her feet, the plaintiff’s leg was severely injured.  The plaintiff sued for negligence and the defendant motioned for summary judgment, citing the Iowa Domesticated Animal Activity Act (Iowa Code Ch. 673) (Act) as providing him with immunity from suit.  The Act states that “A person, including a domesticated animal professional, domesticated animal activity sponsor, the owner of the domesticated animal, or a person exhibiting the domesticated animal, is not liable for the damages, injury or death suffered by a participant or spectator resulting from the inherent risks of a domesticated animal activity.”  The plaintiff asserted that the Act was inapplicable because standing up a downed heifer is not a “domesticated animal activity.”  The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant and the plaintiff appealed.  The appellate court reversed, noting that the statute provided a specific list of definitions for “domesticated animal activity” and that standing up a downed heifer was not in the list. 

Conclusion

There’s never a dull moment in agricultural law and taxation.  Stay tuned for more developments in future posts.

Coeur d’ Alene, Idaho, Conference – Twin Track

Overview

On August 7-8 in beautiful Coeur d’ Alene, ID, Washburn Law School the second of its two summer conferences on farm income taxation as well as farm and ranch estate and business planning.  A bonus for the ID conference will be a two-day conference focusing on various ag legal topics.    The University of Idaho College of Law and College of Agricultural and Life Sciences along with the Idaho State Bar and the ag law section of the Idaho State Bar are co-sponsoring.  This conference represents the continuing effort of Washburn Law School in providing practical and detailed CLE to rural lawyers, CPAs and other tax professionals as well as getting law students into the underserved rural areas of the Great Plains and the West.  The conference can be attended online in addition to the conference location in Coeur d’ Alene at the North Idaho College. 

More information on the August Idaho Conference and some topics in ag law – it’s the topic of today’s post.

Idaho Conference

Over two days in adjoining conference rooms the focus will be on providing continuing education for tax professionals and lawyers that represent agricultural clients.  All sessions are focused on practice-relevant topic.  One of the two-day tracks will focus on agricultural taxation on Day 1 and farm/ranch estate and business planning on Day 2.  The other track will be two-days of various agricultural legal issues. 

Here's a bullet-point breakdown of the topics:

Tax Track (Day 1)

• Caselaw and IRS Update
• What is “Farm Income” for Farm Program Purposes?
• Inventory Method – Options for Farmers
• Machinery Trades
• Easement and Rental Issues for Landowners
• Protecting a Tax Practice From Scammers
• Amending Partnership Returns
• Corporate Provided Meals and Lodging
• CRATs
• IC-DISCS
• When Cash Method Isn’t Available
• Accounting for Hedging Transactions
• Deducting a Purchased Growing Crop
• Deducting Soil Fertility

Tax Track (Day 2)

• Estate and Gift Tax Current Developments
• Succession Plans that Work (and Some That Don’t)
• The Use of SLATs in Estate Planning
• Form 1041 and Distribution Deductions
• Social Security as an Investment
• Screening New Clients
• Ethics for Estate Planners

Ag Law Track (Day 1)

• Current Developments and Issues
• Current Ag Economic Trends
• Handling Adverse Decisions on Federal Grazing Allotments
• Getting and Retaining Young Lawyers in Rural Areas
• Private Property Rights and the Clean Water Act – the Aftermath of the Sackett Decision
• Ethics

Ag Law Track (Day 2)

• Foreign Ownership of Agricultural Land
• Immigrant Labor in Ag
• Animal Welfare and the Legal System
• How/Why Farmers and Ranchers Use and Need Ag Lawyers and Tax Pros
• Agricultural Leases

Both tracks will be running simultaneously, and both will be broadcast live online.  Also, you can register for either track.  There’s also a reception on the evening of the first day on August 7.  The reception is sponsored by the University of Idaho College of Law and the College of Agricultural and Life Sciences at the University of Idaho, as well as the Agricultural Law Section of the Idaho State Bar.

Speakers

The speakers for the tax and estate/business planning track are as follows: 

Day 1:  Roger McEowen, Paul Neiffer and a representative from the IRS Criminal Investigation Division.

Day 2:  Roger McEowen; Paul Neiffer; Allan Bosch; and Jonas Hemenway.

The speakers for the ag law track are as follows:

Day 1:  Roger McEowen; Cody Hendrix; Hayden Ballard; Damien Schiff; aand Joseph Pirtle.

Day 2:  Roger McEowen; Joel Anderson; Kristi Running; Aaron Golladay; Richard Seamon; and Kelly Stevenson

Who Should Attend

Anyone that represents farmers and ranchers in tax planning and preparation, financial planning, legal services and/or agribusiness would find the conference well worth the time.  Students attend at a much-reduced fee and should contact me personally or, if you are from Idaho, contract Prof. Rich Seamon (also one of the speakers) at the University of Idaho College of Law.  The networking at the conference will be a big benefit to students in connecting with practitioners from rural areas. 

As noted above, if you aren’t able to attend in-person, attendance is also possible online. 

Sponsorship

If your business would be interested in sponsoring the conference or an aspect of it, please contact me.  Sponsorship dollars help make a conference like this possible and play an important role in the training of new lawyers for rural areas to represent farmers and ranchers, tax practitioners in rural areas as well as legislators. 

For more information about the Idaho conferences and to register, click here: 

Farm Income Tax/Estate and Business Planning Track:  https://www.washburnlaw.edu/employers/cle/farmandranchtaxaugust.html

Ag Law Track:  https://www.washburnlaw.edu/employers/cle/idahoaglaw.html

Court Says COE Must Pay for Mismanagement of Water Levels in Missouri River

Overview

Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit largely affirmed a lower court ruling that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers unconstitutionally violated the property rights of certain farmers along the Missouri River.  The case stemmed from changed in the COE’s manual for managing waters levels in the river.  Obviously, the appellate court’s decision is very important for the particular farmer’s involved, but it also is an important victory for private property rights.

Property rights of farmers along the Missouri River – it’s the topic of today’s post.

Background

Ideker Farms, Inc. et al. v. United States, No. 14-183L, 2020 U.S. Claims LEXIS 2548 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 14, 2020), affn'g. in part, vacn'g. in part and remanding, No. 2021-1849, 2021-1875, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 15005 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 16, 2023).

The liability issue.  In 2014, 400 farmers along the Missouri River from Kansas to North Dakota sued the federal government claiming that the actions of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE) led to and caused repeated flooding of their farmland along the Missouri River.  The farmers alleged that flooding in 2007-2008, 2010-2011, and 2013-2014 constituted a taking requiring that compensation be paid to them under the Fifth Amendment.  The litigation was divided into two phases – liability and just compensation.  The liability phase was decided in early 2018 when the court determined that some of the 44 landowners selected as bellwether plaintiffs had established the COE’s liability.  In that decision, the court held that the COE, in its attempt to balance flood control and its responsibilities under the Endangered Species Act, had released water from reservoirs “during periods of high river flows with the knowledge that flooding was taking place or likely to soon occur.”  The court, in that case, noted that the COE had made changes to its “Master Manual” in 2004 and made other changes after 2004 to reengineer the Missouri River and reestablish more “natural environments” to facilitate species recovery.  Those changes led to unprecedented releases from Gavins Point Dam in South Dakota after heavy spring rains and snowmelt in Montana during early 2011.  The large volume of water released caused riverbank destabilization which led to flooding and destroyed all of the levees along the lead plaintiff’s farm and an estimated $2 billion in damages.  The COE claimed it acted appropriately to manage the excess water.  Ultimately, the court, in the earlier litigation, determined that 28 of the 44 landowners had proven the elements of a takings claim – causation, foreseeability and severity.  The claims of the other 16 landowners were dismissed for failure to prove causation. The court also determined that flooding in 2011 could not be tied to the COE’s actions and dismissed the claims for that year. 

Damages.  Subsequent litigation involved a determination of the plaintiffs’ losses and whether the federal government had a viable defense against the plaintiffs’ claims.  The court found that the “increased frequency, severity, and duration of flooding post MRRP [Missouri River Recovery Program] changed the character of the representative tracts of land.”  The court also stated that, “ [i]t cannot be the case that land that experiences a new and ongoing pattern of increased flooding does not undergo a change in character.”  The court determined that three representative plaintiffs, farming operations in northwest Missouri, southwest Iowa and northeast Kansas, were collectively owed more than $10 million for the devaluation of their land due to the establishment of a “permanent flowage easement” that the COE acquired along with repairs to a levee.  The easement and levee damage constituted a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment.  However, the court determined that the COE need not compensate the plaintiffs for property and crop losses, and that flooding from 2011 was not compensable. The impact of the court’s ruling meant that hundreds of landowners affected by flooding in six states are likely entitled to just compensation for the loss of property value due to the new flood patterns that the COE created as part of its MRRP. Both parties appealed. 

Appellate decision.  The appellate court affirmed on the compensable taking issue, but determined that the lower court erred by excluding crop damages occurring between 2007 and 2014 from the damages calculation.  Thus, the appellate court vacated the lower’s court determination not to award compensation for crop and property damage for those years and remanded for a determination of the amount of the crop damage to both mature and immature crops.  The compensable taking was for both a flowage easement and crop damage.  The appellate court also determined that the lower court failed to consider whether the actions of the COE actions in accordance with its Master Manual changes increased the severity or duration of the 2011 flooding compared to what was attributable to the record rainfall that year.   

Implications

As noted above, the appellate court held that not had a Taking occurred, but that the farmers in the case had to be paid for all of the crops that were destroyed over the seven year period at issue (2007-2014).  The appellate court’s opinion is important for the fact that it establishes that the government must pay for the damages it causes when it floods farmland and destroys crops.  Certainly, the government has the power to “take” property that it wants.  The Constitution ensures that the government pays for what it takes.  That principle was appropriately applied in this instance.

Sunday Afternoon Random Thoughts on Ag Law and Tax

Overview

I am in the midst of a 10-day traveling and speaking “tour” and have a moment to share a few thoughts of what has been rolling around in my mind (besides what I have been teaching recently).  Some of these thoughts are triggered by questions that I receive, others by cases that I read, yet still others simply from conversations that I have had with other recently.  Those thoughts include liability for guests on the farm; the usefulness of Health Savings Accounts; pre-paid farm expenses and death; putting a plan in place to address long-term health care costs; and custom agreements for direct beef sales from the farm.

Random thoughts in ag law and tax – it’s the topic of today’s blog article.

Direct Beef Sales and Custom Agreements

It seems that the interest in buying beef products directly from cattle producers is on the rise. But direct sales/purchases may trigger some different rules.  In general, if a person wants to buy beef directly from a cattle producer the law treats the transaction differently depending on whether the live animal is sold to the buyer or whether processed beef is sold.  The matter turns on whether the animal owner is the end consumer.  If the cattle producer sells processed beef to the buyer, the processing of the animal must occur in an inspected facility and the producer would also be subject licensing, labeling and insurance requirements.  But if the producer sells the live animal to the buyer then the producer can also do the processing and sell any remaining beef not initially purchased to another buyer.    

This means that a contract should clearly state that the live animal is being sold and in what percentage.  If a specific animal is sold, the animal should be identified.  Also, the calculation of the price should be detailed and how payment is to be made.  Any processing fees should be set forth and the agreement should be clear that the meat can’t be resold or donated.  In addition, it is important to make sure to clearly state when the animal is the buyer’s property.  The key point is that the owner of the animal and the consumer of the beef must be the same. 

The bottom line is to have a good custom harvest agreement to be able to use the custom exempt processing option. 

Handling Long-Term Care Costs

Planning for long-term care costs should be an element of a complete estate plan for many farm and ranch families.  Having a plan can help minimize the risk that the farm assets or land would have to be sold to come up with the funds to pay a long-term care bill.  What are some steps you can take to put a plan in place that will protect the farm assets from being sold to pay a long-term health care bill? 

A ballpark range of the monthly cost of long-term care is $7,000-9,000 in many parts of the country.  If you are planning on covering that expense with Medicaid benefits keep in mind that you can only have very little income and assets to be eligible. 

A good place to start is to estimate your current monthly income sources.  What do you have in rents, royalties, Social Security benefits, investment income, and other income?  You will only need to plug the shortfall between the monthly care cost and your then current monthly income sources.  That difference might be able to be made up with long-term care insurance.  Those policies can differ substantially, so do your homework and examine the terms and conditions closely.    

If a policy can be obtained to cover at least the deficiency that income doesn’t cover, all of the farm assets will be protected. Many insurance agents and financial advisors can provide estimates for policies and help you determine the type of policy that might be best for you. 

When should you be thinking about putting a plan together?  Certainly, before a major medical problem occurs.  If you are in relatively good health, policy premiums will be less.  Certainly, before age 70 would be an excellent time to employ a plan.

Planning to protect assets from depletion paying for long-term health care costs is beset with a complex maize of federal and state rules.  Make sure you get good guidance. 

Pre-Paid Farm Expenses and Death

Many cash-basis farmers pre-pay next-year’s input expenses in the current year and deduct the expense against current year income.  The IRS has specific rules for pre-paying and deducting.  Another issue with pre-paid inputs is what happens if a farmer claims the deduction and then dies before using the inputs that were purchased? 

To be able currently deduct farm inputs that will be used in the next year, three requirements must be met.  The items must be purchased under a binding contract for the purchase of specific goods of a minimum quantity; the pre-purchase must have a business purpose or not be entered into solely for tax avoidance purposes; and the transaction must not materially distort income. 

If the rules are satisfied but the farmer dies before using the inputs that were purchased, what happens?  In Estate of Backemeyer v. Comr., 147 T.C. 526 (2016), a farmer pre-purchased about $235,000 worth of inputs associated with the planting of next year’s crop.  The deduction was taken on the return for the year of purchase, but the farmer died before using the inputs.  The inputs passed to his widow who used them to put the crop in the ground.  She deducted the inputs again on the return for that year.  The IRS objected, but the court said that’s the way the tax rules work.  The value of the inputs was included in his estate, and she could claim a deduction against their cost basis – the fair market value at the time of his death.

Liability for Guests on the Farm

What’s your liability for guests on the farm?  The answer is, “it depends.”  Facts of each situation are paramount, and the outcome of each potential liability event will turn on those facts. For example, in Jones v. Wright, 677 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. Ct. App. 2023), a family who came to the plaintiffs’ property to look at a display of Christmas lights sued the landowner for the death of their child who was killed by a motorist while crossing the road after leaving the premises. 

When they left the property, their minor child was struck and killed by a vehicle while crossing the road to get to the family’s vehicle. The family sued the landowners for wrongful death and negligence claiming that they were owed a duty of care as invitees that was breached by the landowners’ failure to make the premises safe or warn of a dangerous condition.

The court disagreed based on several key factors.  The landowners didn’t charge a fee for viewing the lights; the vehicle that struck the child was being driven at night without lights; there hadn’t been any similar prior accidents on the road; the landowners used loudspeakers to tell visitors not to park on the opposite side of the road; and the accident occurred on property the landowners didn’t own.  Based on those facts, the court said the landowners didn’t breach any duty that was owed to the family.  The child’s death was not a foreseeable risk. 

But slightly different facts could have led to a different outcome.

Health Savings Accounts

One of the best-kept secrets of funding medical costs is a Health Savings Account (HSA).  Surveys indicate that a self-employed farmer pays about $12,000-$15,000 annually for health insurance.  To make matters worse, the policies often come with high deductibles and limited coverage.  An HSA can provide current and future income tax benefits while simultaneously allowing the self-funding of future medical costs. 

An issue for many is that it’s unlikely that medical expenses are deductible for failure to meet the threshold for itemizing deductions.  That threshold is only likely to be met in a year when substantial medical costs are incurred.  An HSA is an option without the deduction restrictions, but it does need to be paired with a high deductible insurance policy.

With an HSA, contributions are deductible up to $7,750 this year for a family, earnings grow tax-free, and distributions to pay for qualified medical expenses are also not taxed. Qualified expenses include Medicare premiums, or any other qualified medical expenses incurred before retirement.  If you’re a farmer that files a Schedule F, an HSA is the simplest and most cost-effective way to receive a deduction for medical costs. 

But you can’t contribute to an HSA once you are enrolled in Medicare. So, it might be a good idea to fully fund an HSA but not take any distributions until retirement.  One downside with an HSA is that if it is inherited, the recipient has one year to cash it in.  If there aren’t any qualified expenses to be reimbursed, income tax will result.

Conclusion

Just some random thoughts this Sunday afternoon.  For you father’s reading this, I trust you have had a very pleasant Father’s Day.  Now it’s time to get some rest for an early morning flight to Georgia.

Decision to not Review USDA Wetland Certification Upheld – What Does the Grassley Amendment Require?

Overview

The “Swampbuster” rules were enacted as part of the conservation provisions of the 1985 Farm Bill.  In general, the rules prohibit the conversion of “wetland” to crop production by producers that are receiving farm program payments.  A farmer that is determined to have improperly converted wetland is deemed ineligible for farm program payments.  But an exception exists for wetland that was converted to crop production before December 23, 1985 – the effective date of the 1985 Farm Bill. 

Under the Swampbuster rules, “wetland” has:  (1) a predominance of hydric soil; (2) is inundated by surface or groundwater at a frequency and duration sufficient to support a prevalence of hydrophytic vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions, and (3) under normal circumstances does support a prevalence of such vegetation. 7 C.F.R. §12.2(a).  In other words, to be a wetland, a tract must have hydric soils, hydrophytic vegetation and wetland hydrology.   

However, there have been several prominent cases in recent years illustrating that the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) has trouble applying the definition as it attempts to determine whether a particular tract has wetlands.  A recent decision of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) National Appeals Division (NAD) makes the point.

Congress amended the Swampbuster statute in 1996 to curtail attempts of NRCS to frequently change wetland delineations.  The amendment specified that prior wetland delineations could only be changed upon a farmer’s request.  That amendment was the subject of a recent case involving a South Dakota farmer.

The 1996 amendment to the Swampbuster rules – that’s the topic of today’s post.

The “Grassley” Amendment

In 1990, the Congress amended the Swampbuster Act to provide a review provision specifying that a prior wetland certification “shall remain valid and in effect…until such time as the person affected by the certification requests review of the certification by the Secretary.”  16 U.S.C. §3822(a)(4).  This became known as the “Grassley Amendment” named after Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa.  Based on the statutory amendment, the USDA developed a regulation, known as the “Review Regulation,” providing procedural requirements a farmer must follow to make an effective review request.  The regulation said a request to review a certification could be made only if a natural event had altered the topography or hydrology of the land or if NRCS believed that the existing certification was erroneous.  7 C.F.R. §12.30(c)(6). 

The Foster Case

Facts and trial court decision.  In Foster v. United States Department of Agriculture, No. 4:21-CV-04081-RAL, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117676 (D. S.D. Jul. 1, 2022), the plaintiff owned farmland containing a .8-acre portion that USDA certified as a “wetland” in 2011 under the Swampbuster provisions of 16 U.S.C. §§3801, 3821-3824.  The wetland was about 8.5 inches deep at certain times during the year, particularly in the spring after snow melt and didn’t drain anywhere.  The wetland resulted from a tree belt that had been planted in 1936 to prevent soil erosion.  Snow accumulated around the tree belt in the winter and melted in the spring with the water collecting in a low spot in of the field before soaking into the ground or evaporating.  In about one-half of the crop years, the puddle would dry out in time or planting.  The certification meant that the puddle could not be drained so that it and the surrounding land could not be farmed without the loss of federal farm program benefits. 

In 2008, Foster request a review of a certification and USDA granted the request simply on the basis of the statute which plainly states that a review of a certification is available upon request.    The request was granted even though the regulation was in place at that time.  The area was recertified as a wetland in 2011.  This was despite Foster having dug two test holes to monitor water levels in the disputed area – one of which was immediately next to the trees.  The data Foster collected showed that the trees slowed the drying of the soil in the hole next to the trees.  The USDA/NRCS refused the data, claiming that Foster didn’t’ have the expertise to interpret the data.  As a result, Foster installed two weather stations and hired an engineering firm to “officially” conclude that the tree belt was slowing the drying of the soil. 

Foster challenged the 2011 recertification, but the trial court affirmed the determination as not arbitrary and capricious (the judicial deference standard given administrative agency decisions).  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, and the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the case.  Foster v. Vilsack, 820 F.3d 330 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. den., 137 S. Ct. 620 (2017). 

Note:  Before Foster’s request for review of the 2011 certification, another South Dakota farmer with a similar set of facts successfully had NRCS remove a wetland label on a .3-acre portion of a field.  Like Foster’s situation, the .3-acre portion was impacted by snow caught in a tree belt.  Thus, after the court decisions, the question remained as to whether a farmer has a legal obligation to present evidence of changed conditions.  The statute contains no such requirement.  In 2008, the recertification request was granted with no obligation on Foster’s part to provide evidence of changed conditions.  The evidence provided was not requested.  Also, published NRCS infiltration rates for the soil type of the depression indicated that the ponding would be gone in less than two weeks (the required inundation period for a wetland finding). 

In 2017, Foster again sought a review of the certification under 16 U.S.C. §3822(a)(4) which, as noted, provides for review of a final certification upon request by the person affected by the certification.  The USDA/NRCS didn’t respond on the basis that Foster didn’t provide new information that the NRCS hadn’t previously considered.  Foster filed for review again in 2020 along with professionally prepared engineering reports from two firms that concluded that the area in question ponded due to the tree belt and was an artificial wetland not subject to Swampbuster. 

The USDA denied review in 2020 citing its own regulation of 7 C.F.R. §12.30(c)(6) which required the plaintiff to show how a natural event changed the topography or hydrology of the wetland that caused the certification to no longer be a reliable indicator of site conditions.  The plaintiff claimed that new evidence existed that would refute the 2011 certification, and also claimed that 16 U.S.C. §3822(a)(4) provided no restriction on the ability to get a review and, as a result, 7 C.F.R. §12.30(c)(6) violated the due process clause by restricting reviews and was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.   

The trial court held that 7 C.F.R. §12.30(c)(6) merely restricted when an agency must review a final certification.  The trial court also determined that 7 C.F.R. §12.30(c)(6) did not violate the due process clause as the plaintiff did not show any independent source of authority providing him with a right to certification review on request. The USDA’s denials of review were found not to be arbitrary or capricious and that the plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that the natural conditions of the site had changed, which would require a review of the certification.  The plaintiff also claimed that the Swampbuster provisions were unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment.  

The trial court rejected the plaintiff’s claims and determined that the statute of limitations on challenging the certification had run.  The trial court also held that the USDA was entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim that Swampbuster was unconstitutional, holding that the provisions were within the power of the Congress under the spending clause of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.  The trial court also ruled that Swampbuster did not infringe upon state sovereignty by requiring states to implement a federal program, statute or regulation. The trial court further rejected the plaintiff’s claim that a part of Swampbuster violated the Congressional Review Act, finding that the provision at issue was precluded from judicial review.  The court dismissed all the plaintiff’s claims against the USDA and denied the ability for the area to be reviewed again. 

The appellate court.  Foster filed an appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on August 16, 2022, and the appellate court issued its opinion on May 12, 2023.  The appellate court affirmed.  The court stated that NRCS noted the engineer’s report and asked the engineering firm to identify any evidence that the NRCS had not fully considered the tree belt at the time of the 2011 recertification decision.  The appellate court stated, “Neither Foster nor the engineering firm ever responded to the request.”  The court went on to state that the NRCS reviewed the engineering report, compared it to the record, and declined the review request for noncompliance with the regulation.

Note:  The court’s statement that the NRCS requested additional evidence is false.  The NRCS letter of May 14, 2020, to Foster by State Conservationist Jeffrey Zimprich merely stated that, “Based on the evidence you provided, I am unable to determine that any of the conditions mentioned above for a redetermination apply.”  There was no request for additional information from either Foster or the engineering firms.

The appellate court concluded that the regulation was not inconsistent with the Swampbuster Act.  There was simply nothing that could be gleaned from the Grassley Amendment as guidance to what constitutes a proper review request.  As such the statute was ambiguous and the administrative procedural requirements were permissible.  The Grassley Amendment was merely so that farmers had a way to contest new NRCS wetland delineations for Swampbuster purposes.  It did not preclude USDA/NRCS from developing procedural requirement to challenge a certification.    

The appellate court also affirmed the trial court’s finding with respect to the Congressional Review Act for lack of authority to review the claim.  The appellate court also affirmed the trial court’s finding that the NRCS refusal to consider the request was not arbitrary and capricious.

Note:  In the concluding paragraph of the appellate court’s opinion, the appellate court stated that, “the NRCS requested Foster’s engineering firm to identify evidence showing the NRCS had failed to consider the tree belt on the Site when it made its prior certification.  The record shows no indication that Foster or his engineering firm responded to this request.”  Unfortunately, the appellate court offers no support for this assertion and there is no record of such a request ever having been made.  What the appellate court bases this statement on is not known.

Conclusion

The Grassley Amendment is clear that can rely on a wetland determination until a new determination is requested.  The point of the amendment is to bar NRCS from unilaterally changing a determination once made.  A farmer may request a redetermination.  While it is reasonable to require that new information bearing on a stie’s wetland status be provided when a redetermination is requested, Foster provided that information in the form of professional engineering reports.  Here, NRCS failed to understand the professional reports submitted with the review request and also did not make a clear request for additional information/clarification.  Indeed, no request at all was made for additional information.  Clearly, the .8-acre depression was the result of snowpack caused by a tree belt and NRCS’ own data showed that the ponding of the depression would be gone in less than two weeks.  A regulation that allows a farmer to receive a redetermination upon NRCS admitting it made an error (one of the two possibilities for a review to be granted) makes it highly unlikely that a review would be granted.

In the Foster case, perhaps an en banc review will be requested. 

SCOTUS Dismisses Pork Case – Case Not Properly Plead

Overview

In a huge blow to pork producers (and consumers of pork products) nationwide, the Supreme Court of the United States (Court) has affirmed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which upheld California’s Proposition 12 against a constitutional challenge.  The Supreme Court dismissed the case without getting to the merits.  But, in dismissing the case, the Court produced five opinions including one plurality opinion.  Proposition 12 requires any pork sold in California to be raised in accordance with California’s housing requirements for hogs.  This means that U.S. hog producers will need to ensure that their production facilities must satisfy California’s requirements for the resulting pork products to be sold to California consumers.

Each state sets its own rules concerning the regulation of agricultural production activities.  So, how can one state override other states’ rules?  Involved in the case was a claim involving the judicially-created doctrine known as the dormant Commerce Clause.

The dormant Commerce Clause, hogs and the SCOTUS  and the ability of a state to dictate ag practices in other states – it’s the topic of today’s post.

Background

The Commerce Clause.  Article I Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides in part, “the Congress shall have Power...To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes.”  The Commerce Clause, on its face, does not impose any restrictions on states in the absence of congressional action.  However, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause as implicitly preempting state laws that regulate commerce in a manner that disrupts the national economy.  This is the judicially-created doctrine known as the “dormant” Commerce Clause. 

The “dormant” Commerce Clause.  The dormant Commerce Clause is a constitutional law doctrine that says Congress's power to "regulate Commerce ... among the several States" implicitly restricts state power over the same area.  In general, the Commerce Clause places two main restrictions on state power – (1) Congress can preempt state law merely by exercising its Commerce Clause power by means of the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution; and (2) the Commerce Clause itself--absent action by Congress--restricts state power.  In other words, the grant of federal power implies a corresponding restriction of state power.  This second limitation has come to be known as the "dormant" Commerce Clause because it restricts state power even though Congress's commerce power lies dormant. Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245 (1829).  The label of “dormant Commerce Clause” is really not accurate – the doctrine applies when the Congress is dormant, not the Commerce Clause itself.

Rationale.  The rationale behind the Commerce Clause is to protect the national economic market from opportunistic behavior by the states - to identify protectionist actions by state governments that are hostile to other states.  Generally, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine prohibits states from unduly interfering with interstate commerce.  State regulations cannot intentionally discriminate against interstate commerce.  If they do, the regulations are per se invalid.  See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).  Also, state regulations cannot impose undue burdens on interstate commerce.  See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).  Under the “undue burden” test, state laws that regulate evenhandedly to effectuate a local public interest are upheld unless the burden imposed on commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits.     

The Court has never held that discrimination between in-state and out-of-state commerce, without more, violates the dormant Commerce Clause.  Instead, the Court has explained that the dormant Commerce Clause is concerned with state laws that both discriminate between in-state and out-of-state actors that compete with one another, and harm the welfare of the national economy.  Thus, a discriminatory state law that harms the national economy is permissible if in-state and out-of-state commerce do not compete.  See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 117 S. Ct. 811, 824-26 (1997).  Conversely, a state law that discriminates between in-state and out-of-state competitors is permissible if it does not harm the national economy. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949). 

California Proposition 12 Litigation

In 2018, California voters passed Proposition 12.  Proposition 12 bans the sale of whole pork meat (no matter where produced) from animals confined in a manner inconsistent with California’s regulatory standards.  Proposition 12 established minimum requirements on farmers to provide more space for egg-laying hens, breeding pigs, and calves raised for veal. Specifically, the law requires that covered animals be housed in confinement systems that comply with specific standards for freedom of movement, cage-free design, and minimum floor space. The law identifies covered animals to include veal calves, breeding pigs and egg-laying hens. The implementing regulations prohibit a farm owner or operator from knowingly causing any covered animal to be confined in a cruel manner, as specified, and prohibits a business owner or operator from knowingly engaging in the sale within the state of shell eggs, liquid eggs, whole pork meat or whole veal meat, as defined, from animals housed in a “cruel manner.”  In addition to general requirements that prohibit animals from being confined in a manner that prevents lying down, standing up, fully extending limbs or turning around freely, the measure added detailed confinement space standards for farms subject to the law. The alleged reason for the law was to protect the health and safety of California consumers and decrease the risk of foodborne illness and the negative fiscal impact on California. 

In late 2019, several national farm organizations challenged Proposition 12 and sought a declaratory judgment that the law was unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause.  The plaintiffs also sought a permanent injunction preventing Proposition 12 from taking effect.  The plaintiffs claimed that Proposition 12 impermissibly regulated out-of-state conduct by compelling non-California producers to change their operations to meet California’s standards.  The plaintiffs also alleged that Proposition 12 imposed excessive burdens on interstate commerce without advancing any legitimate local interest by significantly increasing operation costs without any connection to human health or foodborne illness.  The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint.  National Pork Producers Council, et al. v. Ross, 456 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (S.D. Cal. 2020). 

On appeal, the plaintiffs focused their argument on the allegation that Proposition 12 has an impermissible extraterritorial effect of regulating prices in other states and, as such, is per se unconstitutional.  This was a tactical mistake for the plaintiffs.  The appellate court noted that existing Supreme Court precedent on the extraterritorial principle applied only to state laws that are “price control or price affirmation statutes.”  National Pork Producers Council, et al. v. Ross, 6 F. 4th 1021 (9th Cir. Jul. 2021).  Thus, the extraterritorial principle does not apply to a state law that does not dictate the price of a product and does not tie the price of its in-state products to out-of-state prices.  Because Proposition 12 was neither a price control nor a price-affirmation statute (it didn’t dictate the price of pork products or tie the price of pork products sold in California to out-of-state prices) the law didn’t have the extraterritorial effect of regulating prices in other states. 

The appellate court likewise rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that Proposition 12 has an impermissible indirect “practical effect” on how pork is produced and sold outside California.  Id.  Upstream effects (e.g., higher production costs in other states) the appellate court concluded, do not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.   The appellate court pointed out that a state law is not impermissibly extraterritorial unless it regulates conduct that is wholly out of state.  Id.  Because Proposition 12 applied to California and non-California pork production the higher cost of production was not an impermissible effect on interstate commerce.

The appellate court also concluded that inconsistent regulation from state-to-state was permissible because the plaintiffs had failed to show a compelling need for national uniformity in regulation at the state level.  Id.  In addition, the appellate court noted that the plaintiffs had not alleged that Proposition 12 had a discriminatory effect on interstate commerce. 

Simply put, the appellate court rejected the plaintiffs’ challenge to Proposition 12 because a law that increases compliance costs (projected at a 9.2 percent increase in production costs that would e passed on to consumers) is not a substantial burden on interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. 

U.S. Supreme Court

In 2021, the SCOTUS declined to review Proposition 12 in a different case brought by the North American Meat Institute. North American Meat Institute v. Bonta, No. 20-1215, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 3405 (S. Ct. Jun. 28, 2021).  In that case, the plaintiff sought to preliminarily enjoin Proposition 12.  The trial court declined to do so on the basis that Proposition 12 does not have a discriminatory purpose due to a lack of evidence of a protectionist intent that the law treats in-state pork producers more favorably that out-of-state pork producers (never mind that California has virtually no pork production).  The trial court also determined that Proposition 12 does not regulate extraterritorial conduct because it is not a price control or price affirmation statute.  Similarly, the trial court held that Proposition 12 did not substantially burden interstate commerce.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed.  North American Meat Institute v. Becerra, 825 Fed. Appx. 518 (9th Cir. 2020).  As noted, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case. 

In March of 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review the other case discussed above challenging the constitutionality of Proposition 12.  Oral arguments occurred in early October.  On May 11, the Court issued a 5-4 plurality opinion dismissing the case for failure to state a claim and never getting to the merits of the case.  However, the Court issued a total of five opinions including a dissent that can provide guidance for future cases alleging a dormant commerce clause violation. 

The controlling plurality opinion (Justices Gorsuch, Thomas, Barrett, Sotomayor and Kagan) pointed out that the Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce (Article I, Section 8), but hadn’t enacted any statute that would displace Proposition 12.  So, the Court noted, the pork producers were claiming that the dormant Commerce Clause should be utilized to negate Proposition 12.  The pork producers didn’t allege any purposeful discrimination by California, instead relying on the “extraterritoriality doctrine.”  But, as noted above, that argument was a poor one in this case because price discrimination was not involved, and the Court was not willing to accept a “per se” rule under the dormant Commerce Clause that would strike down state legislation that has an impact beyond that state’s borders.  Indeed, the Court said, “This argument falters out of the gate.” 

The fallback argument of balancing under Pike was rejected by Justices Gorsuch, Thomas and Barrett on the basis that balancing state interests was a policy decision to be left up to the Congress.  Indeed, Justice Barrett concluded that the benefits and burdens of Proposition 12 were impossible to measure, but that the complaint plausibly alleged a substantial burden on interstate commerce that would be felt almost exclusively outside California.  Justices Sotomayor and Kagan would have engaged in balancing but because the pork producers failed to plausibly allege a substantial burden on interstate commerce – which is a requirement under Pike.  The Court said it had no way to weigh the costs of Proposition 12 against California’s “moral and health interests.”  Again, the Court said the matter was a policy choice to be left up to the Congress and that the Commerce Clause does not protect a particular structure or method of business operation – “That goes for pigs no less than gas stations.” 

Chief Justice Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Alito, Kavanaugh and Jackson.  The dissent concluded that a substantial burden on interstate commerce was present because Proposition 12 impacted practically the entire U.S. hog industry due to the interconnected nature of the nationwide pork industry which would require the compliance of the vast majority of hog producers.  It was more than a cost of compliance issue.  The question was then, in the words of the dissent, whether the burden of Proposition 12 was clearly excessive in relation to the “putative local benefits.”  This determination needed to be made by the lower courts. 

Justice Kavanaugh wrote separately to point out that California was regulating hog production in other states and that other states had good reason for allowing hogs to be raised in a manner the California found offensive.  He also noted that it would be virtually impossible for hog farmers and pork processors to segregate individual hogs based on their ultimate destination, and that each state has its own rules for health and safety as applied to hog production.  Justice Kavanaugh stated, “California’s approach undermines federalism and the authority of individual States by forcing individuals and businesses in one State to conduct their farming, manufacturing and production practices in a manner required by the laws of a different State.”  If Proposition 12 were to be upheld, a “blueprint” could be provided for other states.  Justice Kavanaugh also stated that California’s approach could also be challenged under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Import-Export Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.  He concluded with a biting criticism of the lawyers for the pork producers by stating, “It appears, therefore, that properly pled dormant Commerce Clause challenges under Pike to laws like California’s Proposition 12 (or even to Proposition 12 itself) could succeed in the future – or at least survive past the motion-to-dismiss stage.”

Conclusion

The Court has been careless in applying the anti-discrimination test, and in many cases, neither of the two requirements--interstate competition or harm to the national economy--is ever mentioned.  See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). The reason interstate competition goes unstated is obvious – in most cases the in-state and out-of-state actors compete in the same market.  But, the reason that the second requirement, harm to the national economy, goes unstated is because the Court simply assumes the issue away.

The dormant Commerce Clause is something to watch for in court opinions involving agriculture.  As states enact legislation designed to protect the economic interests of agricultural producers in their states, those opposed to such laws could challenge them on dormant Commerce Clause grounds.  But, such cases must be plead carefully to show an impermissible regulation of extraterritorial conduct. 

In the present case, practically doubling the cost of creating hog barns to comply with the California standards was not enough, nor was the interconnected nature of the pork industry.  California gets to call the shots concerning the manner of U.S. pork production for pork marketed in the state.  This, in spite of overarching federal food, health and safety regulations that address California’s purported rationale for Proposition 12.

Clearly a majority of the Justices said such matters as Proposition 12 is up to the Congress.  On that point, since 2015 legislation has been introduced in the U.S. House on multiple occasions to address interstate commerce cannibalization by a state.  On two occasions, the legislation passed the House but only to die in the U.S. Senate and not get included in a Farm Bill.  The legislation, was entitled the “Protect Interstate Commerce Act” and would have barred a state from imposing a standard or condition on the production or manufacture of agricultural products sold or offered for sale in interstate commerce if (1) the production or manufacture occurs in another state, and (2) the standard or condition adds to standards or conditions applicable under Federal law and the laws of the state in which the production or manufacture occurs.  Presently, Senator Marshall from Kansas has renamed the bill and introduced it into the U.S. Senate. 

The dormant commerce clause is one of those legal theories “floating” around out there that can have a real impact in the lives of farmers, ranchers and consumers, and how economic activity is conducted.  But, a case challenging a state law on dormant Commerce Clause grounds must be plead and argued properly for a court to hear it.  That didn’t happen in the present situation. 

Bibliography – First Quarter of 2023

The following is a listing by category of my blog articles for the first quarter of 2023.

Bankruptcy

Failure to Execute a Written Lease Leads to a Lawsuit; and Improper Use of SBA Loan Funds

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/02/failure-to-execute-a-written-lease-leads-to-a-lawsuit-and-improper-use-of-sba-loan-funds.html

Chapter 12 Bankruptcy – Proposing a Reorganization Plan in Good Faith

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/02/chapter-12-bankruptcy-proposing-a-reorganization-plan-in-good-faith.html

Business Planning

Summer Seminars

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/03/summer-seminars.html

Registration Now Open for Summer Conference No. 1 – Petoskey, Michigan (June 15-16)

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/04/registration-now-open-for-summer-conference-no-1-petoskey-michigan-june-15-16.html

Civil Liabilities

Top Ag Law and Tax Developments of 2022 – Part 1

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/01/top-ag-law-and-tax-developments-of-2022-part-1.html

Top Ten Agricultural Law and Tax Developments of 2022 – Numbers 8 and 7

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/01/top-ten-agricultural-law-and-tax-developments-of-2022-numbers-8-and-7.html

Top Ten Agricultural Law and Tax Developments of 2022 – Numbers 2 and 1

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/01/top-ten-agricultural-law-and-tax-developments-of-2022-numbers-2-and-1.html

Contracts

Top Ag Law and Developments of 2022 – Part 2

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/01/top-ag-law-and-developments-of-2022-part-2.html

Failure to Execute a Written Lease Leads to a Lawsuit; and Improper Use of SBA Loan Funds

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/02/failure-to-execute-a-written-lease-leads-to-a-lawsuit-and-improper-use-of-sba-loan-funds.html

Double Fractions in Oil and Gas Conveyances and Leases – Resulting Interpretive Issues

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/03/double-fractions-in-oil-and-gas-conveyances-and-leases-resulting-interpretive-issues.html

Environmental Law

Here Come the Feds: EPA Final Rule Defining Waters of the United States – Again

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/01/here-come-the-feds-epa-final-rule-defining-waters-of-the-united-states-again.html

Top Ag Law and Developments of 2022 – Part 2

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/01/top-ag-law-and-developments-of-2022-part-2.html

Top Ag Law and Developments of 2022 – Part 3

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/01/top-ag-law-and-tax-developments-of-2022-part-3.html

Top Ten Agricultural Law and Tax Developments of 2022 – Numbers 10 and 9

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/01/top-ten-agricultural-law-and-tax-developments-of-2022-nos-10-and-9.html

Top Ten Agricultural Law and Tax Developments of 2022 – Numbers 6 and 5

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/01/top-ten-agricultural-law-and-tax-developments-of-2022-numbers-6-and-5.html

Top Ten Agricultural Law and Tax Developments of 2022 – Numbers 4 and 3

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/01/top-ten-agricultural-law-and-tax-developments-of-2022-numbers-4-and-3.html

Top Ten Agricultural Law and Tax Developments of 2022 – Numbers 2 and 1

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/01/top-ten-agricultural-law-and-tax-developments-of-2022-numbers-2-and-1.html

Estate Planning

Tax Court Opinion – Charitable Deduction Case Involving Estate Planning Fraudster

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/02/tax-court-opinion-charitable-deduction-case-involving-estate-planning-fraudster.html

Happenings in Agricultural Law and Tax

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/03/happenings-in-agricultural-law-and-tax.html

Summer Seminars

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/03/summer-seminars.html

RMD Rules Have Changed – Do You Have to Start Receiving Payments from Your Retirement Plan?

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/03/rmd-rules-have-changed-do-you-have-to-start-receiving-payments-from-your-retirement-plan.html

Common Law Marriage – It May Be More Involved Than What You Think

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/04/common-law-marriage-it-may-be-more-involved-than-what-you-think.html

The Marital Deduction, QTIP Trusts and Coordinated Estate Planning

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/04/the-marital-deduction-qtip-trusts-and-coordinated-estate-planning.html

Registration Now Open for Summer Conference No. 1 – Petoskey, Michigan (June 15-16)

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/04/registration-now-open-for-summer-conference-no-1-petoskey-michigan-june-15-16.html

Income Tax

Top Ag Law and Developments of 2022 – Part 3

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/01/top-ag-law-and-tax-developments-of-2022-part-3.html

Top Ag Law and Developments of 2022 – Part 4

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/01/top-agricultural-law-and-tax-developments-of-2022-part-4.html

Top Ten Agricultural Law and Tax Developments of 2022 – Numbers 8 and 7

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/01/top-ten-agricultural-law-and-tax-developments-of-2022-numbers-8-and-7.html

Top Ten Agricultural Law and Tax Developments of 2022 – Numbers 2 and 1

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/01/top-ten-agricultural-law-and-tax-developments-of-2022-numbers-2-and-1.html

Tax Court Opinion – Charitable Deduction Case Involving Estate Planning Fraudster

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/02/tax-court-opinion-charitable-deduction-case-involving-estate-planning-fraudster.html

Deducting Residual (Excess) Soil Fertility

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/02/deducting-residual-excess-soil-fertility.html

Deducting Residual (Excess) Soil Fertility – Does the Concept Apply to Pasture/Rangeland? (An Addendum)

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/02/deducting-residual-excess-soil-fertility-does-the-concept-apply-to-pasturerangeland-an-addendum.html

Happenings in Agricultural Law and Tax

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/03/happenings-in-agricultural-law-and-tax.html

Summer Seminars

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/03/summer-seminars.html

RMD Rules Have Changed – Do You Have to Start Receiving Payments from Your Retirement Plan?

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/03/rmd-rules-have-changed-do-you-have-to-start-receiving-payments-from-your-retirement-plan.html

Registration Now Open for Summer Conference No. 1 – Petoskey, Michigan (June 15-16)

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/04/registration-now-open-for-summer-conference-no-1-petoskey-michigan-june-15-16.html

Real Property

Equity “Theft” – Can I Lose the Equity in My Farm for Failure to Pay Property Taxes?

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/03/equity-theft-can-i-lose-my-farm-for-failure-to-pay-property-taxes.html

Happenings in Agricultural Law and Tax

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/03/happenings-in-agricultural-law-and-tax.html

Adverse Possession and a “Fence of Convenience”

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/03/adverse-possession-and-a-fence-of-convenience.html

Double Fractions in Oil and Gas Conveyances and Leases – Resulting Interpretive Issues

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/03/double-fractions-in-oil-and-gas-conveyances-and-leases-resulting-interpretive-issues.html

Abandoned Rail Lines – Issues for Abutting Landowners

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/03/abandoned-rail-lines-issues-for-abutting-landowners.html

Regulatory Law

Top Ag Law and Developments of 2022 – Part 2

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/01/top-ag-law-and-developments-of-2022-part-2.html

Top Ag Law and Developments of 2022 – Part 4

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/01/top-agricultural-law-and-tax-developments-of-2022-part-4.html

Top Ten Agricultural Law and Tax Developments of 2022 – Numbers 10 and 9

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/01/top-ten-agricultural-law-and-tax-developments-of-2022-nos-10-and-9.html

Top Ten Agricultural Law and Tax Developments of 2022 – Numbers 8 and 7

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/01/top-ten-agricultural-law-and-tax-developments-of-2022-numbers-8-and-7.html

Top Ten Agricultural Law and Tax Developments of 2022 – Numbers 6 and 5

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/01/top-ten-agricultural-law-and-tax-developments-of-2022-numbers-6-and-5.html

Top Ten Agricultural Law and Tax Developments of 2022 – Numbers 4 and 3

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/01/top-ten-agricultural-law-and-tax-developments-of-2022-numbers-4-and-3.html

Top Ten Agricultural Law and Tax Developments of 2022 – Numbers 2 and 1

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/01/top-ten-agricultural-law-and-tax-developments-of-2022-numbers-2-and-1.html

Foreign Ownership of Agricultural Land

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/02/foreign-ownership-of-agricultural-land.html

Abandoned Rail Lines – Issues for Abutting Landowners

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/03/abandoned-rail-lines-issues-for-abutting-landowners.html

Secured Transactions

Priority Among Competing Security Interests

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/02/priority-among-competing-security-interests.html

Water Law

Top Ten Agricultural Law and Tax Developments of 2022 – Numbers 2 and 1

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/01/top-ten-agricultural-law-and-tax-developments-of-2022-numbers-2-and-1.html

Happenings in Agricultural Law and Tax

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2023/03/happenings-in-agricultural-law-and-tax.html

Abandoned Rail Lines – Issues for Abutting Landowners

Overview

Federal law has established a procedure that a railroad must go through when abandoning a rail line and its corridor.  49 U.S.C. §10903.  In the 1970s, the Congress specified that before abandonment can be completed, other entities can intervene to preserve the corridor for future use.  16 U.S.C. §1247(d).  This process creates numerous issues for farmers, ranchers and other rural landowners along the corridor. 

A couple of recent cases highlighting the issues that can arise for adjacent property owners when a rail line is abandoned – it’s the topic of today’s post.

“Railbanking” – Background

The railbanking process allows a railroad to negotiate with another entity which would then assume the financial and managerial responsibility for the corridor by operating a recreational trail on it.  See, e.g., Presault v. Intertstate Commerce Commission, 494 U.S. 1 (1990).  But, before the trail operator can start negotiations with the railroad, it must file a railbanking petition.  See 49 C.F.R. §1152.29(a).  The trail operator must state that it is willing to assume full responsibility for managing the right-of-way and assume any legal liability for the transfer or use of the right-of-way.  The trail operator also must pay any and all taxes on the right-of-way.  In addition, the trail operator must acknowledge that the land will remain subject to possible reconstruction and reactivation of the right-of-way for rail service.  Once these certifications are made, then the trail group can negotiate with the railroad.  Any agreement that is struck is then submitted to the Surface Transportation Board (STB) which will then issue a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU).  The NITU allows the railroad to discontinue service without abandonment and allows the trail operator to use the corridor for use as a recreational trail. 

The issuance of a NITU can result in a taking of property owned by the original grantor of the corridor easement.  See, e.g., Presault v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 494 U.S. 1 (1990).  That’s because it’s often the case that the railroad merely owns an easement and not an outright fee simple.  In that situation, state law commonly provides that the easement is to revert (go back) to the abutting property owner when the railroad ceases operation.  But, because interim trail use under the railbanking program is a discontinuance rather than an abandonment, the easement doesn’t revert to the abutting landowners.  A taking may also occur if the original easement grant to the railroad under state law is not broad enough to allow for a recreational trail.  When a trail is operated in that situation, it’s a taking of a new easement requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment.  See, Caquelin v. United States, 959 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 

Recent Cases

Central Kansas Conservancy, Inc., v. Sides, 56 Kan. App. 2d 1099, 44 P.3d 337 (2019), rev. den., No. 119,605, 2019 Kan. LEXIS 527 (Kan. Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 2019), cert. den. sub. nom., Sides v. Central Kansas Conservancy, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2741 (2020). 

In this case, the Union Pacific Railroad acquired a right-of-way over a railroad corridor that it abandoned in the mid-1990s. At issue in the case was a 12.6-mile length of the abandoned line between McPherson and Lindsborg, Kansas. NITU was issued in the fall of 1995. The corridor was converted into a trail use easement under the National Trails System Act. In 1997, Union Pacific gave the plaintiff a "Donative Quitclaim Deed" to the railroad’s easement rights over the corridor, with one-quarter mile of it running through the defendant’s property at a width of 66 feet. Pursuant to a separate agreement, the plaintiff agreed to quit claim deed its rights back to the railroad if the railroad needed to operate the line in the future. By virtue of the easement, the plaintiff intended to develop the corridor into a public trail.

In 2013, the plaintiff contacted the defendant about developing the trail through the defendant’s land. The defendant had placed machinery and equipment and fencing in and across the corridor which they refused to remove. In 2015, the plaintiff sued to quiet title to the .75-mile corridor strip and sought an injunction concerning the trail use easement over the defendant’s property. The defendant admitted to blocking the railway with fencing and equipment, but claimed the right to do so via adverse possession or by means of a prescriptive easement. The defendant had farmed, grazed cattle on, and hunted the corridor at issue since the mid-1990s. The defendant also claimed that the plaintiff had lost its rights to the trail because it had failed to complete development of the trail within two years as the Kansas Recreational Trail Act (KRTA) required.

In late 2016, the trial court determined that the two-year development provision was inapplicable because the Interstate Commerce Commission had approved NITU negotiations before the KRTA became effective in 1996. The trial court also rejected the defendant’s adverse possession/prescriptive easement arguments because trail use easements are easements for public use against which adverse possession or easement by prescription does not apply.

During the summer of 2017 the plaintiff attempted work on the trail. When volunteers arrived, the defendant had placed equipment and a mobile home on the corridor preventing any work. The plaintiff sought a "permanent prohibitory injunction and permanent mandatory injunction." The defendant argued that he had not violated the prior court order because "[a]ll the Court ha[d] done [was] issue non-final rulings on partial motions for summary judgments, which [were], by their nature, subject to revision until they [were] made final decisions." Ultimately, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s request for an injunction, determined that the defendant had violated the prior summary judgment order, but also held that the plaintiff had not built or maintained fencing in accordance with state law.

On appeal, the appellate court partially affirmed, partially reversed, and remanded the case. The appellate court determined that the defendant did not obtain rights over the abandoned line via adverse possession or prescriptive easement because such claims cannot be made against land that is held for public use such as a recreational trail created in accordance with the federal rails-to-trails legislation. The appellate court also determined that the plaintiff didn’t lose rights to develop the trail for failing to comply with the two-year timeframe for development under the KRTA. The appellate court held that the KRTA two-year provision was inapplicable because a NITU was issued before the effective date of the KRTA. However, the appellate court determined that the plaintiff did not follow state law concerning its duty to maintain fences. The appellate court held that Kan. Stat. Ann. §58-3212(a) requires the plaintiff to maintain any existing fencing along the corridor and maintain any fence later installed on the corridor. In addition, any fence that is installed on the corridor must match the fencing maintained on the sides of adjacent property. If there is no fencing on adjacent sides of a landowner’s tract that abuts the corridor, the plaintiff and landowner will split the cost of the corridor fence equally.

The appellate court remanded the case for a determination of the type and extent of fencing on the defendant’s property, and that the plaintiff has the right to enter the defendant’s property to build a fence along the corridor. Any fence along the corridor is to be located where an existing fence is located. If no existing fence exists along the corridor, the corridor fence is to be located where the plaintiff’s trail easement is separated from the defendant’s property.

The Kansas Supreme Court declined to review the case, and the U.S. Supreme Court later decline to grant certiorari. 

Behrens, et al. v. Heintz, et al., 59 F. 4th 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2023)

This case involved a 144.3-mile rail line in Missouri that had been in operation for over 100 years.  The railroad had acquired the necessary easements for the corridor via condemnations and agreements with the abutting landowners.  The easements were granted to the railroad in 1901 and 1902.  18 of the 19 deeds containing the easements did not limit the use of the easement for railroad purposes.  Ultimately, a successor-railroad to the easements sought to discontinue service and abandon the railway.  In late 2014, the Missouri Department of Natural Resources filed a request to intervene in the abandonment proceeding seeking to utilize the easement for interim trail use on the corridor.  Five years later, the STB was notified that a trail use agreement had been executed in accordance with the NITU and the STB regulations.

The plaintiffs, owners of the abutting land along the corridor, filed a Takings claim in 2015 in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims on the basis that the railroad originally acquired easements under Missouri law rather than a fee interest and that the easements were for railroad purposes only.  Accordingly, the plaintiffs claimed that the conversion of the easements to recreational trail use was beyond the scope of the easements and constituted a Taking.  The Court of Federal Claims agreed that the property interest acquired involved easements, but that interim trail use was permissible.  Upon reconsideration, the Court of Federal Claims again held that no Taking had occurred because the scope of the easements was broad enough to allow for trail use.  The plaintiffs appealed.

On appeal, the appellate court determined that the railroad had, under Missouri law, undisputedly acquired easements and not fee simple interests.  See Mo. Rev. Stat. §388.210(2).  As to the scope of the easements, the appellate court determined that Mo. Rev. Stat. §388.210(2) explicitly limited the scope of the 18 easements to “railroad purposes” only.  That statute, the appellate court noted, defines the purposes of such voluntary grants to railroads as the ones involved in the case “to aid in the construction, maintenance and accommodation of the railroads.”  The appellate court noted that the Missouri Supreme Court had construed this language to mean that such grants are for “all railroad purposes.”  Brown v. Weare, 152 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1941).

On the takings issue, the appellate court determined that the issue was whether the trail use and railbanking were “railroad purposes” and, as a result, within the scope of the easements.  On that issue, the appellate court cited a Missouri case finding that trail use is not included in the meaning of “railroad purposes.”  Boyles v. Missouri Friends of Wabash Trace Nature Trail, Inc., 981 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).  The appellate court also cited one of its own prior opinions holding that trail use is not a railroad purpose under other states’ laws.  See, e.g., Presault v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996)(construing Vermont law); Toews v. United States, 376 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)(construing California law).  The appellate court also noted that the speculative possibility that the trail would return to rail use did not fall within the scope of the easements that were granted for railroad purposes.  There simply was no realistic possibility the future rail use would occur.  Likewise, the appellate court noted that the easements were granted for the benefits of the railroads to operate a rail line, not the benefit of “some future unidentified entity that might receive the easement in the future.”  The preservation of a tract of land (corridor) for future rail use under the National Trail System Act does not transform an interim trail use into a “railroad purpose.” 

Accordingly, the appellate court held that a Fifth Amendment Taking had occurred, reversed the Court of Federal Claims, and remanded the case to that court for a determination of damages on the Takings issue.

Conclusion

Recreational trails operating on abandoned rail lines present numerous legal issues for abutting landowners.  The constitutional takings issue is a major, but other issues can arise involving fencing, trash and liability for personal injury.  Expect this issue to remain an important one for landowners along abandoned railroad corridors.

Foreign Ownership of Agricultural Land

Overview

An issue that has been around a very long time and dates back to the foundation of the United States is that of agricultural land being owned by non-U.S. citizens and/or entities. It’s a national security and food security issue.  Some states have had restrictions for many years and are considering strengthening existing provisions.  Others are looking at the issue for the first time.  The Kansas legislature currently has bills under consideration in both houses. 

Foreign ownership of agricultural land – it’s the topic of today’s post.

Background of Foreign Ownership Restrictions

Under the English common law, aliens could not acquire title to land except with the King's approval.  The King understood that control and ownership of the land was critical to national security and did not want disloyal subjects owning or acquiring an interest in land.  The common law rule existed in England until it was abolished by statute in 1870.  However, by that time, the notion of limiting alien ownership of agricultural land was well imbedded in United States jurisprudence.  In the 1970s, the issue of foreign investment in and ownership of agricultural land received additional attention because of several large purchases by foreigners and the suspicion that the build-up in liquidity in the oil exporting countries would likely lead to more land purchases by nonresident aliens.  The lack of data concerning the number of acres actually owned by foreigners contributed to fears that foreign ownership was an important and rapidly spreading phenomenon.

Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act

In 1978, the Congress enacted the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act (AFIDA).  7 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.  Under AFIDA, the USDA obtains information on U.S. agricultural holdings of foreign individuals and businesses.  In essence, AFIDA is a reporting statute rather than a regulatory statute.  The information provided in reports by the AFIDA helps serve as the basis for any future action Congress may take in establishing direct controls or limits on foreign investment in agricultural land and provides useful information to states considering limitations on foreign investment. The Act requires that foreign persons report to the Secretary of Agriculture their agricultural land holdings or acquisitions.  The Secretary assembles and analyzes the information contained in the report, passes it on the respective states for their action and reports periodically to the Congress and the President.

AFIDA requires reports in four situations:  (1) when a foreign person “acquires or transfers any interest, other than a security” in agricultural land; (2) when any interest in agricultural land, except a security interest, is held by any foreign person on the day before the effective date of the Act; (3) when a nonforeign owner of agricultural land subsequently becomes a foreign person; and (4) when nonagricultural land owned by a foreign person subsequently becomes agricultural land.

AFIDA defines “agricultural land” as “any land located in one or more states and used for agricultural, forestry, or timber production purposes...”.  7 U.S.C. § 3508(1). The regulations define agricultural land as “land in the United States which is currently used for, or if idle and its last use within the past five years was for, agricultural, forestry, or timber production, except land not exceeding one acre from which the agricultural, forestry, or timber products are less than $1,000 in annual gross sales value and such products are produced for the personal or household use of the person or persons holding an interest in such land.”  44 Fed. Reg. 7117 (1979); 7 C.F.R. § 781.2(b). In 1980, the Secretary proposed a change in this definition to increase the acreage amount to ten acres, while preserving the gross sales test. However, the proposed change has not yet become effective.

The reporting provisions of the AFIDA require the disclosure of considerable information regarding both the land and the reporting party.  The information must be reported on Form FSA-153 and includes: (1) the legal name and address of the foreign person; (2) the citizenship of the foreign person, if an individual; (3) if the foreign person is not an individual or government, the nature of the legal entity holding the interest, the country in which the foreign person is created or organized, and the principal place of business; (4) the type of interest in agricultural land that the person acquired or transferred; (5) the legal description and acreage of the agricultural land; (6) the purchase price paid, or other consideration given, for such interest; (7) if a foreign person transfers an interest, the legal name and address of the person to whom the interest is transferred; (8) the agricultural purposes for which the agricultural land is being used and for which the foreign person intends to use the agricultural property; and (9) such other information as the Secretary of Agriculture may require by regulation.  7 U.S.C. § 3501(a)(9).

State Restrictions

State statutes designed to restrict alien ownership of real property are generally of three types: (1) outright restrictions on the acquisition of certain types of property; (2) limitations on the total amount of land that can be acquired; and (3) limitations on the length of time property can be held.  Acquisition restrictions are common in the agricultural context, with the restriction generally applying only to the acquisition of farmland, as defined by the law.  Exceptions are common for the acquisition of land for conversion to nonagricultural purposes, land acquired by devise or descent, and land acquired through collection of debts or enforcement of liens or mortgages.  Acreage restrictions allow foreign investment but place a premium on having an effective method of discovering and preventing multiple acquisition by the same individuals through the use of various investment vehicles.  Time restrictions generally do not apply to voluntary acquisition of the land by foreign investors but are associated with involuntary acquisitions.  Some states require the disclosure of information concerning the land acquired and the investors.

Currently, about one-half of the states restrict agricultural land acquisition by aliens.  The number is approximate because legislative efforts to legislate in this area have been swift in recent years and continue during the 2023 session in several states.  The states with the most restrictive laws are IL, IN, IA, KY, MN, MO, NE, ND, OK, SD and WI.  Approximately 13 other states have minor restrictions on foreign ownership of agricultural land. 

Recently, the issue of restricting foreign investment in and/or ownership of  agricultural  land has been raised in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Indiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Each of these states have proposed, or plan to propose, legislation restricting foreign ownership and/or investment in agricultural land to varying degrees.  Several high-profile events have spurred this renewed interest including a Chinese-owned company acquiring over 130,000 acres near an Air Force base in Texas and a 300-acre purchase by another Chinese company near a different Air Force base in North Dakota.  Also, the very recent and slow “fly-over” of a Chinese spy balloon from Alaska to South Carolina, mysterious damages to many food processing facilities, pipelines and rail transportation have contributed to the growing interest in national security and restrictions on ownership of U.S. farm and ranchland by known adversaries. 

The following is a brief summary of what some of the other states have proposed recently:

Colorado HB 23-1152

• Prohibits, starting on January 1, 2024, a nonresident foreign citizen, entity, or government of the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation or any country determined by the US secretary of state to be a state sponsor of terrorism from acquiring a controlling ownership share in ag land, mineral rights, or water rights in the state.
• A covered foreign person who acquires a controlling ownership share in a property interest in the state prior to January 1, 2024, may continue to own the property interest but not acquire controlling ownership in any additional property interests.
• A covered foreign person must register with the secretary of state within 60 days of acquiring ownership in property interests.
• If the state attorney general has reason to believe a covered foreign person has not complied with the law, the attorney general must bring a civil action against the covered person. If the court finds the covered foreign person has violated the prohibition the judgment will revert the property interest to the state.

Illinois HB 1267

• Would bar the purchase of public or private real estate by noncitizens for five years after the effective date.
• A “noncitizen” includes an foreign government, entity, corporation, partnership, or other association created under the laws of a foreign country and beneficially owned by a national of that foreign country

New Jersey A5120

• A foreign government or person owning or holding interest in ag land shall sell or convey the ownership within 5 years of the effective date of the Act.
• Ag land acquired by a foreign government or person shall be sold or conveyed within two years after title to the land is transferred thereto. Upon such conveyance, a deed of easement shall be attached to the land requiring it to remain devoted to ag use.
• The land conveyed should not be conveyed to a foreign person or government.

North Dakota SB 2371

• The bill gives counties and municipalities the power to prohibit local development by a foreign adversary.
• County commissions, city commissions, or city council may decide not to authorize a development agreement with a foreign adversary whether individual or government.

Oklahoma SB 212

• No person who is not a US citizen shall acquire title to land either directly through a business entity or trust.
• Exempt is any business entity that has legally operated in the U.S. for at least 20 years.
• Any deed recorded with a county clerk shall include proof that the person or entity obtaining the land is in compliance with the provision.
• No application to lands now owned by aliens so long as they are held by the present owners nor to any alien who shall take up bona fide resident of the state or any lawfully recognized business entity.
• It is the duty of the attorney general or district attorney to institute a suit on behalf of the state if they have reason to believe any lands are being held contrary to the Act.
• Creates a citizen land ownership unit to enforce the provisions of the act within the office of the attorney general.

Texas SB 711

• Prohibited foreign actors may not acquire title to real property without written notification to the seller.
• A “prohibited foreign actor” is an alien, business, government, or an agent from a country identified as a country that poses a risk to the national security of the U.S. in the most recent Annual Threat Assessment issued by the Director of National Intelligence.
• A buyer required to provide written notification shall do so as soon as possible but not later than 10 days before the closing of the property.
• Upon receipt of notification, seller may choose to proceed or revoke sale.
• Court shall dismiss any action brought against seller for revoking a sale.

Current Kansas Law

The Kansas restriction on foreign ownership, to the extent there is one, is contained in the Kansas Constitution and in the anti-corporate farming law.  Section 17 of the Kansas Bill of Rights states as follows:

“No distinction shall ever be made between citizens of the state of Kansas and the citizens of other states and territories of the United States in reference to the purchase, enjoyment or descent of property. The rights of aliens in reference to the purchase, enjoyment or descent of property may be regulated by law.”

The Kansas Bill of Rights, as noted, gives the legislature the power to regulate foreign ownership of “property” – in terms of its, purchase, enjoyments or descent.  One manner that the legislature has chosen to do that is by means of the anti-corporate farming law.  Kan. Stat. Ann. §17-5904.  This provision states that, “no corporation, trust, LLC, limited partnership or corporate partnership other than a family farm corporation … shall either directly or indirectly, own, acquire or otherwise obtain or lease any agricultural land in this state. However, there are many situations to which the restriction does not apply (in addition to not applying to a family farm corporation).

The law was later amended to provide that production contracts “shall not be construed to mean the ownership, acquisition, obtainment, or lease either directly or indirectly on any ag land.”

A violation of the anti-corporate farming law subjects the violator to a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 and the violator must divest itself of all land acquired in violation of the anti-corporate farming law.  Violations may be pursued by either the state attorney general or by a county attorney. 

Kan. Stat. Ann. §17-7505 contains a reporting requirement.  It provides as follows:

1. Every foreign corporation doing business in this state shall make a written business entity information report to the secretary of state.
2. The report shall be made on a form prescribed by the secretary of state.
3. The report shall contain:
   1. The name and the state or country of incorporation.
   2. The location of its principal office
   3. The names and addresses of the officers and board of directors.
   4. The number of shares of capital stock issued.
   5. The nature of the business
   6. If the corporation holds more than 50% equity in ownership in any other business registered with the secretary of state, the name and ID number of that other business.
4. Corporations subject to the provisions of this section that holds ag land within this state shall show the following additional information.
   1. The acreage and location of ag land this state owned or leased by or to the corporation.
   2. The purposes of the ownership or lease
   3. The value of the ag and non-ag assets owned and controlled by the corporate within and without the state of Kansas and where situated.
   4. The number of stockholders of the corporation
   5. The number of acres owned and leased by the corporation and to the corporation.
   6. The number of acres of ag land held and reported in each category under paragraph 5
   7. Whether any of the ag land was acquired after July 1, 1981
5. The official title of the person signing the report must be designated.

Note:  Presently, 2.3 percent of all privately held agricultural land in Kansas is held by a foreign individual or entity.  “Held” means anything from outright title ownership to any interest in the land other than a security interest.  But, “held” does not include leaseholds of less than 10 years’ duration, contingent future interests, non-contingent future interests that don’t become possessory upon termination of the present estate, non-agricultural easements and rights-of-way, and interests solely in mineral rights.  The percentage of foreign “holdings” includes land under long-term wind energy leases where the lessee is a foreign-owned entity. 

Current Kansas Proposals

House Bill 2397

This bill, which would be effective, July 1, 2023, specifies that no person who is owned by or controlled by or subject to the jurisdiction of a “foreign adversary” shall purchase, acquire by grant, devise or descent or otherwise obtain ownership of any interest in real property.  This is defined as an individual or entity acting as an agent, representative or employee, or anyone acting at the order, request or under the direction or control of a foreign adversary or whose activities are directly or indirectly under the supervision, control, direction or are being financed or otherwise subsidized primarily by a foreign adversary.  An exception exists for a person that has acquired dual citizenship with the U.S. and a foreign adversary. 

Note:  While the bill does not limit the restriction on foreign ownership to agricultural land, it doesn’t prevent residential home ownership, for example, by a person who has dual residency in the U.S. and a foreign adversary or a “nation state” that is controlled by a foreign adversary.  This is a reasonable approach to ensuring that home ownership is by a person that is not disloyal to the U.S. given the time necessary to become a dual citizen and the associated vetting that is done during the process to achieve dual citizenship.  Of course, as noted below, there are very few countries that are on the foreign adversary list.  In essence, home ownership by a non-U.S. citizen (even one that has dual citizenship with a foreign adversary) is permissible so long as the person is not a foreign agent. 

“Foreign adversary” is defined by tying it to a federal regulation that provides a list set forth in 15 C.F. R Sec. 7.4 as that list exists on July 1, 2023. Currently on that list are:  (1) the People's Republic of China, including the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (China); (2) the Republic of Cuba (Cuba); (3) the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran); (4) the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea); (5) the Russian Federation (Russia); and (6) Venezuelan politician Nicolás Maduro (Maduro Regime).  The bill vests power in the Secretary of Agriculture to modify the list, but only if the federal government amends the list after July 1, 2023. 

The provision does not apply to land acquired by the collection of debts, foreclosure pursuant to a forfeiture of a contract for deed, and any procedure for the enforcement of a lien or claim on the land.

Land subject to the provision, is to be sold or otherwise disposed of within two years after title is transferred, and a covered “person” who inherits real property on or after July 1, 2023, has 12 months to divest of property once the violation is known. Other subject land transaction may be forfeited.

The Kansas Attorney General has the power to enforce the provisions of the bill. 

Senate Bill 100

Senate Bill 100 has also been proposed this session in the Kansas Senate.  This bill seeks to restrict a “foreign national, foreign business entity, and foreign government” from acquiring, purchasing, or holding any interest in land within the state.  A “foreign business entity” is defined by ownership.  Ownership of land in Kansas is barred under the provision if the majority ownership of an entity is held by a foreign national (non-U.S. citizen) or foreign government (any non-U.S. nation); or foreign business entity.  The provision is prospective only and does not apply to any real property purchased or otherwise acquired before July 1, 2023.  Also, the provisions of the bill do not apply to real estate located wholly in Johnson, Sedgwick, Shawnee or Wyandotte counties. 

Enforcement rests with the Kansas Attorney General and a violation of the provisions of the bill is deemed to be a level 10 nonperson felony.  The Attorney General may investigate any transaction believed to violate the bill. Further.  The bill specifies that land held in violation of the restriction is subject to forfeiture, with the state then taking possession of the land.

General Comments on the Kansas Proposals

The bills take different approaches to address the issue.  The House Bill is more specifically tailored to restricting ownership by a “foreign adversary” as the federal government defines that term.  The Senate Bill focuses on percentage ownership by a “foreign business entity” defined as ownership by persons that are not U.S. citizens as well as entities that are majority owned by non-U.S. citizens. 

Over the past 30 years, the Kansas legislature has encouraged the use of “renewable” forms of energy.  Often, the companies heavily involved in such energy production are foreign-owned.  While the House Bill would not impact current or future development of projects on agricultural land (because the companies involved are not presently on the “foreign adversary” list), the Senate Bill appears to present some issues by its percentage ownership requirements and defining “foreign” as non-U.S. citizen. 

Conclusion

Whichever approach the Kansas legislature takes on this issue, what should remain in focus is that the whole matter involves national security and control of the food supply.  Neither of those are political issues.  That’s true in Kansas and nationwide.  Foreign ownership of agricultural land has been an issue from the time of the founding of the U.S.   It’s an even greater concern today.

Bibliography - July Through December 2022

Overview

 After the first half of 2022, I posted a blog article of a bibliography of my blog articles for the first half of 2022.  You can find that bibliography here:  Bibliography – January through June of 2022

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/09/bibliography-january-through-june-of-2022.html.

Bibliography of articles for that second half of 2022 – you can find it in today’s post.

Alphabetical Topical Listing of Articles (July 2022 – December 2022)

Bankruptcy

More Ag Law Developments – Potpourri of Topics

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/10/more-ag-law-developments-potpourri-of-topics.html

Business Planning

Durango Conference and Recent Developments in the Courts

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/07/durango-conference-and-recent-developments-in-the-courts.html

Is a C Corporation a Good Entity Choice For the Farm or Ranch Business?

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/07/whats-the-best-entity-structure-for-the-farm-or-ranch-business.html

What is a “Reasonable Compensation”?

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/08/what-is-reasonable-compensation.html

Federal Farm Programs: Organizational Structure Matters – Part Three

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/08/federal-farm-programs-organizational-structure-matters-part-three.html

LLCs and Self-Employment Tax – Part One

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/08/llcs-and-self-employment-tax-part-one.html

LLCs and Self-Employment Tax – Part Two

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/08/llcs-and-self-employment-tax-part-two.html

Civil Liabilities

Durango Conference and Recent Developments in the Courts

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/07/durango-conference-and-recent-developments-in-the-courts.html

Dicamba Spray-Drift Issues and the Bader Farms Litigation

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/07/dicamba-spray-drift-issues-and-the-bader-farms-litigation.html

Tax Deal Struck? – and Recent Ag-Related Cases

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/07/tax-deal-struck-and-recent-ag-related-cases.html

Ag Law and Tax Developments

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/09/ag-law-and-tax-developments.html

More Ag Law Developments – Potpourri of Topics

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/10/more-ag-law-developments-potpourri-of-topics.html

Ag Law Developments in the Courts

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/12/ag-law-developments-in-the-courts.html

Contracts

Minnesota Farmer Protection Law Upheld

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/09/minnesota-farmer-protection-law-upheld.html

Criminal Liabilities

Durango Conference and Recent Developments in the Courts

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/20Ag Law Summit

https://lawpr22/07/durango-conference-and-recent-developments-in-the-courts.html

Environmental Law

Constitutional Limit on Government Agency Power – The “Major Questions” Doctrine

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/07/constitutional-limit-on-government-agency-power-the-major-questions-doctrine.html

More Ag Law Developments – Potpourri of Topics

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/10/more-ag-law-developments-potpourri-of-topics.html

Court Says COE Acted Arbitrarily When Declining Jurisdiction Over Farmland

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/10/court-says-coe-acted-arbitrarily-when-declining-jurisdiction-over-farmland.html

Ag Law Developments in the Courts

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/12/ag-law-developments-in-the-courts.html

Estate Planning

Farm/Ranch Tax, Estate and Business Planning Conference August 1-2 – Durango, Colorado (and Online)

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/07/farmranch-tax-estate-and-business-planning-conference-august-1-2-durango-colorado-and-online.html

IRS Modifies Portability Election Rule

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/07/irs-modifies-portability-election-rule.html

Modifying an Irrevocable Trust – Decanting

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/09/modifying-an-irrevocable-trust-decanting.html

Farm and Ranch Estate Planning in 2022 (and 2023)

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/09/farm-and-ranch-estate-planning-in-2022-and-2023.html

Social Security Planning for Farmers and Ranchers

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/11/social-security-planning-for-farmers-and-ranchers.html

How NOT to Use a Charitable Remainder Trust

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/12/how-not-to-use-a-charitable-remainder-trust.html

Recent Cases Involving Decedents’ Estates

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/12/recent-cases-involving-decedents-estates.html

Medicaid Estate Recovery and Trusts

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/12/medicaid-estate-recovery-and-trusts.html

Income Tax

What is the Character of Land Sale Gain?

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/07/what-is-the-character-of-land-sale-gain.html

Deductible Start-Up Costs and Web-Based Businesses

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/07/deductible-start-up-costs-and-web-based-businesses.html

Using Farm Income Averaging to Deal With Economic Uncertainty and Resulting Income Fluctuations

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/07/using-farm-income-averaging-to-deal-with-economic-uncertainty-and-resulting-income-fluctuations.html

Tax Deal Struck? – and Recent Ag-Related Cases

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/07/tax-deal-struck-and-recent-ag-related-cases.html

What is “Reasonable Compensation”?

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/08/what-is-reasonable-compensation.html

LLCs and Self-Employment Tax – Part One

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/08/llcs-and-self-employment-tax-part-one.html

LLCs and Self-Employment Tax – Part Two

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/08/llcs-and-self-employment-tax-part-two.html

USDA’s Emergency Relief Program (Update on Gain from Equipment Sales)

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/08/usdas-emergency-relief-program-update-on-gain-from-equipment-sales.html

Declaring Inflation Reduced and Being Forgiving – Recent Developments in Tax and Law

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/09/declaring-inflation-reduced-and-being-forgiving-recent-developments-in-tax-and-law.html

Ag Law and Tax Developments

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/09/ag-law-and-tax-developments.html

Extended Livestock Replacement Period Applies in Areas of Extended Drought – IRS Updated Drought Areas

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/09/extended-livestock-replacement-period-applies-in-areas-of-extended-drought-irs-updated-drought-areas.html

More Ag Law Developments – Potpourri of Topics

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/10/more-ag-law-developments-potpourri-of-topics.html

IRS Audits and Statutory Protection

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/10/irs-audits-and-statutory-protection.html

Handling Expenses of Crops with Pre-Productive Periods – The Uniform Capitalization Rules

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/10/handling-expenses-of-crops-with-pre-productive-periods-the-uniform-capitalization-rules.html

When Can Depreciation First Be Claimed?

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/10/for-depreciation-purposes-what-does-placed-in-service-mean.html

Tax Treatment of Crops and/or Livestock Sold Post-Death

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/11/tax-treatment-of-crops-andor-livestock-sold-post-death.html

Social Security Planning for Farmers and Ranchers

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/11/social-security-planning-for-farmers-and-ranchers.html

Are Crop Insurance Proceeds Deferrable for Tax Purposes?

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/11/are-crop-insurance-proceeds-deferrable-for-tax-purposes.html

Tax Issues Associated With Easement Payments – Part 1

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/11/tax-issues-associated-with-easement-payments-part-1.html

Tax Issues Associated With Easement Payments – Part 2

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/11/tax-issues-associated-with-easement-payments-part-2.html

How NOT to Use a Charitable Remainder Trust

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/12/how-not-to-use-a-charitable-remainder-trust.html

Does Using Old Tractors Mean You Aren’t a Farmer? And the Wind Energy Production Tax Credit – Is Subject to State Property Tax?

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/12/does-using-old-tractors-mean-you-arent-a-farmer-and-the-wind-energy-production-tax-credit-is-it-subject-to-state-prop.html

Insurance

Tax Deal Struck? – and Recent Ag-Related Cases

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/07/tax-deal-struck-and-recent-ag-related-cases.html

Real Property

Tax Deal Struck? – and Recent Ag-Related Cases

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/07/tax-deal-struck-and-recent-ag-related-cases.html

Ag Law Summit

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/08/ag-law-summit.html

Ag Law and Tax Developments

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/09/ag-law-and-tax-developments.html

More Ag Law Developments – Potpourri of Topics

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/10/more-ag-law-developments-potpourri-of-topics.html

Ag Developments in the Courts

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/12/ag-law-developments-in-the-courts.html

Regulatory Law

Constitutional Limit on Government Agency Power – The “Major Questions” Doctrine

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/07/constitutional-limit-on-government-agency-power-the-major-questions-doctrine.html

The Complexities of Crop Insurance

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/07/the-complexities-of-crop-insurance.html

Federal Farm Programs – Organizational Structure Matters – Part One

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/08/federal-farm-programs-organizational-structure-matters-part-one.html

Federal Farm Programs – Organizational Structure Matters – Part Two

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/08/federal-farm-programs-organizational-structure-matters-part-two.html

Federal Farm Programs: Organizational Structure Matters – Part Three

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/08/federal-farm-programs-organizational-structure-matters-part-three.html

USDA’s Emergency Relief Program (Update on Gain from Equipment Sales)

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/08/usdas-emergency-relief-program-update-on-gain-from-equipment-sales.html

Minnesota Farmer Protection Law Upheld

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/09/minnesota-farmer-protection-law-upheld.html

Ag Law and Tax Developments

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/09/ag-law-and-tax-developments.html

Animal Ag Facilities and Free Speech – Does the Constitution Protect Saboteurs?

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/10/animal-ag-facilities-and-free-speech-does-the-constitution-protect-saboteurs.html

Court Says COE Acted Arbitrarily When Declining Jurisdiction Over Farmland

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/10/court-says-coe-acted-arbitrarily-when-declining-jurisdiction-over-farmland.html

Ag Law Developments in the Courts

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/12/ag-law-developments-in-the-courts.html

Water Law

More Ag Law Developments – Potpourri of Topics

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2022/10/more-ag-law-developments-potpourri-of-topics.html

Top Ten Agricultural Law and Tax Developments of 2022 – Numbers 2 and 1

Overview

Today’s article concludes my look at the top ag law and tax developments of 2022 with what I view as the top two developments.  I began this series by looking at those developments that were significant, but not quite big enough to make the “Top Ten.”  Then I started through the “Top Ten.”

The top two ag law and tax developments in 2022 – it’s the topic of today’s post.

Recap

Here’s a bullet-point recap of the top developments of 2022 that I have written about:

• Nuisance law (the continued developments in Iowa) - Garrison v. New Fashion Pork LLP, 977 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 2022).
• Minnesota farmer protection law - Pitman Farms v. Kuehl Poultry, LLC, et al., 48 F.4th 866 (8th Cir. 2022).
• Regulation of ag activities on wildlife refuges - Tulelake Irrigation Dist. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 40 F.4th 930 (9th Cir. 2022).
• Corps of Engineers jurisdiction over “wetland” - Hoosier Environmental Council, et al. v. Natural Prairie Indiana Farmland Holdings, LLC, et al., 564 F. Supp. 3d 683 (N.D. Ind. 2021).
• U. S. Tax Court’s jurisdiction to review collection due process determination - Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. 1493 (2022).
• IRS Failure to Comply with the Administrative Procedure Act - Mann Construction, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.4th 1138 (6th Cir. 2022); Green Valley Investors, LLC v. Commissioner, 159 T.C. No. 5 (2022).
• State law allowing unconstitutional searches unconstitutional - Rainwaters, et al. v. Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency, No. 20-CV-6 (Benton Co. Ten. Dist. Ct. Mar. 22, 2022).
• No. 10 – USDA’s Emergency Relief Program and the definition of “farm income.”
• No. 9 - USDA decision not to review wetland determination upheld - Foster v. United States Department of Agriculture, No. 4:21-CV-04081-RAL, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117676 (D. S.D. Jul. 1, 2022).
• No. 8 - Dicamba drift damage litigation - Hahn v. Monsanto Corp., 39 F.4th 954 (8th Cir. 2022), reh’g. den., 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 25662 (8th Cir. Sept. 2, 2022).
• No. 7 – The misnamed “Inflation Reduction Act.”
• No. 6 – Caselaw and legislative developments concerning “ag gag” provisions.
• No. 5 - WOTUS final rule.
• No. 4 – Economic issues
• No. 3 – Endangered Species Act regulations

No. 2 – California Proposition 12

National Pork Producers Council, et al. v. Ross, 6 F.4th 1021 (9th Cir. Jul. 28, 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 1413 (2022)

In a huge blow to pork producers (and consumers of pork products) nationwide, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has upheld California’s Proposition 12 in 2021.  Proposition 12 requires any pork sold in California to be raised in accordance with California’s housing requirements for hogs.  This means that any U.S. hog producer, by January 1, 2022, was required to upgrade existing facilities to satisfy California’s requirements if desiring to market pork products in California. In early 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court announced that it would review the Ninth Circuit’s opinion. 

While each state sets its own rules concerning the regulation of agricultural production activities, the legal question presented in this case is whether one state can override other states’ rules. The answer to that question involves an analysis of the Commerce Clause and the “Dormant” Commerce Clause.

The Commerce Clause.  Article I Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides in part, “the Congress shall have Power...To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes.”  The Commerce Clause, on its face, does not impose any restrictions on states in the absence of congressional action.  However, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause as implicitly preempting state laws that regulate commerce in a manner that disrupts the national economy.  This is the judicially-created doctrine known as the “dormant” Commerce Clause. 

The “Dormant” Commerce Clause.  The dormant Commerce Clause is a constitutional law doctrine that says Congress's power to "regulate Commerce ... among the several States" implicitly restricts state power over the same area.  In general, the Commerce Clause places two main restrictions on state power – (1) Congress can preempt state law merely by exercising its Commerce Clause power by means of the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution; and (2) the Commerce Clause itself--absent action by Congress--restricts state power.  In other words, the grant of federal power implies a corresponding restriction of state power.  This second limitation has come to be known as the "Dormant" Commerce Clause because it restricts state power even though Congress's commerce power lies dormant. Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245 (1829).  The label of “Dormant Commerce Clause” is really not accurate – the doctrine applies when the Congress is dormant, not the Commerce Clause itself.

Rationale.  The rationale behind the Commerce Clause is to protect the national economic market from opportunistic behavior by the states - to identify protectionist actions by state governments that are hostile to other states.  Generally, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine prohibits states from unduly interfering with interstate commerce.  State regulations cannot discriminate against interstate commerce.  If they do, the regulations are per se invalid.  See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).  Also, state regulations cannot impose undue burdens on interstate commerce.  See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).  Under the “undue burden” test, state laws that regulate evenhandedly to effectuate a local public interest are upheld unless the burden imposed on commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits.     

The Court has never held that discrimination between in-state and out-of-state commerce, without more, violates the dormant Commerce Clause.  Instead, the Court has explained that the dormant Commerce Clause is concerned with state laws that both discriminate between in-state and out-of-state actors that compete with one another, and harm the welfare of the national economy.  Thus, a discriminatory state law that harms the national economy is permissible if in-state and out-of-state commerce do not compete.  See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 117 S. Ct. 811, 824-26 (1997).  Conversely, a state law that discriminates between in-state and out-of-state competitors is permissible if it does not harm the national economy. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949). 

California Proposition 12 Litigation

In 2018, California voters passed Proposition 12.  Proposition 12 bans the sale of whole pork meat (no matter where produced) from animals confined in a manner inconsistent with California’s regulatory standards.  Proposition 12 established minimum requirements on farmers to provide more space for egg-laying hens, breeding pigs, and calves raised for veal. Specifically, the law requires that covered animals be housed in confinement systems that comply with specific standards for freedom of movement, cage-free design and minimum floor space. The law identifies covered animals to include veal calves, breeding pigs and egg-laying hens. The implementing regulations prohibit a farm owner or operator from knowingly causing any covered animal to be confined in a cruel manner, as specified, and prohibits a business owner or operator from knowingly engaging in the sale within the state of shell eggs, liquid eggs, whole pork meat or whole veal meat, as defined, from animals housed in a “cruel manner.”  In addition to general requirements that prohibit animals from being confined in a manner that prevents lying down, standing up, fully extending limbs or turning around freely, the measure added detailed confinement space standards for farms subject to the law. The alleged reason for the law was to protect the health and safety of California consumers and decrease the risk of foodborne illness and the negative fiscal impact on California. 

In late 2019, several national farm organizations challenged Proposition 12 and sought a declaratory judgment that the law was unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause.  The plaintiffs also sought a permanent injunction preventing Proposition 12 from taking effect.  The plaintiffs claimed that Proposition 12 impermissibly regulated out-of-state conduct by compelling non-California producers to change their operations to meet California’s standards.  The plaintiffs also alleged that Proposition 12 imposed excessive burdens on interstate commerce without advancing any legitimate local interest by significantly increasing operation costs without any connection to human health or foodborne illness.  The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint.  National Pork Producers Council, et al. v. Ross, No. 3:19-cv-02324-W-AHG (S.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2020). 

On appeal, the plaintiffs focused their argument on the allegation that Proposition 12 has an impermissible extraterritorial effect of regulating prices in other states and, as such, is per se unconstitutional.  This was a tactical mistake for the plaintiffs.  The appellate court noted that existing Supreme Court precedent on the extraterritorial principle applied only to state laws that are “price control or price affirmation statutes.”  National Pork Producers Council, et al. v. Ross, No. 20-55631, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 22337 (9th Cir. Jul. 28, 2021).  Thus, the extraterritorial principle does not apply to a state law that does not dictate the price of a product and does not tie the price of its in-state products to out-of-state prices.  Because Proposition 12 was neither a price control nor a price-affirmation statute (it didn’t dictate the price of pork products or tie the price of pork products sold in California to out-of-state prices) the law didn’t have the extraterritorial effect of regulating prices in other states. 

The appellate court likewise rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that Proposition 12 has an impermissible indirect “practical effect” on how pork is produced and sold outside California.  Id.  Upstream effects (e.g., higher production costs in other states) the appellate court concluded, do not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.   The appellate court pointed out that a state law is not impermissibly extraterritorial unless it regulates conduct that is wholly out of state.  Id.  Because Proposition 12 applied to California and non-California pork production the higher cost of production was not an impermissible effect on interstate commerce.

The appellate court also concluded that inconsistent regulation from state-to-state was permissible because the plaintiffs had failed to show a compelling need for national uniformity in regulation at the state level.  Id.  In addition, the appellate court noted that the plaintiffs had not alleged that Proposition 12 had a discriminatory effect on interstate commerce. 

Simply put, the appellate court rejected the plaintiffs’ challenge to Proposition 12 because a law that increases compliance costs (projected at a 9.2 percent increase in production costs that would e passed on to consumers) is not a substantial burden on interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. 

As noted above, the U.S. Supreme court decided to review the Ninth Circuit’s opinion.  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has been careless in applying the anti-discrimination test, and in many cases, neither of the two requirements--interstate competition or harm to the national economy--is ever mentioned.  See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). The reason interstate competition goes unstated is obvious – in most cases the in-state and out-of-state actors compete in the same market.  But, the reason that the second requirement, harm to the national economy, goes unstated is because the Court simply assumes the issue away.  The Supreme Court’s decision in 2023 is a highly anticipated one for agriculture and the dormant Commerce Clause analysis and application in general.

No. 1 – The “Major Questions” Doctrine

West Virginia, et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al., 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022)

Clearly, the biggest development of 2022 that has the potential to significantly impact agriculture and the economy in general is the Supreme Court’s opinion involving the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) regulatory authority under the Clean Air Act (CAA).  The Court invoked the “major question” doctrine to pair back unelected bureaucratic agency authority and return policy-making power to citizens through their elected representatives.  The future impact of the Court’s decision is clear.  When federal regulations amount to setting nationwide policy and when state regulations do the same at the state level, the regulatory bodies may be successfully challenged in court.

The case involved the U.S. Supreme Court’s review of the EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from existing power plants under the CAA. The case arose from the EPA’s regulatory development of the Clean Power Plan (CPP) in 2015 which, in turn, stemmed from then-President Obama’s 2008 promise to establish policy that would bankrupt the coal industry.  The EPA claimed it had authority to regulate CO2 emissions from coal and natural-gas-fired power plants under Section 111 of the CAA.  Under that provision, the EPA determines emission limits.  But EPA took the position that Section 111 empowered it to shift energy generation at the plants to “renewable” energy sources such as wind and solar.  Under the CPP, existing power plants could meet the emission limits by either reducing electricity production or by shifting to “cleaner” sources of electricity generation.  The EPA admitted that no existing coal plant could satisfy the new emission standards without a wholesale movement away from coal, and that the CPP would impose billions in compliance costs, raise retail electricity prices, require the retirement of dozens of coal plants and eliminate tens of thousands of jobs.  In other words, the CPP would keep President Obama’s 2008 promise by bypassing the Congress through the utilization of regulatory rules set by unelected, unaccountable bureaucrats. 

The U.S. Supreme Court stayed the CPP in 2016 preventing it from taking effect.  The EPA under the Trump Administration repealed the CPP on the basis that the Congress had not clearly delegated regulatory authority “of this breadth to regulate a fundamental sector of the economy.”  The EPA then replaced the CPP with the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) rule.  Under the ACE rule, the focus was on regulating power plant equipment to require upgrades when necessary to improve operating practices.  Numerous states and private parties challenged the EPA’s replacement of the CPP with the ACE.  The D.C. Circuit Court vacated the EPA’s repeal of the CPP, finding that the CPP was within the EPA’s purview under Section 7411 of the CAA – the part of the CAA that sets standards of performance for new sources of air pollution.  American Lung Association v. Environmental Protection Agency, 985 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2021).  The Circuit Court also vacated the ACE and purported to resurrect the CPP.  In the fall of 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.

The Supreme Court reversed, framing the issue as whether the EPA had the regulatory authority under Section 111 of the CAA to restructure the mix of electricity generation in the U.S. to transition from 38 percent coal to 27 percent coal by 2030.  The Supreme Court said EPA did not, noting that the case presented one of those “major questions” because under the CPP the EPA would tremendously expand its regulatory authority by enacting a regulatory program that the Congress had declined to enact.  While the EPA could establish emission limits, the Supreme Court held that the EPA could not force a shift in the power grid from one type of energy source to another.  The Supreme Court noted that the EPA admitted that did not have technical expertise in electricity transmission, distribution or storage.  Simply put, the Supreme Court said that devising the “best system of emission reduction” was not within EPA’s regulatory power.

 Clearly, the Congress did not delegate administrative agencies the authority to establish energy policy for the entire country.  While the Supreme Court has never precisely defined the boundaries and scope of the major question doctrine, when the regulation is more in line with what should be legislative policymaking, it will be struck down.  The Supreme Court’s decision is also broad enough to have long-lasting consequences for rulemaking by all federal agencies including the USDA/FSA.  The decision could also impact the Treasury Department’s promulgation of tax regulations. 

The Supreme Court’s decision returns power to the Congress that it has ceded over the years to administrative agencies and the Executive branch concerning matters of “vast economic and political significance.”  But it’s also likely that the Executive branch and the unelected bureaucrats of the administrative state will likely attempt to push the envelope and force the courts to push back.  It’s rare that the Executive branch and administrative agencies voluntarily return power to elected representatives as was done in numerous instances from 2017 through 2020. 

Conclusion

Agricultural law and tax issues were many and varied in 2022.  In 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court will issue opinions in the California Proposition 12 case and the Sackett case involving the scope of the federal government’s jurisdiction over wetlands.  Also, there has been a major development in the Tax Court involving tax issues associated with deferred grain contracts that has resulted in a settlement with IRS, the terms of which cannot be disclosed at this time.  If 2022 showed a trend with USDA it is that the USDA will continue several “hardline” positions against farmers – a narrow definition of farm income; broad regulatory control over wet areas in fields; and ceding regulatory authority to the EPA and the COE.  The U.S. Supreme Court is also anticipated to issue on opinion with potentially significant implications for Medicaid planning. 

Of course, the expanding war against Russia being fought in Ukraine will continue to dominate ag markets throughout 2023.  At home, the general economic data is not good and that will have implications in 2023 for farmers and ranchers.  On January 26, the U.S Bureau of Economic Analysis issued a report (https://www.bea.gov/) showing that the U.S. economy grew by 2.9 percent in the fourth quarter of 2022 and 2.1 percent for all of 2022.  But, the report also showed that economic growth in the economy is slowing.  Business investment grew by a mere 1.4 percent in the fourth quarter of 2022, consisting almost entirely of inventory growth.  That will mean that businesses will be forced to sell off inventories at discounts, which will lower business profits and be a drag on economic growth in 2023.  Nonresidential investment was down 26.7 percent due to the increase in home prices, increased interest rates and a drop in real income.  On that last point, real disposable income dropped $1 trillion in 2022, the largest drop since 1932 - the low point of the Great Depression.  Personal savings also dropped by $1.6 trillion in 2022.  This is a "ticking timebomb" that is not sustainable because it means that consumers are depleting cash reserves.  This indicates that spending will continue to slow in 2023 and further stymie economic growth - about two-thirds of GDP is based on consumer spending.  Relatedly, the Dow was down 8.8 percent for 2022, the worst year since 2008.   2022 also saw a reduction in the pace of international trade.  Imports dropped more than exports which increases GDP, giving the illusion that the economy is better off.  

Certainly, 2023 will be another very busy year for rural practitioners and those dealing with legal and tax issues for farmers and ranchers. 

Top Ten Agricultural Law and Tax Developments of 2022 – Numbers 4 and 3

Overview

Today’s article is another installment on what I believe to be the Top 10 developments in agricultural law and agricultural taxation of 2022.  Today, I look at developments number four and three.

No. 4– Economic Issues

In general.  Economic issues impact daily decision-making for farmers and ranchers. These issues also impact tax and financial planning.   During 2022, economic issues impacted farms and ranches to a great degree.  Price inflation triggered by economic policies increased the price of fossil fuels which, along with other polices produced wage inflation.  In addition, massive deficit spending resulted in a quintupled the money supply which created excess demand that further increased inflation.  In addition, poor policy past policy choices by the Federal Reserve kept interest rates at artificially low levels further increasing demand and increasing inflation.  Beginning in the first half of 2022, the Federal Reserve started to increase interest rates to decrease demand and reduce inflation.  However, further deficit spending by the Congress enacted into law in August of 2022 will largely offset the impact of the Federal Reserve’s interest rate increases with the result that, as of the end of 2022, inflation was anticipated to continue with the possibility of decreased demand, a scenario not unlike the economic situation of the late 1970s. 

All of these political/economic choices have implications for farmers and ranchers.  Crop production, energy issues, monetary policy, issues in the meat sector, water issues west of the sixth Principal Meridian, and unanticipated outside shocks have farm-level impacts that professional advisors and counselors need to account for when representing farm and ranch clients.

Specific points.  Several specific economic points from 2022 are listed below.

• The war in Ukraine has had a major impact on global grain trade and created additional issues for U.S. farmers and ranchers. Russia and Ukraine are leading exporters of food grains.  One estimate is that worldwide food and feed prices could rise by 22 percent which could, in turn, cause a surge in malnutrition in developing nations.  Since the war started, total world food output has decreased, resulting in a sharp drop in food exports from exporting countries.  Other food exporting countries have announced new limitations on food exports (or are exploring bans) to preserve domestic supplies.  This will have an impact on international grain markets and will likely have serious implications for the world’s wheat supply.  The extent of such disruptions remained unknown at the end of 2022.

• The demand for beef remained strong in 2022.  But, a major issue was the disconnect between beef demand and the beef producer.  This fact, along with significant drought in much of the major cattle producing areas signaled producers to decrease herd size.  During 2022, the Congress was considering legislation focused on providing more robust and transparent marketing of live cattle.

• Pork demand was not as impressive of beef, but improved during 2022.  Export demand dropped primarily due to China which cased U.S. pork production to decline along with pork values.    
• Poultry, demand remained strong and flock sizes decreased largely because of the presence of Avian Flu.  Toward the latter part of 2022, retail egg prices increased substantially.
• Water issues. West of the Sixth Principal Meridian, access to water is critical for the success of many farming and ranching operations.  During 2022, a dispute continued to brew between Colorado and Nebraska over water in northeast Colorado that Nebraska lays claim to under a Compact entered into almost 100 years ago.  Water access and availability will continue to be key to profitability of farms and ranches in the Plains and the West.
• Land values; machinery and input costs. Farm and ranchland values remained strong during 2022, and input, machinery costs and land values continued to outpace inflation.  For those farmers that were able to pre-pay input expenses in 2021 for 2022 crops, much of the price increase of inputs could be blunted until another round of inputs were needed in late 2022 for the 2023 crop.  Also, many short-term loans were locked in before interest rates began rising.  That story will also likely be different in early 2023 when those loans are redone. 

During 2023, the biggest risks to agriculture will continue to be from outside the sector.  Unexpected catastrophic events such as the war in Ukraine, whether (or when) China will invade Taiwan, domestic monetary and fiscal policy, political developments at home and abroad, and government regulation of key segments of the economy that impact agricultural activities remain the biggest unknown variables to the profitability of farming and ranching operations and agribusinesses. 

No. 3 – Endangered Species Act regulations

In early 2022, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced a new policy regarding its Endangered Species Act (ESA) responsibilities under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).  The ESA requires federal agencies to determine whether an agency action “may affect” any species or habitat protected or designated under the ESA.  If an agency determines that the an action is “likely to adversely affect” protected species or habitat, the agency must consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service to determine mitigation measures. The EPA administers the FIFRA, and the EPA now considers practically every decision it makes under FIFRA to require consultation in accordance with the ESA.  In late 2022, the EPA published its policy plan focusing on ESA mitigation for FIFRA pesticide registration reviews.

During 2022, additional ESA regulations were changed or modified, many of which will potentially negatively impact agricultural activities on private land.  For instance, “habitat” is no longer specifically defined, and the Critical Habitat Exclusion Rule was rescinded.  This will make it easier for the USFWS to designate critical habitat for protected species under the ESA.  Much critical habitat is on private property.  The USFWS also continued the process of revising its Listing Rule.

Upon enactment in 1973, the ESA barred the “taking” of endangered species.  The “taking” prohibition only extended to “threatened” species if the Interior Department deemed it necessary and advisable for the conservation of the species.  In 1975, the Interior Department, contrary to the statute, issued a “blanket rule” extending the prohibition to all threatened species, unless it adopted a special rule relaxing the prohibition for a particular species. In essence, the blanket rule provided no meaningful distinction between regulations for species that are listed as threatened or endangered. 

The Trump Administration restored the ESA’s distinction between the regulation of endangered and threatened species by repealing the blanket rule.  The move aligned the practice of the Interior Department with that of the Commerce Department (which manages marines species and never had a blanket rule).  The change applied prospectively only, and no species lost any protection due to the change.  The restoration of regulatory distinctions between endangered and threatened species is designed to better align the incentives of landowners with the interests of rare species. By repealing the blanket rule, burdens imposed on landowners will increase if species decline and relax as they recover.

While the blanket rule remained in effect during 2022, the USFWS is in the process of rescinding the rule.  Expect legal challenges to this action which is contrary to the statute and congressional intent to happen once the rule is formally rescinded. 

Conclusion

Next time I will look at developments two and one.

Top Ten Agricultural Law and Tax Developments of 2022 – Numbers 6 and 5

Overview

Today’s article is another installment on what I believe to be the Top 10 developments in agricultural law and agricultural taxation of 2022.  Today, I look at developments number six and five.

No. 6 – Caselaw and Legislative Developments on “Ag Gag” Provisions

2022 saw further developments in the courts and in state legislatures involving legislative attempts to provide a level of protection to livestock facilities is to bar access to an animal production facility under false pretenses.  At their core, the laws attempt to prohibit a person having the intent to harm a livestock production facility from gaining access to the facility (such as via employment) to then commit illegal acts on the premises.  See, e.g., Iowa Code §717A.3A.  Laws that bar lying and trespass coupled with the intent to do physical harm to an animal production facility should not be constitutionally deficient.  Laws that go beyond those confines may be. 

In Animal Legal Defense Fund, et al. v. Reynolds, et al., No. 4:21-cv-00231-SMR-HCA (S.D. Iowa. Sept. 26, 2022), the plaintiffs (animal rights activist groups) claimed the statute violated their First Amendment rights by hindering them from gaining access to farms and dairies under false pretenses of seeking a job to be able to take pictures and/or videos without the property owner’s consent.  The defendants asserted that the case should be dismissed for lack of standing and lack of ripeness.

The Court (the same judge that ruled earlier in 2022 on another variant of the Iowa laws) held that the plaintiffs had standing because their organizational objectives would be hindered, and that an arrest is not required before a criminal statute can be challenged.  The Court noted that the statute prohibited video recordings (which the court asserted was protected “speech”) while trespassing which the plaintiffs considered important to broadcasting their negative messages about animal agriculture to the public.  More specifically, the court determined that the statute singled out conduct (that the plaintiffs contemplated) by expanding the penalty for conduct already prohibited by law and was not limited to specific uses of a camera.  Accordingly, the court determined that the statute was an unconstitutional restriction on the free speech rights of trespassers apparently on the basis that regulating free speech on private property would create a “slippery slope” for not allowing people to record politicians or express views about the Government.   In addition, any recording, production, editing, and publication of the videos is protected speech.  The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. 

According to the court’s view, it seems practically impossible for farmers to protect their farming operations from those who intend to inflict harm via protected “speech.” Is the court saying that there is a constitutional right to trespass?  If so, that is flatly contrary to the recent U.S. Supreme Court opinion of Cedar Point Nursery, et al. v. Hassid, et al., No. 20-107, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 3394 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Jun. 23, 2021).  

Note:  Interestingly (and hypocritically) the Iowa federal district court’s website contains the following information: “To be admitted into the courthouse, you must present a government issued photo identification.  Please be aware the following items are NOT allowed in the courthouse: cell phones, cameras, other electronic devices (including Apple watches), recording devices,…”.

Note:  Iowa Code §716.7A, the Food Operation Trespass Law, remains in effect.  That law, effective on June 20, 2020, treats as an aggravated misdemeanor a first offense of entering or remaining on the property of a food operation without the consent of a person who has real or apparent authority to allow the person to enter or remain on the property.  A subsequent offense is a Class D felony.  This statutory provision was upheld as constitutional by an Iowa county district court judge in early 2022. 

Tenth Circuit.  In Animal Legal Defense Fund, et al. v. Kelly, 9 F.4th 1219 (10th Cir. 2021), pet. for cert. filed, (U.S. Sup. Ct. Nov. 17, 2021), the court construed the Kansas provision that makes it a crime to take pictures or record videos at a covered facility “without the effective consent of the owner and with the intent to damage the enterprise.”  The plaintiffs claimed that the law violated their First Amendment free speech rights.  The State claimed that what was being barred was conduct rather than speech and that, therefore, the First Amendment didn’t apply.  But, the court tied conduct together with speech to find a constitutional violation – it was necessary to lie to gain access to a covered facility and consent to film activities.  As such, the law regulated protected speech (lying with intent to cause harm to a business) and was unconstitutional.  The court determined that the State failed to prove that the law narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest in suppressing the “speech” involved.  The dissent pointed out (correctly and consistently with the Eighth Circuit) that “lies uttered to obtain consent to enter the premises of an agricultural facility are not protected speech.” The First Amendment does not protect a fraudulently obtained consent to enter someone else’s property. 

Note:  On April 25, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case.  Kelly v. Animal Legal Defense Fund, cert. den., 142 S. Ct. 2647 (2022). 

No. 5 – WOTUS Final Rule

On December 30, 2022, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COA).  On December 30, 2022, the agencies announced the final "Revised Definition of 'Waters of the United States'" rule which will become effective on March 20, 2023.  It represents a “change of mind” of the agencies from the positions that they held concerning a water of the United States (WOTUS) and wetlands from just over three years ago.  The bottom line is that the new interpretation is extremely unfriendly to agriculture, particularly to farmland owners in the prairie pothole region of the upper Midwest.    

As promised, the Final Rule uses a definition that was in place before 2015 (for purposes of the Clean Water Act) for traditional navigable waters, territorial seas, interstate waters, and upstream water resources that “significantly” affect those waters.

Note:  Two joint memos were published with the final rule to set forth the delineation of the implementation of roles and responsibilities between the agencies.  One is a joint coordination memo to “ensure accuracy and consistency of jurisdictional determinations under the final rule.”  The other is a memo with the USDA to provide “clarity on the agencies’ programs under the Clean Water act and the Food Security Act (Swampbuster).”

Adjacency.  The EPA wants to restore the “significant nexus” via “adjacency.”  This is a big change in the definition of “adjacency.”  It doesn’t mean simply “abutting.”  Instead, “adjacent” includes a “significant nexus” and a “significant nexus” can be established by “shallow hydrologic subsurface connections” to the “waters of the United States.  A “shallow subsurface connection,” the Final Rule states, may be found below the ordinary root zone (below 12 inches), where other wetland delineation factors may not be present.  Frankly, that means farm field drain tile.      

Specifically, the Final Rule sets forth two kinds of adjacency: 1) the traditional “relatively permanent” standard; and 2) the “significant nexus” standard.  The EPA and the COE say the agencies will not assume that all wetlands in a specific geographic area are similarly situated and can be assessed together on a watershed basis in a significant nexus analysis.  But it is clear from the Final Rule that the agencies intend to expand jurisdiction over isolated prairie pothole wetlands using the “significant nexus” standard. 

Note:  The “significant nexus” can be established via a connection to downstream waters by surface water, shallow subsurface water, and groundwater flows and through biological and chemical connections.  The Final Rule states that adjacency can be supported by a “pipe, non-jurisdictional ditch,… or some other factors that connects the wetland directly to the jurisdictional water.”  This appears to be the basis for overturning the NWPR.  Consequently, the prairie pothole region is directly in the “bullseye” of the Final Rule.

Prior converted cropland.  The agencies say the final rule increases “clarity” on which waters are not jurisdictional – including prior converted cropland.  This doesn’t make much sense.  Supposedly, the agencies are “clarifying” that prior converted cropland, (which is not a water), is not a water, but it somehow could be a water if the agencies had not clarified it?  In addition, the burden is placed on the landowner to prove that prior converted cropland is actually prior converted cropland and therefore not a water.

Ditches and drainage devices.  The Final Rule is vague enough to give the government regulatory authority over non-navigable ponds, ditches, and potholes.

The U.S. Supreme Court.  A case is presently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court involving the definition of a WOTUS.  In Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency, 8 F.4th 1075 (9th Cir. 2021), cert, granted, 142 S. Ct. 896 (2022).  The issue in the case is whether the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit used the proper test for determining whether wetlands are “waters of the United States” under the CWA.  Oral argument occurred in early October of 2022.  The Court’s opinion is anticipated sometime before mid-March of 2023, but the issuance of the Final Rule may cause that to be delayed.  In any event, the Supreme Court will have the final say on what a WOTUS rather than the COE or the EPA.

Conclusion

Next time I will look at developments four and three.

Top Ten Agricultural Law and Tax Developments of 2022 – Numbers 8 and 7

Overview

Today I continue the journey through what I believe to be the Top 10 developments in agricultural law and agricultural taxation of 2022.  Today, I look at developments number eight and seven.

No. 8 – Dicamba Drift Damage Litigation

Hahn v. Monsanto Corp., 39 F.4th 954 (8th Cir. 2022), reh’g. den., 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 25662 (8th Cir. Sept. 2, 2022)

Damage from the drift of Dicamba has been an issue in certain parts of the country for the past two years.  Over that time, I have written on the technical aspects  of Dicamba and the underlying problems associated with Dicamba application.  In 2022, the Dicamba saga continued with litigation involving Missouri’s largest peach farm. 

In Bader Farms, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., et al., No. MDL No. 1:18md2820-SNLJ, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114302 (E.D. Mo. July 10, 2019), the plaintiff is Missouri’s largest peach farming operation and is located in the southeast part of the state.  claimed that his peach orchard was destroyed after the defendants (Monsanto and BASF) allegedly conspired to develop and market Dicamba-tolerant seeds and Dicamba-based herbicides. The suit alleged that the two companies collaborated on Xtend (herbicide resistant cotton seed) that was intended for use with a less volatile form of Dicamba with less drift potential.  But, as of 2015 neither Monsanto nor BASF had produced the new, less volatile, form of Dicamba.  That fact led the plaintiff to claim that the defendants released the Dicamba-tolerant seed with no corresponding Dicamba herbicide that could be safely applied.  As a result, the plaintiff claimed, farmers illegally sprayed an old formulation of Dicamba that was unapproved for in-crop, over-the-top, use and was highly volatile and prone to drift.    The plaintiff claimed its annual peach crop revenue exceeded $2 million before the drift damage, and an expert at trial asserted that the drift caused the plaintiff to lose over $20 million in profits.  While many cases had previously been filed on the dicamba drift issue, the plaintiff did not join the other litigation because it focused on damages to soybean crops.  The plaintiff’s suit also involved claims for failure to warn; negligent training; violation of the Missouri Crop Protection Act (MCPA); civil conspiracy; and joint liability for punitive damages. 

Monsanto moved to dismiss the claims for failure to warn; negligent training; violation of the MCPA; civil conspiracy; and joint liability for punitive damages.  BASF moved to dismiss those same counts except the claims for failure to warn. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in part.  Monsanto argued that the failure to warn claims were preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), but the plaintiff claimed that no warning would have prevented the damage to the peaches. The trial court determined that the plaintiff had adequately plead the claim and denied the motion to dismiss this claim.  Both Monsanto and BASF moved to dismiss the negligent training claim, but the trial court refused to do so. However, the trial court did dismiss the MCPA claims.  The trial court noted that civil actions under the MCPA are limited to “field crops” which did not include peaches.   The trial court, however, did not dismiss the civil conspiracy claim based on concerted action by agreement, but did dismiss the aiding and abetting portion of the claim because that cause of action is not recognized under Missouri tort law.  The parties agreed to a separate jury determination of punitive damages for each defendant.

Note:  The case went to trial in early 2020 and was one of more than 100 similar Dicamba lawsuits.  Bayer, which acquired Monsanto in 2018 for $63 billion, announced in June of 2020 that it would settle dicamba lawsuits for up to $400 million.

At trial, the jury found that Monsanto had negligently designed or failed to warn for 2015 and 2016 and that both defendants had done so for 2017 to the time of trial.  The jury awarded the plaintiff $15 million in compensatory damages and $250 million in punitive damages against Monsanto for 2015 and 2016.  The jury also found that the defendants were acting in a joint venture and in a conspiracy.  The plaintiff submitted a proposed judgment that both defendants were responsible for the $250 million punitive damages award.  BASF objected, but the trial court found the defendants jointly liable for the full verdict considering the jury’s finding that the defendants were in a joint venture.  Bader Farms, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., et al., MDL No. 1:18-md-02820-SNJL, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34340 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 28, 2020). 

BASF then moved for a judgment as a matter of law on punitive damages or motion for a new trial or remittitur (e.g., asking the court to reduce the damage award), and Monsanto moved for a judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.  The trial court, however, found both defendants jointly liable, although the court lowered the punitive damages to $60 million (from $250 million) after determining a lack of actual malice.  The trial court did uphold the $15 million compensatory damage award upon finding that the correct standard under Missouri law was applied to the farm’s damages.  Bader Farms, Inc. v. Monsanto Co, et al., MDL No. 1:18md2820-SNLJ, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221420 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 25, 2020).  The defendants filed a notice of appeal on December 22, 2020.     

In Hahn v. Monsanto Corp., 39 F.4th 954 (8th Cir. 2022), reh’g. den., 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 25662 (8th Cir. Sept. 2, 2022), the appellate court partially affirmed the trial court, partially reversed, and remanded the case.  The appellate court determined that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury to assess punitive damages for Bayer (i.e., Monsanto) and BASF together, rather than separately, and that a new trial was needed to determine punitive damages for each company.  Indeed, the appellate court vacated the punitive damages award and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to hold a new trial only on the issue of punitive damages. 

However, the appellate court did not disturb the trial court’s jury verdict of $15 million in compensatory damages.  On the compensatory damages issue, the appellate court held that the trial court properly refused to find intervening cause as a matter of law for the damage to the plaintiff’s peaches.  On that point, the appellate court determined that the spraying of Dicamba on a nearby farm did not interrupt the chain of events which meant that the question of proximate cause of the damage was proper for the jury to determine.  The appellate court also held that the was an adequate basis for the plaintiff’s lost profits because the award was not based on speculation.  The appellate court noted that the peach orchard had been productive for decades, and financial statements along with expert witness testimony calculated approximately $20.9 million in actual damages.  The appellate court also determined that the facts supported the jury’s determination that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy via unlawful means – knowingly enabling the widespread use of Dicamba during growing season to increase seed sales.

No. 7 – The Misnamed “Inflation Reduction Act”

If ever there has been a deceptively misnamed piece of legislation, this is it.  An Act with $750 billion of newly minted money to will not reduce inflation.  Words have no meaning.  I suppose that we are supposed to believe that the following provisions of the bill will reduce inflation:

• $3 billion for the U.S. Postal Service to buy new electric mail trucks;
• $3 billion for the EPA to oversee block grants for “environmental justice;”
• $40 billion total to the EPA which includes $30 billion for “disadvantaged communities” (keep in mind that the total annual budget of the EPA is about $10 billion);
• $750 million to the Interior Department for new hires;
• $10 million to the USDA to be spent on “equity commissions” to “combat” racism;
• $25 million to the Government Accountability Office to determine, “whether the economic, social and environmental impacts of the funds described in this paragraph are equitable;”
• Via a budget gimmick to keep the amount outside of the Act’s price tag are amounts to the Energy Department for existing “green” energy loan programs and a new energy loan-guarantee program.

Ag Program Spending

The Act contains a great deal of spending on ag conservation-related programs.  Here are the primary provisions:

• EQIP - $8.45 billion additional funding over Fiscal Years 2023-2026. Prioritizes funding for reduction of methane emissions from cattle (e.g., cattle passing gas) and nutrient management activities (e.g., diets to reduce bloating in cows).
• CSP - $3.25 billion additional funding over same time frame.
• Ag Conservation Easement Program (ACEP) - $1.4 billion over same time frame for easements or interests in land that will reduce, capture, avoid or sequester carbon dioxide, or methane oxide emissions with land eligible for the program. ACEP incorporates the Wetlands Reserve Program, the Grasslands Reserve Program and the Farm and Ranch Lands Protection Program. 
• Regional Conservation Partnership Program - $4.95 billion over same timeframe for cover cropping, nutrient management, and watershed improvement.
• $4 billion for drought relief that prioritizes the CO basin.
• The U.S. Forest Service gets $1.8 billion for hazardous fuels reduction projects on USFS land.
• $14 billion for rural development and lending projects.
• $3.1 billion to USDA to provide payments to distressed borrowers.
• $2.2 billion to USDA for farmers, ranchers and forest landowners that have been discriminated against in USDA lending programs (i.e., reparations).
• $5 billion to USDA for National Forest System to fund forest reforestation and wildfire prevention.

The IRS gets approximately $80 billion in IRS funding (over next 10 years) to hire 87,000 agents.  The IRS currently has 78,000 agents, but 50,000 are set to retire in the next few years.  $46 billion is to be dedicated to enforcement and is anticipated to increase the number of audits by $1.2 million annually.  $25 billion is earmarked for IRS operations, $5 billion for business systems modernization. IRS taxpayer services, which many tax practitioners would say as the most in need of funding, gets the short end of the stick with $4 billion.

Conclusion

I will continue looking at the biggest developments of 2022 in ag law and tax in the next post.

Top Ten Agricultural Law and Tax Developments of 2022 – Numbers 10 and 9

Overview

With this post, I begin the trek through what I believe to be the Top 10 developments in agricultural law and agricultural taxation of 2022.  Today, I look at developments No. 10 and nine. 

No. 10 – USDA’s Emergency Relief Program

Background.  The Extending Government Funding and Delivering Emergency Assistance Act was signed into law on September 30, 2021. This legislation includes $10 billion for farmers impacted by weather disasters during calendar years 2020 and 2021. It directs $750 million to assist livestock producers for losses incurred due to drought or wildfires in calendar year 2021 through the Emergency Livestock Relief Program (ELRP). Through the Emergency Relief Program (ERP), the legislation also provides funding for noninsured crop losses incurred.

The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) released information in August of 2022 involving the question of whether income from the sale of farm equipment counted as farm income for purposes of the ERP.  The issue is an important one because an enhanced payment limit might be at stake.

ERP payments may only be made to a producer with a crop eligible for federal crop insurance or the noninsurance crop disaster assistance program (NAP). The crop for which the recovery is sought must have been subject to a qualifying disaster, which is defined broadly. As a type of qualifying disaster, droughts are rated in accordance with the U.S. Drought Monitor, which publishes a list of qualifying counties.

An ERP payment is not made to any producer that did not receive a crop insurance or NAP payment in 2020 or 2021. Because of this requirement, crop insurance premiums that an ERP recipient has paid are reimbursed by recalculating the ERP payment based on the ERP payment rate of 85% and then backing out the crop insurance payment based on coverage level.

In addition, the ERP requires that the producer receiving a payment obtain either NAP or crop insurance for the next crop years. Also, a producer that received prevented planting payments can qualify for ERP Phase 1 payments based on elected coverage.

Note. ERP payments are for damages occurring in 2020 and 2021, so if they were received in 2022 they are not deferrable to 2023.

Payment limit. The ERP payment limit is $125,000 for specialty crops. For all other crops, ERP imposes a limit of $125,000 combined for ERP Phases 1 and 2. However, for an applicant with “average adjusted gross farm income” (average adjusted gross income (AGI)) based on the immediate three prior years but skipping the first year back (e.g., in 2022, tax years 2018, 2019, and 2020 are used to compute the percentage) that is comprised of more than 75% from farming activities (the “75% test”), the normally applicable $900,000 AGI limit is dropped, and the payment limit goes to $900,000 for specialty crops and $250,000 for all other crops. There are separate payment limits for 2020 and 2021. 

Definition of farm income.  Farm income for ERP purposes includes the following.

• Net income from Schedule F, Profit or Loss From Farming
• Pass-through income from farming activities
• Wages from a farming entity
• Interest charge domestic international sales corporation (IC-DISC) income from an entity that materially participates in farming (has a majority of gross receipts from farming)
• Income from packing, storing, processing, transporting and shedding of farm products
• Gains from the sale of farm equipment, but only if farm income is at least two-thirds of overall AGI (excluding gains from equipment sales and the sale of farm inputs).

Observation. Under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), for tax years after 2017, a trade-in of farm equipment is treated as a sale that is reported on Form 4797, Sales of Business Property. As a result, many farmers may have little income reported on Schedule F for a tax year that they incurred a large gain from trading in farm equipment reported as having been sold on Form 4797. Thus, sale of farm equipment could cause such a farmer not to receive an additional ERP payment.

The same rule likely applies to income from custom farming or harvesting services and the income derived from providing seed to farmers (offset by allocated expenses).

 No. 9 – Decision to not Review USDA Wetland Certification Upheld  

Foster v. United States Department of Agriculture, No. 4:21-CV-04081-RAL, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117676 (D. S.D. Jul. 1, 2022)

The plaintiff owned farmland with a .8-acre portion that USDA certified as a “wetland” in 2011 under the Swampbuster provisions of 16 U.S.C. §§3801, 3821-3824.  The wetland was about 8.5 inches deep at certain times during the year, particularly in the spring after snow melt. The wetland resulted from a tree belt that had been planted in 1936 to prevent soil erosion.  Snow accumulated around the tree belt in the winter and melted in the spring with the water collecting in a low spot in of the field before soaking into the ground or evaporating.  In about one-half of the crop years, the puddle would dry out in time or planting.  In other years it had to be drained to plant crops.  The certification meant that the puddle could not be drained so that it and the surrounding land could not be farmed without the loss of federal farm program benefits. 

The plaintiff sought a review of the certification under 16 U.S.C. §3822(a)(4) which provides for review of a final certification upon request by the person affected by the certification.  The USDA denied review in 2020 citing its own regulation of 7 C.F.R. §12.30(c)(6) which required the plaintiff to show how a natural event changed the topography or hydrology of the wetland that caused the certification to no longer be a reliable indicator of site conditions.  The plaintiff claimed that new evidence existed that would refute the 2011 certification, and also claimed that 16 U.S.C. §3822(a)(4) provided no restriction on the ability to get a review and, as a result, 7 C.F.R. §12.30(c)(6) violated the due process clause by restricting reviews and was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.   

The trial court held that 7 C.F.R. §12.30(c)(6) merely restricted when an agency must review a final certification.  The trial court also determined that 7 C.F.R. §12.30(c)(6) did not violate the due process clause as the plaintiff did not show any independent source of authority providing him with a right to certification review on request. The USDA’s denials of review were found not to be arbitrary or capricious and that the plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that the natural conditions of the site had changed, which would require a review of the certification.  The plaintiff also claimed that the Swampbuster provisions were unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment.  

The trial court rejected the plaintiff’s claims and determined that the statute of limitations on challenging the certification had run.  The trial court also held that the USDA was entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim that Swampbuster was unconstitutional, holding that the provisions were within the power of the Congress under the spending clause of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.  The trial court also ruled that Swampbuster did not infringe upon state sovereignty by requiring states to implement a federal program, statute or regulation. The trial court further rejected the plaintiff’s claim that a part of Swampbuster violated the Congressional Review Act, finding that the provision at issue was precluded from judicial review.  The court dismissed all the plaintiff’s claims against the USDA and denied the ability for the area to be reviewed again. 

Note:  The trial court’s ruling seems incorrect and the plaintiff docketed an appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on August 16.  No. 22-2729.  The Constitution limits what the government can regulate, including water that doesn’t drain anywhere.  In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has said the government cannot force people to waive a constitutional right as a condition of getting federal benefits such as federal farm program payments. 

Conclusion

In the next installment I will look at some more of the Top Ten of 2022.

Top Agricultural Law and Tax Developments of 2022 – Part 4

Overview

Today’s blog article continues the series that began earlier this week reviewing the top ag law and tax developments of 2022.  I am working my way through those developments that were significant, but not quite of national significance to make the “Top Ten” of 2022.

More ag law and tax developments of 2022 – it’s the topic of today’s post.

State Law Allowing Warrantless Searches Unconstitutional

Rainwaters, et al. v. Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency, No. 20-CV-6 (Benton Co. Ten. Dist. Ct. Mar. 22, 2022) 

The Fourth Amendment protects against illegal searches and seizures.  In general, government officials must secure a search warrant based on probable cause before searching an area unless the owner gives consent.  However, the Fourth Amendment’s protection accorded to “persons, houses, papers and effects,” does not extend to all open areas contiguous to a person’s home, but rather only to the home itself and its surrounding “curtilage” – the area immediately surrounding and associated with the defendant’s home. 

The scope and extent of curtilage is an important issue to farming and ranching operations.  Farming, hunting, recreational and other activity occurs on private land that is not located in the surrounding vicinity of the home.  Indeed, there may not even be a home on the tract.  Does that mean that government agents can conduct a warrantless search on such property?  The ability to do so has become much easier with the new technological developments. 

In addition to the Fourth Amendment protection, in recent years numerous states have enacted legislation designed to provide what is believed to be greater protection from warrantless searches to rural property owners.  Sometimes those laws find themselves at odds with other state laws that allow certain government officials access to property to perform “official” duties.  Other times, those state laws providing access by government officials without a warrant are challenged as unconstitutional.  That is indeed what happened in a Tennessee case in 2022.

In the case, the plaintiffs owned farmland on which they hunted or fished.  They marked fenced portions of their respective tracts where they hunted and also posted the tracts as “No Trespassing.”  Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency (TWRA) officers entered onto both tracts on several occasions and took photos of the plaintiffs and their guests without permission or a warrant. Tennessee law (Tenn. Code Ann. §70-1-305(1) and (7)) allows TWRA officers to enter onto private property, except buildings, without a warrant “to perform executive duties.”  The TWRA officers installed U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service surveillance cameras on the plaintiffs’ property without first obtaining a warrant to gather information regarding potential violations of state hunting laws.  The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Tennessee law and sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well as nominal damages. The defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that there was no controversy to be adjudicated.

The trial court found the Tennessee law to be facially unconstitutional.  The trial court noted that the statute at issue reached to “any property, outside of buildings” which unconstitutionally allowed for warrantless searches of a home’s curtilage.  The trial court also determined that the officers’ information gathering intrusions were unconstitutional searches rather than reasonable regulations and restrictions, and that the statute was comparable to a constitutionally prohibited general warrant.  It was unreasonable for the TWRA officers to enter onto occupied, fenced, private property without first obtaining consent or a search warrant. The trial court also held the plaintiffs had standing to sue because they experienced multiple unauthorized entries onto their private property, and that declaratory relief was an adequate remedy.  The trial court awarded nominal damages of one dollar. 

Note:  The defendant appealed the trial court’s decision.  Expect more developments in this case in 2023 as well as additional developments in other states on the warrantless search issue.    

IRS Failure to Comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)

Mann Construction, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.4th 1138 (6th Cir. 2022); Green Valley Investors, LLC v. Commissioner, 159 T.C. No. 5 (2022)

Several court decisions in 2022 invalidated IRS action for not following federal law in developing regulations that implement the tax code.  For instance, in Mann Construction, the plaintiff challenged IRS Notice 2007–83, which designated certain employee benefit plans featuring cash value life insurance policies as listed transactions.

Note:  A listed transaction is a transaction that is the same as or substantially similar to one of the types of transactions that the IRS has determined to be a tax avoidance transaction. IRS identifies these transactions by notice, regulation, or other form of published guidance as a listed transaction.

Generally, the Code imposes a 20 percent accuracy-related penalty on a taxpayer who has a “reportable transaction” understatement.  The penalty is 30 percent if the taxpayer fails to make certain disclosure requirements that I.R.C. §6011 requires.  That Code section imposes a penalty on a person who fails to include information about a reportable transaction on a return.  A reportable transaction is one that is the same as or “substantially similar to” a tax avoidance transaction (a.k.a. a “listed transaction”) that the IRS has identified by a Notice, Regulation or some other form of published guidance.  Pursuant to IRC §6707A, a failure to report a listed transaction subjects the taxpayer to potential monetary penalties and criminal sanctions.

Note:  The minimum penalty for failure to report a listed transaction is $10,000 ($5,000 for a natural person).  The maximum penalty is $200,000 ($100,000 for a natural person). 

In Mann Construction, the plaintiff had put a cash value life policy plan into effect from the 2013 to 2017 tax years. In 2019, the IRS determined that the plan fit the description identified in Notice 2007–83 and imposed penalties on the plaintiff and its shareholders for failing to disclose their participation. The plaintiff paid the penalties and then sued for a refund alleging that the IRS failed to comply with the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

Note:  Under the APA, a federal agency must undertake a Notice of Public Rulemaking when developing a legislative rule.  The Notice is published in the Federal Register and typically provides 60 days for public comment and 30 days for the agency to reply. 

The trial court ruled for the Government. However, the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the Notice was invalid because of the APA violation. The IRS argued that it was not required to comply, as the Notice was only an “interpretive rule” and not a “legislative rule.”  However, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the Notice fell on the legislative side. This rulemaking imposed new duties on taxpayers that Congress had not articulated. Congress had delegated the authority to the IRS to determine which transactions will be deemed “a tax avoidance transaction,” and the Notice attempted to do that. The mere fact that the statute permitted some interpretation of the term “tax avoidance transaction” did not remove the Notice from the legislative category. Moreover, Congress did not exempt this from the scope of the APA.

The IRS also argued that Treas. Reg. §1.6011-4(b) allowed the IRS to identify reportable and listed transactions “by notice, regulation, or other form of published guidance.” The Court responded that Congress, not the IRS, gets to amend APA requirements.

In Green Valley Investors, LLC, the petitioner claimed charitable contribution deductions for several syndicated conservation easement transactions.  Effective December 23, 2016, the IRS had identified all syndicated conservation easement transactions from January 1, 2010, forward (and substantially similar transactions) as “listed transactions.”  Notice 2017-10, 2017-4 I.R.B. 544. That designation imposed substantial reporting requirements not only on the participants in such transactions, but also on their material advisors, for as long as the statute of limitations with respect to the transaction remained open.   The IRS denied the deductions and imposed various reportable transaction penalties.  The petitioner challenged the IRS position on the basis that the IRS failed to comply with the notice-and-comment requirements of the APA.  U.S. Tax Court followed the rationale in Mann Construction in holding that Notice 2017-10 was also invalid because of a failure to satisfy the notice and comment requirements of the APA.  The Tax Court determined that Notice 2017-10 was a legislative rule because when the IRS identified syndicated conservation easement transactions as a listed transaction it was not merely providing its interpretation of the law or reminding taxpayers of pre-existing duties.  Instead, the Tax Court determined, the IRS was imposed new duties in the form of reporting and recordkeeping requirements on taxpayers and their material advisors.  These substantive new duties that exposed taxpayer to noncompliance penalties meant that the Notice was a legislative rule subject to the APA’s notice-and-comment requirement.

Note:  Also, in CIC Services, Inc. v. Internal Revenue Service, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63545 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 21, 2022), the court invalidated Notice 2016-66, casting doubt on enforcement against micro captive insurance.  Likewise, in GBX Assoc., LLC v. United States, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206500 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 14, 2022), the federal district court followed Green Valley Investors, Inc. in invalidating Notice 2017-10, but it refused to apply a nationwide injunction to enforcement, binding only the parties and leaving this issue for further judicial development.

These cases invalidating IRS Notices for failure of the agency to follow the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements are important to farmers and ranchers.  USDA regulations often shade the line from an interpretive rule into one that is legislative.  The cases provide helpful guidance on where that line is located.

Conclusion

I will continue my journey through the top ag law and tax developments of 2022 in my next post.

Top Ag Law and Developments of 2022 – Part 2

Overview

Today’s blog article continues the series that began earlier this week reviewing the top ag law and tax developments of 2022.  I am working my way through those developments that were significant, but not quite of national significance to make the “Top Ten” of 2022.

More ag law and tax developments of 2022 – it’s the topic of today’s post.

Regulation of Agricultural Activities on Wildlife Refuges

Tulelake Irrigation Dist. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 40 F.4th 930 (9th Cir. 2022)

This case involves the management of six national wildlife refuges in the Klamath Basin encompassing over 200,000 acres.  The court faced the specific question of whether the federal government can regulate agricultural activities on leased land within the refuges.  The plaintiffs, an irrigation district and associated agricultural groups, sued the defendant, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, claiming the defendant violated environmental laws by regulating leased farmland in the Tule Lake and Klamath Refuge. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant.  The plaintiffs appealed.  The appellate court noted that the Kuchel Act and the Refuge Act allow the defendant to determine the proper land management practices to protect the waterfowl management of the area.  Under the Refuge Act, the defendant was required to issue an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and Comprehensive Conservation Plan (CCP). The defendant did issue an EIS and CCP for the Tule Lake and Klamath Refuge area, which included modifications to the agricultural use on the leased land within the region. The EIS/CCP required the leased lands to be flooded post-harvest, restricted some harvesting methods, and prohibited post-harvest field work, which the plaintiffs claimed violated their right to use the leased land. The plaintiffs argued that the language, “consistent with proper waterfowl management,” within the Kuchel Act was “nonrestrictive” and was not essential to the meaning of the Act. The appellate court held it was improper to read just that portion of the Act without considering the rest of the Act to understand the intent. The appellate court found the Kuchel Act was unambiguous and required the defendant to regulate the leased land to ensure proper waterfowl management. The Refuge Act allows the defendant to regulate the uses of the leased land, but the plaintiffs argued the agricultural practices were a “purpose” rather than a “use” so the defendant could not regulate it under the Refuge Act. The appellate court found the agricultural activity on the leased land was not a “purpose” equal to waterfowl management. The appellate court also held the language of the Act was unambiguous and determined that agricultural activities on the land were to be considered a use that the defendant could regulate.  As such, the conditions needed to benefit waterfowl trumped ag considerations under both the Refuge Act and the Kuchel Act and, as the court stated, if the defendant determined that “an ag use is not consistent with proper waterfowl management, the Service must be allowed to restrict agricultural use.  Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s award of summary judgment for the defendant.

Minnesota Farmer Protection Law Upheld

Pitman Farms v. Kuehl Poultry, LLC, et al., 48 F.4th 866 (8th Cir. 2022)

In early 1988, the Minnesota Legislature directed the Minnesota Department of Agriculture (MDA) to put together a task force to study the issue of agricultural contract production and recommend to the legislature how it might provide additional legal and economic protection to contract growers.  The MDA’s Final Report was issued in February of 1990.  During the 1990 legislative session, the Minnesota legislature approved various economic protections for farmers based on the task force recommendations focusing particularly on parent liability.  As signed into law, MN Stat. §17.93 provides as follows:

“Parent company liability.  If an agricultural contractor is the subsidiary of another corporation, partnership, or association, the parent corporation, partnership or association is liable to a seller for the amount of any unpaid claim or contract performance claim if the contractor fails to pay or perform according to the terms of the contract.” 

In addition, MN Stat. §17.90 specified as follows:

“’Producer” means a person who produces or causes to be produced an agricultural commodity in a quantity beyond the person’s own family use and: (1) is able to transfer title to another; or (2) provides management input for the production of an agricultural commodity.”

The MDA then prepared at “statement of need and reasonableness” (SONAR) to implement the new statutory provision.  The SONAR referred to the legislation as the “Producer Protection Act” (PPA) and the MDA’s implementing rule (MN Rule 1572.0040) for MN Stat §17.93 which went into effect on March 4, 1991, read as follows:

“A corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, or association that through ownership of capital stock, cumulative voting rights, voting trust agreements, or any other plan, agreement, or device, owns more than 50 percent of the common or preferred stock entitled to vote for directors of a subsidiary corporation or provides more than 50 percent of the management or control of a subsidiary is liable to a seller of agricultural commodities for any unpaid claim or contract performance claim of that subsidiary.”

 During the same 1990 legislative session the Minnesota legislature approved, and the governor signed into law MN Stat. §27.133.  This new law stated as follows:

“Parent company liability.  If a wholesale produce dealer is a subsidiary of another corporation, partnership, or association, the parent corporation, partnership, or association is liable to a seller for the amount of any unpaid claim or contract performance claim if the wholesale produce dealer fails to pay or perform in according to the terms of the contract and this chapter.”

Concerning this provision, the legislature stated, “It is therefore declared to be the policy of the legislature that certain financial protection be afforded those who are producers on the farm….”

Also, under both MN Stat. §17.93 and MN Stat. §27.133, “contractor” and “wholesale produce dealer” were defined as “persons” and “person” was to be applied to corporations, partnerships and other unincorporated associations.”  MN Stat. §665.44, sub. 7. 

In 2017, the defendants entered into chicken production contracts with Prairie’s Best Farm, Inc. to grow chickens in exchange for monthly payments and bi-monthly bonus payments.  In late 2017, Simply Essentials bought the assets of Prairie’s Best and assumed the grower contracts.  Simply Essentials, incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in California, was the subsidiary of the plaintiff, Pitman Farms, which owned more than 50 percent of Simply Essentials.  Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff bought Simply Essentials’ membership interests and became its sole owner.  In 2019, Simply Essentials encountered financial trouble, ceased processing activities and notified the defendants that it was terminating the contracts effective three months later.  The defendants’ demands for payment in excess of $6 million from the plaintiff for breach of contract failed. Both parties sought a declaratory judgment concerning the application of the PPA to the contracts. 

The plaintiff claimed that the PPA did not apply because the defendants were not “sellers” and, even if they were, the PPA didn’t apply because Simply Essentials was an LLC rather than a “corporation, partnership, or association.  The plaintiff also asserted that the PPA’s parent company liability provisions didn’t apply to it because Delaware law applied, and that applying Minnesota law would violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.  The defendant’s counterclaim made the opposite arguments.

The trial court ruled for the plaintiff, finding that the PPA did not apply by its terms because the defendants were not “sellers” and because Simply Essentials was an LLC rather than a “corporation, partnership, or association.”

On appeal, the appellate court unanimously reversed.  The appellate court read the various statutes together to determine the legislature’s purpose and intent.  The appellate court noted that the parent company liability statute of MN Stat. §27.133, the PPA of §§17.90-17.98 and the MDA’s implementing rule all arose from the same legislative session, addressed the same issue, and contained nearly identical language.  Accordingly, the appellate court determined that the trial court should have looked to MN Stat. §27.133 when construing the meaning of “seller” contained in MN Stat. §17.93 and in MDA Rule 1572.0040.  When the various provisions were taken together, the appellate court determined that “seller” can include “producer” under the PPA and the MDA’s implementing regulation. 

The appellate court also concluded that the trial court erred in finding that “seller” was limited to transferors of title.  Because the defendants did not have title to the chickens and could not therefore transfer title, the trial court held that the PPA did not apply.  The appellate court held that such a construction was plainly contrary to the legislature’s intent in creating the PPA which was to provide financial protections to agricultural producers in general and not merely agricultural commodity sellers.  Further, because the appellate court determined that “seller” included “producer,” the defendants were covered by the PPA as providing management services in accordance with MN Stat. §17.90 (2) for the growing of the chickens under contract.  In addition, the appellate court held that the growers were also “sellers” for purposes of the parent company liability provision of MN Stat. §27.133.

The plaintiff also asserted that “subsidiary of another corporation, partnership or association” contained in MN Stat. §17.93 and §27.133 meant that both the parent and the subsidiary had to be either a corporation, partnership or an association.  The trial court agreed with this interpretation.  The appellate court also agreed but pointed out that LLCs (which Simply Essentials was) did not exist in Minnesota when the PPA was enacted and, as such, the legislature had not purposefully excluded them from the statute. The appellate court also noted that an LLC had been found to be a “person” for purposes of the Minnesota Human Rights Act.  That law defined “person” to include a partnership, association, or corporation.  In addition, an unpublished decision of the Minnesota Court of Appeals had previously held that an LLC was an “association” for purposes of a Minnesota oil transportation statute. Thus, there was no apparent reason why the legislature would have singled out LLCs to not be covered under the parent company liability provisions of the PPA. 

The appellate court also noted the strong public policy statement of the Minnesota legislature in enacting the PPA – to protect producers of agricultural commodities from economic harm due to parent business entities using their organizational form to avoid liability for their subsidiaries’ actions. 

Conclusion

I will continue my journey through the top developments in ag law and tax in a subsequent post.

Ag Law Developments in the Courts

Overview

It’s been a while since I did a blog article on recent court developments involving farmers, ranchers rural landowners and agribusinesses.  I have been on the road just about continuously for the last couple of months and nine more events remain between now and Christmas.  But, let me take a moment today (and later this week) to provide a summary of some recent court cases involving agriculture.

Recent court opinions involving agriculture – it’s the topic of today’s post.

Jumping Mouse Habitat Designation Upheld

Northern New Mexico Stockman’s Association, et al. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 494 F.Supp.3d 850 (D. N.M. 2020), aff’d., 30 F.4th 1210 (10th Cir. 2022)

In 2014, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) listed the New Mexico Meadow Jumping Mouse as an endangered species based on substantial habitat loss and fragmentation from grazing, water management, drought and wildfire.  Accordingly, in 2016, the USFWS designated 14,000 acres along 170 miles of streams and waterways in New Mexico, Arizona and Colorado as critical habitat for the mouse.  The U.S. Forest Service erected fencing around some streams and watering holes in the Santa Fe and Lincoln National Forests that were in the designated area   The plaintiffs, two livestock organizations, with members that graze cattle in those national forests, sued in 2018 claiming that the USFWS failed to sufficiently consider the economic impact of the critical habitat designation.  The trial court dismissed the case, finding that the USFWS was justified in its decision.  The trial court also determined that the USFWS need not compensate the plaintiffs for the reduction in value of the plaintiffs’ water rights.  The trial court reasoned that the USFWS need not consider all of the economic impacts associated with the mouse’s listing when designating critical habitat, only the incremental costs of the designation itself.  The court cited the nine-month annual hibernation period of the mouse giving it only a short time to breed and gain weight for the winter and, as such, the mouse’s habitat needed to remain ideal with tall, dense grass and forage around flowing streams in the designated area.  On appeal, the appellate court affirmed.  The appellate court held that the assessment method of the USFWS for determining the economic impacts of the critical habitat designation on the water rights of the plaintiffs’ members was adequately considered, and that the USFWS had reasonably supported its decision not to exclude certain areas from the critical habitat designation.  

Court Reduces Dicamba Drift Damage Award; Case Continues on Punitive Damages Issue

Hahn v. Monsanto Co., 39 F.4th 954 (8th Cir. 2022)

The plaintiff claimed that his peach orchard was destroyed after the defendants (Monsanto and BASF) conspired to develop and market dicamba-tolerant seeds and dicamba-based herbicides. The plaintiff claimed that the damage to the peaches occurred when dicamba drifted from application to neighboring fields.  The plaintiff claimed that the defendants released the dicamba-tolerant seed with no corresponding dicamba herbicide that could be safely applied.  As a result, farmers illegally sprayed an old formulation of dicamba herbicide that was unapproved for in-crop, over-the-top, use and was "volatile," or prone to drift.  While many cases had previously been filed on the dicamba drift issue, the plaintiff did not join the other litigation because it focused on damages to soybean crops.  Monsanto moved to dismiss the claims for failure to warn; negligent training; violation of the Missouri Crop Protection Act; civil conspiracy; and joint liability for punitive damages.  BASF moved to dismiss those same counts except the claims for failure to warn. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in part.  Monsanto argued that the failure to warn claims were preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), but the plaintiff claimed that no warning would have prevented the damage to the peaches. The trial court determined that the plaintiff had adequately plead the claim and denied the motion to dismiss this claim.  Both Monsanto and BASF moved to dismiss the negligent training claim, but the trial court refused to do so. However, the trial court did dismiss the claims based on the Missouri Crop Protection Act, noting that civil actions under this act are limited to “field crops” which did not include peaches.   The trial court did not dismiss the civil conspiracy claim based on concerted action by agreement but did dismiss the aiding and abetting portion of the claim because that cause of action is no recognized under Missouri tort law.  The parties agreed to a separate jury determination of punitive damages for each defendant.  Bader Farms, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., et al., No. MDL No. 1:18md2820-SNLJ, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114302 (E.D. Mo. July 10, 2019).  The jury found that Monsanto had negligently designed or failed to warn for 2015 and 2016 and the both defendants had done so for 2017 to the present.  The jury awarded the plaintiff $15 million in compensatory damages and $250 million in punitive damages against Monsanto for 2015 and 2016.  The jury also found that the defendants were acting in a joint venture and in a conspiracy.  The plaintiff submitted a proposed judgment that both defendants were responsible for the $250 million punitive damages award.  BASF objected, but the trial court found the defendants jointly liable for the full verdict in light of the jury’s finding that the defendants were in a joint venture.  Bader Farms, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., et al., MDL No. 1:18-md-02820-SNJL, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34340 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 28, 2020).  BASF then moved for a judgment as a matter of law on punitive damages or motion for a new trial or remittitur (e.g., asking the court to reduce the damage award), and Monsanto moved for a judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.  The trial court, however, found both defendants jointly liable, although the court lowered the punitive damages to $60 million after determining a lack of actual malice.  The trial court did uphold the $15 million compensatory damage award upon finding that the correct standard under Missouri law was applied to the farm’s damages.  Bader Farms, Inc. v. Monsanto Co, et al., MDL No. 1:18md2820-SNLJ, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221420 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 25, 2020).  The defendants filed a notice of appeal on December 22, 2020.     

On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the trial court on the causation issue noting that the defendant retained direct contact with the farmers and exercised some degree of control over their actions.  As such, the defendant was aware of the foreseeable consequences that could come from not controlling the farmers’ actions more closely. On the compensatory damage issue, the defendant argued that compensatory damages should be measured by the difference in the value of the orchard before and after the damage.  The appellate court disagreed, noting that such a calculation only applied when the victim is the owner of the land and not a tenant as was the plaintiff.  Thus, compensatory damages were properly measured by lost profits.   The defendant argued the damages were speculative, but the court found that Bader Farms had provided years of financial statements to show the usual costs and profits associated with farming the orchard. The appellate court determined that there was no doubt the defendant had full control over the critical aspects of the project. In 2007, BASF had relinquished their rights to the seed technology to the defendant, so they could not control something they had no rights to. The appellate court also affirmed the finding that BASF and Monsanto had engaged in a civil conspiracy by agreeing to sell products unlawfully and enabling the widespread use of a product that was illegal to spray during the growing season. As members of the civil conspiracy, BASF was correctly found to be severally liable for the damages. The appellate court also found that Bader Farms provided clear and convincing evidence that the companies had acted with reckless indifference, but the two had different degrees of culpability. The trial court should have assessed the punitive damages of the Monsanto and BASF separately. Thus, the appellate court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded the punitive damages judgment to the trial court.

Court Decides to Resolve Property Dispute by Requiring Parties to Use the Existing Property Line

Barlow v. Saxon Holdings Trust, No. SD37361, 2022 Mo. App. LEXIS 657 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2022)

The plaintiff and her husband purchased land in 1987 by warranty deed that included the language, “running thence Southwesterly along the fence 40 rods.” At the time the plaintiff purchased the property, a fence that ran north to south existed and the plaintiff believed and acted like she owned the land up to that fence. The defendant purchased the neighboring land in 2011 and executed a warranty deed that included the language, “beginning at the NE corner of the NE ¼ of said Section 23 and running SW 40 rods.” In the spring of 2020, the defendant hired a surveyor who informed the defendant that his property extended onto the plaintiff’s property to the “40-rod line.” The defendant put up an electric fence on the disputed property to claim it.  In response the plaintiff hired a surveyor who determined the property line was on the original fence line. The plaintiff sued to quiet title. The trial court found ambiguity between the deeds and resolved the ambiguity in favor of the plaintiff and held the plaintiff had adversely possessed the land. The defendant appealed. The appellate court recognized that the deeds individually did not show patent ambiguity, but the difference between the two on the location of property line did create an ambiguity. The appellate court determined that one way to resolve the ambiguity would be to have the parties continue to occupy the land the way they had in accordance with one of the deeds or constructions. This was the trial court’s approach, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court on this point.  The appellate court also noted that the trial court had found the plaintiff’s surveyor credible, and that credibility of a witness was a determination to be left to the trial court’s discretion that the appellate court would not disturb.  The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s resolution of the deed in favor of the plaintiff and determined it need not address the adverse possession claim.

Oil and Gas Lease on Disputed Property Invalidates Adverse Possession

Cottrill v. Quarry Enterprises, LLC, No. 2022 CA 00011, 2022 Ohio App. LEXIS 3191 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2022)

The plaintiff claimed that she had successfully adversely possessed the defendant’s property by receiving title to the property in 1971 from her mother and caring for the land by mowing and maintaining it and using it for recreational events for herself and family. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish exclusive possession over the land due to an existing oil and gas lease that the defendant had executed. The plaintiff appealed, claiming that the lease did not invalidate her exclusive use. To show exclusive use, the plaintiff did not have to be the only person who used the land but needed to be the only person who asserted their right to possession over the land. The appellate court found that the oil and gas that existed on the property began in 1958. For the entirety of the time that the plaintiff claimed she had adversely possessed the property, the oil and gas company had the right of possession over the land in dispute, invalidating the plaintiff’s claim.