Monday, October 12, 2020

Principles of Agricultural Law

PrinciplesForBlog2020Fall-cropped

Overview

The fields of agricultural law and agricultural taxation are dynamic.  Law and tax impacts the daily life of a farmer, rancher, agribusiness and rural landowner practically on a daily basis.  Whether that is good or bad is not really the question.  The point is that it’s the reality.  Lack of familiarity with the basic fundamental and applicable rules and principles can turn out to be very costly.  As a result of these numerous intersections, and the fact that the rules applicable to those engaged in farming are often different from non-farmers, I started out just over 25 years ago to develop a textbook that addressed the major issues that a farmer or rancher and their legal and tax counsel should be aware of.  After three years, the book was complete – Principles of Agricultural Law - and it’s been updated twice annually since that time. 

The 47th edition is now complete, and it’s the topic of today’s post – Principles of Agricultural Law.

Subject Areas

The text is designed to be useful to farmers and ranchers; agribusiness professionals; ag lenders; educational professionals; lawyers, CPAs and other tax preparers; undergraduate and law students; and those that simply want to learn more about legal and tax issues.  The text covers a wide range of topics.  Here’s just a sample of what is covered:

Ag contracts.  Farmers and ranchers engage in many contractual situations, including ag leases, to purchase contracts.  The potential perils of verbal contracts are numerous and can lead to unnecessary litigation. What if a commodity is sold under forward contract and a weather event destroys the crop before it is harvested?  When does the law require a contract to be in writing?  For purchases of goods, do any warranties apply?  What remedies are available upon breach? If a lawsuit needs to be brought to enforce a contract, how soon must it be filed? Is a liability release form necessary?  Is it valid?  What happens when a contract breach occurs?  What is the remedy? 

Ag financing.  Farmers and ranchers are often quite dependent on borrowing money for keeping their operations running.  What are the rules surrounding ag finance?  This is a big issue for lenders also?  What about dealing with an ag cooperative and the issue of liens?  What are the priority rules with respect to the various types of liens that a farmer might have to deal with? 

Ag bankruptcy.  A unique set of rules can apply to farmers that file bankruptcy.  Chapter 12 bankruptcy allows farmers to de-prioritize taxes.  That can be a huge benefit.  Knowing how best to utilize those rules is very beneficial.  That’s especially true with the unsettled issue of whether Payment Protection Program (PPP) funds can be utilized by a farmer in bankruptcy.  The courts are split on that issue.

Income tax.  Tax and tax planning permeate daily life.  Deferral contracts; depreciation; installment sales; like-kind exchanges; credits; losses; income averaging; reporting government payments; etc.  The list could go on and on.  Having a basic understanding of the rules and the opportunities available can add a lot to the bottom line of the farming or ranching operation as well as help minimize the bleeding when times are tough.

Real property.  Of course, land is typically the biggest asset in terms of value for a farming and ranching operation.  But, land ownership brings with it many potential legal issues.  Where is the property line?  How is a dispute over a boundary resolved?  Who is responsible for building and maintaining a fence?  What if there is an easement over part of the farm?  Does an abandoned rail line create an issue?  What if land is bought or sold under an installment contract?  How do the like-kind exchange rules work when farmland is traded? 

Estate planning.  While the federal estate tax is not a concern for most people and the vast majority of farming and ranching operations, when it does apply it’s a major issue that requires planning.  What are the rules governing property passage at death?  Should property be gifted during life?  What happens to property passage at death if there is no will?  How can family conflicts be minimized post-death?  Does the manner in which property is owned matter?  What are the applicable tax rules?  These are all important questions.

Business planning.  One of the biggest issues for many farm and ranch families is how to properly structure the business so that it can be passed on to subsequent generations and remain viable economically.  What’s the best entity choice?  What are the options?  Of course, tax planning is a critical part of the business transition process.

Cooperatives.  Many ag producers are patrons of cooperatives.  That relationship creates unique legal and tax issues.  Of course, the tax law enacted near the end of 2017 modified an existing deduction for patrons of ag cooperatives.  Those rules are very complex.  What are the responsibilities of cooperative board members? 

Civil liabilities.  The legal issues are enormous in this category.  Nuisance law; liability to trespassers and others on the property; rules governing conduct in a multitude of situations; liability for the spread of noxious weeds; liability for an employee’s on-the-job injuries; livestock trespass; and on and on the issues go.  Agritourism is a very big thing for some farmers, but does it increase liability potential?  Nuisance issues are also important in agriculture.  It’s useful to know how the courts handle these various situations.

Criminal liabilities.  This topic is not one that is often thought of, but the implications can be monstrous.  Often, for a farmer or rancher or rural landowner, the possibility of criminal allegations can arise upon (sometimes) inadvertent violation of environmental laws.  Even protecting livestock from predators can give rise to unexpected criminal liability.  Mail fraud can also arise with respect to the participation in federal farm programs.  The areas of life potentially impacted with criminal penalties are worth knowing, as well as knowing how to avoid tripping into them.

Water law.  Of course, water is essential to agricultural production.  Water issues vary across the country, but they tend to focus around being able to have rights to water in the time of shortage and moving the diversion point of water.  Also, water quality issues are important.  In essence, knowing whether a tract of land has a water right associated with it, how to acquire a water right, and the relative strength of that water rights are critical to understand.

Environmental law.  It seems that agricultural and the environment are constantly in the news.  The Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act and other federal (and state) laws and regulations can have a big impact on a farming or ranching operation.  Just think of the issues with the USDA’s Swampbuster rules that have arisen over the past 30-plus years.  What constitutes a regulatory taking of property that requires the payment of compensation under the Constitution?  It’s good to know where the lines are drawn and how to stay out of (expensive) trouble.

Regulatory law.  Agriculture is a very heavily regulated industry.  Animals and plants, commodities and food products are all subject to a great deal of regulation at both the federal and state level.  Antitrust laws are also important to agriculture because of the highly concentrated markets that farmers buy inputs from and sell commodities into.  Where are the lines drawn?  How can an ag operation best position itself to negotiate the myriad of rules?   

Conclusion

It is always encouraging to me to see students, farmers and ranchers, agribusiness and tax professionals get interested in the subject matter and see the relevance of material to their personal and business lives. Agricultural law and taxation is reality.  It’s not merely academic.  The Principles text is one that can be very helpful to not only those engaged in agriculture, but also for those advising agricultural producers.  It’s also a great reference tool for Extension educators. It’s also a great investment for any farmer – and it’s updated twice annually to keep the reader on top of current developments that impact agriculture.

If you are interested in obtaining a copy, perhaps even as a Christmas gift, you can visit the link here:  http://washburnlaw.edu/practicalexperience/agriculturallaw/waltr/principlesofagriculturallaw/index.html.  Instructors that adopt the text for a course are entitled to a free copy.  The book is available in print and CD versions.  Also, for instructors, a complete set of Powerpoint slides is available via separate purchase.  Sample exams and work problems are also available.  You may also contact me directly to obtain a copy.

If you are interested in obtaining a copy, you can visit the link here:  http://washburnlaw.edu/practicalexperience/agriculturallaw/waltr/principlesofagriculturallaw/index.html.  You may also contact me directly. 

October 12, 2020 in Bankruptcy, Business Planning, Civil Liabilities, Contracts, Cooperatives, Criminal Liabilities, Environmental Law, Estate Planning, Income Tax, Insurance, Real Property, Regulatory Law, Secured Transactions, Water Law | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, July 25, 2020

Recent Court Developments of Interest

Overview

The court decisions of relevance to agricultural producers, rural landowners and agribusinesses keep on coming.  There never seems to be a slack time.  Today’s article focuses on some key issues involving bankruptcy, business valuation, and insurance coverage for loss of a dairy herd due to stray voltage.  More ag law court developments – that’s the topic of today’s post.

 

Court Determines Interest Rate in Chapter 12 Case

In re Key Farms, Inc., No. 19-02949-WLH12, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 1642 (Bankr. D. Wash. Jun. 23, 2020)

 The bankrupt debtor in this case is a family farming operation engaged in apple, cherry, alfalfa, seed corn and other crop production. The parents of the family own 100 percent of the debtor. In 2014, the debtor changed its primary lender which extended a line of credit to the debtor that the father personally guaranteed and a term loan to the debtor that the father also personally guaranteed. The lender held a first-priority security interest in various real and personal property to secure loan repayment. The debtor became unable to repay the line of credit and the default caused defaults on the term loan and the guarantees. The lender sued to foreclose on its collateral and have a receiver appointed.

The debtor filed Chapter 12 bankruptcy and proposed a reorganization plan where it would continue farming during 2020-2024 in accordance with proposed budgets. The plan provided for repayment of all creditors in full, and repayment of the lender over 20 years at a 4.5 percent interest rate (prime rate of 3.25 percent plus 1.25 percent). The lender opposed plan confirmation.

In determining whether the reorganization plan was fair and equitable to the lender based on the facts, the bankruptcy court noted the father’s lengthy experience in farming and familiarity with the business and that the farm manager was experienced and professional. The court also noted that parents had extensive experience with crop insurance and that they were committing unencumbered personal assets to the plan.  In addition, the court took note of the debtor’s recent shift to more profitable crops and a demonstrated ability to manage around cash flow difficulties, and that the lender would be “meaningfully oversecured.” The court also determined that the debtor’s farming budgets appeared to be based on reasonable assumptions and forecasted consistent annual profitability. However, the court did note that the debtor had a multi-year history of operating losses in recent years; was heavily reliant on crop insurance; was engaged in an inherently risky business subject to forces beyond the debtor’s control; had no permanent long-term leases in place for the considerable amount of acreage that it leased; could not anticipate how the Chinese Virus would impact the business into the future; and proposed a lengthy post-confirmation obligation to the lender.

Accordingly, the court made an upward adjustment to the debtor’s prosed additional 1.25 percent to the prime rate by increasing it by at least 1.75 percent. The court scheduled a conference with the parties to discuss how to proceed.

 

Valuation Discount Applies to Non-Voting Interests

Grieve v. Comr., T.C. Memo. 2020-28

The petitioner was the Chairman and CEO of a company. After his wife’s death, he established two limited liability companies, with a management company controlled by his daughter as the general partner in each entity holding a 0.2 percent controlling voting manger interest and a 99.8 percent nonvoting interest in each entity held by a family trust – a grantor retained annuity trust (GRAT). The petitioner gifted the 99.8 percent interest in the two entities and filed Form 709 to report the gifts. The IRS revised the reported value of the gifts and asserted a gift tax deficiency of about $4.4 million based on a theoretical game theory construct.

According to the IRS, a hypothetical seller of the 99.8 percent nonvoting interests in the two LLCs would not sell the interests at a large discount to the net asset value (NAV), but would seek to enter into a transaction to acquire the 0.2 percent controlling voting interest from the current owner of that interest in order to obtain 100 percent ownership and eliminate the loss in value as a result of lack of control and lack of marketability. In support of this, the IRS assumed that the owner of the 99.8 percent nonvoting interest would have to pay the controlling 0.2 percent voting member a premium above their undiscounted NAV. Under traditional methodology, the IRS expert estimated that a 28 percent discount to the NAV was appropriate for the 99.8 percent nonvoting units. But, instead of accepting that level of discount, the IRS proposed that the owner of the nonvoting units would pay a portion of the dollar amount of the discount from NAV to buy the remaining 0.2 percent voting interest.

The petitioner’s expert used a standard valuation methodology to prepare valuation appraisal reports. This expert applied a lack of control discount of 13.4 percent for the gift to the GRAT and a 12.7 percent lack of control discount for the gift to the irrevocable trust. The valuation firm also applied a 25 percent discount for both gifts.

The Tax Court determined that the IRS failed to provide enough evidence for its valuation estimates. The Tax Court also rejected the IRS assumption of the impact of future events on valuation, noting that the IRS valuation expert reports lacked details on how the discounts were calculated. Thus, the Tax Court rejected the proposed valuation estimates of the IRS and accepted those of the petitioner. The result was a 35 percent discount (total) for entity-level lack of control and lack of marketability compared to a 1.4 percent discount had the IRS approach been accepted.

 

S Corporation Value Accounts for Tax on Shareholders

Kress v. United States., 327 F. Supp. 2d 731 (E.D. Wisc. 2019)

The taxpayers, a married couple, gifted minority interests of stock in their family-owned S corporation to their children and grandchildren in 2007-2009. The taxpayers paid gift tax on the transfers of about $2.4 million. The taxpayers’ appraiser valued the S corporation earnings as of the end of 2006, 2007 and 2008 as a fully tax-affected C corporation. On audit, the IRS also followed a tax-effected approach to valuation of the S corporation earnings but applied an S corporation premium (pass-through benefit) and asserted that the gifts were undervalued as a result. The IRS assessed an additional $2.2 million of federal gift tax. The taxpayers paid the additional tax and sued for a refund in 2016.

The issue was the proper valuation of the S corporation. Historically, the IRS has not allowed for tax-affected S corporation valuation based on Gross v. Comr., T.C. Memo. 1999-254; Wall v. Comr., T.C. Memo. 2001-75; Estate of Heck v. Comr., T.C. Memo. 2002-34; Estate of Adams v. Comr., T.C. Memo. 2002-80; Dallas v. Comr., T.C. Memo. 2006-212; and Estate of Gallagher v. Comr, T.C. Memo. 2011-148. The IRS also has an internal valuation guide that provides that “…no entity level tax should be applied in determining the cash flows of an electing S corporation. …the personal income taxes paid by the holder of an interest in an electing S corporation are not relevant in determining the fair market value of that interest.”

But other courts have allowed the tax impact on shareholders. See, e.g., Delaware Open MRI Radiology Associates, 898 A.2d 290 (Del. Ct. Chanc. 2006); Bernier v. Bernier, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 81 (2012).

The court accepted the tax-affect valuation but disallowed the S corporation premium that IRS asserted. The court also allowed a discount for lack of marketability between 25 percent and 27 percent depending on the year of the transfer at issue.

 

Stray Voltage Could Lead to Partial Insurance Coverage

Hastings Mutual Insurance Co. v. Mengel Dairy Farms, Inc., No. 5:19CV1728, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87612 (N.D. Ohio May 19, 2020)

 The defendant unexpectedly had several cows and calves die and also suffered a loss of milk production and profits. The defendant filed a claimed against the plaintiff for insurance coverage for death of livestock, cost of investigation and repairs, and loss of business profits. The plaintiff investigated the claim, utilizing an electrical company to do so. The electrical company found a stray electrical current present on the property. The plaintiff then hired a fire and explosion company to investigate the property. This investigation resulted in a finding of no stray voltage on the property, but the company did express its belief that stray voltage did cause the defendant’s harm. As a result, the plaintiff paid the insurance claim for death of livestock and repairs, but not for loss of business profits.

The plaintiff then filed an action for a determination under the policy of whether loss of business profits was a covered loss. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment specifying that coverage for loss and damage resulting from the stray voltage was not triggered because the defendant was not subject to a “necessary suspension” of farming operations, and that the defendant’s loss or damage had to be directly caused by a “peril insured against” rather than being caused by dehydration which resulted from the cattle’s reaction to the stray voltage. The defendant filed a counterclaim for breach of contract; breach of good faith and fair dealing; and unjust enrichment. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the basis that the policy wasn’t triggered for lack of electrocution and that there was no suspension in the defendant’s business operations. The court determined that the policy did not define the term electrocution in the context of dairy animals. As such, the court concluded that the term could be reasonably interpreted to mean death by electrical shock or the cause of irreparable harm. As an ambiguous term, it was defined against the plaintiff and in the defendant’s favor. The court also refused to grant summary judgment on the cause of death issue. In addition, because the defendant did not cease operations, the court concluded that the policy provided no coverage for lost profits. The court also rejected the defendant’s breach of contract claim due to lack of suspending the business and rejected the good faith/fair dealing claim because mere negligence was not enough to support such a claim. The unjust enrichment claim was likewise denied.

Conclusion

The cases discussed above are all quite relevant to agricultural producers.  For those struggling financially that find themselves in a Chapter 12, the interest rate utilized in the case is of primary importance.  Many factors go into determining the rate, and farming operations can achieve a lower rate by meeting certain factors listed by the court in the decision mentioned above.  Likewise, the valuation issue is critical, particularly if the federal estate tax exemption amount were to drop.  When federal (and, possibly, state) estate tax is involved, valuation is the “game.”  Finally, in all insurance cases, the language of the policy is critical to determine coverage application.  Any ambiguous terms will be construed against the company.  In all situations, having good legal counsel is a must.

July 25, 2020 in Bankruptcy, Business Planning, Insurance | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, July 3, 2020

The “Cramdown” Interest Rate in Chapter 12 Bankruptcy

Overview

In the context of Chapter 12 (farm) bankruptcy, unless a secured creditor agrees otherwise, the creditor is entitled to receive the value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of the claim.  Thus, after a secured debt is written down to the fair market value of the collateral, with the amount of the debt in excess of the collateral value treated as unsecured debt which is generally discharged if not paid during the term of the plan, the creditor is entitled to the present value of the amount of the secured claim if the payments are stretched over a period of years.

What does “present value” mean?  It means that a dollar in hand today is worth more than a dollar to be received at some time in the future.  It also means that an interest rate will be attached to that deferred income.  But, what interest rate will make a creditor whole? A recent decision involving a farming operation in the state of Washington is a good illustration of how courts address the issue.

“Cramdown” and Present Value

When a farmer files a Chapter 12 bankruptcy, the law allows the “cramdown” of a secured creditor if the farmer reorganization plan provides that the secured creditor gets to retain the lien that secures the claim and the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed by the trustee or the debtor under the plan on account of the claim is not less than the allowed amount of the claim.  11 U.S.C. §1225(a)(5)(B)(i)-(ii).  The real issue is what “not less than the allowed amount of the claim” means.  That’s particularly true when the rule is applied in the context of cash payments that are to be made in the future.  In that instance, a value must be derived as of the plan’s effective date, that is discounted to present value.  Present value is the discounted value of a stream of expected future incomes.  That stream of income received in the future is discounted back to present value by a discount rate. 

The determination of present value is highly sensitive to the discount rate, which is commonly expressed in terms of an interest rate.  Several different approaches have been used in Chapter 12 bankruptcy cases (and nearly identical situations in Chapters 11 and 13 cases) to determine the discount rate.  Those approaches include the contract rate – the interest rate used in the debt obligation giving rise to the allowed claim; the legal rate in the particular jurisdiction; the rate on unpaid federal tax; the federal civil judgment rate; the rate based on expert testimony; a rate tied to the lender’s cost of funds; and the market rate for similar loans.

Supreme Court Decision

In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court, in, addressed the issue in the context of a Chapter 13 case that has since been held applicable in Chapter 12 cases.  Till v. SCS Credit Corporation, 541 U.S. 465 (2004).    In Till, the debtor owed $4,000 on a truck at the time of filing Chapter 13.  The debtor proposed to pay the creditor over time with the payments subject to a 9.5 percent annual interest rate.    That rate was slightly higher than the average loan rate to account for the additional risk that the debtor might default.  The creditor, however, argued that it was entitled to a 21 percent rate of interest to ensure that the payments equaled the “total present value” or were “not less than the [claim’s] allowed amount.”  The bankruptcy court disagreed, but the district court reversed and imposed the 21 percent rate.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the 21 percent rate was “probably” correct, but that the parties could introduce additional concerning the appropriate interest rate.  

On further review by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court held that the proper interest rate was 9.5 percent.  That rate, the Court noted, was derived from a modification of the average national loan rate to account for the risk that the debtor would default.  The Court’s opinion has been held to be applicable in Chapter 12 cases.  See, e.g., In re Torelli, 338 B.R. 390 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2006); In re Wilson, No. 05-65161-12, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 359 (Bankr. D. Mont. Feb. 7, 2007); In re Woods, 465 B.R. 196 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2012).   The Court rejected the coerced loan, presumptive contract rate and cost of funds approaches to determining the appropriate interest rate, noting that each of the approaches was “complicated, impose[d] significant evidentiary costs, and aim[ed] to make each individual creditor whole rather than to ensure the debtor’s payments ha[d] the required present value.”  A plurality of the Court explained that these difficulties were not present with the formula approach.  The Court opined that the formula approach requires that the bankruptcy court determine the appropriate interest rate by starting with the national prime rate and then make an adjustment to reflect the risk of nonpayment by the debtor.  While the Court noted that courts using the formula approach have typically added 1 percent to 3 percent to the prime rate as a reflection of the risk of nonpayment, the Court did not adopt a specific percentage range for risk adjustment.

Subsequent Cases

Since the Supreme Court’s Till decision, the lower courts have decided many cases in which they have attempted to apply the Till approach.  Indeed, the Circuit Courts have split on whether the appropriate interest rate for determining present value should be the market rate or a rate based on a formula.  For example, in a relatively recent Circuit Court case on the issue, the Second Circuit held that a market rate of interest should be utilized if an efficient market existed in which the rate could be determined.  In re MPM Silicones, L.L.C., No. 15-1682(l), 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 20596 (2nd Cir. Oct. 20, 2017).  In the case, the debtor filed Chapter 11 and proposed a reorganization plan that gave first-lien holders an option to receive immediate payment without any additional “make-whole” premium, or the present value of their claims by utilizing an interest rate based on a formula that resulted in a rate below the market rate.   The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan, utilizing the formula approach of Till.   The federal district court affirmed.  On further review, the appellate court reversed noting that Till had not conclusively specified the use of the formula approach in a Chapter 11 case.  The appellate court remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for a determination of whether an efficient market rate could be determined based on the facts of the case. 

Recent Washington Case

A recent case from the state of Washington is a good illustration of how a court can use the Till opinion to fashion an interest rate suitable to the debtor’s particular farming operation.  In In re Key Farms, Inc., No. 19-02949-WLH12, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 1642 (Bankr. D. Wash. Jun. 23, 2020), the debtor was a family farming operation engaged in apple, cherry, alfalfa, seed corn and other crop production. The parents of the family owned 100 percent of the debtor, the farming entity. In 2014, the debtor changed its primary lender which extended a line of credit to the debtor that the father personally guaranteed and a term loan to the debtor that the father also personally guaranteed. The lender held a first-priority security interest in various real and personal property to secure loan repayment. The debtor became unable to repay the line of credit and the default caused defaults on the term loan and the guarantees. The lender sued to foreclose on its collateral and have a receiver appointed.

The debtor then filed Chapter 12 bankruptcy and proposed a reorganization plan where it would continue farming under 2020-2024 in accordance with proposed budgets through 2024. The plan provided for repayment of all creditors in full. The plan proposed to repay then lender over 20 years at a 4.5 percent interest rate (prime rate of 3.25 percent plus 1.25 percent). The lender opposed plan confirmation. A primary issue was what an appropriate cramdown interest rate would be.

The court looked at the unique features of the debtor to set the rate.  Indeed, in determining whether the reorganization plan was fair and equitable to the lender based on the facts, the court noted the father’s lengthy experience in farming and familiarity with the business and that the farm manager was experienced and professional. The court also noted that the parents had extensive experience with crop insurance and that they were committing unencumbered personal assets to the reorganization plan. The court also noted the debtor’s shift in recent years to more profitable crops, a demonstrated ability to manage around cash flow difficulties, and that the lender would be “meaningfully oversecured.” The court also determined that the debtor’s farming budgets appeared to be based on reasonable assumptions and forecasted consistent annual profitability.

However, the court did note that the debtor had a multi-year history of operating losses in recent years; was heavily reliant on crop insurance; was engaged in an inherently risky business subject to forces beyond the debtor’s control; had no permanent long-term leases in place for the considerable amount of acreage that it leased; could not anticipate how the Chinese Virus would impact the business into the future; and proposed a lengthy post-confirmation obligation (30 years) to the lender. Accordingly, the court made an upward adjustment to the debtor’s proposed additional 1.25 percent to the prime rate by increasing it by at least 1.75 percent. The court scheduled a conference with the parties to discuss how to proceed. 

Conclusion

The interest rate issue is an important one in reorganization bankruptcy.  the market rate, as applied to an ag bankruptcy, does seem to recognize that farm and ranch businesses are subject to substantial risks and uncertainties from changes in price and from weather, disease and other factors.  Those risks are different depending on the type of agricultural business the debtor operates.  A market rate of interest would is reflective of those factors.

July 3, 2020 in Bankruptcy | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, June 2, 2020

SBA Says Farmers in Chapter 12 Ineligible for PPP Loans

Overview

Economic conditions in agriculture have been difficult for several years.  Added to the down economic cycle that much of agriculture has experienced are the severe hits the economy has taken by actions of state governors reacting to the virus.  Prices for various agricultural commodities are off significantly and Chapter 12 farm bankruptcy filings are up.  One of the measures that the Congress has created to try to provide relief to businesses is the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP).  I have written about the details of that program in other posts, but another aspect of the program that impacts farmers has now come into focus – the issue of whether a farmer in Chapter 12 bankruptcy is eligible for a PPP loan.

Chapter 12 filers and PPP loan eligibility – it’s the topic of today’s post.

Chapter 12

Under 1986 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Congress created Chapter 12 bankruptcy for “family farmers.”  Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3105 (1986), adding 11 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq.  The Act was scheduled to expire on October 1, 1993 but was extended numerous times before being made a permanent part of the Bankruptcy Code by the Bankruptcy Act of 2005, effective July 1, 2005.  Chapter 12 was designed as a response to the difficulties that farmers (and fishermen) suffered in the 1980s.  Chapter 12 is conceptually and statutorily similar to other reorganization-type bankruptcies, but provides more flexibility in making periodic payments to take into account the seasonal nature of many farming or fishing operations.  Under Chapter 12, the debtor proposes a repayment plan that lasts three to five years.  Chapter 12 is also less expensive and, in many respects, less complex than other forms of reorganization bankruptcy. 

PPP and Applicants in Bankruptcy

On March 27, 2020, the President signed into law the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020).  The CARES Act amended the Small Business Administration’s (SBAs) existing “7a Loan Program” to create the PPP.  The PPP provides loans for eligible small businesses to cover allowed uses including payroll costs, interest on mortgage obligations and rent.  The SBA’s First Interim Rule did not address eligibility of bankrupt debtors for the PPP, but it did require an applicant to fill out a form that required the applicant to certify that the applicant was not “presently involved in bankruptcy.”  However, in the SBA’s Fourth Interim Final Rule, posted to its website on April 24, 2020, the SBA said in a Q and A that a business would not be approved for a PPP loan if the business was in bankruptcy.  The rationale given was that making a PPP loan to an applicant in bankruptcy would be too risky – either via unauthorized use of funds or non-repayment of unforgiven loans. 

Implications for Applicants in Bankruptcy

A bankruptcy court in Wisconsin recently dealt with the issue of PPP loan eligibility for a farmer in Chapter 12 bankruptcy.  In Schuessler v. United States SBA, No. 20-02065-bhl, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 1347 (E.D. Wisc. May 22, 2020), the debtors, a married couple operating a farm dairy operation, filed Chapter 12 bankruptcy in late 2018.  On the same day, their wholly-owned, limited liability company (LLC) entity that runs the daily farming and dairy operation filed a separate Chapter 12 petition.  The debtors direct the farming operation and own the real estate and improvements.  The cases were jointly administered, and the debtors’ second amended plan was confirmed on May 8, 2019.  The debtors’ income comes primarily from milk sales and from the sale of culled cows.  Due to the present economic crisis exacerbated by state governors, the debtors’ milk sale revenue declined by more than 30 percent.  Since January of 2019, the wholesale price of milk declined from nearly $19.00 to $12.50 per cwt.  In addition, due to slaughterhouse closures, the debtors received much lower than historical prices for their culled cow sales.  The debtors listed a significant mortgage and utility expenses on the bankruptcy schedules and noted that they employ 14 people with an average monthly payroll of $59,835. 

The debtors applied for a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan from the Small Business Administration (SBA) and were rejected because of their pending bankruptcy case.  They otherwise met the requirements of the PPP.  Without the loan, there was no doubt that the debtors would be forced to lay off essential employees and would be potentially driven out of business.  The debtors then filed for Declaratory Judgment, Writ of Mandamus and Injunctive Relief against the SBA.  The bankruptcy court rejected the debtors’ claims and dismissed the complaint. 

The bankruptcy court noted that the SBA’s Fourth Interim Final Rule, Section III (4) specified that a debtor in bankruptcy is not eligible for a PPP loan.  The issue was whether the SBA’s position violated the anti-discrimination provisions contained in 11 U.S.C. §525(a).  Those provisions bar the government from revoking, suspending, or refusing to renew “a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant” based on a person either being in or having been a debtor in bankruptcy.  The bankruptcy court noted that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (to which any appeal would be made) had not yet ruled on the issue of the scope of 11 U.S.C. §525(a), but that four other Circuit Courts of Appeal had.  Three of those courts took a narrow view of 11 U.S.C. §525(a) and only the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that debtors in bankruptcy couldn’t be denied any “property interests” that were essential to the debtor’s “fresh start” in bankruptcy.  Stolz v. Brattleboro Housing Authority, 315 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2002). 

The bankruptcy court also agreed with the SBA’s reliance on other courts that had recently held that the denial of PPP eligibility to bankrupt debtors did not violate 11 U.S.C. §525(a) because the PPP funds are distributed via “loans” and are, as a result, outside the scope of the antidiscrimination provisions of 11 U.S.C. §525(a)See Cosi, Inc. v. SBA, Adv. No. 20-50591 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 30, 2020); Trudy’s Texas Star, Inc. v. Carranza, Adv. No. 20-1026 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. May 7, 2020).  In addition, the bankruptcy court noted that in In re Elter, 95 B.R. 618 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989) the refusal to extend a government-guaranteed student loan based on the debtor’s bankruptcy history did not violate 11 U.S.C. §525(a). It was the plain terms of the CARES Act creating the PPP as a subsidized loan guarantee program, the bankruptcy court reasoned, that kept it beyond the anti-discrimination provisions of 11 U.S.C. §525(a) that applied to a “license, charter, franchise, or other similar grant.”  While the underlying statute (15 U.S.C. §636(a)(36)(F)(i)) is silent on whether bankrupt debtors are ineligible for PPP loans, the bankruptcy court noted that there was nothing in the statute that suggested the Congress intended to limit the SBA’s rulemaking or that the Congress provided an exhaustive list of eligibility requirements that the SBA couldn’t supplement via rulemaking.  Thus, the Fourth Interim Final rule was not beyond the SBA’s delegated authority.  In addition, the court held that the Fourth Interim Final Rule did not violate the APA for being arbitrary and capricious.  The bankruptcy court noted that had the Congress intended to bar the SBA from denying loan eligibility to applicants in bankruptcy, it could have done so. 

Conclusion

The Wisconsin bankruptcy court’s conclusion barring Chapter 12 debtors from PPP eligibility is harsh.  It clearly runs counter to the policy objective of Chapter 12 bankruptcy – to keep farming operations in business and servicing their debt after having their debt restructured.  Chapter 12 was enacted based heavily on the recognition that farming is subject to numerous factors that can be beyond the control of the particular farmer.  That’s certainly the case with the economic collapse brought on by the (largely unconstitutional) actions of various state governors.  The bankruptcy court’s decision also runs counter to two other bankruptcy court decisions on the PPP eligibility issue – a bankruptcy court in Texas and one in Vermont.  See Hidalgo County Emergency Service Foundation v. Carranza, Adv. No. 20-2006, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 1174 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2020); and In re Springfield Hospital, Inc., No. 19-10283, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 1205 (Bankr. D. Vt. May 4, 2020).   Indeed, the Texas bankruptcy court also noted the lack of collateral requirements to obtain a PPP loan and that the funds need not be repaid if they were used in a qualified manner, illustrating the minimal-to-non-existent risk to a lender of a borrower’s default. 

Congress has been apprised of the SBA’s position and the inconsistent rulings by courts.  Unless the Congress takes action (or the SBA changes its mind), more farming operations will fail than otherwise would. 

June 2, 2020 in Bankruptcy | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, May 27, 2020

Ag Law and Tax Developments

Overview

During the last couple of months while various state governors have issued edicts randomly declaring some businesses essential and other non-essential, the ag industry has continued unabated.  The same is true for the courts – the ag-related cases and tax developments keep on coming in addition to all of the virus-related developments.

As I periodically do, I provide updates of ag law and tax issues of importance to agricultural producers and others in the ag industry, as well as rural landowners in general.

That the topic of today’s post – a few recent developments in ag law and taxation.

FSA Not Entitled To Set-Off Subsidy Payments 

In Re Roberts, No. 18-11927-t12, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 1338 (Bankr. D. N.M. May 19, 2020)

Bankruptcy issues are big in agriculture at the present time.  Several recent blog articles have touched on some of those issues, including bankruptcy tax issues.  This case dealt with the ability of a creditor to offset a debt owed to it by the debtor with payments it owed to the debtor.  The debtors (husband and wife) borrowed $300,000 from the Farm Service Agency (FSA) in late 2010. The debtors enrolled in the Price Loss Coverage program and the Market Facilitation Program administered by the FSA. The debtors filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy in mid-2018 and converted it to a Chapter 12 bankruptcy in late 2019. The debtors defaulted on the FSA loan after converting their case to Chapter 12.

The debtors were entitled to receive approximately $40,000 of total MFP and PLC payments post-petition. The FSA sought a set-off of the pre-petition debt with the post-petition subsidy payments. The court refused to the set-off under 11 U.S.C. §553 noting that the offsetting obligations did not both arise prepetition and were not mutual as required by 11 U.S.C. §553(a). There was no question, the court opined, that the FSA’s obligation to pay subsidy payments arose post-petition and that the debtors’ obligation to FSA arose pre-petition. Thus, set-off was not permissible.

HSA Inflation-Adjusted Amounts for 2021

Rev. Proc. 2020-32, 2020-24 I.R.B.

Persons that are covered under a high deductible health plan (HDHP) that are not covered under any other plan that is not an HDHP, are eligible to make contributions to a health savings account (HSA) subject to certain limits. For calendar year 2021, an HDHP is a health plan with an annual deductible of at least $1,400 for individual coverage or $2,800 for family coverage, and maximum out-of-pocket expenses of $7,000 for individual coverage or $14,000 for family coverage. For 2021, the maximum annual contribution to an HSA is $3,600 for self-only coverage and $7,200 for family coverage. 

Charitable Deduction Allowed for Donated Conservation Easement 

Champions Retreat Golf Founders, LLC v. Comr., No. 18-14817, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 15237 (11th Cir. May 13, 2020), rev’g., T.C. Memo. 2018-146

 The vast majority of the permanent conservation easement cases are losers for the taxpayer.  This one was such a taxpayer loser at the Tax Court level, but not at the appellate level.  Under the facts of the case, the petitioner claimed a $10.4 million charitable deduction related to the donation of a permanent conservation easement on a golf course. The IRS denied the deduction on the basis that the easement was not exclusively for conservation purposes because it didn’t protect a relatively natural habitat of fish, wildlife, or plants, or a similar ecosystem as required by I.R.C. §170(h)(4)(A)(ii). The IRS also asserted that the donation did not preserve open space for the scenic enjoyment of the general public or in accordance with a governmental conservation policy for the public’s benefit under I.R.C. §170(h)(4)(A)(iii). The Tax Court agreed with the IRS and denied the deduction. The Tax Court determined that the “natural habitat” requirement was not met – there was only one rare, endangered or threatened species with a habitat of only 7.5 percent of the easement area. In addition, the Tax Court noted that part of the golf course was designed to drain into this habitat area which would introduce chemicals into it. Thus, the easement’s preservation of open space was not for public enjoyment nor in accordance with a governmental policy of conservation.

On further review, the appellate court reversed. The appellate court found that the deduction was proper if the donation was made for the protection of a relatively natural habitat of fish, wildlife, or plants, or similar ecosystem or was made for the preservation of open space for the scenic enjoyment of the general public. The appellate court noted that without the golf course, the easement would satisfy the requirements and an easement deduction is not denied simply because a golf course is included. The appellate court remanded the case for a determination of the proper amount of the deduction. 

Residence Built on Farm Was “Farm Residence” For Zoning Purposes

Hochstein v. Cedar County. Board. of Adjustment, 305 Neb. 321, 940 N.W.2d 251 (2020)

Many cases involve the issue of what is “agricultural” for purposes of state or county zoning and related property tax issues.  In this case, Nebraska law provided for the creation of an “ag intensive district.” In such designated areas, any “non-farm” residence cannot be constructed closer than one mile from a livestock facility. The plaintiff operated a 4,500-head livestock feedlot (livestock feeding operation (LFO)) and an adjoining landowner operates a farm on their adjacent property. The adjoining landowner applied to the defendant for a zoning permit to construct a new house on their property that was slightly over one-half mile from the plaintiff’s LFO. The defendant (the county board of adjustment) approved the permit and the plaintiff challenged the issuance of the permit on the basis that the adjoining landowner was constructing a “non-farm” residence. The defendant affirmed the permit’s issuance on the basis that the residence was to be constructed on a farm. The plaintiff appealed and the trial court affirmed. On further review, the appellate court affirmed. On still further review by the state Supreme Court, the appellate court’s opinion was affirmed. The Supreme Court noted that the applicable regulations did not define the terms “non-farm residence” or “farm residence.” As such, the defendant had discretion to reasonably interpret the term “farm residence” as including a residence constructed on a farm.

Ag Cooperative Fails To Secure Warehouse Lien; Loses on Conversion Claim. 

MidwestOne Bank v. Heartland Co-Op, 941 N.W.2d 876 (Iowa 2020)

I dealt with the issue in this case in my blog article of March 27.  You may read it here:  https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2020/03/conflicting-interests-in-stored-grain.html  In the article, I detail many of the matters that arose in this case. 

The facts of the case revealed that a grain farmer routinely delivered and sold grain to the defendant, an operator of a grain warehouse and handling facility. The contract between the parties contemplated the sale, drying and storage of the grain. The farmer also borrowed money from the plaintiff to finance the farming operation and granted the plaintiff a security interest in the farmer’s grain and sale proceeds. The plaintiff filed a financing statement with the Secretary of State’s office on Feb. 29, 2012 which described the secured collateral as “all farm products” and the “proceeds of any of the property [or] goods.” The financing statement was amended in late 2016 and continued. The underlying security agreement required the farmer to inform the plaintiff as to the location of the collateral and barred the farmer from removing it from its location without the plaintiff’s consent unless done so in the ordinary course of business. It also barred the farmer from subjecting the collateral to any lien without the plaintiff’s prior written consent. However, the security agreement also required the farmer to maintain the collateral in good condition at all time and did not require the plaintiff’s prior written consent to do so.

The plaintiff complied with the 1985 farm products rule and the farmer gave the plaintiff a schedule of buyers of the grain which identified the defendant. From 2014 through 2017, the farmer sold grain to the defendant, and the defendant remitted the net proceeds of sale via joint check to the farmer and the plaintiff after deducting the defendant’s costs for drying and storage – a longstanding industry practice. The plaintiff, an ag lender in an ag state, claimed that it had no knowledge of such deductions until 2017 whereupon the plaintiff sued for conversion. The defendant did not properly perfect a warehouse lien and the lien claim was rejected by the trial court, but asserted priority on a theory of unjust enrichment. The trial court rejected the unjust enrichment claim.

The state Supreme Court agreed, refusing to apply unjust enrichment principles in the context of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The court did so without any mention of UCC §1-103 (b) which states that, "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, the principles of law and equity” including the law merchant [undefined] and the law relative to capacity to contract; duress; coercion; mistake; principal and agency relationships; estoppel, fraud and misrepresentation; bankruptcy, and other validating or invalidating cause [undefined] supplement its provisions.” This section has been characterized as the "most important single provision in the Code." 1 J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 5. “As such, the UCC was enacted to displace prior legal principles, not prior equitable principles.” However, the Supreme Court completely ignored this “most important single provision in the Code.” The Court also ignored longstanding industry practice and believed an established ag lender in an ag state that it didn’t know the warehouse was deducting its drying and storage costs before issuing the joint check. 

Conclusion

The developments keep rolling in.  More will be covered in future articles.

May 27, 2020 in Bankruptcy, Income Tax, Real Property, Secured Transactions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, May 4, 2020

Farm Bankruptcy – “Stripping,” “Claw-Back” and the Tax Collecting Authorities

Overview

As originally enacted, Chapter 12 did not create a separate tax entity for Chapter 12 bankruptcy estates for purposes of federal income taxation.  That shortcoming precludes debtor avoidance of potential income tax liability on disposition of assets as may be possible for individuals who file Chapter 7 or 11 bankruptcy.  But, an amendment to Chapter 12 enacted nineteen  years after Chapter 12 was established made an important change.  As modified, tax debt associated with the sale of an asset used in farming can be treated as unsecured debt that is not entitled to priority and ultimately discharged.  Without this modification, a farmer faced with selling assets to come up with funds to satisfy creditors could trigger substantial tax liability that would impair the chance to reorganize the farming business under Chapter 12.  Such a farmer could be forced into liquidation.

If taxes can be treated as unsecured debt how are taxes that the debtor has already paid to be treated?  Can those previously paid or withheld taxes be pulled back into the bankruptcy estate where they are “stripped” of their priority? 

Chapter 12 bankruptcy and priority “stripping” of taxes – it’s the topic of today’s post.

2005 Modified Tax Provision

The 2005 Bankruptcy Code allows a Chapter 12 debtor to treat claims arising out of “claims

owed to a governmental unit” as a result of “sale, transfer, exchange, or other disposition of any farm asset used in the debtor’s farming operation” to be treated as an unsecured claim that is not entitled to priority under Section 507(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, provided the debtor receives a discharge.  11 U.S.C. §1222(a)(2)(A).  The amendment attempted to address a major problem faced by many family farmers filing Chapter 12 bankruptcy where the sale of farm assets to make the operation economically viable triggered gain which, as a priority claim, had to be paid in full before payment could be made to general unsecured creditors.  Even though the priority tax claims could be paid in full in deferred payments under prior law, in many instances the debtor did not have enough funds to allow payment of the priority tax claims in full even in deferred payments.  That was the core problem that the 2005 provision was attempting to address.

Nothing in the 2005 legislation specified when the property can be disposed of to have the associated taxes be eligible for unsecured claim status. Of course, to confirm a Chapter 12 plan the taxing agencies must receive at least as large an amount as they would have received had the claim been a pre-petition unsecured claim.  On this issue, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has ruled that a debtor’s pre-petition sale of slaughter hogs came within the scope of the provision, and that the provision changes the character of the taxes from priority status to unsecured such that, upon discharge, the unpaid portion of the tax is discharged along with interest and penalties.  In re Knudsen, et al. v. Internal Revenue Service, 581 F.3d 696 (8th Cir. 2009).   The court also held the statute applies to post-petition taxes and that those taxes can be treated as an administrative expense.  Such taxes can be discharged in full if provided for in the Chapter 12 plan and the debtor receives a discharge. Upon the filing of a Chapter 12, a separate taxpaying entity apart from the debtor is not created. 

That is an important point in the context of the 2005 amendment.  The debtor remains responsible for tax taxes triggered in the context of Chapter 12.  The amendment, however, allows non-priority treatment for claims entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(2).  That provision covers administrative expenses that are allowed by 11 U.S.C. §503(b)(B) which includes any tax that the bankruptcy estate incurs.  Pre-petition taxes are covered by 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(8).  But, post-petition taxes, to be covered by the amendment, must be incurred by the bankruptcy estate such as is the case with administrative expenses.  Indeed, the IRS position is that post-petition taxes are not "incurred by the estate" as is required for a tax to be characterized as an administrative expense in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 503 (b)(1)(B)(i), and that post-petition taxes constitute a liability of the debtor rather than the estate.  See ILM 200113027 (Mar. 30, 2001). The U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits agreed with the IRS position, as did the U.S. Supreme Court.  Hall v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1882 (2012).   

2017 Legislation

H.R. 2266, signed into law on October 26, 2017, contains the Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act (Act). The Act adds 11 U.S.C. §1232 which specifies that, “Any unsecured claim of a governmental unit against the debtor or the estate that arises before the filing of the petition, or that arises after the filing of the petition and before the debtor's discharge under section 1228, as a result of the sale, transfer, exchange, or other disposition of any property used in the debtor's farming operation”… is to be treated as an unsecured claim that arises before the bankruptcy petition was filed that is not entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. §507 and is deemed to be provided for under a plan, and discharged in accordance with 11 U.S.C. §1228. The provision amends 11 U.S.C. §1222(a)(2)(A) to effectively override the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hall.  As noted above, in Hall the U.S. Supreme Court held that tax triggered by the post-petition sale of farm assets was not discharged under 11 U.S.C. §1222(a)(2)(A). The Court held that because a Chapter 12 bankruptcy estate cannot incur taxes by virtue of 26 U.S.C. §1399, taxes were not “incurred by the estate” under 11 U.S.C. §503(b) which barred post-petition taxes from being treated as non-priority.   The 2017 legislation overrides that result.  The provision was effective for all pending Chapter 12 cases with unconfirmed plans and all new Chapter 12 cases as of October 26, 2017.

Computational Issues

The 2005 provision also makes no mention of how the amount of priority and non-priority tax claims is to be computed.  Operationally, if a Chapter 12 bankruptcy filer has liquidated assets used in the farming operation within the tax year of filing or liquidates assets used in the farming operation after Chapter 12 filing as part of the Chapter 12 plan, and gain or depreciation recapture income or both are triggered, the plan should provide that there are will be no payments to unsecured creditors until the amount of the tax owed to governmental bodies for the sale of assets used in the farming operation is ascertained. The dischargeable tax claims are then added to the pre-petition unsecured claims to determine the percentage distribution to be made to the holders of pre-petition unsecured claims as well as the claims of the governmental units that are being treated as unsecured creditors not entitled to priority.  That approach assures that all claims that are deemed to be unsecured claims would be treated equitably.

Methods of computation.  To accurately determine the extent of the priority tax claim under the non-priority provision, it is necessary to directly relate the priority tax treatment to the income derived from sources that either satisfy the non-priority provision or do not satisfy it.  There are two basic approaches for computing the priority and general dischargeable unsecured tax claims – the proportional method or the marginal allocation method.  The proportional method (which is the IRS approach) divides the debtor’s ordinary farming income by the debtor’s total income and then multiplies the total tax claim by the resulting fraction.  That result is then subtracted from the debtor’s total tax liability with the balance treated as the non-priority part of the tax obligation.  Conversely, under the marginal approach, the debtor prepares a pro-forma tax return that omits the income from the sale of farm assets.  The resulting tax liability from the pro forma return is then subtracted from the total tax due on the debtor’s actual return.  The difference is the tax associated with the sale of farm assets that is entitled to non-priority treatment. 

A shortfall of the IRS’ proportional method is that it merely divides the debtor’s tax obligation by applying the ratio of the debtor’s priority tax claim to the debtor’s total income and then divides the total tax claim.  That mechanical computation does not consider any deductions and/or credits that impact the debtor’s final tax liability, and which are often phased out based on income.  Instead, the proportional method simply treats every dollar of income the same.  The result is that the proportional method, as applied to many debtors, significantly increases the debtor’s adjusted gross income and the priority non-dischargeable tax obligation.  The proportional method makes no attempt to measure the type of income, or what income “causes” any particular portion of the tax claim.    

The marginal approach was adopted by Eighth Circuit in the Knudsen case as well as the Bankruptcy Court in In re Ficken, 430 B.R. 663 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2009).  The appropriate tax allocation method was not at issue in either of the cases on appeal.  The Kansas bankruptcy court also rejected the IRS approach in favor of the marginal method.   The most recent court decision on the issue has, like earlier cases, rejected the proportional method in favor of the marginal method.  In re Keith, No. 10-12997, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2802 (Bankr. D. Kan. Jul. 8, 2013).

What About Withheld Tax?

Under the 2005 amendment (and the 2017 legislation) taxes triggered by the sale, exchange, etc., of assets used in farming can be stripped of there priority status in a Chapter 12 farm bankruptcy.  However, the debtor’s method for computing the taxes not entitled to priority involves utilization of the debtor’s total tax claim.  That means that taxes that have already been withheld or paid through estimated payments should be refunded to the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, where it becomes subject to the priority/non-priority computation, rather than being offset against the debtor’s overall tax debt (with none it subject to non-priority treatment).  Of course, the IRS and state taxing authorities object to this treatment.

Iowa bankruptcy case.  The issue of how to handle withheld taxes was at issue in a recent case.  In In re DeVries, No. 19-0018, 2020 U.S. Bankr. LEXIS 1154 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Apr. 28, 2020), the debtors, a married couple, filed an initial Chapter 12 reorganization plan that the bankruptcy court held to be not confirmable.  The debtors filed an amended plan that required the IRS and the Iowa Department of Revenue (IDOR) to refund to the debtors’ bankruptcy estate withheld income taxes.  The taxing authorities objected, claiming that the withheld amounts had already been applied against the debtor’s tax debt as 11 U.S.C. §553(a) allowed.  The debtors claimed that the 2017 legislation barred tax debt arising from the sale of assets used in farming from being offset against previously collected tax.  Instead, the debtors argued, the withheld taxes should be returned to the bankruptcy estate.  If withheld taxes weren’t returned to the bankruptcy estate, the debtors argued, similarly situated debtors would be treated differently. 

The debtors sold a significant amount of farmland and farming machinery in 2017, triggering almost a $1 million of capital gain income and increasing their 2017 tax liability significantly.  The tax liability was offset to a degree by income tax withholding from the wife’s off-farm job.  Their amended Chapter 12 plan called for a refund to the estate of withheld federal and state income taxes.  In the fall of 2019, the debtors submitted pro forma state and federal tax returns as well as their traditional tax returns for 2017 to the bankruptcy court in conjunction with the confirmation of their amended Chapter 12 plan.  The pro-forma returns showed what the debtors’ tax liability would have been without the sale of the farmland and farm equipment.  The pro-forma returns also showed, but for the capital gain, the debtors would have been entitled to a full tax refund of the taxes already withheld from the wife’s off-farm job. 

The court was faced with the issue of whether 11 U.S.C. §1232(a) entitled the bankruptcy estate to a refund of the withheld tax.  The IRS and IDOR claimed that 11 U.S.C. §553(a) preserved priority position for tax debt that arose before the bankruptcy petition was filed.  The court disagreed, noting that 11 U.S.C. §1232(a) deals specifically with how governmental claims involving pre-petition tax debt are to be treated – as unsecured, non-priority obligations.  But the court noted that 11 U.S.C. §1232(a) does not specifically address “clawing-back” previously withheld tax.  It merely referred to “qualifying tax debt” and said it was to be treated as unsecured and not entitled to priority.  Referencing the legislative history behind both the 2005 and 2017 amendments, the court noted that the purpose of the priority-stripping provision was to help farmers have a better chance at reorganization by de-prioritizing taxes, including capital gain taxes.  The court pointed to statements that Sen. Charles Grassley made to that effect.  The court also noted that the 2017 amendment was for the purpose of strengthening (and clarifying) the original 2005 de-prioritization provision by overturning the result in Hall to allow for de-prioritization of taxes arising from both pre and post-petitions sales of assets used in farming.  Accordingly, the court concluded that 11 U.S.C. §1232(a) overrode a creditor’s set-off rights under 11 U.S.C. §553(a) in the context of Chapter 12.  The debtors’ bankruptcy estate was entitled to a refund of the withheld income taxes. 

Indiana bankruptcy case.  In re Richards, No. 18-3418-RLM-12, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 1181 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Apr. 29, 2020) was decided the day after DeVries.  In Richards, the debtors (a married couple) filed Chapter 12 in May of 2018.  The reorganization plan was confirmed in October of 2018.  The plan stated that the IRS’s priority claim was zero for 2016 and $5,681 for 2017.  The plan also provided that the debtors would liquidate some farm assets in 2018 that would qualify for the priority stripping of 11 U.S.C. §1232.  The plan also stated that it was the exclusive means by which “any and all claims” were to be paid post-petition, and that it did not curtail the exercise of a valid right of setoff under 11 U.S.C. §553. 

The debtors’ sold farm assets in 2018 and a pro forma return showed that the debtors were entitled to a $6,414 refund.  The IRS later amended its claim to show that it had offset the 2018 refund against the debtors’ 2016 priority taxes and the taxes related to the sale of the farm assets in 2018.  The debtors objected on the basis that the confirmed plan barred the setoff and wanted the court to order the IRS to issue the 2018 refund to the debtors. 

The court noted that the debtors’ plan provided that “no creditor shall take action to collect on any claim, whether by offset or otherwise, unless specifically authorized by this Plan.”  The plan also said, “[t]his paragraph does not curtail the exercise of a valid right of setoff permitted under §553.”  The court noted that the setoff involved in the case was not a §553 type.  Rather, the setoff was of a 2018 tax refund – a post-petition payment that was owed to the debtors but had been applied against the taxes triggered by the sale of farm assets which are treated as a dischargeable, pre-petition tax.  As such, the set-off violated the plan.

However, the court determined it couldn’t order the refund be paid to the bankruptcy estate unless the refund were “property of the estate.”  On that point, the court noted that nothing in the debtors’ plan or confirmation order provided that post-petition tax refunds remain “property of the estate.”  The debtors also had not claimed that the 2018 refund was necessary to fund the plan.  Likewise, the trustee didn’t seek the refund to be turned over to the estate.  Because the court believed that the refund vested in the debtors upon plan confirmation, it was not “property of the estate.”  As such, the court lacked jurisdiction to make any determination of the amount of the turnover of the 2018 refund.  The court did note that the debtors were free to modify their reorganization plan. 

Conclusion

The Iowa court’s decision is an important one for farmers in financial distress.  11 U.S.C. §1232 is a powerful tool that can assist making a farm reorganization more feasible.  The Indiana case is a bit strange.  In that case, the debtors were also due a refund for 2016.  A pro-forma return for that year showed a refund of $1,300.  Thus, the issue of a refund being due for pre-petition taxes could have been asserted just as it was in the Iowa case.  Another oddity about the Indiana case is that the 2018 pro-forma (and regular) return was submitted to the IRS in March of 2019.  Under 11 U.S.C. §1232, the “governmental body” has 180 days to file its proof of claim after the pro forma tax return was filed.  The IRS timely filed tis proof of claim and later filed an amended proof of claim which was identical to the original proof of claim.  The IRS filed an untimely proof of claim in one of the other jointly administered cases.

A Notice regarding the use of 11 U.S.C. §1232 should have been filed with the court to clarify the dates of Notice to the IRS (and other governmental bodies) of the amount of the priority non-dischargeable taxes and 11 U.S.C. §1232 taxes to be discharged under the plan.  That is when the issue of the refund would have been raised with the IRS.  However, in the Indiana case, there was no Notice of the filing of the pro-forma return with the court. 

Though not revealed in the court’s opinion, the Indiana case also involved significant 11 U.S.C. §1232 taxes from the sale of farm property in 2017 and 2018.  While the Indiana court claimed it lacked authority to force the IRS to issue a refund based on a “property of the estate” argument, that argument leads to a conclusion that is counter to the intent and purpose of I.R.C. §1232.  How is 11 U.S.C. §1232 to be operative if a court says it can’t enforce it?  Certainly, filing a Notice of intent concerning the priority stripping of 11 U.S.C. §1232 taxes with the court asserting the debtors’ right to receive the tax refund would have teed-up the issue more quickly, one wonders whether a judge intent on negating the impact of 11 U.S.C. §1232 would have decided differently. 

Going forward, Chapter 12 reorganization plans should provide that if a pro-forma return shows that the debtor is owed a refund the governmental bodies will pay it. 

It is also important to remember that if the debtor does not receive a Chapter 12 discharge, the taxing bodies are free to pursue the debtor as if no bankruptcy had been filed, assessing and collecting the tax as well as all penalties and interest allowed by law including any refunds the taxing bodies are forced to make based on § 1232.  Competent bankruptcy counsel that appreciates tax law is a must. 

May 4, 2020 in Bankruptcy | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, April 1, 2020

Disaster/Emergency Legislation – Summary of Provisions Related to Loan Relief; Small Business and Bankruptcy

Overview

The disaster/emergency legislation enacted in late March is wide-ranging and far-sweeping in its attempt to provide economic relief to the damage caused by various federal and state “shut-downs” brought on by a widespread viral infection that originated in China in late 2019 and has spread to the United States.  The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) provides relief to small businesses and their employees, including farmers and ranchers, as well as to certain students.  Some states have also acted to temporarily stop mortgage foreclosures. 

I am grateful to Joe Peiffer of Ag and Business Legal Strategies located in Hiawatha, Iowa, for his input on some of the topics discussed below.

Recent disaster/emergency legislation related to loan relief, small business and bankruptcy – it’s the topic of today’s post.   

Deferral of Student Loan Payments

The CARES Act provides temporary relief for federal student loan borrowers by requiring the Secretary of Education to defer student loan payments, principal, and interest for six months, pthrough September 30, 2020, without penalty to the borrower for all federally owned loans. This provides relief for over 95 percent of student loan borrowers. 

Bankruptcy Changes

The CARES Act makes the following changes to the bankruptcy Code:

  • A one-year increase in the debt limit to $7.5 million (from $2.73 million) for small businesses that file Chapter 11 bankruptcy. For one year after date of enactment, following the bill’s enactment, the measure temporarily excludes federal payments related to COVID-19 from income calculations under Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. It would also allow debtors experiencing hardship because of COVID-19 to modify existing bankruptcy reorganization plans.  CARES Act, §1113.
  • Individuals and families currently undergoing Chapter 13 bankruptcy may seek payment plan modifications if they are experiencing a material financial hardship due to the virus, including extending payments for up to seven years after the due date of the initial plan payment. This provision expires one year after date of enactment.  
  • “Income” for Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 debtors does not include virus-related payments from the federal government. This provision expires one year after date of enactment.
  • For Chapter 13 debtors, “disposable income” for purposes of plan confirmation does not include virus-related payments. This is also a one-year provision

“Small Employer” Relief

The CARES Act provides qualified small businesses various options. 

  • Immediate SBA Emergency Economic Injury Disaster Grants. These $10,000 grants (advances) are to be used for authorized costs such as providing paid sick leave; maintaining payroll to retain employees; meeting increased material costs; making rent or mortgage payments; and repaying obligations which cannot be met on account of revenue losses.  The grants are processed directly through the Small Business Association (SBA), but the SBA may utilize lenders (that are an SBA authorized lender) for the processing and making of the grants.  A grant applicant may request an expedited disbursement.  If such a request is made, the funds are to be disbursed within three days of the request. The CARES Act also removes standard program requirements including that the borrower not be able to secure credit elsewhere or that the borrower has been in business for at least a year, as long as the business was in operation as of January 31, 2020.  CARES Act, §1110.
  • Traditional SBA Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDL). The CARES Act expands this existing program such that the SBA can provide up to $2 million in loans to meet financial obligations and operating expenses that couldn’t be met due to the virus such as fixed debts, payroll, accounts payable and other bills attributable to actual economic injury. The loans are available to businesses and organizations with less than 500 employees.  The interest rate is presently 3.75 percent and cannot exceed 4 percent for small businesses that can receive credit elsewhere.  Businesses with credit available elsewhere are ineligible.  The interest rate for non-profits is 2.75%.  The length of the loan can be for up to 30 years with loan terms determined on a case-by-case basis, based on the borrower’s repayment ability.  Applications will be accepted through December of this year.
  • Forgivable SBA 7(a) Loan Program Paycheck Protection Loans. The Paycheck Protection Loan Program (PPP) is an extension of the existing SBA 7(a) loan program with many of the existing restrictions on 7(a) loans waived for a set timeframe including guarantee and collateral requirements and the requirements that the borrower cannot find credit elsewhere.   In addition, a small business loan borrower is eligible for loan forgiveness on existing SBA 7(a) loans.  The 7(a) loan program is the SBA's primary program for providing financial assistance to small businesses. For borrowers with an existing 7(a) loan, the SBA will pay principal, interest, and any associated loan fees for a six-month period starting on the loan’s next payment due date.  Payment on deferred loans start with the first payment after the deferment period.  However, this relief does not apply to loans made under the PPP. 
  • For purposes of the PPP, a “qualified small business” is defined as a business in existence as of February 15, 2020 paying employees or independent contractors that does not have more than 500 employees or the maximum number of employees specified in the current SBA size standards, whichever is greater; or if the business has more than one location and has more than 500 employees, does not have more than 500 employees (those employed full-time, part-time or on another basis) at any one location and the business' primary NAICS code starts with "72" (Accommodation and Food Service – e.g., hotels, motels, restaurants, etc.); or is a franchisee holding a franchise listed on the SBA's registry of approved franchise agreements; or has received financing from a Small Business Investment Corporation. 

    Farmers and ranchers are eligible for PPP loans if the business has 500 or fewer employees; or the business has average annual gross receipts of $1 million or less.  If neither of those tests can be satisfied, the ag business can still qualify if the net worth of the business does not exceed $15 million and the average net income after federal income taxes (excluding carry over losses) for the two full fiscal years before the date of the PPP application does not exceed $5 million.  Affiliation rules are used, when applicable, in determining qualification under the tests.   

    Sole proprietorships and self-employed individuals (i.e., independent contractors) may qualify under this program if the sole proprietor/self-employed person has a principal residence in the United States, and the individual filed or will file a Schedule C for 2019.

    Note:  While the SBA guidance on the issue only refers to Schedule C businesses, it seemed that “Schedule F” should be able to be substituted.  Further guidance, discussed below, has added some clarity to the issue. 

    Additionally, certain I.R.C. §501(c)(3) organizations; qualified veterans’ organizations; employee stock ownership plans; and certain Tribal businesses are also eligible.  Ineligible businesses are those that have engaged in any illegal activity at the federal or state level; household employers; any business with a 20 percent or more owner that has a criminal history; any business with a presently delinquent SBA loan; banks; real estate landlords and developers; life insurance companies; and businesses located in foreign countries.

    The terms and conditions, like the guaranty percentage and loan amount, may vary by the type of loan.  The lender must be SBA-approved.  The loan proceeds can be used for payroll costs (up to a per-employee cap of $100,000 of cash wages (as prorated for the covered period)); a mortgage or rent obligation; payment of utilities; and any other debt obligation incurred before the “covered period” (February 15, 2020 – June 30, 2020) – however, amounts incurred on this expense is not eligible for forgiveness) plus compensation paid to an independent contractor of up to $100,000 per year.  Included in the definition of “payroll costs” are salary, wages, commissions, or similar compensation; guaranteed payments of a partner in a partnership and a partner’s share of income that is subject to self-employment tax (subject to a per-partner cap of $100,000); cash tips; payment for vacation, parental, family, medical or sick leave; an allowance for dismissal or separation; payments for providing group health care benefits, including insurance premiums; payment of retirement benefits; payment of state or local tax assessed on the compensation of employees; and agricultural commodity wages.  Not included in the computation of payroll costs are Federal FICA and Medicare taxes and Federal income tax withholding (but, SBA has subsequently taken the position that this is to be ignored  such that the computation should be based on gross payroll); any compensation paid to an employee whose principal place of residence is outside the United States (e.g., H-2A workers); qualified sick leave and family leave wages that receive a credit under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act. 

    Note:  Wages for an H-2A worker employed under an H-2A contract for over 180 days can establish their U.S. address as their principal residence and include their wages in average payroll.  Once, associated utility costs should also count as eligible expenses. 

    Under the PPP, the bank can lend up to 250 percent of the lesser of the borrower’s average monthly payroll costs (before the virus outbreak) or $10,000,000 (with some exclusions including compensation over $100,000).  For example, if the prior year’s payroll was $300,000, the maximum loan would be $62,500 (total payroll of $300,000 divided by 12 months = 25,000 x 2.5 = $62,500).  The SBA guarantee is 100 percent. 

    Note:  For farm borrowers, some lenders have been reported as claiming that the receipt of a PPP loan makes the farmer ineligible for the ag part of the CARES Act Food Assistance Program.  That is incorrect.  It is also incorrect that the receipt of a PPP loan by a farmer impacts the farmer’s USDA subsidies.  The is no statutory support for either of those propositions. 

    Self-employed taxpayers became eligible for loans on April 10, 2020.  For a self-employed taxpayer, the loan amount is based on the taxpayer’s net self-employment earnings, limited to $100,000 of net self-employment income.  The maximum loan to a self-employed taxpayer is set at 20.8333 percent of self-employment earnings (plus other payroll costs).  For a Schedule C taxpayer, that amount can be determined from line 31 (net profit).  If that amount is over $100,000, the loan is limited to $100,000.  If line 31 is a loss, the loan amount would normally be zero, but one-half of employee payroll costs can be added in.  For a 2019 Schedule F, the applicable line is line 34.  A copy of the taxpayer’s 2019 Schedule C (or Schedule F) must be provided to SBA.

    Note:  The SBA has taken the position that a loss is shown on line 34 of Schedule F that the taxpayer does not qualify for any loan based on earnings and could only qualify for a loan based on employee payroll costs.Thus, the income of a farmer reported on Form 4797 (as the result of an equipment trade, for example, will not qualify.  Thus, while a farmer’s Schedule F income might be a loss, but significant income may be present on Form 4797 (which is not subject to self-employment tax), such a farmer will not be able to reconcile the Schedule F to include all equipment gains.  Likewise, gains attributable to farmland and buildings are also excluded.  Presently, it is unknown whether rental income that is not reported Schedule F qualifies (such as that reported on either Schedule E or on Form 4835). 

    The amount of loan forgiveness for a self-employed taxpayer equals 2/13 of the 2019 line 31 income.  Thus, for a loan that is limited to $20,833, the amount forgiven would be $15,384 ($100,000/52 x 2.5). 

    For partnerships, filing is at the partnership level.  This precludes each partner from receiving a loan.  The law is unclear, however, whether income is based on guaranteed payments to partners or partnership gross receipts.   According to the SBA’s interpretation, a partnership is allowed to count all employee payroll costs.  In addition, the partnership can count all self-employment income of partners computed as the total self-employment income reported on line 14a of Schedule K/K-1.  That amount is then reduced by any I.R.C. §179 expense deduction claimed; unreimbursed partnership expenses claimed, and depletion claimed on oil and gas properties.  That result is then multiplied by 92.35% to arrive at net self-employment earnings. If the final amount exceeds $100,000, it is to be reduced to $100,000. 

    Note.  Multiplying by 92.35% for Schedule F farmers appears not to be required but may be required in a future announcement since the same calculations usually apply to Schedule C and Schedule F filers on Schedule SE.

    Note:  Many farm partnerships have a manager managed LLC structure that allows for a reduction in self-employment tax.  Even though this income is considered to be ordinary income, it appears that none of that income will qualify for a PPP loan.

    Note:  S or C corporations are only allowed to use taxable Medicare wages & tips from line 5c of Form 941.  These wages are subject to FICA and Medicare taxes.

    Based on the SBA position, if it is determined to apply to Form 943 filers, commodity wages will not be allowed for calculating total employee payroll costs.  Thus, it is possible that if a farmer received an original PPP loan using commodity wages, the loan may need to be revised. 

    Likewise, if a taxpayer has an interest in more than one partnership that are treated as self-employed entities, a question remains as to whether each entity can qualify for a loan.  For instance, if a farmer is a partner in three partnerships and earns at least $100,000 of net self-employment earnings in each partnership, can each partnership use the farmer’s full $100,000 compensation limit or must it be allocated among each partnership?  

    For an LLC that is taxed as a partnership, only the amount a partner receives as a guaranteed payment is taxed as self-employment income.  For taxpayer’s with interests in multiple single-member LLCs, a holding company can file for the entities under its ownership or each entity can file for a loan.  What is not known is whether if only one entity is profitable whether a loan can be filed only for the profitable entity.  Similarly, it is not known whether a taxpayer’s compensation from each entity is allowed in full (if it is doesn’t exceed $100,000/entity) even though total earnings exceeds $100,000, or whether the taxpayer’s compensation is limited to $100,000. 

    The interest rate is set at one percent and cannot exceed 4 percent. Payments, including principal, interest and fees can be deferred anywhere from six to 12 months, and the SBA will reimburse lenders for loan original origination fees. A borrower can then apply for loan forgiveness to the extent the loan proceeds were used to cover payroll costs (at least 75 percent), mortgage interest, rent and utility payments during the eight-week period following loan disbursement. 

    Note:  According to the SBA, the forgivable portion of the non-payroll costs is limited to 25 percent. 

    The borrower must have been in business as of February 15, 2020 and employed employees and paid salaries and taxes or had independent contractors and filed Form 1099-MISC for them. Guarantee fees are waived, and the loans are non-recourse to the borrower, shareholders, members and partners of the borrower.  There is no collateral that is required, and the borrower need not show an inability to secure financing elsewhere before qualifying for financing from the SBA. 

    The SBA will pay lenders for processing loans under the Payroll Protection Program in an amount of 5 percent of the loan up to $350,000; 3 percent of the loan from $350,000 to $2 million; and 1 percent of loans of $2 million or more.  Lender fees are payable within five days of disbursement of the loan. 

    A borrower under the PPP can apply for loan forgiveness on amounts the borrower incurs after February 14, 2020, in the eight-week period immediately following the loan origination date (e.g., the receipt of the funds) on the following items (not to exceed the original principal amount of the loan): gross payroll costs (not to exceed $100,000 of annualized compensation per employee); payments of accrued interest on any mortgage loan incurred prior to February 15, 2020; payment of rent on any lease in force prior to February 15, 2020 (no differentiation is made between payments made to unrelated third parties and related entities (self-rents)); fuel for business vehicles and, payment on any utilities, including payment for the distribution of electricity, gas, water, transportation, telephone or internet access for which service began before February 15, 2020.  The amount forgiven is not considered taxable income to the borrower.  Documentation of all payment received under the PPP is necessary to receive forgiveness.  Any amount that remains outstanding after the amount forgiven is to be repaid over two years, after a six-moth deferral, at a one percent interest rate. 

    Note:  For a sole proprietorship or self-employed individual, it is unclear whether the loan forgiveness amount is based on eight weeks of self-employment income in 2019 plus amounts spent on qualified amounts, or whether the amount forgiven is limited to eight weeks of self-employment income.   

    The amount forgiven will be reduced proportionally by any reduction in the number of full-time equivalent employees retained as compared to the prior year. The proportional reduction in loan forgiveness also applies to reductions in the pay of any employee.  The reduction if loan forgiveness applies when the reduction of employees or an employee’s prior year’s compensation exceeds 25 percent.  It is increased for wages paid to employees that are paid tips. A borrower will not be penalized by a reduction in the amount forgiven for termination of an employee made between February 15, 2020 and April 26, 2020, as long as the employee is rehired by June 30, 2020.

    Note:  For both the loan calculation and the amount of forgiveness a taxpayer cannot include any owner’s health insurance or retirement payments.  Reference is to simply be made to Schedule C or Schedule F net income. 

    Note:  As for loan forgiveness for the self-employed owner compensation, apparently Schedule C (of Schedule F) compensation shown on the 2019 return is used.  This amount is then divided by 52 (weeks in the year) and multiplied by eight.  The resulting amount is (apparently) forgiven. 

    The SBA “audits” the requirements that taxpayers certify both that there was economic uncertainty and that the funds were actually needed in order to keep employees on the payroll and paid during the period February 15, 2020 through June 30, 2020.  For farmers, with sufficient liquidity that not poised to shut-down, being able to establish that that the funds were needed for payroll purposes could be difficult to establish.  This could be particularly true for grain farmers and others that are currently planting crops, have sufficient liquidity or lines-of-credit available, and have an adequate percent of their crop insured and have the ability to pay their employees.  For dairy, livestock and produce operations, it will likely be much easier to satisfy the payroll requirement.  Clearly, documentation as to the need for the loan is critical to maintain, as is documentation after the end of the eight-week loan forgiveness period. 

    Note:  A taxpayer that receives a PPP loan is ineligible for the Employee Retention Tax Credit. (discussed next), and is barred from applying for unemployment.

    Certain qualified small businesses are eligible for loan forgiveness of certain SBA loans.  A “covered loan” is a loan added under new §7(a)(36) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. §636(a)).  The amount forgiven is equal to the sum of costs incurred and payment made during the eight-week period beginning on the covered loan’s origination date.  Forgiven amounts are excluded from gross income up to the principal amount of the loan.  To be forgiven, loan proceeds must be used to cover rent paid under a lease agreement in force before February 15, 2020; a mortgage that was entered into in the ordinary course of business that is the borrower’s liability, and is a mortgage on real or personal property incurred before February 15, 2020; or utilities (electricity, gas, water transportation, telephone or internet access) for which service began before February 15, 2020.  The borrower must verify that the amount for which forgiveness is requested was used for the permissible purposes.  The amount of loan forgiveness is subject to a reduction formula tied to employee layoffs.  The numerator of the formula it the average number of full-time employees per month.  The denominator is, at the borrower’s election, the average number of full-time employees per month employed from Feb. 15, 2019 to Jun. 30, 2019 or the average number of full-time employees per month employed from Jan. 1, 2020 to Feb. 29, 2020. 

    Note:  Expenses attributable to loan forgiveness (rent, mortgage, utilities, etc.) are not deductible.  See I.R.C. §265. 

    Employers with seasonal employees use a different formula to calculate payroll costs.  A seasonal employer uses the average total monthly payments for payroll for the twelve-week period beginning Feb. 15, 2019; or, by election, Mar. 1, 2019 through Jun. 1, 2019.  As an alternative, the employer may choose to use any consecutive 12-week period between May 1, 2019 and September 15, 2019.  Thus, if payroll costs are much higher in the summer time to harvest crops, the employer will qualify for a larger PPP loan.     

    To receive any loan forgiveness, the employer must spend at least 75 percent of the loan proceeds on labor costs.  There is also a reduction formula for employee salaries and wages, with the amount forgiven reduced by the amount of any reduction in salary or wages of any employee during the covered period.  That is the excess of 25 percent of total salary and wages for the most recent quarter for that employee.  For purposes of this formula, employees earning over $100,000 are excluded.  If an employer rehires the employees or raises salaries and wages back to their prior level by Jun. 30, 2020, the rehire is not considered for purposes of the formula.  CARES Act, §1106.

  • Employee Retention Credit. If a government order requires an employer to partially or fully suspend operations due to the virus (there is no statutory definition of “partially” or “fully”), or if business gross receipts have declined by more than 50 percent as compared to the same quarter in the immediately prior year,  the employer can receive a payroll tax credit equal to 50 percent of employee compensation (“qualified wages”) up to $10,000 (per employee) paid or incurred from March 13, 2020 and January 1, 2021. For employers with greater than 100 full-time employees, qualified wages are wages paid to employees when they are not providing services (“services” is undefined) due to the coronavirus-related circumstances described above. For eligible employers with 100 or fewer full-time employees, all employee wages qualify for the credit, whether the employer is open for business or subject to a shut-down order. Qualified wages must not “exceed the amount such employee would have been paid for working an equivalent duration during the 30 days immediately preceding such period.”  As noted, the credit applies to the first $10,000 of compensation, including health benefits, paid to an eligible employee. The credit is provided for wages paid or incurred from March 13, 2020 through December 31, 2020.
  • The credit is allowed in each calendar quarter against Medicare tax or the I.R.C. §3221(a) tax imposed on employers at the rate of 50 percent of wages paid to employees during the timeframe of the virus limited to the applicable employment taxes as reduced by any credits allowed under I.R.C. §§3111(e) and (f) as well as the tax credit against amounts for qualified sick leave wages and qualified family leave wages an employer pays for a calendar quarter to eligible employees under the FFCRA.  Thus, “applicable employment taxes” are reduced by the I.R.C. §§3111(e)-(f) credits and those available under the FFCRA.  Then, the resulting amount is reduced by the Employee Retention Credit.  If a negative amount results, the negative amount is treated as an overpayment that will be refunded pursuant to I.R.C. §6402(a) and I.R.C. §6413(b).  CARES Act, §2301.
  • Express Loan Program. The SBA’s Express Loan Program loan limit is increased to $1 million (from $350,000) until December 31, 2020.  This program features an accelerated turnaround time for SBA review, with a response to applications within 36 hours.  CARES Act, §1102(c).
  • Tax Credit to Fund Paid Sick Leave. An employer with an employee that is paid sick-leave on account of the virus receives a FICA tax credit (employer share only) equal to the lesser of wages plus health care costs or $511 per day for up to 10 days.  An employer providing sick leave to an employee with a sick family member, the credit is $200 per day, up to a maximum of $10,000.

Planning strategies.  For businesses with immediate cashflow needs, a $10,000 EIDL grant can be applied for.  Simultaneously, application can be made for PPL program loan.  But, as noted, the basis for the separate loans and the costs being paid with each loan are different.  An application can then be made seeking loan forgiveness.  If this approach is inadequate, a traditional EIDL loan can be applied for.  Also, if the business has sufficient cashflow, one of the FICA/Medicare tax credit options can be considered.  Also, for employers with employees impacted by the virus or are caring for affected family members, the sick leave credit or the employee retention credit can be utilized if business operations were suspended or if gross receipts declined substantially. 

Conclusion

The CARES Act contains many provisions that small employers can utilize to bridge the economic divide created by the government reaction to the virus.  As the new programs are implemented rules will be developed that should address presently unanswered questions.  The SBA has up to 30 days following the enactment of the CARES Act to issue regulations implementing and providing guidance on certain CARES Act provisions.  In addition, the Treasury Department is required to issue regulations implementing and providing guidance under many CARES Act provisions. Issuance of regulations and guidance could delay loan approval and disbursement or modify/waive certain loan requirements.

The disaster/emergency legislation also made numerous tax changes. Those will be addressed in a future post.

April 1, 2020 in Bankruptcy, Business Planning, Income Tax, Regulatory Law | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, March 3, 2020

Recent Cases of Interest

Overview

The cases and rulings of relevance to agricultural producers, ag businesses and rural landowners continue to churn out.  In today’s post a take a brief look at three of them – a couple of bankruptcy-related cases and a case involving a claim of constitutional takings.

“Shared Responsibility” Payment Is Not a “Tax”

United States v. Chesteen, No. 19-30195 (5th Cir. Feb. 20, 2020), rev’g., No. 18-2077, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29346 (E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2019).

In a bankruptcy proceeding, some unsecured creditors receive a priority in payments over other unsecured creditors.  These are termed “priority claims” and they are not subject to being discharged in bankruptcy.  Priority claims are grouped into 10 categories with descending levels of priority.  11 U.S.C. §507(a)(1)-(10).  One of those priority claims is for “allowed unsecured claims of governmental units” to the extent the claims are for “a tax on or measured by income or gross receipts…”.  11 U.S.C. §507(a)(8).  But, does that provision apply to the penalty that had to be paid through 2018 for not having an acceptable form of government-mandate health insurance under Obamacare – the so-called “Roberts Tax”?  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently answered that question.

In the case, the debtor filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The IRS filed a proof of priority claim for $5,100.10, later amending the claim to $5,795.10 with $695 of that amount being an excise tax under I.R.C. §5000A as a result of the debtor’s failure to maintain government mandated health insurance under Obamacare. The debtor objected to the $695 amount being a priority claim that could not be discharged, and the bankruptcy court agreed, finding that the “Roberts Tax” under Obamacare was not a priority claim, but rather a dischargeable penalty in a Chapter 13 case.  On appeal, the federal trial court reversed, holding that the penalty was a tax that was a non-dischargeable priority claim. The trial court noted that the creditor bore the burden to establish that the Roberts Tax was a priority claim and noted that it was the purpose and substance of the statute creating the tax that controlled whether the tax was a tax or a penalty. The trial court noted that a tax is a pecuniary burden levied for the purpose of supporting government while a monetary penalty is a punishment for an unlawful act or omission. On this point, the trial court noted that Chief Justice Roberts, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), upheld the constitutionality of Obamacare on the basis that the “shared responsibility payment” was a tax paid via a federal income tax return and had no application to persons who did not pay federal income tax. The trial court noted that the amount was collected by the IRS and produced revenue for the government. It also did not punish an individual for any unlawful activity and, the trial court noted, the IRS has no criminal enforcement authority if a taxpayer failed to pay the amount.

On further review, the appellate court reversed, reinstating the bankruptcy court’s determination. The appellate court held that the “Roberts Tax” was not entitled to priority in bankruptcy because it was not among the types of taxes listed in the bankruptcy code to have priority treatment under 11 U.SC. §507(a)(8)(E)(i). The appellate court noted that the “Roberts Tax” could not be a priority tax claim in a debtor’s bankruptcy estate because the “tax” applied only when a person failed to buy the government-mandated health insurance, rather than when a transaction was entered into. As such, the “Roberts Tax” was a penalty that could be discharged in bankruptcy. The appellate court also noted that the “tax” zeroed out the “tax” beginning in 2019, thereby nullifying any tax effect that it might have had. 

Cram-Down Interest Rate Determined

In re Country Morning Farms, Inc., No. 19-00478-FPC11, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 307 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 4, 2020).

Under the reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code (Chapters 11, 12 and 13), a debtor can reorganize debts and pay for most (but not all) secured property by paying the present value of the collateral (what the collateral is presently worth) rather than the entire debt.  The procedure for doing this is commonly known as a “cram down” – the terms of the repayment are forced upon the creditor.  The debtor must pay the present value of the collateral (the creditor’s allowed secured claim) via the reorganization bankruptcy.  Because the repayment of the written-down debt will be paid over time in accordance with the reorganization plan, an interest rate is attached to ensure that the creditor receives the present value of the claim.  But, what is the appropriate interest rate in such a setting and how is it determined?  Over the years, courts struggled in determining the appropriate interest rate to use in a reorganization bankruptcy cram-down setting.  The U.S. Supreme Court settled the waters with a decision in 2004 by using the “Prime Plus” method.  The issue of the appropriate interest rate was again as issue in a dairy bankruptcy case from the state of Washington.

In the case, the debtor filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy and the debtor and the bank could not agree on the appropriate interest rate to be used in the debtor’s reorganization plan. The parties agreed that the “Prime Plus” method set forth in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004) was the appropriate method to determine the “cram down” interest rate.” The parties agreed that the prime rate was presently 4.75 percent and that an additional amount as a “risk factor” should be added to the prime rate. The debtors proposed a 6 percent interest rate, based on the risk associated with their dairy business. The bank claimed that the appropriate interest rate was 7.75 percent – the highest rate factor under the Till analysis. The bank cited the length of the plan, the volatility of the dairy market, the debtor’s capital structure, and conflicting projections from an expert when determining the appropriate risk factor. The court determined that the appropriate interest rate was 7 percent which raised the interest rate on some of the debtor’s loans and lowered it on others. 

Reversion to Agricultural Use Classification Not a Taking

Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC v. State Land Use Commission, No. 18-15738, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 5138 (9th Cir. Feb. 19, 2020).

Sometimes, a governmental body enacts a statute or promulgates a regulation that restricts a private property owner’s use of their property.  The restriction on land use may be so complete that, in effect, the restriction amounts to the government “taking” the property. However, these regulatory restrictions on private property usage do not involve a physical taking of the property but can still give rise to Fifth Amendment concerns and trigger the payment of “just compensation” to the landowner.  The legal issues concerns the point at which a defacto regulatory taking has occurred.

In a key case decided in 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth a multi-factored balancing test for determining when governmental regulation of private property effects a taking requiring compensation. In Penn Central Transportation Co. et al. v. New York City, the 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the Court held that a landowner cannot establish a “taking” simply by being denied the ability to exploit a property interest believed to be available for development. Instead, the Court ruled that in deciding whether particular governmental action effects a taking, the character, nature and extent of the interference with property rights as a whole are the proper focus rather than discrete segments of the owner’s property rights.  Later, the Court determined that the touchstone for deciding when a regulation is a taking is whether the restriction on property usage is functionally equivalent to a physical taking of the property.  Lingle, et al. v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005)The issue of a regulatory taking came up in a recent case from Hawaii. 

Under the facts of the recent case, 1,060 acres of undeveloped land on the northeast portion of the Island of Hawaii were designated as conditional urban use. For the 40 prior years, the tract was part of a 3,000-acre parcel zoned for agricultural use. In 1987, the landowner at the time sought to develop a mixed residential community of the 1,060 acres as the first phase of development on the entire 3,000 acres. The landowner petitioned the defendant to reclassify the 1,060 acres as urban. The defendant did so in 1989 on development conditions that ran with title to the land. The land remained undeveloped at the time the plaintiff acquired it in 1999. In 2005, the defendant amended the condition so that fewer affordable housing units needed to be developed. Developmental progress was hampered by the requirement that the plaintiff prepare an environmental impact statement for the development project.

In late, 2008, the defendant ordered the plaintiff to show cause for the nondevelopment. In the summer of 2010, some affordable housing units had been constructed, but upon inspection they were determined to not be habitable. The developer then stated that it lacked the funds to complete the development. In 2011, the defendant ordered the land’s reversion to its prior agricultural use classification due to the unfulfilled representations that the land would be developed. The land was given its conditional urban use classification based on those representations. The plaintiff was one of the landowners and challenged the reversion as illegal, and that it amounted to an unconstitutional regulatory taking of the land. The trial court jury found for the plaintiff on the constitutional claim and the trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a judgment as a matter of law.

On further review, the appellate court reversed The appellate court stated held that no taking had occurred under the multi-factor analysis of Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), because the reclassification did not result in the taking of all of the economic value of the property. Rather, the land retained substantial economic value, albeit at a much lesser amount than if it were classified as urban and developed. An expert valued the land at approximately $40 million as developed land and $6.36 million with an agricultural use classification. The appellate court held that the $6.36 million was neither de minimis nor derived from noneconomic uses. Thus, the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue that a complete economic taking had occurred. It had not. The appellate court also held that the reversion did not interfere substantially with the plaintiff’s investment-backed expectations given that the development conditions were present at the time the plaintiff acquired the property and the plaintiff could expect them to be enforced. The appellate court also determined that the defendant acted properly in protecting the plaintiff’s due process rights by holding hearings over a long period of time. Thus, the appellate court concluded, no reasonable jury could conclude that the reversion effected a taking under the Penn Central factors. The appellate court vacated the trial court’s judgment for the plaintiff and reversed the trial court’s the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s equal protection claim and remanded the case. 

Conclusion

The developments of relevance to agricultural interests keep rolling in.  There will be more discussed in future posts. 

March 3, 2020 in Bankruptcy, Environmental Law, Regulatory Law | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, February 18, 2020

More “Happenings” In Ag Law and Tax

Overview

The law impacts agricultural operations, rural landowners and agribusinesses in many ways.  On a daily basis, the courts address these issues.  Periodically, I devote a post to a “snippet” of some of the important developments.  Today, is one of those days.

More recent developments in agricultural law and taxation – it’s the topic of today’s post.

IRS Rulings on Portability.

Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 201850015 (Sept. 5, 2018); 20152016 (Sept. 21, 2018); 201852018 (Sept. 18, 2018); 201902027 (Sept. 24, 2018); 201921008 (Dec. 19, 2018); 201923001 (Feb. 28, 2019); 201923014 (Feb. 19, 2019); 201929013 (Apr. 4, 2019).    

Portability of the federal estate tax exemption between married couples comes into play when the first spouse dies and the taxable value of the estate is insufficient to require the use of all of the deceased spouse's federal exemption (presently $11.58 million) from the federal estate tax. Portability allows the amount of the exemption that was not used for the deceased spouse's estate to be transferred to the surviving spouse's exemption so that the surviving spouse can use the deceased spouse's unused exemption plus the surviving spouse’s own exemption when the surviving spouse later dies.  Portability is accomplished by filing Form 706 in the deceased spouse’s and is for federal estate tax purposes only.  Some states that have a state estate tax also provide for portability at the state level.  That’s an important feature for those states – it’s often the case that a state’s estate tax exemption is much lower than the federal exemption.

Sometimes a tax election is not made on a timely basis.  Over the past year, the IRS issued numerous rulings on portability of the federal estate tax exemption and the election that must be made to port the unused portion of the exemption at the death of the first spouse over to the surviving spouse.  In general, each of the rulings involved a decedent that was survived by a spouse, and the estate did not file a timely return to make the portability election. The estate found out its failure to elect portability after the due date for making the election.  The IRS determined that where the value of the decedent's gross estate was less than the basic exclusion amount in the year of decedent's death (including taxable gifts made during the decedent’s lifetime), “section 9100 relief” was allowed. Treas. Reg. §§301.9100-1; 301.9100-3

The rulings did not permit a late portability election and section 9100 relief when the estate was over the filing threshold, even if no estate tax was owed because of the marital, charitable, or other deductions.   In addition, it’s important to remember that there is a 2-year rule under Rev. Proc. 2017-34, 2017-26 I.R.B. 1282 making it possible to file Form 706 for portability purposes without section 9100 relief

Not Establishing a Lawyer Trust Account Properly Results in Taxable Income. 

Isaacson v. Comr., T.C. Memo. 2020-17. 

Attorney trust accounts are critical to making sure that money given to lawyers by clients or third-parties is kept safe and isn’t comingled with law firm funds or used incorrectly. But most people (even some new lawyers) don’t fully understand attorney trust accounts.  An attorney trust account is basically a special bank account where client funds are stored for safekeeping until time for withdrawal.  The funds function to keep client funds separate from the funds of the lawyer or law firm.  For example, a trust account bars the lawyer from using a client’s retainer fee from being used to cover law firm operating costs unless the funds have been “earned.”  But, whether funds have been “earned” has special meaning when tax rules come into play – think constructive receipt here.  This was at issue in a recent Tax Court case. 

In the case, a lawyer received a contingency fee upon settling a case.  He deposited the funds in his lawyer trust account but did not report the deposited amount in his income for the tax year of the deposit claiming that his fee was in dispute and, thus, subject to a substantial limitation on his rights to the funds.  The IRS disagreed and claimed that the account was not properly established as a lawyer trust account under state (CA) law.  The IRS also pointed out that the petitioner commingled his funds with his clients’ funds which gave him access to the funds.  The IRS also asserted that the petitioner should have reported the amount in income even if he later had to repay some of the amount.  The Tax Court agreed with the IRS on the basis that the lawyer failed to properly establish and use the trust account and because the he had taken the opposite position with respect to the fee dispute in another court action.  The income was taxable in the year the IRS claimed. 

Semi-Trailer in Farm Field Near Roadway With Advertising Subject to Permit Requirement. 

Commonwealth v. Robards, 584 S.W.3d 295 (Ky. Ct. App. 2019).

Counties, towns, municipalities and villages all have various rules when it comes to billboard and similar advertising.  Sometimes those rules can intersect with agriculture, farming activities and rural land.  That intersection was displayed in a recent case.

In the case, the defendant owned farm ground along the interstate and parked his semi-trailer within view from the interstate that had a vinyl banner tied to it that advertised a quilt shop on his property.  The plaintiff (State Transportation Department) issued the defendant a letter telling him to remove the advertising material. The defendant requested an administrative hearing.  The sign was within 660 feet of the interstate and was clearly visible from the interstate. The defendant collected monthly rent of $300 from the owner of the quilt shop for the advertisement. The defendant never applied for a permit to display the banner. The defendant uses the trailer for farm storage and periodically moves it around his property. The administrative hearing resulted in a finding that the trailer was being used for advertising material and an order was adopted stating the vinyl sign had to be removed. The defendant did not appeal this order, but did not remove the banner.  The plaintiff sued to enforce the order. After the filing of the suit, the defendant removed the vinyl sign only to reveal a nearly identical painted-on sign beneath it with the same advertising. The plaintiffs amended their complaint alleging that the painted-on sign was the equivalent of the vinyl sign ordered to be removed and requesting that the trial court order its removal. The trial court found that the trailer with the painted-on sign was not advertising material as the semi-trailer was being used for agricultural purposes and was not an advertisement. The court did concede that the semi-trailer was within 660 feet of the right-of-way of the interstate; was clearly visible to travelers on the highway; had the purpose of attracting the attention of travelers; defendant received a monthly payment for maintaining the sign.  On further review, the appellate court reversed and remanded.  The appellate court concluded that the trailer served a dual purpose of agricultural use and advertising and that there was no blanket exemption for agricultural use.  The trailer otherwise satisfied the statutory definition as an advertisement because of its location, visibility, and collection of rental income. The appellate court concluded that the defendant could use the trailer for agricultural purposes in its current location, but that advertising on it was subject to a permit requirement. 

Lack of Basis Information in Appraisal Summary Dooms Charitable Deduction for Conservation Easement Donation. 

Oakhill Woods, LLC v. Comr., T.C. Memo. 2020-24.

 The tax Code allows an income tax deduction for owners of property who relinquish certain ownership rights via the grant of a permanent conservation easement to a qualified charity (e.g.,  to preserve the eased property for future generations).  I.R.C. §170(h).  But, abuses of the provision are not uncommon, and the IRS has developed detailed rules that must be followed for the charitable deduction to be claimed.  The IRS audits such transactions and has a high rate of success challenging the claimed tax benefits.

In this case, the petitioner executed a deed of conservation easement on 379 acres to a qualified land trust in 2010.  The deed recited the conservation purpose of the easement. The petitioner claimed a $7,949,000 charitable deduction for the donation. Included with the petitioner’s return was an appraisal and Form 8283 which requires, among other things, basis information concerning the gifted property or an attached reasonable cause explanation of why the information was not included with the return. Basis information was not included on Form 8283, and the petitioner attached a statement taking the position that such information was not necessary. The IRS denied the deduction for noncompliance with Treas. Reg. §1.170A-13(c)(2). The Tax Court agreed with the IRS, noting that the lack of cost basis information was fatal to the deduction as being more than a minor and unimportant departure from the requirements of the regulation. The Tax Court cited its prior opinion in Belair Woods, LLC v. Comr., T.C. Memo. 2018-159. The Tax Court also rejected the petitioner’s argument that Treas. Reg. §1.170A-13(c)(4)(i)(D) and (E) was invalid. The petitioner claimed that the basis information was required with the return and not the appraisal summary, but the Tax Court rejected this argument because a “return” includes all IRS forms and schedules that are required to be a part of the return. As such, Form 8283 was an essential part of the return. In addition, the Tax Court noted that the underlying statute absolutely required basis information to be included with the appraisal summary and, in any event, the IRS’ interpretation of the statute via the regulation was reasonable. 

Cram-Down Interest Rate Determined. 

In re Country Morning Farms, Inc., No. 19-00478-FPC11, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 307 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 4, 2020).

A "cramdown" in a reorganization bankruptcy allows the debtor to reduce the principal balance of a debt to the value of the property securing it.  The creditor is entitled to receive the value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of the claim.  Thus, after a secured debt is written down to the fair market value of the collateral, with the amount of the debt in excess of the collateral value treated as unsecured debt which is generally discharged if not paid during the term of the plan, the creditor is entitled to the present value of the amount of the secured claim if the payments are stretched over a period of years.  11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(2)(A).    But, how is present value determined?  The U.S. Supreme Court offered clarity in 2004.  The matter of determining an appropriate discount rate was involved in a recent bankruptcy case involving a Washington dairy operation.

The debtor filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy and couldn’t agree with a creditor (a bank) on the appropriate interest rate to be used in the debtor’s reorganization plan. The parties agreed that the “Prime Plus” method set forth in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004) was the appropriate method to determine the “cram down” interest rate.” The parties agreed that the prime rate was presently 4.75 percent and that an additional amount as a “risk factor” should be added to the prime rate. The debtor proposed a 6 percent interest rate, based on the risk associated with the dairy business. The bank claimed that the appropriate interest rate was 7.75 percent – the highest rate factor under the Till analysis. The bank cited the length of the plan, the volatility of dairy market, the debtor’s capital structure, and conflicting projections from an expert when determining the appropriate risk factor. The court determined that the appropriate interest rate was 7 percent which raised the interest rate on some of the debtor’s loans and lowering it on others. 

Conclusion

There’s never a dull moment in the world of ag law and ag tax.  These are just a few developments in recent weeks.

February 18, 2020 in Bankruptcy, Estate Planning, Income Tax, Regulatory Law | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, February 6, 2020

Family Farming Arrangements and Liens; And, What’s A Name Worth?

Overview

Farmers, ranchers and agribusinesses engage in various transactions and arrangements on a daily basis, perhaps often without much thought given to the legal consequences if the arrangement or transaction goes awry.  In those situations, when the unexpected happens, it’s useful to know what legal recourse might be available.  Better yet, it’s good to know what the rules are in advance of something happening.

In today’s post, I look at two recent cases that illustrate common situations in agriculture that present interesting legal entanglements.

One type of ag lien, and getting the debtor’s name precisely correct on a lending document – these are the topics of today’s post.

Application of a Harvester’s Lien

States have lien statutes that can apply in various situations.  Often they can come into play when one party that supplies services or goods doesn’t get paid and a state lien statute allows the aggrieved party to apply a lien to particular property or income of the non-paying party to secure repayment.  But, each type of lien is unique and the particular requirements of the applicable lien statute must be followed closely.  One such lien was at the heart of an Iowa case recently.

In Kohn v. Muhr, No. 18-2059, 2019 Iowa App. LEXIS 1064 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2019), a father farmed with his son – a common occurrence in agriculture.  Each of them owned land separately, but they farmed with the father’s equipment on all of the land. The father farmed between 6,500 and 8100 acres, and the son approximately 7,000 to 7,500 acres of land. The son paid his father $400,000 for equipment and other expenses. The father contacted a custom harvester in the fall of 2016 to harvest 2,000 acres of corn. Before the work started, the father provided the custom harvester with crop-insurance maps specifying the fields to be harvested. The maps identified the son as the insured party. The father instructed the custom harvester to deliver the corn to multiple elevators in the father’s name. Stored grain was also delivered in the son’s name to elevators and an ethanol plant. Harvest did not conclude until April 8 or 9, 2017, because of weather. Neither the plaintiff nor son paid the custom harvester for the harvesting within 10 days of completion of the harvesting, and the custom harvester filed a lien against both the father and the son for the non-payment.

The father refused payment due to performance issues, and the harvester issued a demand letter. A couple of months later, the father and his bank requested that the harvester remove the father from the lien arguing that the crop was the son’s. The lien was preventing the father from making a margin call. A few days later, the son paid the harvester for the harvesting services and the lien was extinguished. The father then sued the harvester for wrongful filing of a financing statement to secure the lien, claiming that his commodity contracts were involuntarily liquidated and that he incurred financial damages when reestablishing his place in the grain trading market after the lien was extinguished. The father requested statutory and punitive damages. The harvester counterclaimed for breach of contract, seeking reimbursement for reasonable expenses and a declaratory judgment that the filing of the financing statement was authorized under state law. Both parties filed for summary judgment.

The trial court found that the father was a “debtor” under the Iowa Code §571.1B, and that the harvester had personally contracted for the harvesting services, took possession of the grain at the elevator, and commingled the harvested grain in the on-farm storage. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the harvester as to the properness of the lien filing.

The appellate court affirmed. On appeal, the father claimed that he was not a “debtor” that a lien could be filed against but was merely an agent for his son. The appellate court rejected this argument because it hadn’t been raised at the trial court level. While the harvester worked the son’s property, it was the father that contacted the harvester to arrange for the harvesting and other work. The father was the party responsible for ensuring the property at issue was harvested. The appellate court deemed the situation to be comparable to a contractor/subcontractor arrangement to provide services on the son’s property. As such, the father was “a person for whom the harvester render[ed] such harvesting services” and was a “debtor” under the applicable statute against which the harvester’s lien could apply.

The Importance of Getting A Debtor’s Name Precisely Correct

Ag business sometimes finance purchases of their inventory by farmers and ranchers.  Other times, such purchases are financed by a lender such as a bank.  In all situations, to “perfect” it’s interest in the debtor’s collateral, it is imperative that the debtor’s name be spelled correctly.  The states set forth various rules for determining the parameters of what a correct spelling means.  This is an important point, because claiming an interest in collateral involves filing a document informing the public of the creditor’s interest in the debtor’s collateral.  So, if the debtor’s name isn’t correct, another potential creditor checking the public record may not find the first lender’s interest and lend the debtor additional funds that otherwise wouldn’t have been loaned.

A recent Kansas case illustrates how important it is to get a debtor’s name correct on a publicly filed lending instrument.  In In re Preston, No. 18-41253, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 3864 (Bankr. D. Kan. Dec. 20, 2019), the debtor filed Chapter 12 bankruptcy in the fall of 2018 and his proposed reorganization plan treated a creditor’s security interest in the debtor’s non-titled personal property (including a combine and header) as unperfected (and, hence, unsecured) on the basis that the creditor’s filed financing statements did not correctly state the debtor’s name. In 2015, the debtor had purchased a combine and header from the creditor on an installment basis. The creditor filed a UCC-1 financing statement to perfect its purchase money lien in the combine and a separate financing statement to protect its lien in the header. Both financing statements listed the debtor’s name as "Preston D.Dennis" (with a period but no space). “Preston” was included in the box for Surname, and "D.Dennis" was in the box for “First Personal Name.” The "Additional name(s)/initial(s)" box was blank. The debtor referred to himself as "D. Dennis Preston" (with a period and a space) and his driver's license displayed his name as "Preston D Dennis" (without a period but with a space). The "Additional name(s)/initial(s)" box was blank.

The debtor’s argument that the creditor’s security interest in the combine and header were unsecured was based on the failure to satisfy Kan. Stat. Ann. §84-9-503 (both the collateral and the debtor were located in Kansas). That provision states that, for individual debtors with a Kansas driver’s license or identification card, the name of the debtor is sufficiently stated “only if the financing statement provides the name of the individual which is indicated on the driver’s license or identification card.” Kan. Stat. Ann. §84-9-503(a)(4). While minor errors or omissions on a financing statement will not cause a security interest to fail, a financing statement is deemed to be seriously misleading (and unperfected) if it doesn’t list the debtor’s name exactly as listed on the debtor’s driver’s license or identification card. Kan. Stat. Ann. §84-9-506(b). But, if the financing statement could be found by performing a search using the filing office’s standard search logic, it is not “seriously misleading” even if it fails to comply with Kan. Stat. Ann. §84-9-503(a)(4). The debtor claimed that the creditor’s interests were unsecured for failure to comport with Kansas law and because a search of the debtor’s name as denoted on the financing statements using standard search logic did not reveal the interests.

The bankruptcy court agreed with the debtor, finding that that the debtor’s name as indicated on the financing statements which did not match the debtor’s driver’s license was seriously misleading. The financing statements should have stated Preston as Debtor's surname, D as his first name, and Dennis as his middle name. The lack of a space and the period were material. The bankruptcy court rejected the creditor’s argument, made without authority, that a driver’s license does not identify the fields as "first," "personal," or "middle," and there is nothing to indicate that periods and spaces change what constitutes a name. The result was that the creditor’s security interests in the combine and header were unperfected, and the bankruptcy court sustained the debtor’s objection to the creditor’s proof of claim.  A space and a period proved to be a very costly mistake – a several hundred-thousand-dollar mistake. 

Conclusion

The two cases discussed today illustrate rather common scenarios in agriculture.  But, they have rather serious ramifications.  One slip-up on the law can really cause substantial problems for a farming or ranching operation, or even an agribusiness.   

February 6, 2020 in Bankruptcy, Secured Transactions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, January 29, 2020

Unique, But Important Tax Issues – “Claim of Right”; Passive Loss Grouping; and Bankruptcy Taxation

Overview

It’s not unusual for a taxpayer to present the tax preparer with unique factual situations that aren’t commonplace and have very unique rules.  Today’s post digs into three of those areas that often generate many questions from practitioners, and also aren’t handled easily by tax software.

Unique, but important tax issues - the topic of today’s post.

“Claim of Right” Doctrine Denies Remedy for Stock Sale

Heiting v. United States, No. 19-cv-224-jdp, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10967 (W.D. Wisc. Jan. 23, 2020)

In 1932, the U.S. Supreme Court created the “claim of right” doctrine.  American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932)It applies when a taxpayer receives income, but the income is subject to a contingency or other significant restriction that might remove it from the taxpayer.  In that situation, the taxpayer need not recognize the income.  In essence, the doctrine applies when the taxpayer doesn’t have a fixed right to the income.  If the taxpayer ultimately has to return the income that has been recognized, the taxpayer might be entitled to receive an offsetting deduction or a tax creditI.R.C. §1341. 

The “claim of right” doctrine arose in a recent Wisconsin federal court case in a rather unique situation.  Under the facts of the case, the plaintiffs, a married couple, created a revocable living trust in 2004 and amended it in 2012. The trust was created under Wisconsin law and named a bank as trustee with a different bank as successor trustee. The trust language gave the trustee broad discretion to invest, reinvest, or retain trust assets. However, the trust barred the trustee from doing anything with the stock of two companies that the trust held. The trustee apparently did not know of the prohibition and sold all of the stock of both companies in late 2015, triggering a taxable gain of $5,643,067.50. The sale proceeds remained in the trust. Approximately three months later, in early 2016, the trustee learned of the trust provision barring the stock sale and repurchased the stock with the trust’s assets. The grantors then revoked the trust later in 2016.

On their 2015 return, the plaintiffs reported the gain on the stock sale and paid the resulting tax. On their 2016 return, the plaintiffs claimed a deduction under I.R.C. 1341 for the tax paid on the stock sale gain the prior year. The IRS denied the deduction and the plaintiffs challenged the denial.  The IRS motioned to dismiss the case. The plaintiffs relied on the “claim of right” doctrine of I.R.C. §1341– they reported the income and paid the tax.  Under I.R.C. §1341, the plaintiffs had to: (1) establish that they included the income from the stock sale in a prior tax year; (2) show that they were entitled to a deduction because they did not have an unrestricted right to the income as of the close of the earlier tax year; and (3) show that the amount of the deduction exceeds $3,000. If the requirements are satisfied, a taxpayer can claim the deduction in the current tax year or claim a credit for the taxes paid in the prior year.

The IRS claimed that the plaintiffs could not satisfy the second element because the plaintiffs were not actually required to relinquish the proceeds of the stock sale. The court agreed, noting that once the stocks were sold the plaintiffs had the unrestricted right to the proceeds as part of the revocable trust, as further evidenced by them revoking the trust in 2016. The court noted that neither the trustee nor the plaintiffs had any obligation to repurchase the stock. The court also noted that under Wisconsin trust law, the plaintiffs could have instructed the trustee to do anything with the proceeds of the stock sale, and that they had the power to consent to the trustee’s action of selling the stock. In other words, they were not duty-bound to require the trustee to buy the stock back. Accordingly, the court determined that I.R.C. §1341 did not provide a remedy to the plaintiffs, and that any remedy, if there was one, would be against the trustee. 

Grouping and the Passive Loss Rules

Eger v. United States, 405 F. Supp. 3d 850 (N.D. Cal. 2019)

 Under I.R.C. §469, the deduction of losses from a “passive activity” is limited to the amount of passive income from all passive activities of the taxpayer.  Stated another way, a passive activity loss is the excess of the aggregate losses from all passive activities for the year over the aggregate income from all passive activities for that particular year.  For taxpayers with multiple activities, Treas. Reg. §1.469-4(c)(1) provides for a grouping of legal entities if the activities constitute an appropriate economic unit for the measurement of gain or loss. Also, rental activities can generally be grouped together.  Grouping can be helpful to satisfy the material participation tests of I.R.C. §469 to avoid the application of the passive loss rules.  This grouping issue came up in a recent federal case in Oklahoma involving rental activities. 

In the case, the plaintiff was a real estate professional within the meaning of I.R.C. §469(c)(7) that owned three properties (vacation properties) in different states that he offered for rent via management companies at various times during the year in issue. The plaintiff reserved the right for days of personal use of each rental property. The plaintiff sought to group the vacation rental properties with his other rental activities as a single activity for purposes of the material participation rules of I.R.C. §469. The IRS denied the grouping on the basis that the vacation rental properties were not rental properties on the basis that the average period of customer use for the vacation rentals was seven days or less as set forth in Treas. Reg. §1.469-1T(e)(3)(ii)(A), and that the petitioner was the “customer” rather than the management companies.

The court agreed with the IRS position on the basis that the plaintiff’s retained right to use each vacation property eliminated the management companies from having a continuous or recurring right to use the property when applying the test of Treas. Reg. §1.469-1(e)(3)(iii)(D) providing for measuring the period of customer use. As such, the facts of the case differed substantially from the contracts at issue in White v. Comr., T.C. Sum. Op. 2004-139 and Hairston v. Comr., T.C. Memo. 2000-386.  Thus, the management companies were not customers with a continuous right to use the properties, but merely provided marketing and rental services for the petitioner to rent out the properties. 

Prior Bankruptcy Filings Extends Non-Dischargeability Period

In re Nachimson v. United States, 606 B.R. 899 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2019)

The creation of the bankruptcy estate as a new taxpayer, separate from the debtor, highlights the five categories of taxes in a Chapter 7 or 11 case.  Category 1 taxes are taxes where the tax return was due more than three years before filing.  These taxes are dischargeable unless the debtor failed to file a return or filed a fraudulent return.  Category 2 taxes are the taxes due within the last three years.  These taxes are not dischargeable but are entitled to an eighth priority claim in the bankruptcy estate, ahead of the unsecured creditors.  Category 3 taxes are the taxes for the portion of the year of bankruptcy filing up to the day before the day of bankruptcy filing.  If the debtor's year is closed as of the date of filing, the taxes for the first year, while not dischargeable, are also entitled to an eighth priority claim in the bankruptcy estate.  If the debtor's year is not closed, the entire amount of taxes for the year of filing are the debtor's responsibility.  Category 4 taxes are the taxes triggered on or after the date of filing and are the responsibility of the bankruptcy estate.  Taxes due are paid by the bankruptcy estate as an administrative expense.  If the taxes exceed the available funds, the tax obligation remains against the bankruptcy estate but does not return to the debtor.  Category 5 taxes are for the portion of the year beginning with the date of bankruptcy filing (or for the entire year if the debtor's year is not closed) and are the responsibility of the debtor.

In a recent Oklahoma case, the debtor filed Chapter 7 in late 2018 after not filing his 2013 and 2014 returns. The 2013 return was due on October 15, 2014, and the 2014 return was due April 15, 2015. The debtor had previously filed bankruptcy in late 2014 (Chapter 13). That prior case was dismissed in early 2015. The debtor filed another bankruptcy petition in late 2015 (Chapter 11). Based on the facts, the debtor had been in bankruptcy proceedings during the relevant time period, (October 15, 2014, through October 25, 2018) for a total of 311 days. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A) provides, in general, that a discharge of debt in bankruptcy does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt for an income tax for the periods specified in 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8). One of the periods provided under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8), contained in 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i), is the three years before filing a bankruptcy petition. Also, 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) specifies that an otherwise applicable time period specified in 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) is suspended for any time during which the stay of proceedings was in effect in a prior bankruptcy case or during which collection was precluded by the existence of one or more confirmed bankruptcy plans, plus 90 days.  When a debtor files multiple, successive bankruptcy cases, the ordinary operation of the automatic stay 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) is altered by 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) which specifies that if a debtor had a case pending within the preceding one-year period that was dismissed, then the automatic stay with respect to any action taken with respect to a debt or property securing that debt terminates with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after the filing of the later case.

The debtor sought to have his 2013 and 2014 tax liabilities discharged in the present bankruptcy case under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(1)(A) on the basis that the filing dates for those returns were outside the three-year look-back period. The IRS took the position that the three-year “look-back” period was extended due to the debtor's bankruptcy filings. The court agreed with the IRS, noting that the three-year look-back period began on October 25, 2015. However, the court concluded that an issue remained as to whether the look-back period extended back 401 days, or only for the first 30 days following each bankruptcy filing as provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A). Based on a review of applicable bankruptcy case law, the court concluded that the tolling provision of 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) was not impacted by the automatic nature of 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A). Instead, for purposes of the tolling provision, the stay of proceedings was in effect in each of debtor's three previous cases until each was dismissed. Therefore, the court found that the look-back period extended back three years plus 401 days. Since the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition in the present case on October 25, 2018, the three-year plus 401-day look-back period reached back to September 19, 2014. Because the debtor's 2013 and 2014 tax liabilities were due after that date (including the extension for the 2013 liability), neither was dischargeable in the current bankruptcy case. 

Conclusion

Some clients have standard, straightforward returns.  Others have very complicated returns that present very unique issues.  The cases discussed today point out just three of the ways that tax issues can be very unique and difficult to sort out. 

January 29, 2020 in Bankruptcy, Income Tax | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, January 27, 2020

Ag Law and Tax in the Courts – Bankruptcy Debt Discharge; Aerial Application of Chemicals; Start-Up Expenses and Lying as Protected Speech

Overview

A couple of weeks ago I did a post on some recent developments in the courts involving ag law and ag tax.  Since that time, there have been additional important court developments.  Before getting deep into tax season, it may be a good idea to provide a summary of a few of these cases.

More ag law and tax developments in the courts – it’s the topic of today’s post.

Bankruptcy Discharge and Fraud

In re Kurtz, 604 B.R. 349 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2019)

A major feature of bankruptcy in the United States is the ability to discharge at least some debt.  This makes possible the “fresh start” for debtors. But, some debtors and debts are not eligible for discharge.  Of the several categories of debts that aren’t eligible for discharge, one category is reserved for debts associated with the debtor’s fraudulent conduct.  In this case, the creditor was a landlord and the debtor was the farm tenant who put up hay and other crops on the landlord’s land. The parties did not have a written lease agreement, but the landlord assumed the lease was a 50-50 crop share agreement where the parties would split the expenses and the sale proceeds equally. The record was unclear as to what the tenant understood the relationship to be, but he did make statements to others that it was a cash rent lease. The tenant did not pay the landlord after the first two cuttings of hay because he incurred expenses while cutting. After the third cutting was bailed the landlord contacted the tenant about payment. The tenant told the landlord that he could have the proceeds from the third cutting of hay and that the tenant was finished farming for the landlord. The tenant paid a third party to stack the hay. When the landlord attempted to sell the hay he discovered that the tenant had already given the hay to a third party to settle a debt. Both parties submitted expenses related to the hay crop that year.

The landlord filed a complaint in the tenant’s bankruptcy case alleging fraud and misrepresentation seeking that the debt to the landlord not be discharged. The bankruptcy court agreed, determining that the landlord proved that the tenant’s obligation of $5,916.50 was exempt from discharge because of the debtor’s false representation. The bankruptcy court determined that the full debt owed to the landlord was $22,292.84 based on the oral lease, but that the only part of that amount derived from fraud was the amount related to the third cutting of hay - $5,370.50 plus $546 for stacking. The balance of the unpaid debt arose from a general misunderstanding that wasn’t settled before the debtor put up the first two hay cuttings. The only blatant dishonesty, the bankruptcy court determined, concerned the third cutting.  

Aerial Application of Ag Chemicals Not Inherently Dangerous

Keller Farms, Inc. v. Stewart, No. 1:16 CV 265 ACL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210209 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 13, 2018), aff’d. sub. nom., Keller Farms, Inc. v. McGarity Flying Service, LLC, No. 18-3755, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 36664 (8th Cir. Dec. 11, 2019)

This case involves a dispute involving alleged damage to the plaintiffs’ trees caused by chemicals that allegedly drifted during aerial application. The plaintiffs attempted to hold liable both the aerial applicator and the landowner that hired the applicator. The plaintiffs claimed the landowner was vicariously liable (liable because of the relationship with the applicator) for the applicator’s actions because aerial spraying of burndown chemicals is an "inherently dangerous activity." The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law on the plaintiff's trespass claim, but the remaining issues were left for the jury to resolve. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants on the negligence and negligence per se claims. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial, arguing the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; that the trial court erred in excluding evidence; and that the trial court erred in granting the defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. The trial court, however, denied the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.

On appeal, the appellate court affirmed. The appellate court determined that the jury’s verdict was not against the weight of the evidence, and that the aerial application of herbicides was commonplace and not inherently dangerous. In addition, the appellate court noted that the defendants’ evidence was that the herbicides did not actually drift onto the plaintiffs’ property and that the applicator complied with all label requirements and sprayed during optimal conditions. The appellate court also determined that the trial court had ruled properly on evidentiary matters and that the plaintiff had not proven the alleged monetary damages to the trees properly. The appellate court also upheld the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.

The Line Between Nondeductible Start-Up Expenses and Deductible Business Expenses

Primus v. Comr., T.C. Sum. Op. 2020-2

The petitioner lived in New York and bought a property in Quebec containing 200 maple trees with a significant number of them being mature, maple syrup-producing trees. The tract contained other types of trees and pasture ground and hay fields and a small amount of ground suitable for growing crops. There were also various improvements on the tract. Before collecting sap and producing syrup, the petitioner thinned underbrush and later installed a pipeline to collect sap. Sap production began in 2017. When the petitioner bought the property in 2012, the cleared the areas of the tract where he planned to plant blueberry bushes. He ordered 2,000 blueberry bushes in 2014 and planted them in 2015. He reported a substantial amount of farming-related expenses in 2012 and 2013, with most of the expenses attributable to costs of repairs to improvements on the property. The petitioner deducted expenses attributable to preparatory costs for the production of selling maple syrup and blueberries as trade or business expenses under I.R.C. §162 (or as I.R.C. §212 expenses for income-producing property).

The IRS denied the deductions, asserting that they were nondeductible start-up expenses under I.R.C. §195 on the basis that the petitioner had not yet begun the business of producing maple syrup and blueberries. The Tax Court upheld the IRS position. The Tax Court noted that expenses are not deductible as trade or business expenses until the business is actually functioning and performing the activities for which it was organized. Here, the petitioner had not actually started selling blueberries or sap in either 2012 or 2013.  That meant that the expenses incurred in 2012 and 2013 were incurred to prepare the farm to produce sap and plant blueberries, and were nondeductible startup expenses. The thinning activities, while a generally acceptable industry practice, did not establish that the business had progressed beyond the startup phase. In addition, during the years at issue, the petitioner had not collected sap, installed any infrastructure needed to convert sap into syrup, or bought any blueberry bushes. 

Lying With Purpose of Harming Livestock Facility is Protected Speech

Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Schmidt, No. 18-2657-KHV, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10202 (D. Kan. Jan. 22, 2020)

The plaintiffs are a consortium of activist groups regularly conduct undercover investigations of livestock production facilities. Some of the plaintiffs gain access to farms through employment without disclosing the real purpose for which they seek employment (and lie about their ill motives if asked) and wear body cameras while working. For those hired into managerial and/or supervisory positions, they gain the ability to close off parts of the facility to avoid detection when filming and videoing. The film and photos obtained are circulated through the media and with the intent of encouraging public officials, including law enforcement, to take action against the facilities. The employee making the clandestine video or taking pictures, is on notice that the facility owner forbids such conduct via posted notices at the facility. The other plaintiffs utilize the data collected to cast the facilities in a negative public light, but do no “investigation.”

In 1990, Kansas enacted the Kansas Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research Facilities Protect Act (Act). K.S.A. §§ 47-1825 et seq.  The Act makes it a crime to commit certain acts without the facility owner’s consent where the plaintiff commits the act with the intent to damage an animal facility. Included among the prohibited acts are damaging or destroying an animal facility or an animal or other property at an animal facility; exercising control over an animal facility, an animal from an animal facility or animal facility property with the intent to deprive the owner of it; entering an animal facility that is not open to the public to take photographs or recordings; and remaining at an animal facility against the owner's wishes. K.S.A. § 47-1827(a)-(d). In addition, K.S.A. § 47-1828 provides a private right of action for "[a]ny person who has been damaged by reason of a violation of K.S.A. § 47-1827 against the person who caused the damage." For purposes of the Act, a facility owner’s consent is not effective if it is induced by force, fraud, deception duress or threat. K.S.A. § 47-1826(e). The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the Act, and filed a motion for summary judgment. The defendant also motioned for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs lacked standing or, in the alternative, the Act barred trespass rather than speech.

On the standing issue, the trial court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the portions of the Act governing physical damage to an animal facility (for lack of expressed intent to cause harm) and the private right of action provision, However, the trial court determined that the plaintiffs did have standing to challenge the exercise of control provision, entering a facility to take photographs, etc., and remaining at a facility against the owner’s wishes to take pictures, etc. The plaintiffs that did no investigations but received the information from the investigations also were deemed to have standing on the same grounds. On the merits, the trial court determined that the Act regulates speech by limiting what the plaintiffs could say and by barring pictures/videos. The trial court determined that the provisions of the Act at issue were content-based and restricted speech based on viewpoint – barring only that speech that would harm an animal facility. The trial court determined that barring lying is only constitutionally protected when it is associated with a legally recognizable harm, and the Act is unconstitutional to the extent it bars false speech intended to damage livestock facilities. Because the provisions of the Act at issue restrict content-based speech, its constitutionality is measured under a strict scrutiny standard. As such, a compelling state interest in protecting legally recognizable rights must exist. The trial court concluded that even if privacy and property rights involved a compelling state interest, the Act must be narrowly tailored to protect those rights. By focusing only on those intending to harm owners of a livestock facility, the Act did not bar all violations of property and privacy rights. The trial court also determined that the Governor was a proper defendant. 

The status of the litigation presently rests with the Kansas Attorney General and the Governor to determine the next step(s) to be taken.

Conclusion

There is never a dull moment in agricultural law and taxation.  I will provide more updates like this is in future posts.

January 27, 2020 in Bankruptcy, Civil Liabilities, Criminal Liabilities, Income Tax | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, January 17, 2020

Principles of Agricultural Law

Overview

Principles2020springedition400x533The fields of agricultural law and agricultural taxation are dynamic.  Law and tax impacts the daily life of a farmer, rancher, agribusiness and rural landowner practically on a daily basis.  Whether that is good or bad is not really the question.  The point is that it’s the reality.  Lack of familiarity with the basic fundamental and applicable rules and principles can turn out to be very costly.  As a result of these numerous intersections, and the fact that the rules applicable to those engaged in farming are often different from non-farmers, I started out just over 25 years ago to develop a textbook that addressed the major issues that a farmer or rancher and their legal and tax counsel should be aware of.  After three years, the book was complete – Principles of Agricultural Law - and it’s been updated twice annually since that time. 

The 46th edition is now complete, and it’s the topic of today’s post – Principles of Agricultural Law.

Subject Areas

The text is designed to be useful to farmers and ranchers; agribusiness professionals; ag lenders; educational professionals; laywers, CPAs and other tax preparers; undergraduate and law students; and those that simply want to learn more about legal and tax issues.  The text covers a wide range of topics.  Here’s just a sample of what is covered:

Ag contracts.  Farmers and ranchers engage in many contractual situations, including ag leases, to purchase contracts.  The potential perils of verbal contracts are numerous as one recent bankruptcy case points out.  See, e.g., In re Kurtz, 604 B.R. 549 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2019).  What if a commodity is sold under forward contract and a weather event destroys the crop before it is harvested?  When does the law require a contract to be in writing?  For purchases of goods, do any warranties apply?  What remedies are available upon breach? If a lawsuit needs to be brought to enforce a contract, how soon must it be filed?

Ag financing.  Farmers and ranchers are often quite dependent on borrowing money for keeping their operations running.  What are the rules surrounding ag finance?  This is a big issue for lenders also?  For instance, in one recent Kansas case, the lender failed to get the debtor’s name exactly correct on the filed financing statement.  The result was that the lender’s interest in the collateral (a combine and header) securing the loan was discharged in bankruptcy.   In re Preston, No. 18-41253, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 3864 (Bankr. D. Kan. Dec. 20, 2019). 

Ag bankruptcy.  A unique set of rules can apply to farmers that file bankruptcy.  Chapter 12 bankruptcy allows farmers to de-prioritize taxes.  That can be a huge benefit.  Knowing how best to utilize those rules is very beneficial.

Income tax.  Tax and tax planning permeate daily life.  Deferral contracts; depreciation; installment sales; like-kind exchanges; credits; losses; income averaging; reporting government payments; etc.  The list could go on and on.  Having a basic understanding of the rules and the opportunities available can add a lot to the bottom line of the farming or ranching operation. 

Real property.  Of course, land is typically the biggest asset in terms of value for a farming and ranching operation.  But, land ownership brings with it many potential legal issues.  Where is the property line?  How is a dispute over a boundary resolved?  Who is responsible for building and maintaining a fence?  What if there is an easement over part of the farm?  Does an abandoned rail line create an issue?  What if land is bought or sold under an installment contract? 

Estate planning.  While the federal estate tax is not a concern for most people and the vast majority of farming and ranching operations, when it does apply it’s a major issue that requires planning.  What are the rules governing property passage at death?  Should property be gifted during life?  What happens to property passage at death if there is no will?  How can family conflicts be minimized post-death?  Does the manner in which property is owned matter?  What are the applicable tax rules?  These are all important questions.

Business planning.  One of the biggest issues for many farm and ranch families is how to properly structure the business so that it can be passed on to subsequent generations and remain viable economically.  What’s the best entity choice?  What are the options?  Of course, tax planning is part and parcel of the business organization question. 

Cooperatives.  Many ag producers are patrons of cooperatives.  That relationship creates unique legal and tax issues.  Of course, the tax law enacted near the end of 2017 modified an existing deduction for patrons of ag cooperatives.  Those rules are very complex.  What are the responsibilities of cooperative board members? 

Civil liabilities.  The legal issues are enormous in this category.  Nuisance law; liability to trespassers and others on the property; rules governing conduct in a multitude of situations; liability for the spread of noxious weeds; liability for an employee’s on-the-job injuries; livestock trespass; and on and on the issues go.  It’s useful to know how the courts handle these various situations.

Criminal liabilities.  This topic is not one that is often thought of, but the implications can be monstrous.  Often, for a farmer or rancher or rural landowner, the possibility of criminal allegations can arise upon (sometimes) inadvertent violation of environmental laws.  Even protecting livestock from predators can give rise to unexpected criminal liability.  Mail fraud can also arise with respect to the participation in federal farm programs.  The areas of life potentially impacted with criminal penalties are worth knowing, as well as knowing how to avoid tripping into them.

Water law.  Of course, water is essential to agricultural production.  Water issues vary across the country, but they tend to focus around being able to have rights to water in the time of shortage and moving the diversion point of water.  Also, water quality issues are important.  In essence, knowing whether a tract of land has a water right associated with it, how to acquire a water right, and the relative strength of that water rights are critical to understand.

Environmental law.  It seems that agricultural and the environment are constantly in the news.  The Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act and other federal (and state) laws and regulations can have a big impact on a farming or ranching operation.  Just think of the issues with the USDA’s Swampbuster rules that have arisen over the past 30-plus years.  It’s good to know where the lines are drawn and how to stay out of (expensive) trouble.

Regulatory law.  Agriculture is a very heavily regulated industry.  Animals and plants, commodities and food products are all subject to a great deal of regulation at both the federal and state level.  Antitrust laws are also important to agriculture because of the highly concentrated markets that farmers buy inputs from and sell commodities into.  Where are the lines drawn?  How can an ag operation best position itself to negotiate the myriad of rules?   

Conclusion

The academic semesters at K-State and Washburn Law are about to begin for me.  It is always encouraging to me to see students getting interested in the subject matter and starting to understand the relevance of the class discussions to reality.  The Principles text is one that can be very helpful to not only those engaged in agriculture, but also for those advising agricultural producers.  It’s also a great reference tool for Extension educators. 

If you are interested in obtaining a copy, you can visit the link here:  http://washburnlaw.edu/practicalexperience/agriculturallaw/waltr/principlesofagriculturallaw/index.html

January 17, 2020 in Bankruptcy, Business Planning, Civil Liabilities, Contracts, Cooperatives, Criminal Liabilities, Environmental Law, Estate Planning, Income Tax, Insurance, Real Property, Regulatory Law, Secured Transactions, Water Law | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, December 30, 2019

The “Almost Top Ten” Ag Law and Ag Tax Developments of 2019

Overview

It’s the time of year again where I sift through the legal and tax developments impacting agriculture from the past year, and rank them in terms of their importance to farmers, ranchers, agribusinesses, rural landowners and the ag sector in general. 

As usual, 2019 contained many legal developments of importance.  There were relatively fewer major tax developments in 2019 compared to prior years, but the issues ebb and flow from year-to-year.  It’s also difficult to pair things down to ten significant developments.  There are other developments that are also significant.  So, today’s post is devoted to those developments that were left on the cutting table and didn’t quite make the “Top Ten” for 2019.

The “almost top ten of 2019” – that’s the topic of today’s post.

Chapter 12 Debt Limit Increase

To be eligible for Chapter 12 bankruptcy, a debtor must be a “family farmer” or a “family fisherman” with “regular annual income.”  A “family farmer” is defined as an individual or individual and spouse who earned more than 50 percent of their gross income from farming either for the taxable year preceding the year of filing or during the second and third tax years preceding filing; have more than 50 percent of their debt be debt from a farming operation that the debtor owns or operates; and, the aggregate debt must not exceed a threshold amount. That threshold amount has only adjusted for inflation since enactment of Chapter 12 in 1986, even though farms have increased in size and capital needs faster than the rate of inflation.  When enacted, 86 percent of farmers were estimated to qualify for Chapter 12.  That percentage had declined over time due to the debt limit only periodically increasing with inflation and stood at $4,411,400 as of the beginning of 2019.  Thus, fewer farmers were able to use Chapter 12 to deprioritize taxes associated with the sale of farm assets used in the farming operation and ultimately put together a reorganization plan that will allow the farmer to stay on the farm to continue production activities, make restructured loan payments and have some debt written off.  However, as of August 23, 2019, the debt limit for a family farmer filing Chapter 12 was increased to $10,000,000 for plans filed on or after that date.  H.R. 2336, Family Farmer Relief Act of 2019, signed into law on Aug. 23, 2019 as Pub. L. No. 116-51.

Which Government Agency Sues a Farmer For a WOTUS Violation?

In 2019, a federal trial court allowed the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to sue a farmer for an alleged CWA dredge and bill permit violation without a specific recommendation from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  The farmer was alleged to have discharged “pollutants” into a “waters of the United States” (WOTUS) as a result of tractor tillage activities on his farmland containing or near to wetlands contiguous to a creek that flowed into a WOTUS.  Staff of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE) saw the tilled ground and investigated.  The COE staff then conferred with the EPA and referred the matter to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).  The DOJ sued (during the Obama Administration) for enforcement of a CWA §404 permit “by the authority of the Attorney General, and at the request of the Secretary of the Army acting through the United States Corps of Engineers.”  The DOJ alleged that the equipment "constituted a 'point source'" pollutant under the CWA and "resulted in the placement of dredged spoil, biological materials, rock, sand, cellar dirt or other earthen material constituting “pollutants” (within the meaning of 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6)) into waters of the United States. The DOJ alleged that the defendant impacted water plants, changed the river bottom and/or replaced Waters of the United States with dry land, and "resulted in the 'discharge of any pollutant' within the meaning of 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)."  The farmer moved for summary judgment on the basis that the CWA authorizes only the EPA Administrator to file a CWA §404 enforcement action and that the court, therefore, lacked jurisdiction.  The court disagreed and determined that the defendant could be sued by the U.S. Department of Justice upon the mere recommendation of the COE and without a specific recommendation from the EPA alleging a CWA violation, and in a situation where the CWA did not determine any CWA jurisdiction and only the COE did.  This finding was despite a 1979 Attorney General opinion No. 197 determining that the EPA and not the COE has the ultimate authority to construe what is a navigable WOTUS.  Ultimately, the parties negotiated a settlement costing the farmer over $5 million.  United States v. Lapant, No. 2:16-CV-01498-KJM-DB, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75309 (E.D. Cal. May 3, 2019)United States v. Lapant, No. 2:16-CV-01498-KJM-DB, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93590 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 3, 2019).

USDA’s Swampbuster “Incompetence”

How does the USDA determine if a tract of farmland contains a wet area that is subject to the Swampbuster rules?  That’s a question of key importance to farmers.  That process was at issue in a 2019 case, and the court painted a rather bleak and embarrassing picture of the USDA bureaucrats.  In fact, the USDA-NRCS was brutalized (rightly so) by the appellate court’s decision for its lack of candor and incompetence.  I will skip the details here (I covered the case in a blog post earlier in 2019), but the appellate court dealt harshly with the USDA.  The USDA uses comparison sites to determine if a particular site is a wetland subject to Swampbuster rules.  In this case, the USDA claimed that 7 C.F.R. § 12.31(b)(2)(ii) allowed them to select a comparison site that was "on the same hydric soil map unit" as the subject property, rather than on whether the comparison site had the same hydrologic features as the subject tract(s).  The appellate court rejected this approach as arbitrary and capricious, noting that the NRCS failed to try an "indicator-based wetland hydrology" approach or to use any of their other tools when picking a comparison site. In addition, the appellate court noted a COE manual specifies that, “[a] hydrologist may be needed to help select and carry out the proper analysis" in situations where potential lack of hydrology is an issue such as in this case.   However, the NRCS did not send a hydrologist to personally examine the plaintiff’s property, claiming instead that a comparison site was not even necessary.  Based on 7 C.F.R. §12.32(a)(2), the USDA claimed, the removal of woody hydrophytic vegetation from hydric soils to permit the production of an agricultural commodity is all that is needed to declare the area "converted wetland."  The appellate court concluded that this understanding of the statue was much too narrow and went against all the other applicable regulatory and statutory provisions by completely forgoing the basis of hydrology that the provisions are grounded in.   Accordingly, the appellate court reasoned that because hydrology is the basis for a change in wetland determination, the removal of trees is merely a factor to determine the presence of a wetland, but is not a determining factor.  In addition, the appellate court pointed out that the NRCS never indicated that the removal of trees changed the hydrology of the property during the agency appeal process – a point that the USDA ignored during the administrative appeal process.  The court’s decision is a step in the right direction for agriculture.  Boucher v. United States Department of Agriculture, 934 F.3d 530(7th Cir. 2019). 

No More EPA “Finger on the Scales”

During 2019, a federal trial court ruled that the EPA has the authority to bar persons currently receiving grant money from the EPA to serve on EPA scientific advisory committees.  That’s an important development for the regulated community, including farmers and ranchers.  The court’s opinion ended an Obama-era EPA policy of allowing EPA advisory committee members to be in present receipt of EPA grants.  At issue in the case was a directive of the Trump-EPA regarding membership in its federal advisory committees.  The directive specified “that no member of an EPA federal advisory committee be currently in receipt of EPA grants.” The directive reversed an Obama-era rule that allowed scientists in receipt of EPA grants to sit on advisory panels.  That rule was resulting in biased advisory committees stacked with committee members that opposed coal and favored an expansive “Waters of the United States” rule among other matters.  In defending its policy change, the EPA explained that “while receipt of grant funds from the EPA may not constitute a financial conflict of interest, receipt of that funding could raise independence concerns depending on the nature of the research conducted and the issues addressed by the committee.” Thus, the change was necessary “to ensure integrity and confidence in its advisory committees.” The trial court found the EPA’s explanation to be within the zone of reasonableness. Based on these findings, the trial court held that the EPA action was rational, considered the relevant factors and was within the authority delegated to the agency.  The court granted the EPA’s motion to dismiss the case. Physicians for Social Responsibility v. Wheeler, 359 F. Supp. 3d 27 (D. D.C. 2019).

Coming-To-The-Nuisance By Staying Put?

Nuisance lawsuits filed against farming operations are often triggered by offensive odors that migrate to neighboring rural residential landowners.  In these situations courts consider numerous factors in determining whether any particular farm or ranch operation is a nuisance.    Factors that are of primary importance are priority of location and reasonableness of the operation.  Together, these two factors have led courts to develop a “coming to the nuisance” defense.  This means that if people move to an area they know is not suited for their intended use, they should be prohibited from claiming that the existing uses are nuisances.  But, what if the ag nuisance comes to you?  Is the ag operation similarly protected in that situation?  An interesting Indiana court case in 2019 dealt with the issue.  In the case, the defendants were three individuals, their farming operation and a hog supplier.  Basically, a senior member of the family retired to a farm home on the premises and other family members established a large-scale confined animal feeding operation (CAFO) on another part of the farm nearby.  The odor issue got bad enough that the retired farmer sued.  However, the court determined that the CAFO was operated properly, had all of the necessary permits, and was within the zoning laws.  The court noted that the plaintiff alleged no distinct, investment-backed expectations that the CAFO had frustrated.  The court upheld the state right-to-farm law and also determined that a “taking” had not occurred because the plaintiff had not sold his home and moved away from the place where he grew up and lived all of his life.  Himsel v. Himsel, No. 18A-PL-645, 2019 Ind. App. LEXIS 181 (Ind. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2019).

Obamacare Individual Mandate Unconstitutional

In his decision in 2012 upholding Obamacare as constitutional, Chief Justice Roberts hinged the constitutionality of the law on the individual mandate (contained in I.R.C. §5000A) being a tax and, therefore, within the taxing authority of the Congress.  Thus, if the tax is eliminated or the rate of the penalty tax taken to zero is the law unconstitutional?  That’s a possibility now that the tax rate on the penalty is zero for tax years beginning after 2018.  In late 2018, a federal district court noted that the payment was distinct from the individual mandate and determined that the individual mandate was no longer constitutional as of January 1, 2019 because it would no longer trigger any tax. In addition, because the individual mandate was the linchpin of the entire law, the court determined that the provision could not be severed from the balance of the law. As a result, the court reasoned, as of January 1, 2019, Obamacare no longer had any constitutional basis.  Texas v. United States, 340 F.3d 579 (N.D. Tex. 2018).  In 2019, the appellate court affirmed.  Texas v. United States, No. 19-10011, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 37567 (5th Cir. Dec .18, 2019).  The appellate court determined that the individual mandate was unconstitutional because it could no longer be read as a tax, and there was no other constitutional provision that justified that exercise of congressional power.  Watch for this case to end up back before the Supreme Court.  The case is of monumental importance not only on the health insurance issue.  Obamacare contained many taxes that would be invalidated if the law were finally determined to be unconstitutional. 

Conclusion

These were the developments that didn’t quite make the “Top 10” of 2019.  In Wednesday’s post, I will start the trek through the Top 10 of 2019.

December 30, 2019 in Bankruptcy, Environmental Law, Income Tax, Regulatory Law | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, September 9, 2019

Are Taxes Dischargeable in Bankruptcy?

Overview

When facing financial trouble and bankruptcy, don’t forget about the taxes.  While Chapter 12 bankruptcy contains a provision allowing for the deprioritization of taxes, there is no comparable provision for other types of bankruptcies.  But, for Chapter 7 and 11 filers, there is a possibility that taxes could be dischargeable in bankruptcy.  That’s because under those bankruptcy code provisions, a new tax entity is created at the time of bankruptcy filing. 

But, discharging taxes in bankruptcy is a tricky thing.  It involves timing and, perhaps, not filing successive cases.

The discharge of tax liability in bankruptcy – it’s the topic of today’s post.

The Bankruptcy Estate as New Taxpayer

As noted, for Chapter 7 (liquidation bankruptcy) or Chapter 11 (non-farm reorganization bankruptcy), a new tax entity separate from the debtor is created when bankruptcy is filed.  That’s not the case for individuals that file Chapter 12 (farm) bankruptcy, or Chapter 13 bankruptcy, and for partnerships and corporations under all bankruptcy chapters.  In those situations, the debtor continues to be responsible for the income tax consequences of business operations and disposition of the debtor's property.  Thus, payment of all the tax triggered in bankruptcy is the responsibility of the debtor.  The only exception is that Chapter 12 filers can take advantage of a special rule that makes the taxes a non-priority claim.  11 U.S.C. §1232.

Categories of taxes.  The creation of the bankruptcy estate as a new taxpayer, separate from the debtor, highlights the five categories of taxes in a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 case.

  • Category 1 taxes are taxes where the tax return was last timely due more than three years before filing. If an extension was filed, an individual’s return can last be timely filed on October 15th.  In this case, the tax is dischargeable provided the bankruptcy is filed on or after October 16th three years after the year the tax return was filed. These taxes are dischargeable unless the debtor failed to file a return or filed a fraudulent return. 
  • Category 2 taxes are the taxes due within the last three years. These taxes are not dischargeable but are entitled to an eighth priority claim in the bankruptcy estate, ahead of the unsecured creditors. 
  • Category 3 taxes are the taxes for the portion of the year of bankruptcy filing up to the day before the day of bankruptcy filing. If the debtor's year is closed as of the date of filing, the taxes for the first year, while not dischargeable, are also entitled to an eighth priority claim in the bankruptcy estate.  If the debtor's year is not closed, the entire amount of taxes for the year of filing are the debtor's responsibility.
  • Category 4 taxes are the taxes triggered on or after the date of filing and are the responsibility of the bankruptcy estate. Taxes due are paid by the bankruptcy estate as an administrative expense.  If the taxes exceed the available funds, the tax obligation remains against the bankruptcy estate but does not return to the debtor.  Most bankruptcy trustees abandon assets if the taxes incurred will make the bankruptcy estate administratively insolvent.
  • Category 5 taxes are for the portion of the year beginning with the date of bankruptcy filing (or for the entire year if the debtor's year is not closed) and are the responsibility of the debtor.

The election to close the debtor’s tax year.  In general, the bankrupt debtor’s tax year does not change upon the filing of bankruptcy.  But, debtors having non-exempt assets that will be administered by the bankruptcy trustee may elect to end the debtor’s tax year as of the day before the bankruptcy filing.

Making the election creates two short tax years for the debtor.  The first short year ends the day before bankruptcy filing and the second year begins with the bankruptcy filing date and ends on the bankrupt’s normal year-end date.  If the election is not made, the debtor remains individually liable for income taxes for the year of filing.  But, if the election is made, the debtor’s income tax liability for the first short year is treated as a priority claim against the bankruptcy estate, and can be collected from the estate if there are sufficient assets to pay the bankruptcy estate’s claims through the eighth priority.  If there are not sufficient assets to pay the income tax, the remaining tax liability is not dischargeable, and the tax can be collected from the debtor at a later time.  The income tax the debtor owes for the years ending after the filing is paid by the debtor and not by the bankruptcy estate.  Thus, closing the debtor’s tax year can be particularly advantageous if the debtor has substantial income in the period before the bankruptcy filing.  Conversely, if a net operating loss, unused credits or excess deductions are projected for the first short year, a short year election should not be made in the interest of preserving the loss for application against the debtor’s income from the rest of the taxable year.  Even if the debtor projects a net operating loss, has unused credits or anticipates excess deductions, the debtor may want to close the tax year as of the day before bankruptcy filing if the debtor will not likely be able to use the amounts, the items could be used by the bankruptcy estate as a carryback to earlier years of the debtor (or as a carryforward) and,

But, in any event, if the debtor does not act to end the tax year, none of the debtor’s income tax liability for the year of bankruptcy filing can be collected from the bankruptcy estate.  Likewise, if the short year is not elected, the tax attributes (including the basis of the debtor’s property) pass to the bankruptcy estate as of the beginning of the debtor’s tax year.  Therefore, for example, no depreciation may be claimed by the debtor for the period before bankruptcy filing.  That could be a significant issue for many agricultural debtors.

Consider the following example:

Sam Tiller, a calendar year/cash method taxpayer, on January 26, 2019, bought and placed in service in his farming business, a new combine that cost $400,000.  Sam is planning on writing off the entire cost of the new combine in 2019.  However, assume that during 2019, Sam’s financial condition worsens severely due to a combination of market and weather conditions.  As a result, Sam files Chapter 7 bankruptcy on September 5, 2019.

If Sam does not elect to close the tax year, the tax attributes (including the basis of his property) will pass to the bankruptcy estate as of the beginning of Sam’s tax year (January 1, 2019).  Therefore, Sam would not be able to claim any of the depreciation for the period before he filed bankruptcy (January 1, 2016, through September 4, 2019).

The Timing Issue - Illustrative Cases

As you have probably already figured out, timing of the bankruptcy filing is critical to achieving the best possible tax result.  Unfortunately, it’s often the case that tax considerations in bankruptcy are not sufficiently thought out and planned for to achieve optimal tax results.  Unfortunately, this point is illustrated by a couple of recent cases. 

Filing too soon.  In Ashmore v. Comr., T.C. Memo. 2017-233, the petitioner claimed that his 2009 tax liability, the return for which was due on April 15, 2010, was discharged in bankruptcy.   He filed Chapter 7 on April 8, 2013. That assertion challenged whether the collection action of the IRS was appropriate.  As indicated above, the Tax Court noted that taxes are not dischargeable in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy if  the return can last be timely filed within three years before the date the bankruptcy was filed.  Because the petitioner filed bankruptcy a week too soon, the Tax Court held that his 2009 taxes were not dischargeable and could be collected.  As a result, the IRS settlement officer did not abuse discretion in sustaining the IRS levy.  In addition, the Tax Court, held that the IRS did not abuse the bankruptcy automatic stay provision that otherwise operates to bar creditor actions to collect on debts that arose before the bankruptcy petition was filed. 

The Tax Court’s conclusion in Ashmore is not surprising.  The three-year rule has long been a part of the bankruptcy code.  Indeed, in In re Reine, 301 B.R. 556 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2003), the debtor filed the Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition more than three years after filing the tax return, but within three years of due date of return.  The court held that the debtor’s tax debt was not dischargeable.

The peril of multiple filings.  In Nachimson v. United States, No. 18-14479-SAH, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 2696 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. Aug. 23, 2019), the debtor filed Chapter 7 on October 25, 2018 after not filing his tax returns for 2013 through 2016. Immediately after filing bankruptcy, the debtor filed an action claiming that his past due taxes were discharged under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(1).  After extension, the debtor’s 2013 return was due on October 15, 2014.  His 2014 return was due April 15, 2015.  The 2016 return was due on April 15, 2016.  The 2016 return was due April 15, 2017.  The debtor had previously filed bankruptcy in late 2014 (Chapter 13), but the case was dismissed on January 14, 2015 after lasting 80 days.  He then filed a Chapter 11 case on November 5, 2015, but it was dismissed on April 13, 2016 after 160 days.  After that dismissal, he filed another Chapter 11 case on October 20, 2016, but it was dismissed on December 30, 2016 after 71 days.  He filed the present Chapter 7 case, as noted, on October 25, 2018.  Thus, as of October 25, 2018, he had been in bankruptcy proceedings from October 15, 2014 through October 25, 2018 -311 days. 

11 U.S.C. §523(a)(1)(A) provides, in general, that a discharge of debt in bankruptcy does not discharge an individual debtor from any income tax debt for the periods specified in 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(8). One of the periods contained in 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(8)(A)(i), is the three-year period before the bankruptcy petition is filed.  Importantly, 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(8)(A)(ii)(II) specifies that an otherwise applicable time period specified in 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(8) is suspended for any time during which a governmental unit is barred under applicable non-bankruptcy law from collecting a tax as a result of the debtor’s request for a hearing and an appeal of any collection action taken or proposed against the debtor, plus 90 days; plus any time during which the stay of proceedings was in effect in a prior bankruptcy case or during which collection was precluded by the existence of one or more confirmed bankruptcy plans.

So, what does all this mean?  It means that when a debtor files multiple, successive bankruptcy cases, the ordinary operation of the automatic stay 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) and the three-year look-back rule is altered by 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) which specifies that if a debtor had a case pending within the preceding one-year period that was dismissed, then the automatic stay with respect to any action taken with respect to a debt or property securing that debt terminates with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after the filing of the later case.

Here, the debtor sought to have his 2013 and 2014 tax liabilities discharged in the present bankruptcy case under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(1)(A) on the basis that the filing dates for those returns were outside the three-year look-back period.  He wanted a rather straightforward application of the three-year rule.  However, the IRS took the position that the three-year “look-back” period was extended due to the debtor's bankruptcy filings. The court agreed with the IRS, noting that the three-year look-back period began on October 25, 2015. But the court determined that the real issue was whether the look-back period extended back 401 (311 plus 90) days, or only for the first 30 days following each bankruptcy filing as provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A).

The court noted that the Congress, in 2005, amended 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(8) to codify the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43 (2002) where the Supreme Court concluded that the tolling provision of 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) was not impacted by the automatic nature of 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A). Instead, for purposes of the tolling provision, the stay of proceedings was in effect in each of debtor's three previous cases until each was dismissed. In addition, the Congress amended the statute to tack-on another 90 days to the extension.  See, In re Kolve, 459 B.R. 376 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 2011).  The look-back period automatically tolls upon the filing of a previous case.  See, e.g., In re Clothier, 588 B.R. 28 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2018).  Thus, instead of suspending the look-back period, it extends it and allows the priority and nondischargeability of tax claims to reach further into the past.  Thus, the court in the present case determined that the look-back period extended back three years plus 401 days. Since the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition in the present case on October 25, 2018, the three-year plus 401-day look-back period (80 + 160 + 71 +90) reached back to September 19, 2014. Because the debtor's 2013 and 2014 tax liabilities were due after that date (including the extension for the 2013 liability), neither was dischargeable in the current bankruptcy case. 

Conclusion

Bankruptcy planning should necessarily account for taxes.  The cases point out that timing of the filing of the bankruptcy petition is critical, and that successive filings can create tremendous complications.  Competent legal and tax counsel is a must, in addition to competent bankruptcy counsel. 

September 9, 2019 in Bankruptcy, Income Tax | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, August 2, 2019

Ag Legal Issues in the Courts

Overview

It’s been about a month since I devoted a blog post to court litigation involving agricultural producers and businesses.  So, it’s time to devote another post to the matter as an illustration of how often the law and the business of agriculture intersect.  These posts have proven to be quite popular and instructive.

“Ag in the Courtroom” – the most recent edition.  It’s the topic of today’s post.

More Bankruptcy Developments

As I have noted in numerous posts over the past couple of years, the difficult economic conditions in much of agriculture in the Great Plains and the Midwest have made bankruptcy law rise in importance.  Fortunately, legislation is headed to the President’s desk that will increase the debt limit in Chapter 12 bankruptcy to $10 million and place some of the existing Chapter 12 provisions in Chapter 11 for use by non-farm small businesses.  Those were needed pieces of legislation.

A recent Alabama bankruptcy case illustrates the peril of selling loan collateral without the creditors notice and consent.  It’s a unique set of facts because the debtor sold the collateral, a tractor, to bail her boyfriend out of jail.  In In re Reid, 598 B.R. 674 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2019), the Farm Service Agency (FSA) attached itself as a creditor in the debtor’s chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. In March of 2016 the debtor took out two FSA loans for a total of $50,000. A security agreement was also executed at the same time granting the FSA a security interest in "All farm equipment . . . and inventory, now owned or hereafter acquired by the Debtor, together with all replacements, substitutions, additions, and accessions thereto, including but not limited to the following which are located in the State of Alabama." A specific list of assets was attached, including a New Holland tractor, ten beef breeding cows, and nine calves. The debtor used the loan proceeds to purchase the equipment and livestock that was listed as collateral.

In June of the same year, the debtor was notified that she could not have cattle on the land she purchased with another loan not at issue in the case. However, the debtor was never notified of the restriction and it was not stated in the purchase contracts. Ultimately, the debtor was given thirty days to vacate the premises. Around this time, the debtor’s equipment and cattle started to go missing. The debtor was also becoming aware that her boyfriend (and father of her children) had a drug problem, and she began to suspect that he was selling the equipment and cattle for drugs. Later, the debtor attempted to stop a man from taking cattle from the property and the man said to take it up with her boyfriend. The debtor did not report the cattle or equipment as stolen. The debtor’s boyfriend was arrested about the same time for drug crimes and eluding the police. The debtor vacated the property with the only collateral remaining at the property being the New Holland tractor, which the debtor listed for sale on Facebook. The debtor testified that she sold the New Holland tractor to an unknown purchaser for between $6,000.00 and $8,000.00. But the exact price and identity of the purchaser could not be found as the debtor deleted her Facebook account. The proceeds of the tractor sale were put towards bail money for the boyfriend. The debtor never made a payment on the loans and vacated the property before the first payment was due.

The FSA attempted to recover the tractor but was unsuccessful. The FSA sought to have the bankruptcy court find the debt owed to the FSA in the amount of $52,048.56 plus interest to be non-dischargeable for fraud; fiduciary defalcation; embezzlement; and willful and malicious injury. The court averaged the alleged selling price of the tractor and rendered $7,000 non-dischargeable. The court also determined that the debtor did not fraudulently obtain the FSA loans, and did not embezzle the collateral because fraud wasn’t present. Because willful and malicious injury was present upon the debtor’s sale of the tractor without notice to the FSA and use of the proceeds for the debtor’s personal benefit, the $7,000 that the debtor received upon sale of the tractor was non-dischargeable. 

The Intersection of State and Federal Regulation

Agriculture is a heavily regulated industry.  Sometimes that regulation is apparent and sometimes it occurs an a rather unique manner.  Sometimes it comes from the federal government and sometimes it is purely at the state and local level.  In yet other situations, the regulation is an interesting (and frustrating for those subject to it) blend of federal and state/local regulation. 

In 2009, the defendant in Carroll Airport Comm'n v. Danner, No. 17-1458, 2019 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 57 (May 10, 2019), planned to construct a grain leg (bucket elevator) and grain bins. In 2013, the defendant obtained the proper county zoning permits but was told of the need to comply with the airport zoning ordinances. The grain leg stands within 10,000 feet horizontally from the end of plaintiff’s runway. The structure reaches a height of 127 feet off the ground. The parties agree the grain leg intrudes within the airport's protected airspace by approximately sixty feet. After construction began it was evident that there would be issues with the airport zoning ordinances and the plaintiff asked the Federal Airport Administration (FAA) to perform an aeronautical study of the grain leg and its impact on aviation safety. The FAA issued a letter stating, "This aeronautical study revealed that the structure does exceed obstruction standards but would not be a hazard to air navigation." It also warned, “This determination concerns the effect of this structure on the safe and efficient use of navigable airspace by aircraft and does not relieve the sponsor (i.e., the defendant) of compliance responsibilities relating to any law, ordinance, or regulation of any Federal, State, or local government body.” Lastly the FAA requested that the defendant paint the structure and add red lights to the top of it. The defendant did so. The FAA also adjusted the flight patterns in and out of the airport to accommodate this structure. The plaintiff did not seek review under this determination.

Two years later, the plaintiff (the local airport commission) sued alleging the grain leg violated certain building ordinances; city and county zoning ordinances; airport commission regulations; and constituted a nuisance and hazard to air traffic. The plaintiff sought equitable relief—an injunction requiring the defendant to modify or remove the grain leg. The defendant raised an affirmative defense of federal preemption. In June 2017, the trial court found that the grain leg violated state and local zoning ordinances and constituted a nuisance and an airport hazard. The trial court found that the grain leg did not fall within the agricultural exemption to certain zoning laws and rejected the defendants’ affirmative defense that the no-hazard letter preempted state and local zoning ordinances. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the doctrines of express, implied, and conflict preemption did not apply to the FAA no-hazard determination. On further review, the state Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded that the FAA no-hazard determination did not preempt local zoning ordinances, was not legally binding, and contained language notifying the defendant that compliance with local rules was required. 

Water Rights

Rights involving surface water vary from state-to-state.  In some parts of the U.S., however, a party owning land adjacent to a watercourse has what are known as “riparian” rights to the water.  But, do those rights apply to man-made lakes, or just natural lakes?  The issue came up recently in Incline Village Board of Trustees v. Edler, No. SC97345, 2019 Mo. LEXIS 178 (Mo. Sup. Ct. Apr. 30, 2019). 

The defendants owned properties in subdivisions around a lake. One of the properties of the second subdivision abutted the lake. The properties they owned in the first subdivision did not abut the lake. During the creation of the first subdivision, restrictions were added to the land. One such restriction stated, “No structures or other improvements shall be made on or to any common area, including any body of water, other than such structures or improvements which are made by the trustees for the benefit of all lot owners. Except that, the owner of each lot which abuts any body of water, may construct one boat dock on such body of water, provided that, said boat dock extends from said lot and is first approved in writing by the trustees.” All landowners in the first subdivision were entitled to use the lake, even if they did not abut the lake. The second subdivision was not joined with the first one, but it was clear that the second subdivision was excluded from use rights on the lake. Lots in the first subdivision were subject to assessments to maintain the lakes.

The defendants built a dock on the property on the second subdivision. The trustees of the first subdivision defendants sued seeking a declaratory judgment, damages for trespass, and the removal of the dock. The district court ordered removal of the dock and determined that special circumstances existed supporting the award of attorney's fees of $70,000 in favor of the trustees.

On appeal, the appellate court determined that the lake was clearly artificial and, thus, the defendants were not riparian owners. Riparian rights are only extended to landowners adjacent to natural lakes. The appellate court also rejected the defendants’ reliance-based argument. The appellate court noted that the defendants had never had use of the lake for dock purposes or paid assessments for its maintenance. In addition, the defendants’ predecessor in title's deed to the adjacent land explicitly excepted the lake from the transfer. In addition, the plaintiffs had told the defendants of the property restrictions before the dock was built. As for attorney fees, the appellate court determined that there was not any special circumstance to merit an award of attorney fees. The plaintiff had not given any formal warning about not building the dock and the defendants had sought legal advice. 

Conclusion

It’s never a dull moment in ag law involving ag producers, agribusinesses and rural landowners.  The cases keep on rolling in. 

August 2, 2019 in Bankruptcy, Regulatory Law, Water Law | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, July 29, 2019

Key Farm Bankruptcy Modification on the Horizon?

Overview

Under 1986 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Congress created Chapter 12 bankruptcies for “family farmers.” Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3105 (1986), adding 11 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq.  Chapter 12 became a permanent part of the Bankruptcy Code effective July 1, 2005.  Numerous requirements must be satisfied for a debtor to qualify for Chapter 12 relief.  One of those requirements, the “aggregate debt test” is the subject of a bill, H.R. 2336, that passed the U.S. House on July 25.  The legislation increases the maximum aggregate debt a debtor can have and remain eligible for Chapter 12.  It’s an important bill because of the economic struggles of many farming operations in certain parts of the country.  I have discussed those problems in other posts, such as this one:  https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2018/03/chapter-12-bankruptcy-feasibility-of-the-reorganization-plan.html

The proposed increase in the Chapter 12 bankruptcy aggregate debt test - it’s the topic of today’s post.

Eligibility Requirements

To be eligible for Chapter 12 bankruptcy, a debtor must be a “family farmer” or a “family fisherman” with “regular annual income.” 11 U.S.C. §§101(19A) & (21).  A “family farmer” is defined as an individual or individual and spouse who earned more than 50 percent of their gross income from farming either for the taxable year preceding the year of filing or during the second and third tax years preceding filing, and whose aggregate debts do not exceed $4,411,400.  11 U.S.C. §18).  In addition, more than 50 percent of the debt must be debt from a farming operation that the debtor owns or operates.  Id.  H.R. 2336 proposes to increase the $4,411,400 amount to$10 million. 

Changed Nature of Agricultural Production

As noted above, Chapter 12 was added to the Bankruptcy Code in 1986.  At that time, much of agriculture was faced with a debt crisis when crop prices declined sharply, interest rates rose sharply, and farmland values, particularly in the Midwest, plummeted.  That toxic mix resulted in many farmers, some of whom were very good managers, finding themselves in a precarious economic position.  It was this environment that led to Chapter 12’s enactment and, at the time, it was estimated that 86 percent of farmers could qualify for relief under Chapter 12 .  At time of enactment, the aggregate debt limit for Chapter 12 was $1,500,000.  That debt limit did not increase until 2005 when it was increased to $3.237,000 via an inflation adjustment.  The current limit of $4,411,400 is the present inflation-adjusted limit. 

More Economics

According to U.S.D.A. data, total real farm sector debt has now reached the level it was at during the depth of the farm debt crisis in the early 1980s.  However, the increase has been particularly accelerated since 2009, with lenders shoring up their collateral positions by increasing debt on real estate to allow them to continue making loans to farmers. But that is only a short-term solution to a deeper problem.  Presently, U.S.D.A. data indicates that the current ratio for agriculture (a measure of the ability to pay bill from current assets – it is total current assets divided by total current liabilities) is 1.31.  That number indicates that many farmers are facing a liquidity crisis, and it is generally the position of ag economists that the ratio should be between 1.5 and 3.0.  

In addition, U.S.D.A. data also indicates that the working capital compared to the value of farm production is at .09, further supporting the notion that a liquidity crisis is looming for even more farmers.  Working capital is the amount of liquid funds that a business has available to meet short-term financial obligations.  It is calculated by subtracting current liabilities from current assets, and it provides the short-term financial reserves that are available.  In other words, it measures the ability of a farming operation to withstand a financial/economic downturn.  For healthy farm businesses, ag economists generally take the position that ratio should be in the 15% to 25% range. The current number of nine-percent means that ag operations are “burning” through working capital and are more vulnerable to financial stress.  

“Right-Sizing” the Farming Operation

With land increasingly used as collateral, if economic conditions in agriculture remain difficult, the ability of many farmers to stay in business will be further decreased.  Some will be forced to “right-size” their farms by selling assets.  But doing so has the very real potential of triggering significant taxes – both capital gain and ordinary income caused by depreciation recapture.  Historically, this was a very real problem for farmers filing Chapter 12.  The sale of farm assets to make the operation economically viable triggered gain which, as a priority claim, had to be paid in full before payment could be made to general creditors.  Even though the priority tax claims could be paid in full in deferred payments, in many instances the debtor did not have sufficient funds to allow payment of the priority tax claims in full even in deferred payments. 

Congress addressed this problem with the 2005 Bankruptcy Act overhaul.  That law contained a provision allowing a Chapter 12 debtor to treat claims arising out of “claims owed to a governmental unit” as a result of “sale, transfer, exchange, or other disposition of any farm asset used in the debtor’s farming operation” to be treated as an unsecured claim that is not entitled to priority under Section 507(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, provided the debtor receives a discharge.  The provision is now contained in 11 U.S.C. §1232, and it is immaterial whether the tax is triggered pre or post-petition.

Back to the Debt Limit

For the above-mentioned reasons, eligibility for Chapter 12 essential for a farmer to be able to deprioritize taxes associated with the sale of farm assets used in the farming operation and ultimately put together a reorganization plan that will allow the farmer to stay on the farm to continue production activities, make restructured loan payments and have some debt written off. 

While the Chapter 12 debt limit has only adjusted for inflation since 1986, farms have increased in size and capital needs faster than the rate of inflation.  This means that far less than 86 percent of farmers can satisfy the aggregate debt limit of Chapter 12 – the percentage estimated to qualify for Chapter 12 when it was enacted.  While Chapter 11 is an alternative reorganization provision, it does not contain the favorable tax rule of a Chapter 12, is more costly to file, has different “timing” rules, and contains an “absolute priority” rule that can severely limit the ability of a farmer to reorganize debts and remain in farming.  I discussed the absolute priority rule here: https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2019/07/farmers-bankruptcy-and-the-absolute-priority-rule.html.  In addition, for a farm debtor that has aggregate debt over the $4,411,400 limit, it’s not possible to file a Chapter 11, pay debt down beneath the threshold, and convert to Chapter 12. 

Conclusion

H.R. 2336 (and the companion Senate bill S. 987) is important legislation designed to restore the availability of Chapter 12 to farmers (but not family fisherman) that were intended to benefit from it when it was enacted in 1986.  If the original policy reasons justifying the enactment of Chapter 12 in 1986 remain, the debt ceiling should increase to reflect that rationale.  Senate rules are different than those in the House and a Senator’s objection to a bill can cause a bill to stall much more easily than in the House.  Presently, Senator Feinstein (D-CA) is objecting to the legislation on the basis that hearings have not been held.  However, she is mistaken on that point.  Hearings were held last year – on both the House and Senate bills.  Senator Durbin (D-IL) is also objecting for other reasons, and Senator Warren (D-MA) is believed to follow whatever Sen. Durbin does. 

At this point, interested farmers and others are encouraged to contact their Senators via email before Thursday of this week.  After Wednesday, the Senate is recessed.  This week will be a key week for many family farmers.

July 29, 2019 in Bankruptcy | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, July 9, 2019

Ag In The Courtroom

Overview

Agriculture and the law intersect in many ways.  Of course, tax and estate/business planning issues predominate for many farmers and ranchers.  But, there are many other issues that arise from time-to-time.  Outside of tax, leases and fences are issues that seem to come up repeatedly.  Other issues are cyclical.  Bankruptcy is one of those issues that has increased in importance in recent months.  Of course, legal issues associated with the administration of federal farm programs is big too.  In addition, legal issues associated with market structure and competition in various sectors of agriculture are of primary importance particularly in the poultry and cattle sectors.

Periodically, I step away from the technical article aspect of this blog and do a survey of some recent ag-related developments in the courts.  That’s what today’s post is about – it’s “ag in the courtroom” day today – at least with respect to a couple of recent cases.

Abandoned Rail Lines

One matter that is a big one in ag for those farms and ranches impacted by it involves the legal issues associated with abandoned rail lines.  It’s often a contentious matter, and it doesn’t help that the Congress changed the rules several decades ago to, in the view of many impacted adjacent landowners, diminish private property rights. 

Recently, another abandoned rail line case was decided.  This time the decision was rendered by the Kansas Court of Appeals.   In Central Kansas Conservancy, Inc., v. Sides, No.119,605, 2019 Kan. App. LEXIS 29 (Kan. Ct. App. May 17, 2019), the Union Pacific Railroad acquired a right-of-way over a railroad corridor that it abandoned in the mid-1990s. At issue in the case was a 12.6-mile length of the abandoned line between McPherson and Lindsborg, Kansas. A Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) was issued in the fall of 1995. The corridor was converted into a trail use easement under the National Trails System Act. In 1997, Union Pacific gave the plaintiff a "Donative Quitclaim Deed" to the railroad’s easement rights over the corridor, with one-quarter mile of it running through the defendant’s property at a width of 66 feet. Pursuant to a separate agreement, the plaintiff agreed to quit claim deed its rights back to the railroad if the railroad needed to operate the line in the future. By virtue of the easement, the plaintiff intended to develop the corridor into a public trail.

In 2013, the plaintiff contacted the defendant about developing the trail through the defendant’s land. The defendant had placed machinery and equipment and fencing in and across the corridor which they refused to remove. In 2015, the plaintiff sued to quiet title to the .75-mile corridor strip and sought an injunction concerning the trail use easement over the defendant’s property. The defendant admitted to blocking the railway with fencing and equipment, but claimed the right to do so via adverse possession or by means of a prescriptive easement. The defendant had farmed, grazed cattle on, and hunted the corridor at issue since the mid-1990s. The defendant also claimed that the plaintiff had lost its rights to the trail because it had failed to complete development of the trail within two years as the Kansas Recreational Trail Act (KRTA) required.

In late 2016, the trial court determined that the two-year development provision was inapplicable because the Interstate Commerce Commission had approved NITU negotiations before the KRTA became effective in 1996. The trial court also rejected the defendant’s adverse possession/prescriptive easement arguments because trail use easements are easements for public use against which adverse possession or easement by prescription does not apply.

During the summer of 2017 the plaintiff attempted work on the trail. When volunteers arrived, the defendant had placed equipment and a mobile home on the corridor preventing any work. The plaintiff sought a "permanent prohibitory injunction and permanent mandatory injunction." The defendant argued that he had not violated the prior court order because "[a]ll the Court ha[d] done [was] issue non-final rulings on partial motions for summary judgments, which [were], by their nature, subject to revision until they [were] made final decisions." Ultimately, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s request for an injunction, determined that the defendant had violated the prior summary judgment order, but also held that the plaintiff had not built or maintained fencing in accordance with state law.

On appeal, the appellate court partially affirmed, partially reversed, and remanded the case. The appellate court determined that the defendant did not obtain rights over the abandoned line via adverse possession or prescriptive easement because such claims cannot be made against land that is held for public use such as a recreational trail created in accordance with the federal rails-to-trails legislation. The appellate court also determined that the plaintiff didn’t lose rights to develop the trail for failing to comply with the two-year timeframe for development under the KRTA. The appellate court held that the KRTA two-year provision was inapplicable because a NITU was issued before the effective date of the KRTA. However, the appellate court determined that the plaintiff did not follow state law concerning its duty to maintain fences. The appellate court held that Kan. Stat. Ann. §58-3212(a) requires the plaintiff to maintain any existing fencing along the corridor and maintain any fence later installed on the corridor. In addition, any fence that is installed on the corridor must match the fencing maintained on the sides of adjacent property. If there is no fencing on adjacent sides of a landowner’s tract that abuts the corridor, the plaintiff and landowner will split the cost of the corridor fence equally. The appellate court remanded the case for a determination of the type and extent of fencing on the defendant’s property, and that the plaintiff has the right to enter the defendant’s property to build a fence along the corridor. Any fence along the corridor is to be located where an existing fence is located. If no existing fence exists along the corridor, the corridor fence is to be located where the plaintiff’s trail easement is separated from the defendant’s property. The appellate court remanded to the trial court for a reconsideration of its ruling on fence issues. 

Feasibility of Chapter 12 Plan

As I mentioned at the beginning of the post, bankruptcy is one of those ag legal issues that has increased in relevancy in recent months.  In certain parts of the country Chapter 12 (farm) bankruptcy has been on the rise.  Once a farmer qualifies for Chapter 12 (not always an easy task), the reorganization plan was be proposed in good faith and be feasible.  Those issues were at stake in a recent case from Iowa. 

In In re Fuelling, No. 18-00644, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 1379 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa May 1, 2019), the debtor was a farmer that granted the bank a first priority lien on all farm assets other than a truck and cash proceeds to the 2017 crop. To pay for the 2017 inputs, the debtor secured financing though another creditor (not the bank). The creditor obtained a subordination agreement from the bank, giving the creditor a $151,000 first priority lien in the 2017 crop sale proceeds. However, the proceeds from the 2017 crop were not enough to repay the creditor or continue making payments to the bank. The debtor filed Chapter 12 bankruptcy in May of 2018. The debtor sold the 2017 crops and various equipment to repay secured creditors. The creditor’s remaining claim was $107,506.45, $66,625.37 of which is secured by the remaining 2017 crop sale proceeds that the debtor still held.

The parties agreed that the bank's secured claim was $214,093.86 for purposes of plan confirmation. The creditors filed a motion for relief that would allow them to collect the remainder of the 2017 crop proceeds. The debtor filed a motion to use cash collateral to start a cattle feeding operation and grant the creditor a lien in the cattle and feed. The debtor also proposed to use rental payments from the grain bins on the property to make interest payments to the creditor and the bank for five years. The entire principal of the loans would come due as a balloon payment at the end of the plan period.

The bank, the Chapter 12 Trustee, the Iowa Department of Revenue, and the creditor objected to the debtor’s plan. The bankruptcy court denied the debtor’s proposed plan and motion to use cash collateral. The creditors’ motion for relief of stay was granted due to the court finding that the debtor’s plan was not feasible. The court denied the plan for multiple reasons. First the plan improperly substituted the creditor’s lien in the crop with a lien in cattle. Second the plan impermissibly utilized rental payments covered by the bank lien for payments towards the other creditors. The court also determined that the debtor’s proposed interest rate was not correct. The court agreed with the bank and the creditor that the plan was not feasible based on the information in the record. The debtor’s health issues, overly optimistic rental rates for the grain bins, and the balloon payment all factored in the court’s decision of lack of feasibility, even though the plan was submitted in good faith. Since the debtor’s plan to feed cattle was impermissible and not feasible, the court did not need any additional analysis to deny the debtor’s motion to use cash collateral. The debtor claimed that the remaining proceeds were necessary for reorganization, but the court concluded that the debtor’s proposed use of the proceeds impermissibly substituted the creditors. In the end, the court simply could not find a permissible way for the funds to be utilized in reorganization.

Conclusion

These are just two recent cases involving ag legal issues.  There are many more.   This all points out the need for well-trained lawyers in the legal issues that face farmers and ranchers. 

July 9, 2019 in Bankruptcy, Real Property | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, July 1, 2019

Farmers, Bankruptcy and the “Absolute Priority” Rule

Overview

Financial and economic continue to predominate in numerous parts of the ag economy.  Current statistics show that economic woes are the most difficult in the dairy sector and other areas on a regional basis – particularly parts of the Great Plains and the Upper Midwest. 

Initially passed in the midst of the farm debt crisis of the 1980s, Chapter 12 bankruptcy is uniquely tailored to address the needs of farmers in financial distress.  That’s particularly true because of a special tax rule and the ability to avoid something known as the “absolute priority” rule of Chapter 11.  However, appropriate planning must be utilized for a farmer to take advantage of Chapter 12.

The peril of a farmer not being eligible for Chapter 12 bankruptcy – that’s the topic of today’s post.

Foreseeing Problems

I was asked during a recent radio interview what I would tell a farmer or rancher facing potential financial problems if there was only one piece of advice I could give.  My response – “listen to your wife.”  Why?  In many farming and ranching operations, the operating spouse simply works in the business of farming or ranching rather than working on it.  There is a big difference between the two.  The spouse that works on the business is the one keeping the books and records, tracking income and expense and monitoring the financial strength of the business.  The operating spouse often is not tuned-in to these important aspects of the business.  Instead, if lenders will continue to lend, the farmer can continue doing what they do best – farm, ranch and… sign lending documents without having legal counsel review them.  But, this can lead to ignoring financial problems until it’s too late.  Then, it might be necessary to liquidate assets. 

Chapter 12

This is the problem that Chapter 12 was designed to address.  Chapter 12 allows a farmer to downsize the operation so that it can continue.  The business gets reorganized, not liquidated.  While the sale of assets to “right-size” the operation can trigger significant taxes, Congress added 11 U.S.C. §1222(a)(2)(A) with the overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code in 2005.  Under that provision (and an amendment to it that took effect for new Chapter 12 cases on or after October 26, 2017), a Chapter 12 debtor can treat claims arising out of “claims owed to a governmental unit” as a result of “sale, transfer, exchange, or other disposition of any farm asset used in the debtor’s farming operation” to be treated as an unsecured claim that is not entitled to priority under Section 507(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, provided the debtor receives a discharge.  The amendment addressed a major problem faced by many family farmers filing under Chapter 12 where the sale of farm assets to make the operation economically viable triggered gain which, as a priority claim, had to be paid in full before payment could be made to general creditors.  Even though the priority tax claims could be paid in full in deferred payments under prior law, in many instances the debtor operation did not generate sufficient funds to allow payment of the priority tax claims in full even in deferred payments.  That was the core problem that the 2005 provision attempted to address.

Among other eligibility requirements, a farmer must have aggregate debt not exceeding $4,411,400.  That is presenting a very real problem for many farmers at the present time.  If Chapter 12 is not available because a farmer has debt exceeding the limit, what are the options?  In terms of bankruptcy, the only viable options are a Chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy and a Chapter 11 reorganization.  But, in terms of reorganization, Chapter 11 is not nearly as favorable to the farm debtor as is Chapter 12 for the reasons noted below.  Thus, for a farmer with excessive debt the strategy would be to identify and liquidate underperforming assets; repay creditors; and get the debt limit beneath the $4,411,400 threshold.  That will allow the farmer to file Chapter 12 and get a stronger bargaining position in negotiating a debt settlement with creditors and get favorable tax treatment upon sale, etc., of farm assets.

The Perils of Chapter 11

Chapter 11 is the general reorganization provision for individuals and firms operating a business.  There is no debt limit associated with Chapter 11, but major drawbacks of Chapter 11 include the relatively short time the debtor has to overcome existing financial problems, and an absolute priority rule that prohibits debtors from retaining ownership of their property unless unsecured creditors receive 100 percent of their claims.

The absolute priority rule.  Under 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(1), a creditor's plan objection will be upheld if the plan: (1) discriminates unfairly; or (2) is not fair and equitable with respect to each non-accepting class of claims or interests that is impaired under the plan.  In this context, "impaired" means that the plan alters the rights of a class of creditors compared to the contractual rights prior to bankruptcy.  The rule arose from several railroad case about a century ago.  For example, in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913), the debtor’s reorganization plan proposed to not pay the claims of junior creditors.  The Court refused to approve the plan.  Instead, the Court concluded that an “absolute priority rule,” as applied to a dissenting class of impaired unsecured creditors, must result in a plan being "fair and equitable."   As codified, the “fair and equitable” test (i.e., the “absolute priority rule”) is satisfied only if the allowed value of the claim is to be paid in full, or if the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the dissenting creditors will not receive or retain any property under the plan on account of such junior claim or interest.  See 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).  

The absolute priority rule came up in a recent Wisconsin bankruptcy case involving a dairy.  In In re Schroeder Bros. Farms of Camp Douglas LLP, No. 16-13719-11, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 1705 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. May 30, 2019), a dairy was structured as a limited liability partnership (LLP). The LLP filed Chapter 11 in late 2016. At the time the Chapter 11 petition was filed, the debtor was ineligible to file Chapter 12 because aggregate debts exceeded the limit for Chapter 12 eligibility. The bankruptcy court confirmed the debtor’s reorganization plan in mid-2018. The debtor became unable to make plan payments and the committee of unsecured creditors motioned for the appointment of a liquidating trustee. The debtor objected on the basis that the sale of any assets would trigger capital gain taxes, and the combination of those taxes, the liquidating trustee’s fees, attorney fees and committee attorney fees would completely consume the sale proceeds of the encumbered real estate, farm equipment and cattle rendering the estate insolvent and leaving the individuals subject to pay the unpaid income taxes.

The debtor subsequently claimed that total debts had fallen beneath the debt limit for a Chapter 12 filing and sought to convert the Chapter 11 case to Chapter 12. Doing so would allow the debtor to take advantage of 11 U.S.C. §1222(a)(2)(A) (the predecessor to current 11 U.S.C. §1232) so that capital gain taxes could be treated as an unsecured claim. The committee of unsecured creditors asserted that the non-priority treatment of capital gain taxes was a non-issue because the debtor, as a pass-through entity, had no liability for any taxes. Instead, it would be the partners of the LLP that would have personal liability for taxes arising from asset sales. The debtor claimed it could elect to be taxed as a corporation via IRS Form 8832 upon making an election. Doing so, the debtor claimed, would result in the capital gain taxes being discharged as an unsecured claim. The committee claimed that the debtor was ineligible to convert to Chapter 12 because it was ineligible at the time the petition was filed.

The bankruptcy court agreed with the committee of unsecured creditors.  The original petition date of the debtor’s Chapter 11 filing is the measuring date for the debtor’s Chapter 12 eligibility.  However, when the debtor filed Chapter 11, the debtor was ineligible for Chapter 12.  The bankruptcy court also pointed out that the debtor’s bankruptcy filing did not impact the debtor’s tax status. The bankruptcy court reasoned that allowing the debtor to make an election to be treated for tax purposes as a corporation would violate the absolute priority rule of 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(2)(B) – a mainstay of Chapter 11. The absolute priority rule, the court noted, bars a court from approving a plan that gives a holder of a claim anything unless objecting classes have been paid in full. Thus, the proposed conversion of tax status would dilute the class of unsecured creditors and shift unfavorable tax treatment to the detriment of creditors. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court determined that the proposed tax election was not in the best interests of the debtor, the bankruptcy estate or the creditor and denied the tax election. The bankruptcy court approved the appointment of a liquidating trustee. 

Conclusion

For farmers and ranchers, proper planning is the key to dealing with financial distress so they can utilize the advantages of Chapter 12.  In the In re Schroeder Bros. case, a suggested approach for the dairy would have been to file the election to be treated as a C corporation at least one year before filing the bankruptcy petition. Then a pre-petition partial liquidation could have been utilized to get the debt level within the Chapter 12 limit. If the LLP couldn’t be treated taxwise as a C corporation, the farmer would have needed to file Chapter 12 individually to utilize the tax provisions of 11 U.S.C. §1232.  In the alternative, two jointly administered petitions could have been filed. 

Chapter 11 has serious limitations and is clearly disadvantageous compared to Chapter 12. It’s never too early to seek out competent legal counsel.  A great deal of advance planning is often required to obtain the best possible result in a difficult situation. 

July 1, 2019 in Bankruptcy | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, May 10, 2019

More Ag Law and Tax Developments

Overview

It’s been a while since I have devoted a post to recent developments, so that’s what today’s post is devoted to.  There are always many significant developments in ag law and tax.  I was pleased recently when one of my law students, near the conclusion of the course, commented on how many areas of the law that agricultural law touches and how often the rules as applied to farmers and ranchers are different.  That is so true.  Ag law is daily life for a farmer, rancher, rural landowner, and agribusiness in action.

Recent development in ag law and tax – that’s the topic of today’s post.

Chapter 12 Plan Not Feasible

As I have written in other posts, when a farmer files Chapter 12 bankruptcy, the reorganization plan that is proposed must be feasible.  That means that the farmer must estimate reasonable crop yields and revenue based on historical data, and also provide reasonable estimates of expenses.  Courts also examine other factors to determine whether a reorganization plan is feasible.

In, In re Jubilee Farms, 595 B.R. 546, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 4080 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Dec. 28, 2018), the debtor, a farm partnership operated by two brothers, farmed primarily corn and soybeans. The Debtors filed Chapter 12 bankruptcy in early 2018. In May of 2018, the Debtors filed a joint Chapter 12 plan, but the secured creditors, FCMA and FCS, objected. The debtors filed an amended Chapter 12 plan providing FCMA with a fully secured claim of roughly $2.7 million and FCS with a fully secured claim of roughly $180,000. The plan provided for periodic payments funded primarily by the debtor’s farming income and supplemented by custom trucking and combining revenue. Additional funding in the first year would come from crop insurance and anticipated federal aid for farmers affected by political activity upsetting foreign crop sales.

The creditors and the Trustee objected to the confirmation of the amended plan on various grounds, but the main argument raised was that the amended plan was not feasible, because the debtor’s one-year income and expense projections were limited and unrealistic compared to the debtor’s historical income and expenses. An evidentiary hearing was held to present projected revenue and expenses for the farm and thus determine the feasibility (whether the debtor could make all plan payments and comply with the plan) of the amended plan.

The court analyzed the projected revenues and expenses for the coming year, and the concluded that the plan was not feasible because the debtors had failed to prove that the plan was feasible beyond March 2019. The court stated that if the debtors only had to prove they could make the payments required up to March 2019, the debtors would prevail because the testimony created a reasonable belief that the receipts necessary to make payments up to that time either had or would soon occur. However, beyond March 2019 that was not the case. The court compared the debtors’ projections to calculations using the yield and price per acre that was supported by the record. The record showed that the debtors could only pay anticipated operating expenses and plan payments after March 2019 if the debtor’s unsupported projections were used. The projections using the bushels per acre and price per bushel only showed revenue of $592,000 to $736,000 with expenses of $872,000. Given this lack of ability to pay combined with the debtor’s projections overstating revenue from soybean production during the 2019 crop year the court found that the debtors anticipated receipts simply did not cover the debtors’ obligations to pay operating expenses and plan payments beyond March 2019. Thus, the plan was not feasible and the court denied confirmation of the amended plan.

Grazing Scam Results in Fraud Convictions

There are various scams that one can get caught up in, but they don’t often involve cattle grazing.  However, a recent case did involve a cattle grazing scam.  In United States v. Hagen, No. 17-3279, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 6109 (8th Cir. Feb. 28, 2019), the defendant and his ex-wife set up a company to provide custom grazing in 2004. The ex-wife obtained grazing leases on tribal land from the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA"). The defendant worked with ranchers to set up custom grazing contracts. In 2011, the BIA issued letters to the defendants for non-compliance with leasing procedures. In 2012, the defendants had leased enough pasture to sustain 57.92 cow-calf pairs but contracted to graze with three cattle producers for the lease of 100 cow-calf pairs and 200 heifers. That summer, 70 pairs were grazed for the full term of the grazing contract, and 33 pairs belonging to another rancher were grazed for a day. A third rancher was forced to find other pasture for his heifers. In 2013, the defendants had leased pasture for 91.26 pairs and had contracted with six different producers to graze a total of 380 pairs. A total of $126,500 was paid upfront by the producers. Not a single pair was grazed that summer and no rancher was reimbursed.

In 2014, the defendants had leased pasture for 6.67 pairs and again over-contracted with three ranchers for 300 pairs, who paid $102,500 up front. No pairs grazed during the summer of 2014 and the ranchers were not reimbursed. The defendants were charged with three counts of wire fraud, four counts of mail fraud, and one count of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud for their fraudulent contracting/leasing practices. The ex-wife plead guilty to the conspiracy count and testified against the her ex-spouse at trial. He was convicted by a jury on all eight counts. Sentencing included 46 months imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release on each count, restitution in the amount of $236,000, and a $100 special assessment on each count. The defendant appealed on the basis that the evidence was insufficient to prove he had the requisite intent to defraud, and that the two mailings were not in furtherance of any fraud.

The appellate court affirmed the defendant’s conviction of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, but vacated the conviction and special assessments on the other five substantive counts. The appellate court determined that sufficient evidence supported the jury verdict that the ex-husband had conspired to commit fraud by contracting with twelve different cattle producers to graze cattle. Only one of those contracts had been filled, and the defendants failed to issue refunds on the other contracts for the the 2012-2014 grazing seasons. The appellate court also found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict of use of mail and wire to defraud. One of the ranchers had mailed the defendant a $35,000 check, as full payment for the grazing contract and the defendant had cashed the check using a wire transmission a week later. There was a pasture visit where a rancher was assured that the pasture could support 200 pairs. Another contract was signed by the rancher’s son, and another $35,000 check was written to the defendant. This second contract brought the total contracted to graze with the defendant to 200 pairs for $70,000. It later became evident that the defendant only had 40 acres leased, enough to sustain 6.67 pairs. When it came time for delivery, the defendant did not return any calls. The ranch did not graze any cattle that season nor issued refunds for their payments. The appellate court determined that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the defendant knowingly only had enough pasture to graze 6 pairs but nonetheless contracted to graze 200 pairs with this rancher. However, the appellate court vacated the convictions and special assessments tied to specific instance of fraud against different ranchers. The dry conditions that limited the length of the grazing season likely lead to a breach of contract for early termination, rather than an intent to defraud. Other mailings by the defendants containing offers to graze cattle were not in furtherance of fraud, and the convictions and special assessments related to these mailings were vacated.

Fences, Boundary Lines and Adverse Possession

Fences and boundary issues present many court cases.  It is certainly true that good fences make good neighbors.  Bad fences and boundary disputes tend to bring out the worst in neighbors.  A recent Alabama case illustrates the issues that can arise when fences and boundary issues are involved.  In Littleton v. Wells, No. 2170948, 2019 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 20 (Civ. App. Feb. 22, 2019), a predecessor sold 82 acers to the defendants in 2015. This land had been in the same family for generations, however the seller had only been on the property “maybe twice” since 1989. The plaintiffs received title to their property from their parents, who had been there since 1964. There were three fences between the party’s properties. The defendant relied on a 1964 survey when making his purchase, thinking the property line was the middle fence.  No survey was completed at that time.

In 2000, the mapping office notified the parties of a “conflict.” The office determined the actual boundary to be closer to the fence on the defendant’s property rather than the middle fence. However, this determination was for tax purposes and was not a substitute for a survey. The plaintiffs also treated the third fence line, like the map office, as the boundary line.

The plaintiffs grazed cattle up to the furthest fence and maintained all the ground between the fences as their own. The plaintiff also testified as to working on the furthest fence as a child in the 1960’s. The plaintiffs also showed that they held annual gatherings and the kids would play in the creek on the disputed ground. There was also evidence that the plaintiffs leased the disputed ground to others. The plaintiffs did not present all the witnesses as to the family’s use of the property up to the furthest fence. Nor was the employee of the map office testimony heard in court.

The trial court determined that the property line was to be the closer center fence, not the third fence as the plaintiffs claimed. The court ordered an official survey to their findings and entered that survey as the final order. The plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court reversed and remanded. The plaintiffs’ challenged the trial court’s denial of their adverse possession claim and determination of the location of the boundary line. The court looked at all the evidence on record from trial, when analyzing the plaintiff’s adverse possession claim. The appellate court held that the record showed that the plaintiffs had been in actual, hostile, open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous possession of the disputed property for more than ten years (the statutory timeframe). The plaintiffs had presented evidence to support every one of those elements and the defendants have not rebutted any element. The only evidence the defendant presented to rebut the plaintiffs’ evidence was a “belief” that he owned up to the second fence. Since the lower court was erroneous in determining the adverse possession claim, the appellate court did not need to analyze the boundary line determination. The court remanded to create a new boundary line that included the property that the plaintiffs had adversely possessed.

Conclusion

There’s never a dull moment in agricultural law.  It’s everyday reality in the life of a farmer, rancher, rural landowner and agribusiness.

May 10, 2019 in Bankruptcy, Civil Liabilities, Criminal Liabilities | Permalink | Comments (0)