Friday, November 18, 2016
This is according to every news source out there, including the Washington Post. Anyone who thinks this will be an easy nomination to put through, because Sessions is a sitting Senator, is in for a big surprise. It will be a bruising battle.
Tuesday, November 15, 2016
The Attorney General, or in cases in which the Attorney General is recused, the Acting Attorney General, will appoint a Special Counsel when he or she determines that criminal investigation of a person or matter is warranted and -
(a) That investigation or prosecution of that person or matter by a United States Attorney's Office or litigating Division of the Department of Justice would present a conflict of interest for the Department or other extraordinary circumstances; and
(b) That under the circumstances, it would be in the public interest to appoint an outside Special Counsel to assume responsibility for the matter.
FBI Director James Comey:
- F for failure to resign in protest when Attorney General Lynch kept the email investigation within the confines of DOJ. If there was ever a case justifiying the appointment of a Special Counsel, this was it. You appointed a Special Counsel to investigate the Plame Email leak when you were Acting Attorney General in the Bush Administration. You should have insisted on the same course of conduct here on threat of resignation. You had the standing and reputation to pull it off. You didn't. You blew it, and later apparently tried to make up for it through your inappropriate prejudicial public pronouncements.
- F for letting Attorney General Lynch off the hook and effectively announcing the non-prosecution recommendation. Prosecutive decisions belong to prosecutors, not FBI agents or FBI officials.
- F for publicly smearing Ms. Clinton while announcing that no charges would be brought against her. If you don't indict, you don't smear, unless you are under a statutory duty to file a report.
- F for answering too many questions about the investigation when appearing before the House Judiciary Committee.
- F for releasing confidential FBI investigative reports to the House.
- F for failure to resign in protest given the kid gloves treatment afforded to Ms. Clinton and her aides during the investigation.
- F for your public announcement 11 days before the election.
Attorney General Loretta Lynch:
- F for failure to appoint a Special Counsel.
- F for your tarmac meeting with former President Bill Clinton.
- F for handing over the prosecutive decision to FBI Director Comey. If you needed to recuse, the final call, at that point in time, should have been made by your Deputy AG Sally Yates.
- A for your four line statement announcing the declination. It is the one thing you got right.
President Barack Obama:
- F for failing to insist that AG Lynch appoint a Special Counsel.
- F for your repeated public statements effectively proclaiming Ms. Clinton's innocence. You interfered with a pending investigation and potentially poisoned the jury pool.
- F for handing out use derivative immunity deals like they were candy and reaping no indictments in return.
- F for allowing Cheryl Mills to attend Ms. Clinton's final interview as one of her attorneys.
- F for not recording Ms. Clinton's interview.
These are preliminary grades, subject to revision as more facts are revealed.
Friday, October 28, 2016
It is common in white collar cases for investigations to span over many years. Being essentially document cases, one sees white collar crime investigations lasting the length of a grand jury or sometimes the span of a few grand juries. It is rare that one sees the investigated party receiving a letter at the end saying that we tried to find something in this investigation against you, but we failed. And having a press conference to announce it, is going even further.
Yet, surprisingly that essentially occurred when FBI Director James Comey investigated Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. As I previously noted, I gave an "A" to Attorney General Loretta Lynch for her 3 1/2 line statement closing the investigation (see here), a contrast to FBI Director James Comey's statement that insinuated wrongdoing while also saying a prosecution was not warranted here because "we cannot find a case that would support bringing criminal charges on these facts." (see here). Case closed.
Now enter the current political climate, a climate that has been contentious, exhausting, and embarrassing to our nation. And on the near eve of the final voting we see the FBI Director re-examining his prior decision and as opposed to keeping his investigation secret, as is typically done, he announces to the world that he is re-examining his case. FBI Director Comey states in a letter updating his prior congressional testimony that the F.B.I. was taking "steps designed to allow investigators to review these emails to determine whether they contain classified information, as well as to assess their importance to our investigation." FBI Director Comey is also saying that he "cannot predict how long this would take. . ." (see NYTimes copy of letter here).
Double jeopardy does not apply here, and an investigation can be re-opened. But why is he telling us this? And why is he stating this just 11 days before the election? The most likely answer is that he had no choice given his prior decision earlier this year to go against the typical process of keeping investigations secret. When evidence is given to the DOJ and then presented to a grand jury, Federal Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure insures that secrecy.
Now just 11 days before Election Day, we are now seeing the ramifications of FBI Director Comey's initial misstep in commenting on an investigation -- how deep those ramifications are won't be known until the final votes are in. If even then.
Also Jamie Gorelick and Larry Thompson, James Comey is Damaging Our Democracy
Wednesday, October 12, 2016
At Counsel’s Table: A Conversation with Henry W. (“Hank”) Asbill of Jones Day
Hank Asbill is a partner at Jones Day and widely recognized as one of the country’s best white collar criminal defense attorneys. In 2015, he was awarded the prestigious White Collar Defense Lawyer of the Year Award by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Mr. Asbill’s most recent accomplishments include representing Virginia’s former governor Robert McDonnell in his battle against federal corruption charges. In Governor McDonnell’s case, Mr. Asbill and his team were able to devise and execute a winning strategy that ultimately resulted in the dismissal of all charges after the Supreme Court reversed Governor McDonnell’s convictions in an 8-0 opinion.
In this interview, we catch up with Mr. Asbill to talk about his career path, advice for young lawyers, and his thoughts on the McDonnell case.
Q: You have worked as a defense attorney for close to 40 years. What inspired you to work in criminal defense? And what other fields of law have you considered?
I am a child of the 60’s and have always questioned authority. Someone has to keep the government honest. And, I have always been interested in constitutional law. I also watched a lot of Perry Mason as a kid.
I never considered any other field of law. I knew I wanted to be a criminal defense lawyer before law school, and that never changed.
Q: Do you feel that the practice of law has changed in the forty years since you began practicing? If so, how?
It has changed substantially, and in terms of criminal defense, I feel it has been primarily for the worse.
The biggest change has been the decline of jury trials, which keep the system honest. There are far fewer jury trials today because of the enactment of sentencing guidelines in both federal and state systems, as well as the draconian push for mandatory minimums and lengthy sentences for all crimes. These changes have spawned many more pleas because the sentencing risk of losing at trial is so great.
I think the two biggest policy failures in the criminal justice system in my career have been the enactment of the sentencing guidelines and the “war on drugs.”
The alleged war has unfairly targeted the most vulnerable people in society, including minorities and the poor.
As for the Guidelines, I never thought that there was a serious sentencing disparity among judges that would justify the Guidelines in the first place. The Guidelines were promoted by the DOJ to give prosecutors much more control – to make sure that the only way out of a harsh sentence is a 5K1 motion by the government based on the defendant’s assistance in prosecuting others.
This 5K1 regime incentivizes lying by co-defendants and targets. The government does not give 5K1 credit for cooperation when it does not result in prosecution of others. On only one occasion have I had a client who gave honest answers that prevented the government from going down the wrong road and charging innocent people who still received 5K1 credit.
Q: Can you tell us a bit about your career path and how you got to where you are now?
I started as law clerk on the D.C. Court of Appeals. After that I practiced with a large firm, doing civil securities and antitrust litigation, before going to D.C.’s Public Defender Service for four years. I then started a small trial firm with a PDS colleague. We later added a civil trial lawyer, and grew the firm until we were at 9 or 10 people. I worked there for 23 years until I transitioned to Big Law. At that time we had to decide whether to renew a 15-year lease. The management of a small firm was becoming cumbersome, and the desires of the founding partners were diverging.
I was taking on more complicated cases and needed specific subject matter expertise, and more staff to help on projects.
I ultimately ended up choosing Jones Day for many reasons: its culture is unique; it is extraordinarily well-managed; the lawyers genuinely like and respect each other; the Firm has tremendous subject matter expertise; it has a terrific appellate group with many former Supreme Court or Circuit Court clerks who want to work on trial matters; and, there are many talented young lawyers here who have the temperament, talent, passion, and zeal to become great trial lawyers whom I’ve greatly enjoyed working with and mentoring. Lastly, we are given great latitude in terms of pro bono work, both with respect to the type of cases and the amount of pro bono work we can do.
Q: In contrast to many other prominent white collar criminal defense attorneys, you have never worked as a prosecutor. Do you think this background offers any advantages, or drawbacks, in your practice?
I believe being a defense lawyer for my entire career has been a major advantage. I often represent individuals and companies that want to fight, and that’s what I’ve specialized in my entire career.
There is a myth that you need to work as a prosecutor to be able to know how they think. I have interacted with enough prosecutors and have been friends and partners with enough former prosecutors over the years, that I know how they think. Besides, I have never wanted to put people in jail.
Some former prosecutors are able to successfully transition to the defense side. Some are not, and end up exclusively doing internal investigations and turning the results over to the government. That is not the work I prefer to do.
Also, I believe criminal defense attorneys are generally much better cross-examiners than prosecutors, because defendants rarely testify, and often do not put on a direct defense case. In contrast, prosecutors will generally be more experienced in direct examinations. Although both skills are very important, for criminal defense attorneys, the ability to do a good cross-examination is the more important of the two.
The main disadvantage of having never been a prosecutor is that you do not have the network of former AUSAs to access for business development. The prosecutors’ network is often much more active and cohesive than the defenders’ network.
Q: Do you have any advice for younger attorneys who want to get into white collar criminal defense?
First get trial experience, whether with a public defender’s office or prosecutor’s office. That’s the easiest way to develop the essential skills. But it’s not the only way. I’ve got a young partner here whom I’ve mentored for a dozen years who has worked only in law firms. But, she connected with the trial lawyers in those firms and learned a lot by working with them as second chair and being advised by them on her own smaller cases. She has become an extraordinarily talented trial lawyer in her own right.
As for being a public defender, it’s important to try to work at an office that reasonably restricts the intake of new cases. If you look at, for example, the Public Defender Service in D.C., it is a low volume office that accepts mostly difficult cases and it has lots of resources for experts and investigators. You need to be able to expend the time necessary to thoroughly research and prepare a case and, that attention to factual detail and the nuances of the statutes, rules and procedures are very important in the more complex cases.
You can learn by doing but you can also learn by watching. Go see the best trial lawyers in action whenever you have the chance. You can also learn by doing some appellate work because it helps you figure out how to avoid mistakes at trial.
Q: To follow up on that, how can a younger attorney develop the trial experience needed to be an effective criminal defense attorney in today’s environment?
If you want to get trial experience, you need to look for it. Federal courts these days have very few trials. You need to be willing to take on pro bono or court-appointed cases, or smaller cases for lesser fees – often in state court. You need to take trial practice courses and attend CLE programs on trial skills. And, read biographies of great trial lawyers.
In a large firm, you need to figure out who is going to trial, and ask to be on those trial teams. You need to know more about the facts than anyone else working on the case. You need to prove yourself in depositions, or motions hearings, where you are examining witnesses and arguing your positions. You need to lobby and advocate for a chance to do that. The people who really want to be trial lawyers will go out of their way to look for opportunities that large firms do not gratuitously provide.
Q: Let’s talk about the McDonnell case. The trial in that case lasted almost six weeks. Do you have any special tips for handling very long trials that go on for months or longer?
Its not unusual for me to try cases that are several months long. I tried one case for 22 months. That was the longest federal criminal trial in history. It took us four months just to pick the jury.
Lengthy trials are certainly mentally and physically demanding and can take a toll on other aspects of your life. You are always focused on the trial, which means you ignore other things in your life – your practice, your friends, and your family. But minimizing outside distractions is important. If your family and client’s budget will permit, stay in a hotel very near the courthouse even if the trial is local.
Make sure you get some exercise, at least a modest amount everyday. Eat well. Try to get at least four or five hours of uninterrupted sleep. I have never gotten more than that amount a night since I was a teenager, but I have been fortunate to be able to thrive on it. I also try to catch up a bit on sleep on the weekends.
You need to be someone who thrives on stress, as opposed to being someone who is enervated by stress. Sometimes you have to play hurt. Your back may be killing you; you have a cold or a headache. You do your best to power through these minor injuries.
Q: What advice do you have for being a source of strength for clients, particularly during long trials?
I like to analogize it to a boxing match. I have never seen one where one guy lands all the blows. When a compelling witness for the government testifies on direct for three days, you can do nothing but sit and listen and grimace. But you will have your chance to fight back when it comes time for cross. There are peaks and valleys in long trials. You need to keep your eye on the end-game. Advise your client before the trial starts that there will be good and bad days. The issue is who is standing at the end. Convince your client that you have a plan to get through this, to be victorious at the conclusion.
You need to be able to adjust during the course of a trial. You need to have a plan that is comprehensive enough and flexible enough to be adaptable to new evidence or new developments.
If the client knows you are working hard, that you are totally prepared, that you have good defense themes and legal theories, it is much easier to distinguish between battles and the war. If I can’t win every battle, I can still win the war. If the client thinks you know what you are doing, and you are it doing well, they will share your confidence and, at a minimum, believe that you have done everything for them you possibly could have.
I always believe I can and will win no matter what the odds are, no matter what unexpected problems may arise. That inspires my clients. The client made a decision to not plead, and understands there’s risk involved. Clients will accept outcomes if they see sustained effort by competent people. At the end of the day, I don’t control what the judge or jury does, and I don’t create the facts. Clients recognize that there can be mistakes, screw-ups, missed opportunities in trial. It’s a dynamic arena. But if you work hard enough, think hard enough, fully accept the responsibility of defending someone’s freedom, reputation and fortune – you can overcome those problems.
Q: In working on the McDonnell case, your strategy involved preserving and seeking Supreme Court review on the official acts issue from the very beginning. Can you tell us what were some of the alternative plans you had for the case?
Before the trial started, we filed a motion to dismiss based on the official acts issue. We also tried to get the judge to give us the legal instructions the prosecutors gave the grand jury, because we thought they misunderstood the law. Both motions were denied. So, I did not go into trial assuming that we would be getting the final instructions we wanted.
We had other defenses besides the correct definition of “official act,” including reasonable doubt, good faith and good character.
I was optimistic. I went into closing arguments thinking we were going to win no matter how bad the instructions were because our client had no criminal intent. I tried to argue as closely as I could to the instructions I wanted. I had a plan, but it was multifaceted.
I knew if we ended up losing the case at trial, we had a fantastic appellate issue that likely would be cert-worthy. I thought if we did get to Supreme Court, we would win, 9-0. If Justice Scalia had been on the bench, the Court might have even invalidated the bribery statutes on vagueness grounds. Several jurors even told the press after the trial that they believed my client’s trial testimony. The jury convicted the Governor because they were directed to do so by the flawed instructions.
Q: Did the location of the McDonnell trial in Richmond, Virginia figure into your preparation for trial at all, and if so, how?
To prepare for any trial, you need to know that court. You need to understand who the players are. You need to know their personalities, likes, dislikes. The trial in this case was held in the Richmond Division of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. It is a small court, with only four judges and two magistrates. It is a tight community of prosecutors and judges who work together all the time.
The Richmond Division is also notorious for being fast and formal. You don’t have conference calls with the judge to resolve discovery disputes. You need to file a motion, in the right format, at the right time, with the right page limits. Before the trial started, we belatedly received about 5 million pages of discovery documents. That was sometime in late March. And we had to go to trial at the beginning of August. That was as far out on the calendar as the judge was going to let it go. He wanted to get it over with before his clerks rotated out on Labor Day.
You have to be ready going into that jurisdiction, knowing that you will be on a very fast track. Substantial advance preparation is key. You need the resources to deal with that pace of litigation. You’re filing motions all the time and arguing constantly. You typically won’t get all of the discovery you need until close to the trial date. You need to be prepared for all of that. You need to consult with local lawyers who regularly practice there and make sure you know what problems might arise and how best to avoid or solve them.
In any major case, you need to know the personalities of the players: what annoys them, what makes them happy. The clerks, judges, opposing counsel. The local quirks. For example, in Richmond, if you run out of defense witnesses early on a particular day, maybe because the prosecution didn’t spend long cross-examining your witnesses, your case is over, even if you have more witnesses lined up for tomorrow. You can beg the judge to adjourn early that day, but you don’t want to count on getting that slack.
Also, the Richmond division, like the rest of EDVA, does not allow electronics in the courthouse without the judge’s permission. If you don’t have electronics, it is hard to communicate with people in your firm or witnesses. In Alexandria, you need to line up to use the few available payphones. These are the types of restrictions you need to know about and plan for before a trial. You have to be prepared to inconvenience witnesses by making them show up early. You need to have law clerks or paralegals who are keeping the witnesses happy and on the reservation while waiting.
Q: Governor McDonnell was himself a former prosecutor, and an accomplished attorney. Did this background make any difference for you in terms of your representation?
The Governor’s background created both opportunities and challenges. He was a politician, a lawyer, and the CEO of a state with 100 billion dollar biennial budget and 100,000 employees.
I’ve represented many lawyers and business executives. One common thread is that they are particularly difficult to train as witnesses. Many do not think that anyone on the jury is their peer. They have a hard time trusting the jury. Based on decades of experience, I generally trust jurors, as long as I get a reasonable voir dire. You have to convince your client that this group is a jury of your peers. Even if individually they may not be your peers, collectively they are as smart as you are. You have to convince your client to trust in the system, and the magic number of 12 jurors who must be unanimous. You have to convince your client to believe in a system which has historically proven reliable, even if not unerring.
Lawyer clients, in particular, often second guess you on legal issues and trial strategy. They can’t help themselves. They act like lawyers even though they are the client. They want to expand and explain, question and challenge. CEO’s don't like being told what to do. Politicians want to manipulate the press. You have to convince these clients that you, not they, deserve to be in control.
Q: People have praised you for your cross-examination of the FBI agents in the Governor McDonnell case. Do you have any general philosophy or approach for cross-examining law enforcement agents?
My first rule is that you cannot be the least bit intimidated or afraid to take on an agent on cross-examination, even though they are usually the most well-trained and experienced witnesses in the case.
Secondly, my experience has been that law enforcement witnesses often act like expert witnesses, even if not qualified as such. They are primed to give opinions at the slightest opportunity. You have to approach them as you would approach an expert witness. This means learning how they think, how they work, how they operate, how they do their job. What rules and practices govern their conduct and influence their thinking. What their biases, motivations are. What their weaknesses and strengths are. Then you exploit these things on cross-examination.
You must remain in control of these witnesses, while giving them enough rope to make mistakes.
I like cross-examining experts and law enforcement agents. I know how agents think, talk and how they collaborate. And what corners they may cut. Whether or not they think the ends justify the means. Then I devise a strategy for cross-examining them that is effective in making the point I want to make.
Q: You have obviously achieved an incredible outcome in the McDonnell case. With that said, we know that no case is ever perfect. Do you believe that there was anything in the case you would have done differently?
To begin with, it was a team effort. It takes a village to win these types of cases. As for doing things differently, I don’t mean to be flip, but I would have preferred to try the case in October or April rather than August. A better month of the year with better weather in Richmond. Fewer potential jurors with substantial business expertise out on vacation.
We probably should not have had so many defense lawyers in the courtroom on a daily basis. It can look odd to a jury. We could have been better at tasking folks in the courtroom to be specifically responsible for keeping track of all the various courtroom dynamics. We could have done a better job of not annoying the judge.
But, you need to try to find ways to give young lawyers on the team opportunities to do something substantive in court.
There was also a benefit to having a large team in trial. If a juror does not like me, maybe she will like the personality of another lawyer on the team. Same with witnesses. Some lawyers draw the judge’s fire more than others.
In hindsight, I would have also tried hard to move the case out of Richmond. The problem was that I did not get the kind of voir dire I expected on pre-trial publicity. Going into the trial, I knew the demographics of the Richmond jury pool. I knew the political polling. I knew what the press coverage was going to be like after the investigation was made public. Knowing all that, I was still convinced that if I got reasonable voir dire, I could get a good jury.
Things did not work out that way. The voir dire was severely restricted. For example: both sides agreed that the Court should ask the following question: “based on your exposure to the media, have you formed any opinions about guilt or innocence of either defendant?” The Court would not ask that question. Instead, the judge asked the entire jury pool of 143 to stand up if they had heard about the case and to keep standing if they could not be fair. Naturally, all sat down. I was not amused.
In terms of other issues, there are things I wished would have come out differently, but not that I would have done differently. For example, I would have liked the two defendants to be severed, but the judge did not allow it. We filed many other motions. The judge ruled against us on nearly all, except 17(c) subpoenas and pro hac vices. I did not expect to win many other motions, but there are strategic reasons for filing them anyway. For example, you get to learn more about the government’s case because they have to respond. You also build up chits, so you can tactfully say: “how about ruling for me once in a while, judge?”
Another issue from the case that I still think about is the problem of dealing with leaks during the grand jury phase. To give some background, during the investigation of Governor McDonnell, many leaks appeared in the press that were attributed to law enforcement sources. However, we were not able to slow the flow of leaks, or figure out a good way to stop them.
Trying to run down grand jury leaks can be a real diversion of resources and time when you are on the fast track to trial. While most prosecutors are ethical and would not leak grand jury info, there are many sources other than prosecutors who can leak information about a grand jury investigation.
The only way to find out is through litigating the issue. Then you would be fighting Williams & Connelly or Cahill Gordon on these First Amendment side issues if you tried to subpoena reporters, while you are also fighting the prosecution on the main front. You may stop the leak and punish the person responsible, but you can’t repair the damage done in terms of influencing public opinion.
One other thing that bothered me during the trial, and which I still don’t have a good answer for, is the problem in a high profile case, of dealing with the constant negative press, before, during and after the trial. Various major publications were obviously out to do Governor McDonnell in, and there was a constant torrent of false narratives being spread in the major news outlets as well as the blogging sphere. The problem only got worse when we were in trial. Reporters were all over the courthouse. There would be twenty or thirty reporters in my hotel whom I couldn’t recognize. Every time I sat with a colleague for breakfast or dinner, I had to worry about whether there were reporters listening to our conversations.
I was never able to figure out an effective way, consistent with the free press-fair trial restrictions, to deal with the negative publicity in the McDonnell case. The best solution I could come up with was to file motions articulating something that I’d like the press to pick up on, and hope that they print it, and if a reporter called me and said he was going to print something which I knew was false and defamatory, I threatened to sue.
Of course, the client is always free to speak to the press because he has First Amendment rights. In Governor McDonnell’s case, the day after the indictment was returned, he, with his wife and his children beside him, gave a short press conference in the lobby of a law firm in Richmond. The magistrate judge at the subsequent bond hearing was upset by this. He quoted me the local free press-fair trial rule, and noted that my client is also a lawyer. Of course, the magistrate was wrong about the rule’s application, because it clearly only applied to attorneys representing a client, and my client was not representing himself. Later at the arraignment, the district court judge said to both sides: “the game playing with the press is over.” From that point forward we were never quoted in the press again until the trial was over.
In sum, I felt that the negative and false press coverage during the trial really hurt us, and I’d like to think if I did the trial again, I’d figure out a better, ethical way of controlling or balancing that narrative.
Q: A final question: sometimes our most memorable cases may not be the most high-profile cases. Do you have any little-talked about cases that are especially memorable to you?
I’ve always liked all of my clients over the years, and found something to admire in each one of them, no matter what types of crimes they were charged with. One especially memorable one was a young man, who was a juvenile at the time I represented him in the Public Defender Service. I won his trial, and he was very grateful.
Later on when he was an adult, he got himself in trouble on major federal offenses I did not know about, and he ended up with a life sentence on cocaine trafficking and firearms related charges. Four or five years ago, while still in prison, he wrote to me and asked for Jones Day’s help with a habeas petition. We ended up getting his life sentence substantially reduced. He is now out of prison, married, working several jobs and doing extremely well.
When he wrote that letter to me asking for help with his habeas petition, he included the pleadings that he had filed pro se up to that point to resurrect some of his legal issues and get his foot in the door. He had turned into quite the jailhouse lawyer. What struck me most, though, were the footnotes at the bottom of the first page of all his motions, expressing gratitude to me personally as his mentor for teaching him everything about the law.
[This interview has been lightly edited for brevity and clarity.]
(EG & ZZ)
Tuesday, October 11, 2016
In this second post from the Fifth Annual ABA Criminal Justice Section London White Collar Crime Institute, I will discuss some of the lessons learned and issues discussed during this morning’s panel on international internal investigations.
The panel emphasized that one of the first issues for consideration after the discovery of potential misconduct by a corporate employee is disclosure obligations. One of the issues discussed in this context was the tension the exists when a corporation wants time to develop the facts, but mandatory disclosure requirements restrict the time frame during which this can occur. This is an issue made even more complex in the international context, where the disclosure obligations might vary significantly from one jurisdiction to another. Further, along with mandatory disclosure obligations, there are permissive disclosure considerations. One of the most important, of course, is the decision whether and when to disclosure the issues discovered to the government in an effort to demonstrate cooperation and voluntary disclosure.
The panel also considered the importance of seeking to preserve evidence immediately. As readers know, failure to protect evidence from destruction can both jeopardize the ability of counsel to conduct an effective internal investigation and, potentially, lead to charges of obstruction of justice.
Part of the hypothetical discussed during the panel involved a number of emails being collected by private counsel as part of the internal investigation. These emails came from various parts of the world, including Hong Kong and Amsterdam. While counsel in the U.S. are comfortable with collecting emails and other corporate documents during an investigation without significant impediment, data privacy laws in other countries introduce a number of complexities. In the European Union, for example, there are many restrictions on the transfer of data out of the country. One related issue explored by the panel was whether U.S. prosecutors understand or appreciate the significance of these data privacy obligations. Based on discussions both today and yesterday at the conference, it appears that one of the reasons tension exists in this area is because of the different approaches to these data privacy obligations taken by corporations during pending investigations.
The panel then discussed issues associated with employee interviews during an internal investigation. Here, the panel examined the ways that local employment, criminal, and civil laws can impact the ability of counsel to conduct such interviews. Once again, while few restrictions exist in the United States, a host of restrictions and requirements related to interacting with employees in this way may apply abroad. Can the interview be recorded? Can the employee’s statements be disclosed to the government? Does the employee need to be given notice or provided with representation prior to the interview? What types of disclosures need to be made to the employee before the interview begins? Are interview notes privileged? How do the answers to these questions impact an internal investigator’s strategy? As these questions illustrate, each step of the investigation on the international stage posses various pitfalls and perils.
As part of this panel, we also heard an interesting discussion of the economics of profit and loss calculations in a bribery case. The presentation reminded us of the complexities of profit and loss calculations and the significant impact these calculations might have on the outcome of the case. It also reminded us of the importance of retaining the right experts in any case, particularly one that crosses borders.
The panel as a whole served as a nice reminder of the importance of considering local laws and rules when engaging in a cross-border investigation.
Monday, October 10, 2016
I’m attending the Fifth Annual ABA Criminal Justice Section London White Collar Crime Institute this week and the program will be touching on various important issues in the field. I thought I might share some of what was discussed with our readers.
In this first post, I’ll focus on what was discussed during the first morning session where we heard from Andrew Weissmann, Chief of the DOJ Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, and Mark Steward, Director of Enforcement and Market Oversight at the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) in London. During the panel, Mr. Weissmann and Mr. Steward focused on four themes – cooperation, corporate compliance programs, individual accountability, and reliance on internal investigations.
Regarding the first issue, Mr. Steward noted that currently there is significant contact between the FCA and the DOJ. In particular, he noted that there is little preclusion today regarding regulators and prosecutors collaborating on investigations and how they might conclude. Mr. Weissmann agreed that there is significant cooperation today, not just between the U.S. and U.K., but also with many other countries around the globe. The challenge he noted is that moving forward global enforcement bodies need to be cognizant of what each other wants and ensure that the penalty at the end of the day is fair.
Regarding compliance programs, there was discussion of the DOJ compliance expert, Hui Chen. Mr. Weissmann noted that there are two key questions for Ms. Chen based on the Principles of Prosecution. He described those as (1) did the company have an adequate compliance program and (2) did the company adequately remediate the issue? The DOJ, he noted, looks at compliance programs through this lens. The take-away from the discussion was that the process of receiving credit for a compliance program is much more rigorous than in the past and is, at least in part, data driven. Mr. Steward stated that compliance programs are important because of the manner in which they speak to a company’s culture.
Regarding individual accountability, Mr. Weissmann stated that the Yates Memo has been somewhat misunderstood. To illustrate this point, he noted that the DOJ Fraud Section prosecuted 225 individuals and 11 corporations last year. So it has not been the case, he emphasized, that the DOJ has been focusing only on corporations. There was a focus on individuals before the Yates Memo, he said, and that focus remains after the Yates Memo. Mr. Weissmann also noted that it is important to recognize that the issue of individual responsibility is important when considering compliance programs and remediation. From his comments, it appears clear that corporations must consider not only how to sanction those responsible for the actions under investigation, but also those who were responsible for monitoring or supervising these individuals.
Regarding internal investigations, Mr. Weissmann stated that the DOJ finds it very helpful for a company to conduct an internal investigation. He encouraged cooperation and coordination during such inquiries. For example, he said that the DOJ is interested in learning who will be interviewed in an investigation because the government might like a particular issue asked during the interview or might like to interview the employee before investigating counsel. In general, Mr. Weissmann stated that the DOJ is looking for investigations that are “independent and candid.” Mr. Steward was more skeptical of the value of internal investigations because of what he described as an inherent conflict of interest. He stated that he must base a decision in a matter on evidence gathered and corroborated by his organization, not by a private law firm. Mr. Weissmann stated that internal investigations are particularly helpful in complex cases. For example, he stated that in large cases it could be difficult to determine who might actually have valuable information. Investigating counsel, he said, can help focus the DOJ on the right individuals so the government can use its resources in a targeted manner. As another example, Mr. Weissmann noted that many cases today have international components. In such matters, it can be difficult or time consuming to gather information from abroad through the MLAT process. Law firms, he noted, can be very helpful is assisting to get information and determine where further inquiry might be valuable.
Saturday, October 8, 2016
This week in U.S. v. Free, the Third Circuit sent a sentencing case back to the district court for further proceedings, because the sentencing judge appeared to have based his loss calculations on defendant's harm to "the integrity of the judicial process." Free was convicted after a jury trial on bankruptcy fraud charges. The sentencing court found that Free lied and obstructed justice throughout the bankruptcy court proceedings and hid assets totaling over $1 million. But in the end all creditors were paid in full and it appears that Free filed for bankruptcy for reasons unrelated to defrauding his creditors of the funds he owed them. The Third Circuit held that it is improper to base loss calculations on harm to the integrity of the judicial process, as opposed to real harm inflicted on the actual victims of a bankruptcy fraud. The Third Circuit, however, virtually invited the district court to upwardly vary on remand, based on Free's obstructive conduct.
Thursday, September 29, 2016
In white collar cases, prosecutors often stress the signs or "indicia" of fraud inherent in a given defendant's conduct. In the FBI/DOJ investigation of Secretary Clinton we have several signs of incompetence and/or highly irregular conduct on the part of those in charge. The one that stands out most clearly to anyone who practices white collar criminal defense was the decision to allow Cheryl Mills to attend Secretary Clinton's FBI interview. Competent prosecutors do not allow a key witness to participate as an attorney in an FBI interview of the main subject. It just isn't done. It isn't a close question. It is Baby Prosecution 101. Director Comey's attempt to justify this decision during yesterday's House Judiciary Committee Oversight Hearing was disingenuous and disgraceful. According to Comey, the FBI has no power to control which attorney the subject of an investigation chooses to represent her during an interview. This is literally true, but irrelevant and misleading. Prosecutors, not FBI agents, run investigations. Any competent prosecutor faced with the prospect of Ms. Mills's attendance at Secretary Clinton's interview would have informed Clinton's attorneys that this was obviously unacceptable and that, if Clinton insisted on Mills's attendance, the interview would be conducted under the auspices of the federal grand jury. At the grand jury, Secretary Clinton would not have enjoyed the right to her attorney's presence in the grand jury room during questioning. In the event Clinton brought Ms. Mills along to stand outside the grand jury room for purposes of consultation, competent prosecutors would have gone to the federal judge supervising the grand jury and attempted to disqualify Ms. Mills. In all likelihood, such an attempt would have been successful. But of course, it never would have gotten that far, because Secretary Clinton will do anything to avoid a grand jury appearance. So, Director Comey's response was a classic dodge, one of several that he perpetrated during yesterday's hearing. As noted above, the decision to allow Ms. Mills to attend Secretary Clinton's FBI interview was only the clearest example to date of irregular procedures sanctioned by the prosecutors in charge of the Clinton email investigation. More to come on that in a subsequent post.
Monday, September 26, 2016
In the recently-released hit movie "Sully," about a pilot who landed a disabled US Airways plane on the Hudson River after its engines hit a flock of geese shortly after taking off from LaGuardia Airport, the film's heroes, Capt. Chesley B. Sullenberger lll (the "Sully" of the title), played by Tom Hanks, and the co-pilot Jeff Skiles, played by Aaron Eckhart, worry that the agency investigating the water landing, the National Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB") will publicly criticize them for making a dangerous water landing rather than just turning around and returning to LaGuardia. In the movie, the agents appear adversarial and close-minded and looking to blame the pilots based on simulated tests and preliminary expert evaluation.
NTSB released a statement regretting that the filmmakers had not asked it to review the film before its release, and the now-retired leader of the NTSB inquiry complained that the film unfairly characterized the agency as prosecutorial. According to the New York Times (Negroni, "'Sully is Latest Historical Film to Prompt Off-Screen Drama" Sept. 9, 2016), the NTSB maintained that its investigations are primarily meant to understand how humans and machines fail to prevent accidents, and not to blame individuals. (Later that week, however, the NTSB strongly criticized the pilot and crew of a Delta airplane that had skidded off a LaGuardia runway).
While "true story" films often veer from accuracy, as this one apparently did, one of the film producers denied that the film took creative license as to the pilots' fears, saying that the film was told through the perspectives of the pilots, who felt under "extreme scrutiny." And, Mr. Sullenberger, in an e-mail to the Times, wrote that the film accurately reflects his state of mind. "For those who are the focus of the investigation, the focus of it is immense," he wrote, and that the investigative process was "inherently adversarial, with professional reputations absolutely in the balance."
The contrasting viewpoints of the former NTSB investigator and its investigatee, Mr. Sullenberger, demonstrates the not uncommon disconnect in perception between how those who investigate and those who are investigated. Investigators view their behavior, even if aggressive and apparently hostile, as just rightfully doing their jobs. Those being investigated, no matter how innocent or blameless they might be, often feel that the investigators are biased and out to get them, regardless of their blameworthiness or lack of it.
To be sure, investigators often believe that an aggressive, hostile, unbelieving manner is a good way to reach the truth. Those being questioned often view that type of investigation and interrogation as a means to reach a predetermined result regardless of its accuracy.
Investigators - and I include criminal prosecutors - often lack sensitivity to how those they investigate perceive them or the psychological toll their investigations take. They rarely understand, in Sully's words, "the [immense] intensity " that affects an individual, including the innocent. Investigators virtually never take into consideration how heart-wrenching, all-consuming and destructive an investigation may be to an individual when they determine whether and how to investigate. They generally believe, and judges rarely disagree, they (and especially the grand juries prosecutors nominally act for) have an absolute right to investigate and question (with some constitutional and statutory restraints) anyone. In the movie, and in real life, the investigation consumed and heavily worried the pilots, members of a profession known for calm and equanimity. One would expect people in other walks of life to be more affected.
I do not suggest that prosecutors or agencies forego investigations if based on reasonable suspicion or another more than insubstantial basis. I do suggest, however, in instances where there is little factual or other basis to suggest wrongdoing by an individual, that prosecutors and agencies consider the human cost and anguish an investigation or the manner in which it will be conducted may cause the person being investigated or interrogated.
As a young lawyer just out of a prosecutor's office, I worked for a state investigative commission with subpoena power. Its chair, a prominent Wall Street lawyer and former bar association president, was hesitant to issue subpoenas to individuals without a substantial basis to believe there was wrongdoing, a hesitancy which bothered its ex-prosecutor lawyers (including me), who used to issue subpoenas like street vendors issue flyers. As Sully's situation suggests, some hesitancy in starting investigations, issuing subpoenas or harshly interrogating witnesses based on how it would affect the individuals involved may be appropriate.
Monday, September 12, 2016
I agree with my colleague Prof. Podgor that DOJ made the "right decision" to drop the prosecution of former Virginia governor Robert McDonnell. Under the narrow definition of "official act" given by the Supreme Court a re-prosecution was doomed. I further agree with Prof. Podgor that McDonnell's legal team, led by Hank Asbill and Noel Francisco, deserves plaudits for its determined and outstanding lawyering.
I do not, however, criticize DOJ for bringing this case. McDonnell's acts - accepting $175,000 in money and gifts in exchange for favorable treatment for the donor - although ultimately determined not to be "official acts" and thus not criminal, were unseemly and corrupt. That the Commonwealth of Virginia, in its wisdom or lack of it, chose not to criminalize such activity to me was a reason for federal prosecution, not for abstention. To be sure, the government should have been aware that there was Supreme Court case law arguably undermining its position. On balance, the egregiousness of McDonnell's conduct, I believe, justified a prosecution, even if it "pushed the envelope."
The McDonnell decision will allow federal prosecutions of politicians accepting things of value for favorable votes or actions on legislation or favorable decisions awarding governmental appointments, contracts and benefits, the areas within which most corruption cases fall. It will, however, eliminate or preclude almost any prosecution for payments to officials for access, referrals and introductions, allowing donors an advantage over non-payers. "Pay-for-play" systems do not guarantee winning a contract, but do allow one to be among those considered - a giant and necessary step. Thus, the decision will, like Citizens United, most benefit the rich, powerful and politically-connected.
I, like many others, was surprised by the unanimity of the court. Although I am no expert on Supreme Court internal politicking, I suspect some justices might have gone along with the decision to prevent a broader decision which would have greatly limited, or even eliminated, federal prosecutions of state and local corruption, either by finding the term "official acts" constitutionally void for vagueness, or on federalism grounds. In his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts mentioned, but did not rule on, both considerations.
I cannot dismiss an undiscussed "elephant in the room," alluded to by Prof. Podgor. The American election system commonly allows campaign contributions to be rewarded by at the least access to elected and appointed officials. It is extremely doubtful whether McDonnell would have been prosecuted for accepting campaign contributions and rewarding the donor with access to state officials. It seems to me extremely difficult to make a lawful/unlawful distinction between situations involving gifts to politicians for their personal use, as in McDonnell, and those involving gifts to politicians for campaign purposes. Absent such a distinction, an affirmance of McDonnell might have led to cases concerning campaign contributions, which might have led to an upheaval in campaign financing practices generally accepted in America. Thus, it is not surprising that a host of former Counsels to the President and Attorneys General submitted amicus briefs in support of McDonnell, a fact noted with apparent respect in the opinion.
Lastly, I wonder whether the Court was wary of allowing federal prosecutors expansive power to prosecute political officeholders. There is always a danger - at least theoretical - that a prosecutor will misuse her power to indict political opponents, as is not infrequently done in foreign nations, and perhaps occasionally done in the United States. It may well be that the case should be considered primarily as a limitation of prosecutorial and executive branch power.
Thursday, September 8, 2016
As noted here by Solomon Wisenberg, DOJ moved to remand the case against Robert F. McDonnell to the district court in order to dismiss the indictment with prejudice. Many in the media have reported about this dismissal (e.g., Washington Post here, USA Today here) The Washington Post states that this results from a "new legal definition" being given to public corruption (Washington Post). While others criticize the Supreme Court with comments such as "[w]e are now seeing that the Supreme Court's decision will in fact result in corrupt conduct going unpunished, just as we feared it would." See Statement here - Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington.
But some media and critics are missing the point here. The McDonnell decision was not a close call - it was a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court. There were no dissents.
This is not a case that puts a stop to prosecuting bribery and extortion cases. The law clearly allows such prosecutions and there have been many such prosecutions without reversals.
The McDonnell case was one we see too many times, where prosecutors push the envelope and prosecute conduct that does not meet the statute. And Hank Asbill, Noel Francisco, and the rest of McDonnell's legal team did a wonderful job showing this.
Elected officials who corruptly take money or items of value for an official act can be prosecuted. And prosecutors need to focus on bringing cases that meet the language of this statute. But the receipt of money or items of value alone are not a crime. If a politician's merely taking money is considered to be a crime, then politicians would be unable to accept any campaign contributions. And although many may find this result good - it is not the law.
So, DOJ should be applauded for making the right decision here. Spending more time or money on a case that does not meet the legal mandates is a poor choice of how to spend limited resources. What is particularly outstanding on the part of DOJ here is that they issued a press release stating, ""[a]fter carefully considering the Supreme Court's recent decision and the principles of federal prosecution, we have made the decision not to pursue the case further."
It is rare that DOJ issues a press release noting a not guilty verdict, a court dismissal, or something other than an indictment or conviction. It is hopeful that what DOJ has done with the McDonnell case, of issuing a statement of dismissal, will be replicated in non-white collar cases.
It's now official. Former Virginia Governor Robert McDonnell and his wife Maureen will not be retried and all charges are to be dropped. The Washington Post has the story here. It is unclear whether Main Justice overruled the EDVA or caused that office to change its mind regarding proceeding to a second trial. More analysis to come.
Wednesday, September 7, 2016
Finally, as promised, here is the U.S. v. Reddy Annappareddy 9-1-16 Motion to Dismiss Hearing Transcript. At the conclusion of that hearing Judge George Levi Russell dismissed the Indictment with prejudice. Judge Russell's rationale for his ruling can be found at pages 49-62 of the transcript. This was a health care fraud case and a core government theory was that Mr. Annappareddy received Medicaid reimbursement for pills that were never given to patients. The government sought to prove its theory by showing that Mr. Annappareddy's pharmacies billed for more pills than they received. The most significant evidence that the prosecutors offered in support of this allegation was a calculation of the purported “loss” from the alleged fraud. The following factors were key to the Court's finding that the government committed due process violations that shocked the conscience and rendered it impossible to put Mr. Annappareddy back on an even footing with the government: 1) the government violated Brady by failing to disclose loss calculations from its initial auditing team that were significantly smaller (in total and with respect to two key pharmacies) than the calculations of a subsequent government auditor who testified at trial; 2) the government violated Brady by failing to disclose the risk of double-counting errors in the loss calculations; 3) the government presented false testimony regarding the loss calculations due to double counting errors; 4) the government presented false testimony by a government agent, based on her examination of the wrong set of phone records, that Mr. Annappareddy had NOT made any calls to a key individual in response to a material email from that individual, when in fact Annappareddy had several phone contacts with the individual within minutes of the material email; and 5) the government destroyed potentially key exculpatory evidence without a court order or the defense's permission. The Court also sent a not so subtle warning to the government: "In the event that my record is not clear or exercise of my discretion too broad, this Court will conduct an extensive time-consuming and costly hearing as to these matters and the other grounds supporting the motion to dismiss and other motions which have already been filed. To that end, the balance of all other motions in this case are denied as moot." Translation: If you appeal this ruling and I am reversed, we will delve in detail into the other grounds of error raised by the defense. And it will not be a pleasant process. Hat Tip to David Debold of Gibson Dunn for sending along the transcript.
Thursday, September 1, 2016
The case against Reddy Annappareddy is over. The Government's case has been dismissed with prejudice by U.S. District Court Judge George Russell because of a pattern of government misconduct that shocks the conscience. As soon as I obtain a copy of today's hearing transcript we will post it. Congratulations are in order for Mr. Annappareddy and his Womble Carlyle defense team of Mark Schamel and Josh Greenberg. Greenberg's relentless motions work over the past 11 months has been particularly brilliant. Anybody who does white collar work in the federal courts knows how difficult it is to obtain a result like this, post-trial. This is a magnificent victory.
As we write this post U.S. District Court Judge George Russell is holding a hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with prejudice. I have previously discussed this case here and here. The motion is bottomed on various alleged prosecutorial errors and misdeeds. In a bad omen for the Government, Judge Russell only set arguments on the Motion to Dismiss (despite the pendency of other motions) and summarily denied the Government's motion to delay the hearing. The Government wanted a delay in the wake of an onslaught of defense motions, authored by Womble Carlyle's Josh Greenberg, alleging additional Government misbehavior, including destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence at a time when the Defendant's Motion for New Trial was filed and awaiting a decision. The Government later joined in the Motion for New Trial after admitting that it presented false material testimony to the jury. Meanwhile, in a filing that can only be described as stunning, the Government yesterday attempted to defend its admitted document destruction. Here lies the Government's Response Re Document Destruction.
Wednesday, August 31, 2016
Guest Blogger: Rory K. Little (Joseph W. Cotchett Professor of Law, U.C. Hastings College of Law)
Almost all of the Court’s October arguments will be in criminal cases
In a somewhat unprecedented calendaring wrinkle, the entire first week of oral arguments at the Supreme Court this coming Term, and 7 of the 8 cases to be argued in all of October, are criminal-law-based cases. This is probably not intentional, but rather reflects hesitancy in certiorari consideration last Spring by an evenly-divided eight-Justice Court.
Although the Court normally opens with oral arguments on “the first Monday in October,” this Term, due to Rosh Hashanah, the Court will only issue Orders on that day. Then on Tuesday, October 4 the Court will open its argument Term by hearing two cases; and on Wednesday, three. Three of these five arguments are pure criminal cases; the other two are “civil” but arise directly from criminal prosecutions.
The next Monday, October 10, is the Columbus Day holiday, and Wednesday is Yom Kippur. So the only argument day that week will be Tuesday October 11, when the Court will hear three cases. Two of those are criminal (discussed below), and the third is Samsung v. Apple, October’s only completely non-criminal case (described briefly in the next paragraph).
That’s it for October -- eight cases which, given the Court’s slow pace in granting certiorari until late June, were all that could be fully briefed and ready for argument that “speedily.”
The lone civil case set for argument in October, Samsung Electronics v. Apple, is a “big” IP case, presenting an important question about the extent of damages available for patent infringement when the infringed patented design applies only to a “component” of a product. Oral arguments will be presented by two well-known Supreme Court “heavy-hitters” -- Kathleen Sullivan for Samsung, and William Lee for Apple.
Otherwise, the Court’s entire argument focus in October will be on criminal matters. Below are short (and undoubtedly simplified) summaries of the seven criminal cases set for argument in October, presented in the order they will be heard.
- Bravo-Fernandez v. United States (argument on Oct. 4): A somewhat complicated Double Jeopardy question, which invokes a favorite old chestnut of law professors, Ashe v. Swenson, and the “collateral estoppel” effects of related prosecutions. When jury convictions have been vacated on appeal, is retrial on those counts barred by (perhaps inconsistent) acquittals that were returned on other counts? Arguing: former Assistant to the U.S. Solicitor General Lisa Blatt (for Bravo) and Elizabeth Prelogar from the current U.S. Solicitor General’s office. (Specific arguing counsel have not yet been officially identified by the Court; these summaries present my best guesses as to arguing counsel.)
- Shaw v. United States (argument on Oct. 4): Does subsection (1) of the federal bank fraud statute require the government to prove that the defendant intended to obtain “bank-owned” property, as opposed to fraudulently obtaining assets of a customer that are held by the bank? The case is a follow-on from the Court’s 2014 decision in Loughrin v. United States. Arguing: Deputy Federal public Defender Koren Bell of Los Angeles (for Shaw); and Anthony Yang from the current U.S. Solicitor General’s office.
- Salman v. United States (argument on Oct. 5): An important insider trading case. Is the Second Circuit’s groundbreaking 2014 decision in United States v. Newman correct in holding that the government must prove “at least a potential gain [to the tipper] of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature;” and if so, does the gift of a “tip” to a close friend or relative satisfy this “personal benefit” requirement (derived from Dirks v. SEC, 1983)? Arguing: Alexandra Shapiro of New York (for Salman), and Deputy U.S. Solicitor General Michael Dreeben.
- Buck v. Davis (argument on Oct. 5): The case presents a technical procedural question arising from a decidedly un-technical incident of racial bias in a death penalty case. Buck’s defense counsel actually elicited “expert” testimony at sentencing that Buck was more likely to be dangerous in the future because he is black – Texas now concedes that such generic race-based testimony is “always inappropriate.” So, did the Fifth Circuit erroneously deny a Certificate of Appealability from the district court’s denial of federal habeas corpus? Such a Certificate is a statutory prerequisite to allow review of Buck’s habeas corpus claim on the merits. This same case previously attracted the Court’s attention in 2011, when the Court denied certiorari at an earlier stage and five Justices joined two opinions: three Justices concurring in, and two dissenting from, the denial of certiorari. Arguing: Christina Swarns of the NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund (for Buck); and someone from the Texas Attorney General’s office.
- Manuel v. City of Joliet (argument on Oct. 5): It is complicated to even briefly describe what question this case presents. In a §1983 civil rights complaint, filed after criminal charges against him were dropped, Manuel alleged that he was held in jail for 47 days based on false reports made by the police. Among other things he claimed damages for “malicious prosecution” after the institution of “legal process” -- and to avoid dismissal under a statute of limitations, Manuel argued that he could not legally file that claim until the prosecution against him had terminated in his favor. The central question presented is whether the Fourth Amendment, or the Due Process Clause, governs such a claim. Many federal Circuits have said Fourth Amendment, while the Seventh Circuit here said Due Process. This same question was debated, but not resolved by a majority, in Albright v. Oliver (1994) (a plurality said Fourth Amendment; Justice Kennedy joined by Thomas said Due Process), and oral argument will likely focus on the intricacies and subsequents Court statements about Albright. However, the briefs filed so far also suggest that the parties disagree about a number of preliminary wrinkles, which could sidetrack the Court at argument. Arguing: Stanley Eisenhammer of Arlington Heights, Illinois (or possibly Professor Jeff Fisher of Stanford, see the next case) for Manuel; Michael Scodro of Chicago’s Jenner & Block (and former Illinois Solicitor General and Justice O’Connor clerk) for the City of Joliet; and Assistant to the U.S. Solicitor General Ilana Eisenstein for the United States as Amicus..
- Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (argument on Oct. 11): After Pena-Rodriguez was convicted of three sexual assault misdemeanors, two jurors reported that during deliberations, another juror had made a number of racist statements against “Mexicans.” The question is whether the Sixth Amendment right to an “impartial jury” requires that such reports of “racial bias” during criminal jury deliberations be considered, despite Colorado’s (and many other jurisdictions’) “no impeachment” rule that generally bars use of evidence about things said or done inside the jury room to impeach a verdict. Something like this question was left open by the 2014 decision in Warger v. Shauers. Arguing: Jeff Fisher of Stanford Law School, for Pena-Rodriquez; Frederick Yarger, Solicitor General of Colorado; and Assistant to the U.S. Solicitor General Rachel Kovner afor the United States as Amicus.
- Manrique v. United States (argument Oct. 11): Is a notice of appeal -- filed after sentence and judgment (including a general restitution obligation) is imposed, but before restitution is precisely determined -- sufficient to challenge the details of the restitution award? Arguing: Paul Rashkind, Assistant Federal Public Defender in Miami (for Manrique); and Allon Kedem from the U.S. Solicitor General’s office.
* * * * *
So stay tuned for an almost “all criminal, all the time” month of arguments at the nation’s Highest Court! (And if you really want an earful, attend the “UC Hastings Annual Supreme Court Review & Preview” panel discussion, in San Francisco at Hastings on September 26, 2016.)
Tuesday, August 30, 2016
The Supreme Court decision in McDonnell v United States, decided June 27, has given several politicians whose corruption convictions are on appeal both a cause for optimism and freedom on bail pending appeal. Last week SDNY District Judge Valerie Caproni granted former New York Assembly Speaker Silver's request for bail pending appeal on the grounds that there was a "substantial question" whether the court's instruction defining "official act" passed muster in light of the narrow definition of that term announced in the later Supreme Court decision.
Judge Caproni made it clear that she had little doubt about Silver's guilt of the major accusations against him, stating, "There is no question that Silver took a number of official acts - most obviously passing legislation and approving state grants and tax-exempt financing - as part of a quid pro quo scheme." These acts would clearly fall within the Supreme Court definition of "official act." But the judge recognized that there were other acts committed by Silver that were presented to the jury by the government, such as holding a meeting or arranging an internship, that might not fall within the narrow Supreme Court definition of "official acts." The jury was thus presented with instructions which may have permitted it to find Silver guilty for actions that were not criminal even if bought and paid for.
18 USC 3143(b)(1) allows a convicted defendant to be granted bail pending appeal if, inter alia, there is "a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in (i) reversal [or] (ii) an order for a new trial...." Finding the existence of a "substantial question," despite the literal language of the statute, does not mean that the judge believes there is a likelihood of reversal, only that if there were a substantial question which if decided in the defendant's favor would bring such relief. United States v. Miller, 750 F2d 19 (3d Cir 1985). Appellate courts deal with a lot of "substantial questions" that have led to bail pending appeal, but rarely reverse trial convictions.
Here, it appears that under the instructions it was given, the jury could have convicted Silver based on acts not within the statute as limited by the Supreme Court.. But that is not the end of the analysis. The appellate court will also consider, and the decision is likely to turn on, whether the evidence is considered so strong that the jury would have undoubtedly convicted Silver under a proper charge - in other words, whether the erroneous instruction constituted "harmless error."
I hesitate to predict the outcome of the appeal. Cases of political figures, as demonstrated by McDonnell, are scrutinized by appellate courts more carefully than, for instance, cases of drug dealers. I believe it is likely, and will appear likely to the appellate court, that Silver would have been convicted upon a proper instruction. How likely is the issue. Is it so likely that the court will find the error "harmless?" What is "harmless error' is in many ways just a visceral judgment by the judges putting themselves in the role of jurors. Harmless error analysis, thus, arguably deprives an accused of his basic constitutional right to a determination by a properly-instructed jury of peers and I believe should be applied rarely.
Other factors the appellate court will probably consider include whether the defense proposed an instruction in accord with the standard set forth in McDonnell, and whether the defense specifically objected to the definition given by the trial court as too broad. Another factor that may conceivably affect the decision, although unlikely to be mentioned, is whether the judges believe the 12-year prison sentence imposed on the 72-year old Silver is excessive. And, of course, there may be other, unrelated issues raised. In any case, based on the "official act" issue issue alone, a reversal will likely not give Silver a dismissal, but only a new trial, presumably with proper jury instructions.
One lesson that lawyers - both prosecutors and defense lawyers - might learn from this situation is to be aware and up-to-date on cases for which the Supreme Court has granted cert and, if any concern issues that might arise in a pending case, to craft requests to charge in anticipation of the possible result of the Supreme Court case. Another lesson - for judges and prosecutors more than defense lawyers - is to adjourn a pending case that might be affected by a pending Supreme Court case until after that decision. A third lesson - for prosecutors - is to analyze all aspects of their prospective case and discard legally or factually questionable ones when there are strong aspects.
Monday, August 29, 2016
Things are getting personal in U.S. v. Annappareddy. I posted here last week about this District of Maryland case in which the Government ultimately admitted to having presented false evidence to the trial jury, and grudgingly joined Defendant's new trial motion--granted the next day by Judge George Russell. Now the Government has admitted to "disposal" of certain documents while defendant's New Trial Motion was pending in March 2015. Annappareddy's current trial team was not notified of the disposal until August 19, 2016, and claims, in Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time to File Motions In Limine, that some of the destroyed documents were exculpatory in nature. No court order authorized the destruction at the time it was accomplished.
The DOD/OIG Evidence Review Disposal Sheet from March 11, 2015 states that AUSA Sandy Wilkinson determined that the items in question "were not used as exhibits in trial and would not be used in future proceedings against Annaparreddy." In other words, Wilkinson acted unilaterally, apparently consulting no one on the defense team before making her decision. The Government's response to the allegation is a footnote stating in part that "in early March 2015, after the trial, the government began to clean up papers and documents not used from the Washington Blvd collection and store the trial exhibits post- trial. The government began purging the contents of several unused boxes. These were items Defendant and his own attorneys had reviewed at length and were never marked as exhibits or used in any way by them at trial. Yet they couch their complaint again in the most accusatory of tones. "
Well, yes. Destruction of potential evidence prior to final judgment on appeal is quite rare, if not unheard of, in federal criminal practice. That an AUSA would do it on her own is remarkable. The Government's Response to Annappareddy's Motions to Limit Government Evidence complains further that Annappareddy's new lawyers don't play nice in the sandbox, unlike the original trial lawyers--you know, the ones who lost after the Government presented false testimony. That's right, Ms. Wilkinson. Lawyers tend to get angry when false testimony is put in front of the jury and potentially exculpatory evidence is destroyed.
The case is far more involved, and the issues more complex, than I can do justice to here. Annappareddy has moved to dismiss with prejudice and a hearing on that motion is set for September 1. Failing that, the defense wants to limit the Government's evidence at a new trial to the evidence presented at the first trial. One thing absent from the Government's papers that I have had an opportunity to review is any recognition of the emotional, financial, and strategic harm suffered by defendants when the Government screws up, forcing a new trial. It's as if Ms. Wilkinson wants a cookie and a pat on the back for deigning to agree that Reddy Annappareddy gets to go through the whole damn thing again.
Wednesday, August 24, 2016
Criminal defense lawyers in federal courts in this nation on an average plead 35 defendants guilty for every one they take to trial. Accordingly, many criminal defense lawyers are not much more "trial lawyers" than the many big firm "litigators" who have never selected a jury or cross-examined a trial witness. However, one area in which federal defense lawyers have plenty of experience is crafting the expressions of remorse made at sentencing by virtually every criminal defendant (save those who were convicted after trial and intend to appeal and do not wish to make any sort of admission because it might later be used against them). The expression of remorse, a near uniform ritual in every federal sentencing proceeding, is made in order to ensure that the court grant a reduction in the Sentencing Guidelines level of two or three levels for "acceptance of responsibility" (USSG Sec. 3E1.1) and to demonstrate that the defendant is truly sorry and contrite for having committed criminal acts, a factor many judges consider in the sentencing determination.
To be sure, the incantation of remorse is often less than fully sincere, and the defendant is actually only sorry that he was caught and is now facing punishment. An astute defense lawyer will counsel her client that the expression of remorse should reflect his realization of and sorrow for the wrong he has done and harm he has caused to his victims and to society in general, and not only to his family and friends, and not to excuse or justify his acts, or minimize the damage. She will counsel her client not to use weak words like "regret" or stiff ones like "remorseful." Thus, it is difficult for a judge to distinguish the absolutely genuine shame and sorrow some defendants feel from the false impression of remorse others present.
Some judges do suspect or realize that the expression of remorse is not genuinely sincere, but feel that the mere expression of remorse is itself a step forward. Others, while perhaps doubtful of the defendant's sincerity, accept the expression of remorse without comment or much consideration. Some judges accept the apology at face value and credit it. Some few listen carefully and skeptically, and, if they detect a false note, sometimes comment on the defendant's lack of genuine remorse to justify, in part, a severe sentence (which they had probably decided beforehand to impose in any case). I have not heard of a judge who denied an acceptance of responsibility reduction solely because of the defendant's presumed insincerity. (I wonder whether such a determination would be upheld on appeal; I suspect, depending on the facts, that it might.)
Last week, two notable men, presidential candidate Donald Trump and Olympic swimmer Ryan Lochte (neither of course criminal defendants) made widely-publicized "apologies" of sorts. Both "apologies" would trouble a judge considering whether to credit the speakers for "acceptance of responsibility" or genuine remorse.
Mr. Trump. who in the course of his campaign has insulted the parents of a heroic soldier who died in action, a woman Fox television commentator, a federal judge of Mexican ancestry, a U.S. Senator who was a prisoner of war for five years, a disabled reporter, and, generically, Mexicans and Muslims, chose to use the word "regret" rather than "sorry" or "apologize." And his "regret" was for an inadvertent slip of the tongue, rather than a deliberate slur, and without any specificity of what statements he regretted or whom he may have harmed and no direct admission that they did harm anyone. He said, "Sometimes in the heat of debate, and speaking on a multitude of issues, you don't choose the right words or say the right thing. I have done that, and, believe it or not, I regret it, I do regret it, particularly where it may have caused personal pain."
Mr. Lochte, in a television interview and at least one social media post, presented a fictitious account of robbers in police uniforms pulling over a taxi he and fellow swimmers were in and robbing them at gunpoint. This account received widespread publicity (perhaps to Mr. Lochte's surprise)and was a great international embarrassment for Brazil, a country which with its many troubles appeared to have demonstrated competence and provided adequate safety for the Olympics. In fact, as Mr. Lochte's swim team colleagues later admitted, they were drunk, urinated on a wall, and vandalized the gas station, and that the guns were drawn by security guards who demanded they pay compensation for the damage before they left. Faced with the contradictory statements by his colleagues, Mr. Lochte then said, "I want to apologize for my behavior last weekend - for not being more careful and candid in how I described the events of that early morning." He went on to excuse himself even for that minor transgression by seemingly claiming he was victimized: "It's traumatic to be out late with your friends in a foreign country - with a language barrier - and have a stranger point a gun at you and demand money to let you leave." While Mr. Lochte did use the word "apologize," his apology minimized his misbehavior by describing it as lack of carefulness and candor rather than lying, and omitted any mention of the intoxication, urination and vandalism.
Similar "apologies" by criminal defendants would both cause scrutiny and little impress federal sentencing judges. Mr. Trump's was limited by the use of the wishy-washy word "regret." Both Mr. Trump's and Mr. Lochte's played down their own seeming misbehavior. And, both contained defenses or excuses to justify or mitigate the limited degree of impropriety they admitted. Defense lawyers should keep copies of these "apologies" to show their clients how not to do it.
Were Mr. Trump or Mr. Lochte criminal defendants who had offered "apologies," a federal judge might have some difficulty finding, even if they had pleaded guilty, that they had "clearly demonstrate[d] acceptance of responsibility for the offense." USSG Sec. 3E1.1(a).
Tuesday, August 23, 2016
In June 2016, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland (Judge George Levi Russell III, presiding) granted Reddy Annappareddy a new trial on the grounds that the prosecutors presented false evidence to the jury at his first trial and that the outcome might have been different without the false evidence. This ruling is part of a remarkable turnaround for Mr. Annappareddy, whose case appeared to be over after the first trial ended in December 2014.
The case is captioned as United States v. Annappareddy, No.1:13-cr-00374 (D. Md.). The prosecutors’ main allegation during the first trial was that Mr. Annappareddy’s chain of pharmacies, known as Pharmacare, committed health care fraud by billing government insurance programs for prescriptions that were never picked up or delivered. The most significant evidence that the prosecutors offered in support of this allegation was a calculation of the purported “loss” from the alleged fraud. Mr. Annappareddy’s current counsel, Mark Schamel and Josh Greenberg of Womble Carlyle, began working on the case in the spring of 2015. In September 2015, they filed a Supplement to the one-and-a-half-page Motion for New Trial filed by Annappareddy's original trial counsel. The Supplement and a Reply in support of it argued, among other things, that the prosecutors presented materially false evidence to the jury on a number of important subjects in violation of the Due Process Clause.
After many months, during which the parties took depositions of trial counsel and Greenberg and Schamel filed extensive additional briefs raising troubling issues, the Court scheduled a hearing for June 3 on Annappareddy's Motion for New Trial. On the afternoon of June 2, the prosecutors filed a letter with the Court conceding that the "inventory analysis" it presented to the jury, in an effort to prove purportedly enormous losses caused by Annappareddy, was in "substantial error", rendering its own evidence "wrong", and violative of Due Process. The Government effectively joined Annappareddy's Motion for New Trial, which was granted the next day by Judge Russell during a status conference.
Judge Russell scheduled a second trial – to last eight weeks, three weeks longer than the first trial – to begin on September 19. Last month, the Court entered an Order denying the Government's motion to delay the second trial. The Order emphasizes that the Court granted a new trial because the prosecutors presented “significant material and false testimony” at the first trial and that the delay they sought “would be fundamentally unfair” to Mr. Annappareddy.
While government admissions of error are always welcome, one of the striking things about this case has been the prosecution's reluctance to admit that the evidence it presented to the jury was not just wrong or in error--it was false.
The defense recently filed a motion calling for dismissal with prejudice. Check this space for further details. The multiple briefs filed by Greenberg and Schamel since they entered their appearances represent outstanding work.
Here are some relevant documents pertaining to the case: a partial transcript from the U.S. v. Annappareddy 6-3-16 Status Conference; Judge Russell's 7-6-16 Order Denying Gov't's Motion for Modification of Trial Schedule; and the Government's Letter to Court Conceding that New Trial is Warranted.