White Collar Crime Prof Blog

New York Civil Case Allows Exorbitant Pay for Witness Testimony

In Caldwell v. Cablevision, 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 00783, the New York Court of Appeals two weeks ago unanimously affirmed a trip-and-fall civil defendant's verdict in which an emergency room physician subpoenaed by the defense as a fact witness was paid $10,000 for one hour of testimony to verify an entry he made in the "history" section of the hospital records.  That note read that the plaintiff had "tripped over [her] dog while walking in the rain," seemingly contradicting the plaintiff's claim that she tripped because of an unfilled trench dug by the defendant.

The court was "troubled" by what was clearly an exorbitant fee paid to a witness for minimal testimony.  The relevant statute provided that a witness was entitled to a fee of $15 per day and $.23 per mile travel, but the court wrote it was not improper to pay a witness "reasonable" compensation beyond those amounts for attending, testifying and preparing.  The court noted that a witness, however, could not be paid based on the outcome of the litigation.

The court, disturbed by what it called a "disproportionate fee for a short amount of time" and realizing that an excessive payment tended to influence witnesses to testify favorably for the party that paid them, also stated "[a] line must be drawn."  However, it not only failed to draw that line, but did not set forth any criteria for when a payment to a witness becomes a bribe.  It did hold that the trial court should have tailored a specific jury instruction for the situation, but found the failure to do so was harmless error.

Initially, I thought the court's opinion might provide some limited protection to a New York criminal defense lawyer to offer a witness in a state case a substantial payment to overcome the typical witness reluctance to testify against the prosecution.  After a moment's reflection, however, I concluded that such protection was illusory.  A criminal defense lawyer who pays a fact witness $10,000 for an hour of testimony is likely to face indictment for bribery.  What is acceptable in civil cases is often not acceptable in criminal cases, especially if one's adversary has the power to prosecute.  Further, what is acceptable conduct by a prosecutor in criminal cases is often not acceptable if done by a defense lawyer.

Prosecutors routinely induce testimony from witnesses by offering "something of value" greater than money -- a witness' freedom from incarceration, something a defense lawyer obviously cannot offer.  While one federal appellate court shook the foundations of federal prosecution offices by holding that the government could not induce testimony by offering such leniency to a witness, United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), that case was swiftly and soundly overruled en banc, 165 F.3d 1302 (10th Cir. 1999).

In white collar and other cases, the defense often is hampered by its inability to induce a witness to testify by offering something of value for fear that the defendant or her attorney will be prosecuted for bribing a witness.  While the defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to subpoena and call fact witnesses (and to pay witness fees and the "reasonable value of lost time"), that right is considerably limited by the witness' Fifth Amendment right to assert his privilege against self-incrimination and decline to testify.  Further, defense attorneys lack a mechanism (such as a grand jury) to test what an unamenable witness will state under oath.

One instance where witnesses are often necessary for a viable defense in white-collar cases is where the defendant claims she acted with a lack of criminal intent, often evidenced by a direction or assurance by superiors of the propriety of her conduct or her openness and expressions to her co-workers.  Witnesses who might substantiate the defendant's good faith who were somewhat involved in, or just near, the questioned activity, generally at the direction of prudent counsel will often refuse to testify for fear they will be prosecuted.  This foreclosure of potentially favorable testimony is sometimes reinforced by prosecution sabre-rattling, often disingenuous, that the witness himself is a potential defendant.  Such a declaration almost always will frighten the witness from testifying and deter a judge from granting the witness immunity over prosecutorial objection.  But see here.

Allowing white-collar defendants to "buy" (honest) testimony from a reluctant witness -- that is, to pay the witness to give up his constitutional right not to testify -- conceivably theoretically acceptable under the Caldwell case -- might somewhat level the playing field in which the prosecutor to a considerable extent controls who will testify for either side.  However, until a court or legislature "draws a line" that clearly allows it, such a payment is fraught with danger to the defendant and the defense lawyer. 

(goldman)

New Scholarship - Scienter Pleading and Rule 10b-5

A recent publication in the Case Western Reserve Law Review by Dain C. Donelson and Robert A.
Prentice, Scienter Pleading and Rule 10b-5: Empirical Analysis and Behavioral Implications. From the abstract:

Pleading requirements are the keys to the courthouse. Nowhere is this more true than with rule 10b-5 class action securities fraud claims. Provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 impose special pleading burdens upon plaintiffs regarding the scienter element and bar them from discovery when defendants file a motion to dismiss. This Article begins with a doctrinal history of the scienter element of a rule 10b-5 claim that indicates that many key legal questions remain unsettled and that application of legal rules to specific factual allegations regarding a particular type of defendant—external auditors—is extraordinarily muddled. To determine whether the impression arising from this extensive but nonsystematic examination of the case law is accurate, we also empirically examine rule 10b-5 claims against auditors and confirm that few facts are consistently viewed by the courts as indicating the presence (or absence) of scienter. This lack of clarity in the law and its application makes it difficult for either plaintiffs or defendants to evaluate the settlement value of claims. Furthermore, the law’s excessive vagueness affords judges virtually untrammeled discretion. The literature of behavioral psychology and related fields indicates that excessive discretion exacerbates problems that arise from unconscious judicial bias.

(esp)

New Scholarship - "Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything is a Crime"

New Article by Glenn Reynolds (Tenn).  SSRN Abstract and Article here -

Though extensive due process protections apply to the investigation of crimes, and to criminal trials, perhaps the most important part of the criminal process -- the decision whether to charge a defendant, and with what -- is almost entirely discretionary. Given the plethora of criminal laws and regulations in today's society, this due process gap allows prosecutors to charge almost anyone they take a deep interest in. This Essay discusses the problem in the context of recent prosecutorial controversies involving the cases of Aaron Swartz and David Gregory, and offers some suggested remedies, along with a callfor further discussion.

(esp)

In the News & Around the Blogopshere

David Oscar Markus, Southern District of Florida Blog, A Call to the Judiciary

Sherri Qualters, National Law Jrl, law.com, Lawyer gets home confinement for failing to report
boss's mortgage fraud

Texas State Securities Board, Foreign Notes Scammer Sentenced to 80 Years in State Prison

This Week From 500 Pearl Street

Casey Sullivan, Reuters (Chicago Tribune), Prominent NY prosecutor enters private practice

Thomson/Reuters, Money News, Former Goldman Director Seeks Reversal of Insider Trading
Conviction

Patricia Hurtado, Bloomberg News, Gupta Says in Appeal Trial Judge Hampered Defense Case

Todd Ruger & Jenne Greene, National Law Jrl, Securities bar predicts White will be 'tough sheriff' at SEC

Sherri Qualters, National Law Jrl, Alleged hacker's prosecutor defends case, stressing low
sentence sought

DOJ Press Release, Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer Announces Departure from Department of Justice

DOJ Press Release, BP Exploration and Production Inc. Pleads Guilty, Is Sentenced to Pay Record $4 Billion for Crimes Surrounding Deepwater Horizon Incident Court Accepts Guilty Plea to Felony
Manslaughter, Environmental Crimes and Obstruction of Congress Prior to Imposing Historic Sentence

DOJ Press Release, Former Chief Financial Officer of Stanford Financial Group Entities Sentenced to Prison for Role in Fraud Scheme and Obstruction 

Katie Couric Show, Cheating? Lying? Why Do We Do It?

Mike Scarcella, BLT Blog, Prosecutors Mounting New Case Against Blackwater Security Guards

(esp)

Irving R. Kaufman Memorial Securities Law Moot Court Competition

Announcement from the Fordham Law Moot Court Board

Each spring, Fordham University School of Law hosts the Irving R. Kaufman Memorial Securities Law Moot Court Competition. Held in honor of Chief Judge Kaufman, a Fordham Alumnus who served on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Kaufman Competition has a rich tradition
of bringing together complex securities law issues, talented student advocates, and top legal minds.

This year’s Kaufman Competition will take place on March 22-24, 2013. The esteemed final round panel includes Judge Paul J. Kelly, Jr., of the Tenth Circuit; Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., of the Sixth Circuit; Judge Jane Richards Roth, of the Third Circuit; and Commissioner Troy A. Paredes, of
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. The competition will focus on two issues that arise in the fallout of Ponzi schemes: whether the “stockbroker safe harbor” of the Bankruptcy Code applies to Ponzi scheme operators, and the application of SLUSA, which was recently granted cert by the Supreme Court.

We are currently soliciting practitioners and academics to judge oral argument rounds and grade competition briefs. No securities law experience is required to participate and CLE credit is available.

Information about the Kaufman Competition and an online Judge Registration Form is available on our website, www.law.fordham.edu/kaufman. Please contact Michael N. Fresco, Kaufman Editor, at KaufmanMC@law.fordham.edu or (561) 707-8328 with any questions.

(esp)

Ring Case - Commentary

The D.C. Court of Appeals rejected all of Kevin Ring’s appellate arguments, from his claims of an impropriety premised on the district court’s definition of what constitutes an "official act" to a claim of a  Federal Rule of Evidence 403 violation. The court’s findings include that "campaign contributions can be distinguished from other things of value." (see here). 

The court states "[t]he distinction between legal lobbying and criminal conduct may be subtle, but, as this case demonstrates, it spells the difference between honest politics and criminal corruption."  This sentence in the opinion concerns me.  Should a distinction that results in imprisonment be "subtle"?  "Googling" the word "subtle" a definition provided is "[s]o delicate or precise as to be difficult to analyze or describe."  And if this distinction is "subtle," should the rule of lenity be considered?  And should a "subtle" difference be considered to "spell[ ] the difference between honest politics and criminal corruption" or as this case finds - spell the difference between freedom and prison.

Irrespective of whether the movie Lincoln wins best picture, unlike Argo, Zero Dark Thirty, Silver Lining Playbook, and the other nominees, Steven Spielberg will be able to say that a federal appellate court has quoted the movie in its decision.  Yes, Hon.Tatel held that "[t]he ubiquity of these practices perhaps explains why in Steven Spielberg’s film Lincoln a lobbyist declared, "It is not illegal to bribe congressmen—they’d starve otherwise."

(esp)

D.C. Circuit Affirms Ring Decision

The D.C. Circuit affirmed the decision in the Kevin Ring case.  See here - Download Ring Decision Commentary to follow.

(esp)

In Memoriam: Murray Janis

Murray Janis, a dean of the Virginia and national criminal defense bars, passed away a few days ago.  Murray, a former president of the NACDL, was a superb lawyer highly respected and well loved by his peers.  He was a true gentlemen whose grace and smile lighted up a room.  He will be sorely missed but fondly remembered.

(goldman)

Casey Anthony Seeks Bankruptcy Protection for Legal Fees

Casey Anthony, who was acquitted of murdering her daughter Caylee Marie in 2011, has filed for bankruptcy in federal bankruptcy court in Florida.  She has listed approximate assets of $1,100 and debts of $800,000, including $500,000 due Jose Baez, one of her defense attorneys.  See here.  I was pleased to see no debt listed for my colleague and friend Cheney Mason, who as Baez' co-counsel, added gravitas, savvy and experience to Ms. Anthony's defense team.

It is not surprising for a criminal defense lawyer not to be paid a large part of the legal fees owed to her.  I venture that the average criminal defense lawyer is "beat" for some 10-20% of her fees.  And I do not know how much Baez actually did receive in fees, but I am sure nothing like the fees many white-collar lawyers and firms often receive for representation in criminal matters of institutions or individuals, even those who never get close to being indicted.  Of course, the Anthony case did provide Baez considerable fame.

(goldman)

Pre-trial Restraints Have Negative Side Effects

It is hard to argue against the idea of criminal forfeiture; fairness demands that one convicted of a crime give up his ill-gotten gains.  A recent article in the New York Times seemed to give its full unstinting approval to federal asset forfeiture (see here).

However, asset forfeiture, aside from its several unfair procedural aspects, has its downsides.  It has to an extent diverted prosecutorial resources from investigation and prosecution of more serious cases to "sitting duck" targets involved in lucrative but arguably harmless violations of law, such as offshore gambling enterprises. 

And, primarily because of pre-trial restraints, it has, with the 5-4 imprimatur of the Supreme Court in Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989), and United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989), turned the presumption of innocence on its head and allowed pre-trial restraint of funds to leave many defendants without sufficient funds to hire experienced, able (and often expensive) counsel of choice.  While court-appointed counsel assigned to represent those now-indigent defendants are generally competent or better than competent, they often lack the experience, resources, aggressiveness and time to provide a first-rate defense.  Thus, asset forfeiture often tilts the board in the prosecutor's favor.

Prosecutors are obviously aware that broad pretrial restraint of assets may skew the results of a litigation by preventing the defendant from hiring top-notch counsel.  While I do not believe that prosecutors often seek pre-trial restraint for that reason, eliminating experienced and able counsel is an obvious byproduct of many such restraints.

Even in New York State, where the Legislature has, alone among the 50 states, specifically provided for expenditures of seized funds to pay reasonable legal fees, some prosecutors, notably the New York County District Attorney, have taken a strong position, "play[ing] hardball" in the words of a senior forfeiture prosecutor, against release of seized funds for legal fees to private counsel.  In New York County, a defendant seeking release of restrained funds for private counsel must initially fill out a sworn 40-page detailed financial questionnaire to demonstrate her lack of access to funds for legal fees.  On the other hand, a defendant in New York County who seeks assigned counsel paid for by public funds needs only to say he cannot afford counsel, and such a statement is rarely questioned. 

The District Attorney in New York and many places elsewhere receives a portion of forfeited funds; thus, he has an extra incentive to fight the release of funds for private counsel, as well as to prosecute those with substantial assets.  An objective observer might question whether the crucial decision whether to prosecute should be made by one with a financial interest in the proceeds of the prosecution.  Compare Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (conviction at trial by magistrate/mayor where municipality retains part of fine proceeds violates due process).

(goldman) 

Standing Ovation for Mike Attanasio & Rusty Hardin

Mike Attanasio (Cooley LLP) and Rusty Hardin (Rusty Hardin and Associates) were the opening speakers at the NACDL White Collar Criminal Defense College at Stetson.And, of course, they were spectacular in their discussion of their successful representation of Roger Clemens. The timing of this event was appropriate as it came the day that the Baseball Writers' Association of America failed to vote Roger Clemens into the Hall of Fame. (see here)

It really is sad to see the Baseball Writers' Association of America turning their heads at our judicial system, a system that found Roger Clemens not guilty of the crimes charged by the government. Clemens could have easily taken the 5th Amendment and never faced these charges.  Instead, he did what innocent folks do - he believed in the judicial system and fought back.  To now have the Baseball Writers' Association of America disregard this verdict is sad to see. 

(esp)

Decision by Tagliabue in NFL "Bounty" Cases May Be Instructive in Criminal Sentencing

One of the many things that has bothered me about the criminal justice system is that there are no "grays."  Everything is either criminal or non-criminal.  Conduct that on one day is legally acceptable, even if perhaps sharp and unwholesome, on the next day will, if a penal statute goes into effect, be criminal and punishable by years in prison.

This fair-to-foul scenario is particularly troublesome in certain areas of white-collar law.  On day one, for instance, conduct which exploits "loopholes" in the tax law may go from widely-practiced and legally-tolerated "tax avoidance" to now-prohibited and severely punishable "tax evasion."  When this change from acceptable to criminal occurs by statute, there at least is some public notice and warning to potential wrongdoers, although such notice obviously never reaches many persons.  When, however, the law, or potential law, changes overnight by an unpredictable or unexpected court decision or an indictment based on a novel theory of prosecution, the sudden changes to what is considered prosecutable is even more problematical. 

I do not have any easy solution to this problem.  We cannot expect the government to send out a hundred million notices that new criminal laws have been enacted (although we do, for instance, require financial institutions to notify all of their credit card customers of interest rate changes).  Nor, of course, if such notices were sent, can we reasonably expect a hundred million people to read or understand them.  Additionally, we do not want to prohibit prosecutors from imaginative use of legally permissible tactics to prosecute what is apparently morally wrong and harmful.

We should, however, in the sentencing area recognize that it is essentially unfair to punish a defendant as seriously for conduct that had previously been generally accepted or tolerated than for conduct clearly known at the time of the offense to be criminal.  Under this theory, for instance, Michael Milken could reasonably be prosecuted, as he was in the late '80s, for essentially "parking" stock, an arguably "civil" violation never before prosecuted criminally, but could not reasonably be sentenced, as he was initially, to ten years in jail (later reduced upon a Rule 35 motion).

I have on a few occasions argued to a sentencing judge that she should give a less severe sentence because the defendant's conduct was at the time he committed it not widely known to be criminal or generally was not prosecuted.  I have never been successful, at least to the extent a judge explicitly agreed (of course, judges often do not explicate their reasoning).  I am aware of no case in which a court explicitly granted a departure or variance on these grounds (although there may well be some).  Nor am I aware of any Sentencing Guidelines consideration of this issue.

The decision by arbitrator Paul Tagliabue in the National Football League's New Orleans Saints "bounty" case (In the Matter of New Orleans Saints Pay-for-Performance/Bounty, December 11, 2012) is interesting and relevant.  See here.  See also here.  Tagliabue, the former National Football League commissioner and a lawyer, affirmed the findings of misconduct made by Commissioner Roger Goodell but vacated the disciplinary sanction for the four players involved, suspensions of from four games to one year.  Tagliabue based his vacation on sanctions essentially on two grounds:  first, that the players' actions were encouraged by the coaches and other officials of the Saints, and, second, that professional football had previously treated such conduct gently, if not tolerating it.  Tagliabue strongly suggested that when an existing "negative culture" is addressed by strict prohibitions, the penalties for violations should be phased in.

I do not expect federal sentences to be "phased in" so that, for instance, a violation of a new law within two years of enactment be punishable by a sentence of up to two years, and thereafter by up to five, although I do not think such an idea is entirely far-fetched.  I do hope, however, that in appropriate cases judges consider adjusting sentences downward when the conviction is based on new law or a new application of existing law, especially when the change caused a sudden prohibition of generally acceptable behavior in the prevailing culture, even a negative culture.  Mr. Tagliabue's opinion will not, of course, be considered precedential in the criminal law, but application of its reasoning in certain criminal cases may be appropriate.

(goldman) 

Related Article - Tagliabue tosses out player penalties in bounty case

New Scholarship - Conflict Minerals Legislation

One of the hot topics for corporate counsel is the conflict minerals legislation.  Karen E.Woody of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP has a new article that was recently published in 81 Fordham Law Review (2012) titled "Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC's New Role as Diplomatic and Humanitarian Watchdog."  SSRN describes it as:

"Buried in the voluminous Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is an oft-overlooked provision requiring corporate disclosure of the use of "conflict minerals" in products manufactured by issuing corporations. This article scrutinizes the legislative history and lobbying efforts behind the conflict minerals provision to establish that, unlike the majority of the bill, its goals are moral and political, rather than financial. Analyzing the history of disclosure requirements, the article suggests that the presence of conflict minerals in a company’s product is not inherently material information, and that the Dodd-Frank provision statutorily renders non-material information material. The provision, thus, forces the SEC to expand beyond its congressional mandate of protecting investors and ensuring capital formation by requiring issuers engage in additional non-financial disclosures in order to meet the provision’s humanitarian and diplomatic aims. Further, the article posits that the conflict minerals provision is a wholly ineffective means to accomplish its stated humanitarian goals, and likely will cause more harm than good in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In conclusion, this article proposes that a more efficient regulatory model for conflict minerals is the Clean Diamond Trade Act and the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme."

(esp)

Mail Fraud - Part II By Hon. Jed Rakoff

The Ninth Circuit issued an opinion in United States v. Philips, a case that includes issues related to mail fraud, money laundering, forfeiture, and alleged government misconduct.  The court reversed the district court decision to deny the government's forfeiture application, and affirmed other aspects of the case, including the money laundering conviction.  All but one, that is - the mail fraud conviction.  Here the court rejected the government's arguments and reversed the conviction. 

In a opinion written by District Judge Jed Rakoff (yes, sitting on the Ninth Circuit by designation) we are finally getting to see what we hope he will include in a Part II to his famed mail fraud article published in 18 Duq. L. Rev. 771 (1979-80) titled Federal Mail Fraud (Part 1).  

Hon.Rakoff does not cite to himself in this opinion, but his incredible knowledge of this statute definitely shows.He dissects the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Maze and concludes that "[h]ere as in Maze, the success of Phillip's fraudulent scheme did not depend in any way on the use of the mails."

Too many take for granted the enormous power of the government in its use of the "stop-gap" provision. But it is also important to remember that there are limits - constitutional ones - with this statute. Thank you, Judge Rakoff for reminding us of this. And thank you Washington Appellate Project atty Lila Silverstein for making this argument.

(esp)(with a hat tip to Evan Jenness)

New Scholarship - Cloud Computing

James B. Baldinger & Charles P. Short of CarltonFields have a new article titled Uncertainty in the Cloud: Changing Requirements for Disclosing Customer Data.

(esp)

In the News & Around the Blogosphere

Joel Rosenblatt, Bloomberg, Rajaratnam Agrees to Pay $1.5 Million to Settle SEC Case

DOJ Press Release, Victory Pharma Inc. of San Diego Pays $11.4 Million to Resolve Kickback Allegations in Connection with Promotion of Its Drugs

DOJ Press Release, Illinois-based Hardware Distributor W.W. Grainger Pays US $70 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations

Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

(esp)

New Head of Antitrust

DOJ Press Release, Attorney General Eric Holder Welcomes Bill Baer as Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division  Baer, a Stanford Law grad, comes to Antitrust from Arnold & Porter.

(esp)

DOJ Should Be Commended for Requiring a Conviction by UBS

It is not often that I praise the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), especially for bringing a prosecution.  However, I commend the decision to prosecute -- really prosecute, and not just indict and offer a deferred prosecution -- a UBS subsidiary for its role in manipulating the benchmark LIBOR interest rate.  See here.

To be sure, UBS was allowed to offer as the defendant in this case a Japanese subsidiary (UBS Securities Japan Co. Ltd.), for which a conviction would bring considerably less collateral damage than it would upon the parent company.  Substituting others for prosecution, whether corporations or individuals, of course, is not a common benefit offered to criminal targets.  Nonetheless, for DOJ, bringing a prosecution against a major financial institution, even a subsidiary, is a considerable and commendable step.

Generally, I believe that prosecutions should not be brought against large institutions because of a few rogue employees, unless at least one is a director or "a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation."  New York Penal Law Section 20.20(2)(b).  See also Model Penal Code Section 2.07.  UBS, however, is a serial offender with a history (not alone among Swiss and other banks) as an eager accomplice of money launderers and tax evaders throughout the world.  Although UBS' belated and commendable efforts to clean up its act and cooperate deserve credit, in this case DOJ apparently felt it did not make up for its past conduct enough to deserve non-prosecution, and appropriately broke its usual pattern of allowing major financial institutions to avoid criminal convictions.

As a practical matter, one may ask what the difference is between an indictment/deferred prosecution (as occurred in the case of the parent, UBS AG of Zurich) and indictment/conviction if both ultimate results carry huge financial penalties and other requirements, such as monitoring.  Aside from the collateral consequences -- which can, as in the obvious case of Arthur Andersen, be fatal to a major financial institution (although I agree to an extent with Gabriel Markoff (see here) that such a fear is exaggerated) -- the conviction here has importance as a symbol, and perhaps also a deterrent in both the specific and general aspects.

Although the huge UBS fines will be borne by current UBS shareholders (not necessarily the same stockholders who benefited from the LIBOR bid-rigging), one would hope that UBS makes an effort to recoup the substantial financial gains through bonuses and other compensation geared to profits that those in leadership and supervisory roles made as a result of UBS' now-admitted criminality even if those leaders were uninvolved or unaware of the wrongdoing.  I suspect that there will be no such serious effort, or at least little or no success if there is one. 

(goldman) 

2012 White Collar Crime Awards

Each year this blog has honored individuals and organizations for their work in the white collar crime arena by bestowing "The Collar" on those who deserve praise, scorn, acknowledgment, blessing, curse, or whatever else might be appropriate. I welcome comments from readers who would like to suggest additional categories or winners (or losers?).

With the appropriate fanfare, and without further ado,

The Collars for 2012:

The Collar for Delay of Game Followed by Strikeout - To the Roger Clemens prosecution team

The Collar for the Most illegitimate Prosecution -  To the prosecutors who brought the case against John Edwards

The Collar for "I'm Sorry But I Forgot!"- To the authors of the wiretap application in the Rajaratnam case.

The Collar for the Most Missed Law School Exam Questions by DOJ Attorneys  - Discovery Questions

The Collar for the Tim Geithner Lifetime Achievement Award - To Attorney General Eric Holder for acquiescing in Treasury's decision not to indict HSBC or any of its senior officers

The Collar for the Statute Giving Courts the Best Shot at Correcting Poor Legislative Drafting - False claims (18 U.S.C. s 287) for Congress' failure to specify materiality and willfulness

The Collar for the Most Likely to Receive a Pardon - DOJ's pardon attorney

The Collar for Best Job at Protecting Your Own - To the DOJ's Office of Professional Responsibility for its report and recommendation on the Stevens case

The Collar for the Most Likely to be Indicted - Your choices are: Governor, Senator, Mayor, recreational pot smoker

The Collar for the Best Legal Treatise - Holder & Breuer on White Collar Declinations (Publication forthcoming in four years)

The Collar for the Show Least Likely to Survive a Season - An FCPA case

The Collar for the Agency to Have the Highest Number of Early Retirements - Tied between the SEC and State Department 

The Collar for the Most Likely to Survive a Spill - BP

The Collar for the Best Attempt to Alleviate the Financial Crisis - DOJ's Nearly $5 BIllion Recovery in False Claims Act cases 

The Collar for the Worst Attempt to Alleviate the Financial Crisis - DOJ's Failure to prosecute financial institution fraud

The Collar for the Most Likely to Be Visiting a Prison Camp - Former middle management executives of companies that enter into Deferred Prosecution Agreements

The Collar for the Most Likely to Come Closest to Playing "Who Wants to Be a Millionaire" with Donald Trump - Monitors under deferred prosecution agreements 

The Collar for the Best Parent - retired years ago and renamed the Bill Olis Best Parent Award - unawarded this year since no one comes even close to Bill Olis, may he rest in peace.

(wisenberg), (goldman), (esp) 

New Scholarship - Prosecutors and Professional Regulation

Professor Bruce Green has a new article titled, Proscutors and Professional Regulation forthcoming at 25 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 873 (2012). The SSRN abstract states:

Prosecutors often express mistrust of professional regulators, their rules and their processes. This may have been more understandable twenty years ago, when prosecutors perceived that the organized bar had been captured by defense lawyers seeking to use professional regulation as a means of imposing limits on criminal investigative authority that the law did not otherwise recognize. Although that criticism no longer has much basis in reality, it has persisted in the rhetoric prosecutors employ in advocacy regarding their professional conduct. This article explores prosecutors’ public attitude toward professional regulation, beginning with a brief account of their responses two decades ago, then considering three recent examples: the NDAA’s opposition to a broad reading of Model Rule 3.8(d)’s disclosure obligation; some prosecutors’ opposition to states’ adoption of the post-conviction obligations of Model Rules 3.8(g) and (h); and the Queens County, NY, district attorney’s opposition to a trial court’s consideration of the ethical propriety of his office’s post-arrest interrogation practices. The article argues that prosecutors’ anti-regulatory rhetoric undermines the culture of prosecutors’ offices and is contrary to the public interest in other ways.

(esp)