Friday, December 2, 2016

Josh Greenberg, U.S. v. Annappareddy Hero, Opens New Firm.

Readers of this Blog are no doubt familiar with United States v. Reddy Annappareddy, the District of Maryland case in which a guilty verdict was overturned (and new trial granted) with the grudging, belated concurrence of government prosecutors, because the government presented false testimony to the jury. The indictment was then dismissed with prejudice, over government objection, due to the government's destruction of potentially relevant evidence and the trial court's finding of prosecutorial misconduct.  All of this was the result of the tireless and brilliant work of Annappareddy's post-trial attorneys, Josh Greenberg and Mark Schamel of Womble Carlyle.  See my prior posts herehereherehere, and here. Since my last post, the government moved to withdraw its appeal, the Fourth Circuit granted the motion, and the mandate has issued. 

Now, Josh Greenberg, who played a key role in devising and implementing the post-trial strategy, has decided to open his own shop, focusing on white collar criminal defense, civil litigation, and appeals. Congratulations to Josh. We wish him the best.

(wisenberg)

December 2, 2016 in Defense Counsel, Judicial Opinions, Legal Ethics, News, Prosecutions, Prosecutors | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, October 12, 2016

At Counsel’s Table: A Conversation with Henry W. (“Hank”) Asbill of Jones Day

Guest Bloggers - Eugene Gorokhov,  Charles Burnham, & Ziran Zhang (Burnham & Gorokhov, PLLC)

At Counsel’s Table: A Conversation with Henry W. (“Hank”) Asbill of Jones Day

             Hank Asbill is a partner at Jones Day and widely recognized as one of the country’s best white collar criminal defense attorneys. In 2015, he was awarded the prestigious White Collar Defense Lawyer of the Year Award by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Mr. Asbill’s most recent accomplishments include representing Virginia’s former governor Robert McDonnell in his battle against federal corruption charges. In Governor McDonnell’s case, Mr. Asbill and his team were able to devise and execute a winning strategy that ultimately resulted in the dismissal of all charges after the Supreme Court reversed Governor McDonnell’s convictions in an 8-0 opinion.

            In this interview, we catch up with Mr. Asbill to talk about his career path, advice for young lawyers, and his thoughts on the McDonnell case. 

 Q: You have worked as a defense attorney for close to 40 years. What inspired you to work in criminal defense? And what other fields of law have you considered?

            I am a child of the 60’s and have always questioned authority. Someone has to keep the government honest. And, I have always been interested in constitutional law.  I also watched a lot of Perry Mason as a kid. 

            I never considered any other field of law. I knew I wanted to be a criminal defense lawyer before law school, and that never changed.

Q: Do you feel that the practice of law has changed in the forty years since you began practicing?  If so, how? 

            It has changed substantially, and in terms of criminal defense, I feel it has been primarily for the worse.  

            The biggest change has been the decline of jury trials, which keep the system honest. There are far fewer jury trials today because of the enactment of sentencing guidelines in both federal and state systems, as well as the draconian push for mandatory minimums and lengthy sentences for all crimes.  These changes have spawned many more pleas because the sentencing risk of losing at trial is so great.

            I think the two biggest policy failures in the criminal justice system in my career have been the enactment of the sentencing guidelines and the “war on drugs.”

            The alleged war has unfairly targeted the most vulnerable people in society, including minorities and the poor.

            As for the Guidelines, I never thought that there was a serious sentencing disparity among judges that would justify the Guidelines in the first place. The Guidelines were promoted by the DOJ  to give prosecutors much more control – to make sure that the only way out of a harsh sentence is a 5K1 motion by the government based on the defendant’s assistance in prosecuting others. 

            This 5K1 regime incentivizes lying by co-defendants and targets. The government does not give 5K1 credit for cooperation when it does not result in prosecution of others.  On only one occasion have I had a client who gave honest answers that prevented the government from going down the wrong road and charging innocent people who still received 5K1 credit.

Q: Can you tell us a bit about your career path and how you got to where you are now?

            I started as law clerk on the D.C. Court of Appeals. After that I practiced with a large firm, doing civil securities and antitrust litigation, before going to D.C.’s Public Defender Service for four years.   I then started a small trial firm with a PDS colleague. We later added a civil trial lawyer, and grew the firm until we were at 9 or 10 people. I worked there for 23 years until I transitioned to Big Law. At that time we had to decide whether to renew a 15-year lease. The management of a small firm was becoming cumbersome, and the desires of the founding partners were diverging. 

            I was taking on more complicated cases and needed specific subject matter expertise, and more staff to help on projects.

            I ultimately ended up choosing Jones Day for many reasons:  its culture is unique; it is extraordinarily well-managed; the lawyers genuinely like and respect each other; the Firm has tremendous subject matter expertise; it has a terrific appellate group with many former Supreme Court or Circuit Court clerks who want to work on trial matters; and, there are many talented young lawyers here who have the temperament, talent, passion, and zeal to become great trial lawyers whom I’ve greatly enjoyed working with and mentoring. Lastly, we are given great latitude in terms of pro bono work, both with respect to the type of cases and the amount of pro bono work we can do.

Q: In contrast to many other prominent white collar criminal defense attorneys, you have never worked as a prosecutor. Do you think this background offers any advantages, or drawbacks, in your practice?  

            I believe being a defense lawyer for my entire career has been a major advantage.  I often represent individuals and companies that want to fight, and that’s what I’ve specialized in my entire career. 

            There is a myth that you need to work as a prosecutor to be able to know how they think.  I have interacted with enough prosecutors and have been friends and partners with enough former prosecutors over the years, that I know how they think.  Besides, I have never wanted to put people in jail. 

            Some former prosecutors are able to successfully transition to the defense side.  Some are not, and end up exclusively doing internal investigations and turning the results over to the government. That is not the work I prefer to do.

            Also, I believe criminal defense attorneys are generally much better cross-examiners than prosecutors, because defendants rarely testify, and often do not put on a direct defense case. In contrast, prosecutors will generally be more experienced in direct examinations. Although both skills are very important, for criminal defense attorneys, the ability to do a good cross-examination is the more important of the two.

            The main disadvantage of having never been a prosecutor is that you do not have the network of former AUSAs to access for business development.  The prosecutors’ network is often much more active and cohesive than the defenders’ network.

Q: Do you have any advice for younger attorneys who want to get into white collar criminal defense?

            First get trial experience, whether with a public defender’s office or prosecutor’s office.  That’s the easiest way to develop the essential skills. But it’s not the only way. I’ve got a young partner here whom I’ve mentored for a dozen years who has worked only in law firms. But, she connected with the trial lawyers in those firms and learned a lot by working with them as second chair and being advised by them on her own smaller cases. She has become an extraordinarily talented trial lawyer in her own right.

            As for being a public defender, it’s important to try to work at an office that reasonably restricts the intake of new cases. If you look at, for example, the Public Defender Service in D.C., it is a low volume office that accepts mostly difficult cases and it has lots of resources for experts and investigators. You need to be able to expend the time necessary to thoroughly research and prepare a case and, that attention to factual detail and the nuances of the statutes, rules and procedures are very important in the more complex cases.

            You can learn by doing but you can also learn by watching. Go see the best trial lawyers in action whenever you have the chance.  You can also learn by doing some appellate work because it helps you figure out how to avoid mistakes at trial.

Q: To follow up on that, how can a younger attorney develop the trial experience needed to be an effective criminal defense attorney in today’s environment? 

            If you want to get trial experience, you need to look for it.  Federal courts these days have very few trials. You need to be willing to take on pro bono or court-appointed cases, or smaller cases for lesser fees – often in state court.  You need to take trial practice courses and attend CLE programs on trial skills. And, read biographies of great trial lawyers.

            In a large firm, you need to figure out who is going to trial, and ask to be on those trial teams. You need to know more about the facts than anyone else working on the case.  You need to prove yourself in depositions, or motions hearings, where you are examining witnesses and arguing your positions. You need to lobby and advocate for a chance to do that. The people who really want to be trial lawyers will go out of their way to look for opportunities that large firms do not gratuitously provide.

Q: Let’s talk about the McDonnell case.  The trial in that case lasted almost six weeks.  Do you have any special tips for handling very long trials that go on for months or longer?

            Its not unusual for me to try cases that are several months long.  I tried one case for 22 months. That was the longest federal criminal trial in history. It took us four months just to pick the jury.

            Lengthy trials are certainly mentally and physically demanding and can take a toll on other aspects of your life.  You are always focused on the trial, which means you ignore other things in your life – your practice, your friends, and your family. But minimizing outside distractions is important. If your family and client’s budget will permit, stay in a hotel very near the courthouse even if the trial is local. 

            Make sure you get some exercise, at least a modest amount everyday.  Eat well.  Try to get at least four or five hours of uninterrupted sleep.  I have never gotten more than that amount a night since I was a teenager, but I have been fortunate to be able to thrive on it.  I also try to catch up a bit on sleep on the weekends.

            You need to be someone who thrives on stress, as opposed to being someone who is enervated by stress.  Sometimes you have to play hurt. Your back may be killing you; you have a cold or a headache. You do your best to power through these minor injuries. 

Q: What advice do you have for being a source of strength for clients, particularly during long trials?

            I like to analogize it to a boxing match.  I have never seen one where one guy lands all the blows. When a compelling witness for the government testifies on direct for three days, you can do nothing but sit and listen and grimace.  But you will have your chance to fight back when it comes time for cross. There are peaks and valleys in long trials.  You need to keep your eye on the end-game. Advise your client before the trial starts that there will be good and bad days. The issue is who is standing at the end.  Convince your client that you have a plan to get through this, to be victorious at the conclusion. 

            You need to be able to adjust during the course of a trial. You need to have a plan that is comprehensive enough and flexible enough to be adaptable to new evidence or new developments.

            If the client knows you are working hard, that you are totally prepared, that you have good defense themes and legal theories, it is much easier to distinguish between battles and the war.  If I can’t win every battle, I can still win the war.  If the client thinks you know what you are doing, and you are it doing well, they will share your confidence and, at a minimum, believe that you have done everything for them you possibly could have.  

            I always believe I can and will win no matter what the odds are, no matter what unexpected problems may arise.  That inspires my clients.  The client made a decision to not plead, and understands there’s risk involved.  Clients will accept outcomes if they see sustained effort by competent people.  At the end of the day, I don’t control what the judge or jury does, and I don’t create the facts.  Clients recognize that there can be mistakes, screw-ups, missed opportunities in trial. It’s a dynamic arena. But if you work hard enough, think hard enough, fully accept the responsibility of defending someone’s freedom, reputation and fortune – you can overcome those problems. 

Q: In working on the McDonnell case, your strategy involved preserving and seeking Supreme Court review on the official acts issue from the very beginning. Can you tell us what were some of the alternative plans you had for the case?

            Before the trial started, we filed a motion to dismiss based on the official acts issue.  We also tried to get the judge to give us the legal instructions the prosecutors gave the grand jury, because we thought they misunderstood the law. Both motions were denied. So, I did not go into trial assuming that we would be getting the final instructions we wanted.

We had other defenses besides the correct definition of “official act,” including reasonable doubt, good faith and good character.

            I was optimistic.  I went into closing arguments thinking we were going to win no matter how bad the instructions were because our client had no criminal intent. I tried to argue as closely as I could to the instructions I wanted.  I had a plan, but it was multifaceted. 

            I knew if we ended up losing the case at trial, we had a fantastic appellate issue that likely would be cert-worthy.  I thought if we did get to Supreme Court, we would win, 9-0.  If Justice Scalia had been on the bench, the Court might have even invalidated the bribery statutes on vagueness grounds.  Several jurors even told the press after the trial that they believed my client’s trial testimony. The jury convicted the Governor because they were directed to do so by the flawed instructions. 

Q: Did the location of the McDonnell trial in Richmond, Virginia figure into your preparation for trial at all, and if so, how?

            To prepare for any trial, you need to know that court.  You need to understand who the players are. You need to know their personalities, likes, dislikes.  The trial in this case was held in the Richmond Division of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.  It is a small court, with only four judges and two magistrates. It is a tight community of prosecutors and judges who work together all the time.

            The Richmond Division is also notorious for being fast and formal.  You don’t have conference calls with the judge to resolve discovery disputes.  You need to file a motion, in the right format, at the right time, with the right page limits.  Before the trial started, we belatedly received about 5 million pages of discovery documents. That was sometime in late March. And we had to go to trial at the beginning of August.  That was as far out on the calendar as the judge was going to let it go.  He wanted to get it over with before his clerks rotated out on Labor Day. 

            You have to be ready going into that jurisdiction, knowing that you will be on a very fast track. Substantial advance preparation is key. You need the resources to deal with that pace of litigation. You’re filing motions all the time and arguing constantly. You typically won’t get all of the discovery you need until close to the trial date. You need to be prepared for all of that.  You need to consult with local lawyers who regularly practice there and make sure you know what problems might arise and how best to avoid or solve them. 

            In any major case, you need to know the personalities of the players: what annoys them, what makes them happy.  The clerks, judges, opposing counsel.  The local quirks.  For example, in Richmond, if you run out of defense witnesses early on a particular day, maybe because the prosecution didn’t spend long cross-examining your witnesses, your case is over, even if you have more witnesses lined up for tomorrow.  You can beg the judge to adjourn early that day, but you don’t want to count on getting that slack. 

            Also, the Richmond division, like the rest of EDVA, does not allow electronics in the courthouse without the judge’s permission.  If you don’t have electronics, it is hard to communicate with people in your firm or witnesses.  In Alexandria, you need to line up to use the few available payphones.  These are the types of restrictions you need to know about and plan for before a trial.  You have to be prepared to inconvenience witnesses by making them show up early.  You need to have law clerks or paralegals who are keeping the witnesses happy and on the reservation while waiting. 

Q: Governor McDonnell was himself a former prosecutor, and an accomplished attorney. Did this background make any difference for you in terms of your representation?

            The Governor’s background created both opportunities and challenges.  He was a politician, a lawyer, and the CEO of a state with 100 billion dollar biennial budget and 100,000 employees. 

            I’ve represented many lawyers and business executives.  One common thread is that they are particularly difficult to train as witnesses.  Many do not think that anyone on the jury is their peer.  They have a hard time trusting the jury.  Based on decades of experience, I generally trust jurors, as long as I get a reasonable voir dire.  You have to convince your client that this group is a jury of your peers.  Even if individually they may not be your peers, collectively they are as smart as you are.  You have to convince your client to trust in the system, and the magic number of 12 jurors who must be unanimous.  You have to convince your client to believe in a system which has historically proven reliable, even if not unerring.

            Lawyer clients, in particular, often second guess you on legal issues and trial strategy. They can’t help themselves.  They act like lawyers even though they are the client.  They want to expand and explain, question and challenge. CEO’s don't like being told what to do. Politicians want to manipulate the press. You have to convince these clients that you, not they, deserve to be in control. 

Q: People have praised you for your cross-examination of the FBI agents in the Governor McDonnell case. Do you have any general philosophy or approach for cross-examining law enforcement agents?

            My first rule is that you cannot be the least bit intimidated or afraid to take on an agent on cross-examination, even though they are usually the most well-trained and experienced witnesses in the case.

            Secondly, my experience has been that law enforcement witnesses often act like expert witnesses, even if not qualified as such. They are primed to give opinions at the slightest opportunity.  You have to approach them as you would approach an expert witness. This means learning how they think, how they work, how they operate, how they do their job.  What rules and practices govern their conduct and influence their thinking. What their biases, motivations are.  What their weaknesses and strengths are.  Then you exploit these things on cross-examination. 

            You must remain in control of these witnesses, while giving them enough rope to make mistakes. 

            I like cross-examining experts and law enforcement agents.  I know how agents think, talk and how they collaborate.  And what corners they may cut.  Whether or not they think the ends justify the means.  Then I devise a strategy for cross-examining them that is effective in making the point I want to make. 

Q: You have obviously achieved an incredible outcome in the McDonnell case. With that said, we know that no case is ever perfect.  Do you believe that there was anything in the case you would have done differently?

            To begin with, it was a team effort. It takes a village to win these types of cases. As for doing things differently, I don’t mean to be flip, but I would have preferred to try the case in October or April rather than August.  A better month of the year with better weather in Richmond.  Fewer potential jurors with substantial business expertise out on vacation.

            We probably should not have had so many defense lawyers in the courtroom on a daily basis.  It can look odd to a jury. We could have been better at tasking folks in the courtroom to be specifically responsible for keeping track of all the various courtroom dynamics. We could have done a better job of not annoying the judge.

            But, you need to try to find ways to give young lawyers on the team opportunities to do something substantive in court.

            There was also a benefit to having a large team in trial.  If a juror does not like me, maybe she will like the personality of another lawyer on the team. Same with witnesses. Some lawyers draw the judge’s fire more than others. 

            In hindsight, I would have also tried hard to move the case out of Richmond.  The problem was that I did not get the kind of voir dire I expected on pre-trial publicity.  Going into the trial, I knew the demographics of the Richmond jury pool. I knew the political polling.  I knew what the press coverage was going to be like after the investigation was made public. Knowing all that, I was still convinced that if I got reasonable voir dire, I could get a good jury.

            Things did not work out that way. The voir dire was severely restricted. For example: both sides agreed that the Court should ask the following question: “based on your exposure to the media, have you formed any opinions about guilt or innocence of either defendant?”  The Court would not ask that question.  Instead, the judge asked the entire jury pool of 143 to stand up if they had heard about the case and to keep standing if they could not be fair. Naturally, all sat down. I was not amused. 

            In terms of other issues, there are things I wished would have come out differently, but not that I would have done differently.  For example, I would have liked the two defendants to be severed, but the judge did not allow it.  We filed many other motions.  The judge ruled against us on nearly all, except 17(c) subpoenas and pro hac vices.  I did not expect to win many other motions, but there are strategic reasons for filing them anyway. For example, you get to learn more about the government’s case because they have to respond. You also build up chits, so you can tactfully say: “how about ruling for me once in a while, judge?” 

            Another issue from the case that I still think about is the problem of dealing with leaks during the grand jury phase.  To give some background, during the investigation of Governor McDonnell, many leaks appeared in the press that were attributed to law enforcement sources. However, we were not able to slow the flow of leaks, or figure out a good way to stop them. 

            Trying to run down grand jury leaks can be a real diversion of resources and time when you are on the fast track to trial.  While most prosecutors are ethical and would not leak grand jury info, there are many sources other than prosecutors who can leak information about a grand jury investigation. 

            The only way to find out is through litigating the issue.  Then you would be fighting Williams & Connelly or Cahill Gordon on these First Amendment side issues if you tried to subpoena reporters, while you are also fighting the prosecution on the main front.  You may stop the leak and punish the person responsible, but you can’t repair the damage done in terms of influencing public opinion. 

            One other thing that bothered me during the trial, and which I still don’t have a good answer for, is the problem in a high profile case, of dealing with the constant negative press, before, during and after the trial.  Various major publications were obviously out to do Governor McDonnell in, and there was a constant torrent of false narratives being spread in the major news outlets as well as the blogging sphere.  The problem only got worse when we were in trial.  Reporters were all over the courthouse.  There would be twenty or thirty reporters in my hotel whom I couldn’t recognize.  Every time I sat with a colleague for breakfast or dinner, I had to worry about whether there were reporters listening to our conversations. 

            I was never able to figure out an effective way, consistent with the free press-fair trial restrictions, to deal with the negative publicity in the McDonnell case.  The best solution I could come up with was to file motions articulating something that I’d like the press to pick up on, and hope that they print it, and if a reporter called me and said he was going to print something which I knew was false and defamatory, I threatened to sue.

            Of course, the client is always free to speak to the press because he has First Amendment rights. In Governor McDonnell’s case, the day after the indictment was returned, he, with his wife and his children beside him, gave a short press conference in the lobby of a law firm in Richmond. The magistrate judge at the subsequent bond hearing was upset by this. He quoted me the local free press-fair trial rule, and noted that my client is also a lawyer. Of course, the magistrate was wrong about the rule’s application, because it clearly only applied to attorneys representing a client, and my client was not representing himself.  Later at the arraignment, the district court judge said to both sides: “the game playing with the press is over.”  From that point forward we were never quoted in the press again until the trial was over. 

            In sum, I felt that the negative and false press coverage during the trial really hurt us, and I’d like to think if I did the trial again, I’d figure out a better, ethical way of controlling or balancing that narrative. 

Q: A final question: sometimes our most memorable cases may not be the most high-profile cases.  Do you have any little-talked about cases that are especially memorable to you? 

I’ve always liked all of my clients over the years, and found something to admire in each one of them, no matter what types of crimes they were charged with.  One especially memorable one was a young man, who was a juvenile at the time I represented him in the Public Defender Service. I won his trial, and he was very grateful.

Later on when he was an adult, he got himself in trouble on major federal offenses I did not know about, and he ended up with a life sentence on cocaine trafficking and firearms related charges. Four or five years ago, while still in prison, he wrote to me and asked for Jones Day’s help with a habeas petition.  We ended up getting his life sentence substantially reduced.  He is now out of prison, married, working several jobs and doing extremely well. 

When he wrote that letter to me asking for help with his habeas petition, he included the pleadings that he had filed pro se up to that point to resurrect some of his legal issues and get his foot in the door. He had turned into quite the jailhouse lawyer. What struck me most, though, were the footnotes at the bottom of the first page of all his motions, expressing gratitude to me personally as his mentor for teaching him everything about the law. 

[This interview has been lightly edited for brevity and clarity.] 

(EG & ZZ)

October 12, 2016 in Defense Counsel, Legal Ethics, Prosecutors | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, September 29, 2016

Comey Digs A Deeper Hole

In white collar cases, prosecutors often stress the signs or "indicia" of fraud inherent in a given defendant's conduct.  In the FBI/DOJ investigation of Secretary Clinton we have several signs of incompetence and/or highly irregular conduct on the part of those in charge. The one that stands out most clearly to anyone who practices white collar criminal defense was the decision to allow Cheryl Mills to attend Secretary Clinton's FBI interview. Competent prosecutors do not allow a key witness to participate as an attorney in an FBI interview of the main subject. It just isn't done. It isn't a close question. It is Baby Prosecution 101. Director Comey's attempt to justify this decision during yesterday's House Judiciary Committee Oversight Hearing was disingenuous and disgraceful.  According to Comey, the FBI has no power to control which attorney the subject of an investigation chooses to represent her during an interview. This is literally true, but irrelevant and misleading. Prosecutors, not FBI agents, run investigations. Any competent prosecutor faced with the prospect of Ms. Mills's attendance at Secretary Clinton's interview would have informed Clinton's attorneys that this was obviously unacceptable and that, if Clinton insisted on Mills's attendance, the interview would be conducted under the auspices of the federal grand jury. At the grand jury, Secretary Clinton would not have enjoyed the right to her attorney's presence in the grand jury room during questioning. In the event Clinton brought Ms. Mills along to stand outside the grand jury room for purposes of consultation, competent prosecutors would have gone to the federal judge supervising the grand jury and attempted to disqualify Ms. Mills. In all likelihood, such an attempt would have been successful. But of course, it never would have gotten that far, because Secretary Clinton will do anything to avoid a grand jury appearance. So, Director Comey's response was a classic dodge, one of several that he perpetrated during yesterday's hearing. As noted above, the decision to allow Ms. Mills to attend Secretary Clinton's FBI interview was only the clearest example to date of irregular procedures sanctioned by the prosecutors in charge of the Clinton email investigation. More to come on that in a subsequent post.

(wisenberg)

September 29, 2016 in Current Affairs, Defense Counsel, Grand Jury, Investigations, Legal Ethics, News, Obstruction, Privileges | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, September 7, 2016

U.S. v. Reddy Annappareddy: What The Judge Saw

Finally, as promised, here is the U.S. v. Reddy Annappareddy 9-1-16 Motion to Dismiss Hearing Transcript. At the conclusion of that hearing Judge George Levi Russell dismissed the Indictment with prejudice. Judge Russell's rationale for his ruling can be found at pages 49-62 of the transcript. This was a health care fraud case and a core government theory was that Mr. Annappareddy received Medicaid reimbursement for pills that were never given to patients. The government sought to prove its theory by showing that Mr. Annappareddy's pharmacies billed for more pills than they received. The most significant evidence that the prosecutors offered in support of this allegation was a calculation of the purported “loss” from the alleged fraud. The following factors were key to the Court's finding that the government committed due process violations that shocked the conscience and rendered it impossible to put Mr. Annappareddy back on an even footing with the government: 1) the government violated Brady by failing to disclose loss calculations from its initial auditing team that were significantly smaller (in total and with respect to two key pharmacies) than the calculations of a subsequent government auditor who testified at trial; 2) the government violated Brady by failing to disclose the risk of double-counting errors in the loss calculations; 3) the government presented false testimony regarding the loss calculations due to double counting errors; 4) the government presented false testimony by a government agent, based on her examination of the wrong set of phone records, that Mr. Annappareddy had NOT made any calls to a key individual in response to a material email from that individual, when in fact Annappareddy had several phone contacts with the individual within minutes of the material email; and 5) the government destroyed potentially key exculpatory evidence without a court order or the defense's permission. The Court also sent a not so subtle warning to the government: "In the event that my record is not clear or exercise of my discretion too broad, this Court will conduct an extensive time-consuming and costly hearing as to these matters and the other grounds supporting the motion to dismiss and other motions which have already been filed. To that end, the balance of all other motions in this case are denied as moot." Translation: If you appeal this ruling and I am reversed, we will delve in detail into the other grounds of error raised by the defense. And it will not be a pleasant process. Hat Tip to David Debold of Gibson Dunn for sending along the transcript.

(wisenberg)

 

September 7, 2016 in Current Affairs, Defense Counsel, Judicial Opinions, Legal Ethics, Obstruction, Prosecutions, Prosecutors | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, May 26, 2016

Foster Decision Raises Question Whether Batson is Workable

The Supreme Court this week in Foster v. Chatman  (14-8349, decided May 23,2016) reversed a Georgia murder conviction because the prosecutors violated the requirement of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) that lawyers not use race-based peremptory challenges to remove jurors.   The Court, in an exquisitely detailed factual analysis by Chief Justice Roberts, dissected the prosecutors' purported reasons for challenging two prospective African-American jurors and found them disingenuous. 

In a Slate article, my friend and colleague, the prolific and invaluable Prof. Bennett Gershman ("How Prosecutors Get Rid of Black Jurors," May 26,2016) writes that, notwithstanding Batson and now Foster, prosecutors will continue to "remove black persons from jury service with impunity simply by concocting purportedly race-neutral reasons."  He points out that the Foster reversal occurred only because of the random discovery of the prosecutors' file containing telltale notations and comments about their intentions to strike black jurors.

I agree with Prof. Gershman.  Prosecutors will continue to use race as a basis, sometimes the predominant or even only basis, in their determinations which jurors to challenge.  And, so will defense lawyers.  Given the limited knowledge lawyers have about the predelictions and potential biases of jurors, especially in jurisdictions which prohibit or severely limit lawyer questioning of jurors. a juror's's race is perceived by trial lawyers, reasonably I believe (although not to my knowledge based on any scientific proof), as an indication of how he will vote in the jury room, just as how he will vote in the voting booth. 

As Prof. Gershman states with respect to prosecutors (generally applicable also to defense lawyers), "Prosecutors have long believed that striking black jurors improves their chances of convicting a black defendant.  Prosecutors assume that black people are more likely than white people to have negative feelings about government, to have had bad experiences with the police, are more likely to have been targeted for arrests and forcible stops than white people, are more likely to have been imprisoned for minor drug crimes, and are more likely to believe that crimes against black victims are prosecuted less aggressively than crimes against whites."  Thus, generally, prosecutors (and defense lawyers) believe that, all other things being equal, black jurors are more likely to acquit black defendants than other jurors.  (I am not aware of any empirical studies of how race affects jury decisions.  Empirical studies of jury verdicts are, it seems, far fewer than analyses of voting decisions.)

Accordingly, prosecutors and defense lawyers, both seeking to win (and believing that jury composition is a major factor as to whether they will), and therefore  desiring jurors likely to favor their clients, consider race in their jury selection decisions and, when challenged (as are prosecutors more often than defense lawyers) employ less than candid justifications for their choices.  And, since judges are hesitant to call lawyers, especially prosecutors, liars, the lawyers' justifications, if at all plausible, are almost always accepted.  Compliance with Batson's dictates therefore is essentially,  as Prof. Gershman states, "a charade,"  commonly violated by prosecutors (and also by defense lawyers). 

To be sure, there are some differences between race-based challenges by prosecutors and by  defense lawyers.  Prosecutors' race-based challenges more often are exercised  in order to deprive a defendant from a cross-section of the community and a jury including some of his peers; defense lawyers' race-based challenges are more often designed to reach those goals.  Prosecutors' race-based challenges more often deprive black citizens of the right to serve on juries; defense lawyers' challenges enhance that (but diminish the right of whites and others to serve).  Additionally, to discriminate - which is what challenging a juror based on race is - is presumably more invidious if done by an agent of the state than a private citizen.  But race-based challenges by either side are common, and violate the constitutional principles of Batson

Batson, therefore, simply does not work.  Both sides commonly violate its principles to achieve their own goals.  It may be considered a noble experiment with a lofty goal that has failed, or perhaps an example of a short-sighted Supreme Court just not realizing how things are done down in the pits.  What can or should be done?  I am sure many trial lawyers, both criminal and civil, prosecutor or defense counsel, would prefer it be eliminated.   Prof. Gershman mentions a proposal to limit peremptory challenges to situations where attorneys give a "credible reason" for their exercise, what I call a challenge for "semi-cause."  Another proposal he mentions is to track carefully all prosecutorial challenges similar to the way police stops are tracked.  An obvious way is to eliminate all peremptory challenges, as Justice Marshall had suggested in Batson.  And, of course, professional sanctions against lawyers who violate Batson might help enforce its dictates.  (However,  the history of lack of sanctions against prosecutors for other areas of prosecutorial misconduct suggests increased sanctions would have little effect).   Lastly, more lengthy voir dire of jury panels, especially if by lawyers and not judges, would provide the litigants with a greater basis to exercise challenges than racial generalizations.

As Prof. Gershman says, "[Batson] diminishes the integrity of the criminal justice system."   The decision in Foster is unlikely to solve that problem.

May 26, 2016 in Legal Ethics, Prosecutions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, May 4, 2016

Ninth Circuit Reverses Judge Real for Berating Lawyer

As every veteran litigator knows, who the trial  judge is not only a major determinant in the ultimate result of a case, but a major factor in how unpleasant and difficult the lawyer's life will be.  There are judges, I suspect fewer than in the past, who are so biased to defendants and hostile to their lawyers, more often to defense lawyers than prosecutors, that the case is a nightmare for the lawyers (and obviously their clients).  Reversals of judges for intemperate and biased conduct toward lawyers, or even the generally meaningless criticisms in cases that are not reversed, are rare.  Defense lawyers, therefore, rejoice when one of those decisions is issued by an appellate court.

Last week, the Ninth Circuit in an unpublished opinion, United States v. Onyeabor, 13-50431 (April 27, 2016), reversed a conviction by a jury before Central District of California Judge Manuel Real primarily because the judge's remarks "devastated the defense, projected an appearance of hostility to the defense, and went far beyond the court's supervisory role"  so that they "revealed such a high degree of antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible."  This is not the first time the court has admonished Judge Real, who in 2006 was the subject of a Congressional investigation which considered but did not vote impeachment.

Almost every state has a judicial conduct commission which on occasion removes unfit judges.  These commissions generally consist of a combination of judges, lawyers, and laypeople.  There is no direct federal analog, although there is a somewhat clumsy  apparatus whereby the judiciary itself may impose sanctions and recommend that Congress consider impeachment.  Sanctions on federal judges for abusing lawyers and litigants are, to my knowledge, virtually non-existent.  Although a federal judge apparently may be removed for beating a spouse (as Alabama District Judge Mark Fuller likely would have, had he not resigned) , he or she will likely not be sanctioned at all for beating up lawyers and defendants.

 

May 4, 2016 in Defense Counsel, Judicial Opinions, Legal Ethics | Permalink | Comments (2)

Saturday, April 9, 2016

Settlement by Trump Required Alleged Victims to Tell DA They Don't Want to Assist

The New York Times reported on Tuesday, April 5 that Donald Trump, contrary to his asserted practice of refusing to settle civil cases against him, had settled a civil fraud suit brought by disgruntled purchasers of Trump SoHo (New York) condos setting forth fraud allegations that also were being investigated by the District Attorney of New York County ("Donald Trump Settled a Real Estate Lawsuit, and a Criminal Case Was Dismissed").  The suit alleged that Trump and two of his children had misrepresented the status of purchaser interest in the condos to make it appear that they were a good investment.

What made this case most interesting to me is language, no doubt inserted by Trump's lawyers, that required as a condition of settlement that the plaintiffs "who may have previously cooperated" with the District Attorney notify him that they no longer wished to "participate in any investigation or criminal prosecution" related to the subject of the lawsuit.  The settlement papers did allow the plaintiffs to respond to a subpoena or court order (as they would be required by law), but required that if they did they notify the defendants.

These somewhat unusual and to an extent daring conditions were no doubt designed to impair the District Attorney's investigation and enhance the ability of the defendants to track and combat it, while skirting the New York State penal statutes relating to bribery of and tampering with a witness.  The New York statute relating to bribery of a witness proscribes conferring, offering or agreeing to confer a benefit on a witness or prospective witness upon an agreement that the witness "will absent himself or otherwise avoid or seek to avoid appearing or testifying at [an] action or proceeding" (or an agreement to influence his testimony). Penal Law 215.11 (see also Penal Law 215.30, Tampering with a Witness).  Denying a prosecutor the ability to speak with prospective victims outside a grand jury makes the prosecutor's job of gathering and understanding evidence difficult in any case.  Here, where it is likely, primarily because of a 120-day maximum residency limit on condo purchasers, that many were foreigners or non-New York residents and thus not easily served with process, the non-cooperation clause may have impaired the investigation more than it would have in most cases. 

A clause requiring a purchaser to declare a lack of desire to participate, of course, is not the same as an absolute requirement that the purchaser not participate.  And, absent legal process compelling one's attendance, one has no legal duty to cooperate with a prosecutor.  It is questionable that if, after one expressed  a desire not to participate, his later decision to assist the prosecutor voluntarily would violate the contract (but many purchasers would not want to take a chance).  The condition of  the contract thus, in my view,  did not violate the New York statutes, especially since the New York Court of Appeals has strictly construed their language.  People v. Harper, 75 N.Y.2d 373 (1990)(paying victim to "drop" the case not violative of statute).

I have no idea whether the settlement payment to the plaintiffs would have been less without the condition they notify the District Attorney of  their desire not to cooperate.  And, although the non-cooperation of the alleged victims no doubt made the District Attorney's path to charges more difficult, the facts, as reported, do not seem to make out a sustainable criminal prosecution.  Allegedly, the purchasers relied on deceptive statements, as quoted in newspaper articles, by Mr. Trump's daughter Ivanka and son Donald Jr. that purportedly overstated the number of apartments sold and by Mr. Trump that purportedly overstated the number of those who had applied for or expressed interest in the condos,  each implying that the condos, whose sales had actually been slow, were highly sought.  A threshold question for the prosecutors undoubtedly was whether the statements,  if made and if inaccurate, had gone beyond acceptable (or at least non-criminal) puffing into unacceptable (and criminal) misrepresentations.

Lawyers settling civil cases where there are ongoing or potential parallel criminal investigations are concerned whether payments to alleged victims may be construed by aggressive prosecutors as bribes, and often shy away from inserting restrictions on the victims cooperating with prosecutors.  On the other hand, those lawyers (and their clients) want some protection against a criminal prosecution based on the same allegations as the civil suit.  Here, Trump's lawyers boldly inserted a clause that likely hampered the prosecutors' case and did so within the law.  Nonetheless, lawyers seeking to emulate the Trump lawyers should be extremely cautious and be aware of the specific legal (and ethical) limits in their jurisdictions.  For instance, I personally would be extremely hesitant to condition a settlement of a civil case on an alleged victim's notifying a federal prosecutor he does not want to participate in a parallel federal investigation.  The federal statutes concerning obstruction of justice and witness tampering are broader and more liberally construed than the corresponding New York statutes.

 

April 9, 2016 in Celebrities, Civil Litigation, Current Affairs, Defense Counsel, Fraud, Investigations, Legal Ethics, News, Obstruction, Prosecutors | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, March 7, 2016

What Every Federal Prosecutor (and Every Federal Criminal Defense Attorney) in Texas Should Know

    The McDade Act, 28 U.S.C. § 530B, enforces "[e]thical standards for attorneys for the Government." Passed by Congress in 1999, the Act provides that "[a]n attorney for the Government shall be subject to State laws and rules, and local Federal court rules, governing attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that attorney’s duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as other attorneys in that State." In other words, the Act requires every federal prosecutor to adhere to the ethical rules of the state in which he or she serves as an AUSA.

    Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 3.09(d) requires a prosecutor to:

make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal.

    Rule 3.04(a) requires, among other things, that "a lawyer shall not obstruct another party's access to evidence."

    In a highly significant ethics opinion, signed and delivered on December 17, 2015, the Texas Board of Disciplinary Appeals ("BODA") ruled that Rule 3.09(d) does not contain the Brady v. Maryland materiality element, or any de minimus exception to the prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory information in a timely manner. BODA also held that Rule 3.09(d) applies in the context of guilty pleas as well as trials. In other words, the prosecutor cannot negotiate a guilty plea without beforehand disclosing exculpatory information to the defense.

    The case decided by BODA is Schultz v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline. William Schultz was the Assistant District Attorney in Denton County. He prosecuted Silvano Uriostegui for assaulting Maria Uriostegui, his estranged wife. Maria testified at a protective order hearing that Silvano was her attacker. Schultz never disclosed to the defense that Maria could only identify Silvano by his smell, boot impression, and stature "as seen in the shadow," as it was dark at the time and Maria could not see her attacker's face. Schultz learned this information from Maria one month prior to the trial date. Silvano entered a guilty plea. At the sentencing hearing, Maria testified "that she did not see her attacker's face and that she did not know whether her attacker was Silvano. Maria also testified that she had told the prosecutor earlier that she did not see who attacked her." (With respect to the protective order hearing, Maria "explained that she had testified...that Silvano was her attacker because she had assumed it was him from his smell and boot.")

    The testimony at the sentencing hearing was the first time defense counsel Victor Amador learned of the exculpatory information, despite having filed broad pre-trial requests for exculpatory evidence. Amador moved for a mistrial which was granted by the trial court. Amador next filed an application for writ of habeas corpus. The trial court granted habeas relief, allowing Silvano to withdraw his guilty plea. The court also ruled that double jeopardy had attached.

    Amador filed a grievance against Schultz with the State Bar, which was the basis of the disciplinary proceeding. Schultz contended that the information in question was neither exculpatory or material. The Commission for Lawyer Discipline disagreed, as did BODA. BODA based its holding primarily on the plain language of Rule 3.09(d) and on commentary to the Rule and to the ABA Model Rule on which Rule 3.09(d) is based. BODA also held that Schultz's failure to disclose the exculpatory information constituted obstruction of another party's access to evidence under Rule 3.04(a). Schultz received a six month fully probated suspension.

    The only Texas attorney disciplinary authority higher than BODA is The Supreme Court of Texas. Schultz did not appeal BODA's decision to The Supreme Court of Texas. Thus BODA's decision in Schultz is now the governing ethical interpretation of Rule 3.09(d) in Texas. Ergo, under the McDade Act, it now appears that both state and federal prosecutors litigating in Texas are under an ethical duty to timely disclose to the defense all evidence or information "that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense," irrespective of its materiality. The disclosure must be made prior to any guilty plea.

    The defense bar owes a great debt of gratitude to defense attorney Victor Amador, the Committee for Lawyer Discipline of the State Bar, and BODA. It should also be noted that many other jurisdictions have rules containing similar or identical wording to 3.09(d). There is much more work to be done. Hat Tip to Cynthia Orr of Goldstein, Goldstein & Hilley for bringing this opinion to our attention.

(wisenberg)

 

March 7, 2016 in Legal Ethics, Prosecutions, Prosecutors | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, November 2, 2015

A Reply to Steven H. Levin's Responsive Blog on Hassert

   Last Friday attorney Steven H. Levin posted a guest blog disagreeing with my view in a blog earlier that day that Dennis Hastert should not have been prosecuted.  Hastert was charged with, and pleaded guilty to,  structuring withdrawals from financial institutions of his own apparently legitimately derived funds, purportedly to conceal payoffs to an alleged extortionist whom he had purportedly sexually victimized over 30 years ago.  Hastert, Mr. Levin said, "had to be prosecuted" because his prosecution had "potential deterrent effect" on "would-be structurers" and "would-be extortionists."

  Even if the Hastert prosecution were to  have a deterrent effect on such "would-be" criminals, I still believe, for the reasons I expressed, that this case was an appropriate one for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  I do recognize that deterrence is a commonly recognized goal of prosecution and sentencing, and accept that prosecutions do have a deterrent effect on some "would-be" white-collar criminals (but far less an effect on those who might commit crimes involving violence and narcotics).  Nonetheless,  I question whether this prosecution will cause a positive deterrent effect on those who are considering the commission of either structuring or extortion.

   I do accept that the publicity attendant to the prosecution will to an extent increase public awareness of the existence of a crime called structuring whose broad expanse covers acts committed by otherwise law-abiding citizens to maintain their privacy and avoid disclosure of things they prefer be confidential, and therefore may have some deterrent effect on those persons.  However, deterring people from committing essentially harmless acts even though criminalized by an overbroad statute does not appear to me to be much of a societal benefit.  And, to the extent that the attendant publicity will educate money launderers of criminal proceeds and deter them from violating the structuring statute, of which sophisticated criminals are overwhelmingly aware in any case, the positive effect is also questionable since its potential effects will be further concealment and consequent limitations on governmental discovery of criminality.

   Additionally, I doubt that many would-be extortionists would be deterred from acts of extortion by this prosecution, in which, it so far appears, the purported extortion victim has been prosecuted and the purported extortion perpetrator remains free and also has probably received millions of dollars in payments (and also perhaps achieved some measure of retribution by the exposure, so far limited, of Hassert's alleged misdeeds) .  To the extent it has any effect on rational would-be extortionists who weigh the benefit/risk ratio, this prosecution encourages rather than deters them.

November 2, 2015 in Celebrities, Legal Ethics, Money Laundering, Prosecutions, Prosecutors, Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, October 29, 2015

Should Hastert Have Been Prosecuted?

   Former Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert yesterday pleaded guilty to money laundering in a Chicago federal court.  Hastert admitted that he structured banking transactions by taking out amounts under $10,000 to avoid reporting requirements in order to conceal the reason he was using the money, which according to the plea agreement was "to compensate and keep confidential his prior misconduct."  Although the facts were not revealed in court (but may later be in sentencing  proceedings), sources reported that he was paying "hush money" to a former student he allegedly molested over 30 years ago when he taught high school and coached wrestling. 

   It thus appears that Hastert was an extortion victim, coerced into paying a former student millions of dollars to avoid public disclosure of his misdeeds and the destruction of his reputation.   (I assume that the applicable Illinois statute of limitations had passed.) 

   I question whether Hastert should have been prosecuted.  The money laundering statutes, although clearly an intrusion into privacy, serve a generally laudable purpose in making it difficult for criminals to accumulate and spend ill-gotten gains.  Here, however,  Hastert (although he may have done serious wrongs many years ago) was not a criminal, but a victim.

   Congress has given the government broad power to prosecute violators of the money laundering laws well beyond those who derive funds from crime.    I do not know what drove the decision to prosecute Hastert.  Perhaps it was outrage over his long-ago sexual misconduct;  perhaps it was to put forth a case which would derive considerable publicity, something to which prosecutors are not averse;  perhaps it was just a rigid application of the law.   Although Hastert's banking conduct does clearly fall within the statutory bounds,  and there may be arguably legitimate reason to prosecute him, on balance I believe prosecutorial discretion should have been exercised and a case not brought.  I wonder whether it would have been brought against an ordinary Joe Smith.

October 29, 2015 in Celebrities, Legal Ethics, Money Laundering, Prosecutions, Prosecutors | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, June 9, 2015

Second Circuit Reverses Denial of New Trial Because of Juror Misconduct

Three years ago, I wrote a lengthy blog piece about U.S. v. Daguerdas, a case in which a SDNY judge ordered a new trial for three of four defendants because of juror misconduct. ("Lying Juror Requires New Trial in Tax Fraud Case," July 12, 2012).  The judge denied a new trial for the fourth defendant, Parse, because his lawyers, said the judge, knew or should have known of the juror's misconduct and chose not to report it to the court,  and thus Parse waived the misconduct.  On appeal to the Second Circuit, U.S. v. Parse (13-1388, June 8, 2015)), the Court, with Judge Amalya Kearse writing the majority opinion, reversed Parse's conviction and remanded for a new trial as to him also.

 

The Court  spent a considerable time reviewing the record to conclude that the district court's factual findings (by Judge William Pauley) that prior to the verdict the lawyers knew about the misconduct or failed to exercise due diligence to determine whether it had occurred was "clearly erroneous" and "unsupported by the record."   This ruling, with which Judge Chester Straub, while concurring in the reversal, disagreed,  I am sure gave some measure of relief to the trial lawyers, from the firm of Brune and Richard, whom Judge Pauley had chastised.  Those lawyers appeared to have been faced with the difficult dilemma of whether and when a lawyer is obliged to report suspected misconduct by a trial participant that is likely to be favorable to her client and to have chosen not to report something that would have diminished his (and their) chance of winning.   (It is also possible that during the heat and travail of trial the lawyers never focused on the reporting issue.)

This ethical/practical dilemma arises, for instance, when an attorney suspects or believes - but lacks actual knowledge - about trial misconduct, whether minor misconduct such as a juror engaging a defendant in casual conversation outside a courtroom despite a  court admonition, or  major misconduct such as a witness or defendant perjuring himself.  Reporting the misconduct would likely result in removing a potentially favorable juror in the first example and in striking favorable testimony and severely limiting the defense in the second, in both cases lessening the client's (and attorney's) chance of a favorable outcome. 

The Court declined to adopt a general rule, as requested by the defendant and amicus New York Council of Defense Lawyers, that lawyers (including prosecutors presumably) need not bring juror misconduct to the attention of the court unless counsel actually knew that such misconduct had occurred.  Nonetheless, I suspect lawyers will cite the case for that specific proposition and the broader proposition that lawyers need not report any trial misconduct unless they have actual knowledge.

Interestingly, the extensive, case-specific factual analysis about the extent of the attorneys' knowledge of the juror's misconduct was unnecessary to the Court's decision, as both the two-judge majority and concurring opinions demonstrated.  Even assuming the district court was correct in its negative evaluation of the attorneys' conduct, the Court found the denial to Parse of his basic Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury by the improper presence of the lying juror was so significant that it could not be, as the district court had found, "waived" by the lawyers' conduct, and warranted reversal.

 

 

June 9, 2015 in Defense Counsel, Judicial Opinions, Legal Ethics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, May 29, 2015

Hastert Case Raises Questions

Former Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert has been indicted for structuring and lying to the FBI, two crimes that many reasonable people, including me, are not certain should be crimes.  Structuring involves, as alleged here,  limiting deposits and other financial arrangements so as not to trigger a bank report to the IRS. Lying to the FBI includes a denial of wrongful activity, a natural human response by those confronted (although a mere "exculpatory no" without more is no longer generally prosecuted).

The indictment states that Hastert had paid off a fellow Yorkville, Illinois resident he had known most of that person's life  $1.7 million, and promised a total of 3.5 million, "in order to compensate for and conceal...misconduct" committed "years earlier" against that person. The indictment mentions that Hastert was a teacher and wrestling coach at a local high school from 1965-1981. 

Reading between the lines of this deliberately vague and unspecific indictment, my guess is that the alleged underlying misdeeds are sexual in nature.  I also wonder whether the  considerable payment mentioned in the indictment  "to compensate for and conceal misconduct " resulted from extortion and, if so, whether as a matter of prosecutorial discretion and perhaps even as a matter of law Hastert should be prosecuted for such relatively minor crimes, and  whether Hastert is really being punished for wrongs done decades ago (and probably beyond a statute of limitations).  These thoughts, let me be clear, are based on speculation and surmise, with only preliminary knowledge of the facts.

 

 

 

May 29, 2015 in Celebrities, Congress, Legal Ethics, Prosecutions, Prosecutors | Permalink | Comments (2)

Thursday, April 30, 2015

False Accusation of Rolling Stone Article Suggests prior Notification of Targets in White-collar Cases

In November Rolling Stone published a blockbuster article about a student's account of being  gang-raped at a University of Virginia frat house.  Within days others, primarily the Washington Post, sharply questioned the truthfulness of the student's claim.  Rolling Stone then commissioned an independent investigation by Steve Coll, the respected Dean of Columbia Journalism School, to review the magazine's reporting, editing and fact-checking.  That report, written by Coll and two colleagues, came out a few weeks ago.  See hereRolling Stone also "withdrew" the article.

The report (Sheila Coronel, Steve Coll, Derek Kravitz, "An Anatomy of a Journalistic Failure") is "intended as a work of journalism about a failure of journalism." It is thorough and comprehensive and, as expected, clear and thoughtful.  Although the purpose of the report was to investigate the conduct of Rolling Stone and not the conduct of the student, it treats the student who made the false accusation and continued it over months of questioning by the reporter much too gently and itself is affected by the implicit bias that it suggests motivated the writer.  For instance, it takes pains to state that the student who made the indisputably false accusation may well have in fact been a victim of some predatory sexual act(s), and does not even speculate that she might have made up the incident out of whole cloth.  It expresses its regret that the the widely-disseminated revelation of the false accusation might cast doubt on other campus sex accusations (accepting the questionable estimates that false charges make up  less than 8% of rape allegations) and fails even to consider the possibility that the false claim here might not be such an aberration , and perhaps will serve a salutary purpose by increasing public (and governmental and institutional) awareness that false accusations are not so infrequent. 

To be sure, campus sexual abuse by male students against women is a serious problem and deserves vigorous, but measured and fair, action by universities and, when appropriate, law enforcement, and aggressive reporting on that subject is important to increase public knowledge.  School officials, and magazine and newspaper writers (and also law enforcement officers)  should be mindful, however, that this is an area where accusations are often inaccurate,  exaggerated, and sometimes downright false, and that there are sometimes unjust findings and convictions, by courts and schools, that wrongly destroy the lives of those accused.  Indeed, in my opinion, rape is the area of criminal law in which there are the most intentionally false (as opposed to mistaken) accusations by civilian complainants.

The report demonstrates convincingly that there were a series of errors in the investigation, review, fact-checking and editing of the story before it appeared.  Among those errors was the failure to give the person accused an opportunity to refute the accusations.  "Journalistic practice - and basic fairness - require that if a reporter intends to publish derogatory information about anyone, he or she should seek that person's side of the story."

I could not help but thinking that the defective  oversight  of the Rolling Stone journalists and their seemingly limited concern for the reputations of the institutions accused were nonetheless far greater and far more likely to uncover false accusations than the minimal or nonexistent review by law enforcement  that typically occurs in a criminal case prior to an arrest (and sometimes even after).  Once law enforcement officers decide to make an arrest, why should the accused not be allowed to present beforehand his "side of the story?"  Obviously, in many cases, such as where there is a need for immediate apprehension by a police officer, no pre-arrest review or notification is possible. Further,  in many other cases, for instance where the identity of the alleged perpetrator is unknown, or where there is a reasonable fear that if not arrested he will flee and not be available to face charges, an immediate unannounced arrest is called for. 

However, in many, probably most, white-collar cases, there is no such need. In those cases, as a general rule a prosecutor should notify a target that he is under investigation and seek his "side of the story."  Nonetheless, many prosecutors proceed the "old-fashioned" way by ordering an arrest first without giving the defendant an opportunity to hire a lawyer and present, should he choose to, his side of the story.

Notifying a prospective defendant that he is likely to be arrested and may choose to present his case beforehand has advantages for prosecutors in many situations. The defendant and his lawyer might provide evidence or legal arguments that will persuade the prosecutor to seek lesser charges or not to go forward at all.  Sometimes a plea agreement might be reached with the defendant which will eliminate the need for a time-consuming grand jury presentation.  And, should the defendant decide to cooperate, he may be able to do so proactively and generally more effectively since an indictment often tips off others to steer clear of him.

There are, arguably, certain benefits to law enforcement in making surprise arrests. There is a  possibility that an upset, unprepared  and  uncounseled defendant will make incriminating statements.  And, a defendant may have on his person or in proximity evidentiary items which will be found by a search.  Those advantages, however,  are less likely to occur in white-collar case, where defendants are less likely to make statements without lawyers or carry contraband or evidence.  Another potential benefit to prosecutors  is that at bail hearings a defendant's attorney may not be able to argue  that the defendant did not flee after becoming aware of the charges.  Such an argument, I have found, does not carry as much weight as it should. In any case, prosecutors are unlikely to provide prior notification of their intent to arrest to any who are conceivable flight risks.

For these reasons, the most successful and sophisticated prosecutors in white collar cases, such as the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, generally notify white-collar targets of their investigations and give them or their attorneys an opportunity to dissuade, minimize or deal.  Less sophisticated prosecutors of white-collar crimes, often state prosecutors, are more likely to make summary arrests.  These cases, generally not well vetted since there was no input from the accused or his counsel, more often lead to dismissals, acquittals or cheap pleas.

Not only is pre-arrest notification to a prospective defendant more fair to him in that it gives him  an opportunity to defend, explain, negotiate or prepare psychologically, it will benefit judicial and prosecutorial economy of resources by allowing for some matters to be settled with less or no litigation and court involvement.  And, as discussed above, it helps law enforcement.   It should be the default position in white-collar (and many other) cases, and deviated from only when there are genuine countervailing reasons.

 

April 30, 2015 in Attorney Fees, Books, Current Affairs, Investigations, Legal Ethics, Prosecutors | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, April 10, 2015

District of Columbia Court of Appeals Makes It Official: Prosecutor's Duty To Disclose Exculpatory Evidence Is Broader Than Brady

The case, handed down yesterday, is In Re Kline. This matter has wound its way through the disciplinary process for years. I posted about it here in 2012 and here in 2013.

Kline was prosecuting Arnell Shelton for the shooting of Christopher Boyd. Shelton had filed an alibi notice and "the reliability of the government's identification witnesses" was the principal issue at the 2002 trial, according to the Report and Recommendation of Hearing Committee Number Nine ("Report and Recommendation").

Kline spoke with Metropolitan Police Department Officer Edward Woodward in preparation for trial. Kline took contemporaneous notes. Woodward was the first officer at the scene of the crime and spoke to victim Boyd at the hospital shortly after the shooting. According to the Report and Recommendation, Kline's notes of his conversation with Woodward were, in pertinent part, as follows: "Boyd told officer at hospital that he did not know who shot him–appeared maybe to not want to cooperate at the time. He was in pain and this officer had arrested him for possession of a machine gun."

At trial Boyd identified Shelton as the shooter. According to Bar Counsel, Kline never disclosed Boyd's hospital statement to the defense despite a specific Brady/Giglio request for impeachment material. The other identification witnesses were weak and/or impeachable.  The case ended in a hung jury mistrial and the alleged Brady material (that is, Boyd's hospital statement to Woodward) was not revealed to the defense until literally the eve of the second trial, even though DC-OUSA prosecutors and supervisors had known about it for some time.

The court offered defense counsel a continuance, but she elected to go to trial as her client was then in jail. The second trial ended in Shelton's conviction. You can consult my earlier posts for a more detailed factual and case history background.

Rule 3.8(e) of the DC Rules of Professional Conduct states in pertinent part that: "The prosecutor in a criminal case shall not . . . intentionally fail to disclose to the defense, upon request and at a time when use by the defense is reasonably feasible, any evidence or information that the prosecutor knows or reasonably should know tends to negate the guilt of the accused...except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by protective order of the tribunal."

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the position of D.C. Bar Counsel and the Board that Rule 3.8(e) is not synonymous with Brady v. Maryland. The Court declined to import Brady's materiality test into Rule 3.8(e), making it clear that at the pre-trial and trial stages  of a case, no prosecutor is fit to make a speculative materiality analysis. The rule is now clear. Any evidence that tends to negate the guilt of the defendant must be disclosed under the D.C. Rules of Professional Responsibility.

The Court overturned the Board's 30-day sanction imposed against Kline, given the confusion engendered by the Commentary to Rule 3.8(e). The Commentary states in part that: "The rule...is not intended either to restrict or to expand the obligations of prosecutors derived from the United States Constitution, federal or District of Columbia statutes, and court rules of procedure." Courts in other jurisdictions, as well as the ABA, have construed the D.C. Rule as including the Brady materiality standard, based on this Commentary. Additionally, at the time of Kline's actions, DC-USAO's training taught that Rule 3.8(e) was synonymous with Brady. The Court held that even if the Commentary was inconsistent with the Rule, the plain language of the Rule, and its legislative history, prevailed.

"However, while clear and convincing evidence has been presented that Kline violated Rule 3.8 when he failed to turn over the Boyd Hospital Statement to the defense prior to trial, we are mindful of the fact that our comment to Rule 3.8 (e) has created a great deal of confusion when it comes to a prosecutor’s disclosure obligations under Rule 3.8. Thus, Kline's understanding of his ethical obligations, while erroneous, does not warrant an ethical sanction."

The Board originally found that the suppressed exculpatory statement was material, even though a subsequent jury in possession of the material convicted the defendant. I don't know if that finding was ever revisited. I mention it because the Court's opinion nowhere discusses this point and seems to assume that the withheld statement was immaterial.

The opinion by Chief Judge Washington is extremely well-crafted and enormously significant.

Hat Tip to Charles Burnham of Burnham & Gorokhov for informing me of this ruling  and sending a copy.

(wisenberg)

 

April 10, 2015 in Judicial Opinions, Legal Ethics, Prosecutors | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, October 6, 2014

Rob Cary's Book on Senator Ted Stevens

Rob Cary's book, "Not Guilty: The Unlawful Prosecution of U.S. Senator Ted Stevens" is a wonderful read and reminder of what needs to be corrected in our criminal justice system. Discovery in a criminal case is incredibly important, and this book emphasizes its importance in the criminal justice system and to society. In white collar document driven cases, the amount of paperwork can be overwhelming.  It becomes important to not merely provide discovery to defense counsel, but also  that it be given in an organized manner. Dumping documents on defense counsel is not enough.  And failing to provide crucial documents, witnesses, and evidence is even more problematic. More needs to be done to correct discovery injustices in society and hopefully this book can serve as the momentum and real-life story to make it happen.

Hats off to lawyer Rob Cary (Williams & Connolly) who took the bold step to tell this important story and to tell it in a very "real" way. 

(esp)

October 6, 2014 in Books, Books [1], Defense Counsel, Legal Ethics, Prosecutions, Prosecutors | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, August 27, 2014

Article About Former Penn State President Raises Issues Concerning Independent Investigative Reports and Role of Corporate Counsel

The New York Times Magazine several weeks ago published a lengthy, largely sympathetic article about Graham Spanier, the former Penn State president (Sokolove, "The Shadow of the Valley"), see here, who is awaiting trial on charges of perjury and other crimes in connection with the Pennsylvania grand jury investigation of his alleged complicity or nonfeasance concerning the actions of now-convicted (and affirmed on appeal) former assistant football coach Jerry Sandusky.

The article rather gently criticized the Freeh report, commissioned by the university, as I too did (see here), and asserts that it "probably led to [Spanier's] indictment."  Commissioning an independent investigative report -- generally either by a former prosecutor or judge, or a large law firm -- is the de rigueur response of institutions or corporations accused of wrongdoing.  An independent investigative report, especially by a respected authority, has the weight of apparent impartiality and fairness and thus the appearance of accuracy.  However, the investigative report -- frequently done with no input from the accused or presumed wrongdoers (since, fearful of prosecution, they choose not to be interviewed) -- is often based on an incomplete investigation.  Further, since the investigator is expected to reach conclusions and not leave unanswered questions, but unlike a prosecutor may not be required to have those conclusions tested by an adversary in an open forum, such investigations, like the Freeh investigation, are often based on probability, and sometimes even speculation, more than hard evidence.  Lastly, the "independent" report, like the report concerning Gov. Christopher Christie's alleged involvement in Bridgegate, may be less than independent.

*                    *                    *

The article also discusses an interesting pretrial motion in Spanier's case concerning a question that had puzzled me since the Penn State indictments were announced over two years ago -- what was Penn State's counsel doing in the grand jury?  Sub judice for six months is a motion for dismissal of the indictment and other relief related to the role of the Penn State general counsel ("GC") who appeared in the grand jury with Spanier, and also earlier with two other officials who were indicted, Tim Curley, the former athletic director, and Gary Schultz, a vice president.

According to the submitted motions (see herehere and here ), largely supported by transcripts and affidavits, the GC appeared before the grand jury with Spanier (and also separately with Curley and Schultz) and Spanier referred to her as his counsel (as also did Curley and Schultz).  According to what has been stated, neither she, who had previously told the supervising judge -- in the presence of the prosecutor but not Spanier -- that she represented only Penn State, nor the prosecutor corrected Spanier.  Nor did the judge who advised Spanier of his right to confer with counsel advise Spanier that the GC was actually not representing him or had a potential conflict.

Later, after Spanier's grand jury testimony, according to the defense motion, the GC -- represented by Penn State outside counsel -- was called to testify before the grand jury.  Curley and Schultz -- both of whom had by then been charged -- objected in writing to the GC's revealing what they asserted were her privileged attorney-client communications with them.  Spanier apparently was not notified of the GC's grand jury appearance  and therefore submitted no objection.

Prior to the GC's testimony, Penn State's outside counsel asked the court essentially to rule on those objections and determine whether the GC was deemed to have had an attorney-client relationship with the individuals, as they claimed, before Penn State decided whether to waive its privilege (if any) as to the confidentiality of the conversations.  Upon the prosecutor's representation "that he would put the matter of her representation on hold" and not "address . . . conversations she had with Schultz and Curley about [their] testimony," the judge chose not to rule at that time on the issue of representation, which he noted "perhaps" also concerned Spanier, and allowed her to testify, as limited by the prosecutor's carve-out.

Nonetheless, despite the specific carve-out to conversations with Schultz and Curley analogous to those she had with Spanier and the judge's mention that the issue might also apply to Spanier, the prosecutor questioned the GC about her conversations with Spanier in preparation for his testimony.  Her testimony was reportedly harmful to Spanier (see here).  At no time did the GC raise the issue of whether her communications with Spanier were privileged. 

Whether the motion will lead to dismissal, suppression of Spanier's testimony or preclusion or limitation of the GC's testimony, or none of the above, will be determined, presumably soon, by the judge.  Whatever the court's ruling(s), I have little hesitation in saying that is not how things should be done by corporate or institutional counsel.   At the least, even if the GC were, as she no doubt believed, representing the university and not the individuals, in my opinion, the GC (and also the prosecutor and the judge) had an obligation to make clear to Spanier (and Schultz and Curley) that the GC was not their counsel.  Additionally, the GC had, in my view, an obligation to make clear to Spanier that the confidentiality of his communications with her could be waived by the university if it (and not he) later chose to do so.  Further, the GC, once she was called to testify before the grand jury, had in my opinion an obligation to notify Spanier that she might be questioned as to her conversations with him in order to give him the opportunity to argue that they were privileged.  And, lastly, the GC had, I believe, an obligation to ask for a judicial ruling when the prosecutor went beyond at least the spirit of the limit set by the judge and sought from her testimony about her communications with Spanier.

(goldman)

August 27, 2014 in Current Affairs, Defense Counsel, Grand Jury, Investigations, Legal Ethics, News, Perjury, Privileges, Prosecutors, Sports | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, June 2, 2014

Second Circuit Reverses Convictions Due to Prosecutorial Misconduct and Exclusion of Good-Faith Evidence

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which issues complete reversals in only about five percent of the criminal cases it hears, last week in an opinion by Judge Jed S. Rakoff (sitting by designation) reversed the trial conviction of two individuals and a corporation for environmental crimes involving asbestos removal, and ordered a new trial.  United States v. Certified Environmental Services, Inc., et al. (see here).  The reversal was based on the denial of a fair trial due cumulatively to the exclusion of evidence of good faith to demonstrate the defendants' lack of intent (an issue not discussed here) and prosecutorial misconduct in improper "bolstering" during the opening and closing arguments.  The Court denied that part of the defendants' appeal based on Brady v. Maryland.

The decision does not concern any novel legal grounds.  Perhaps most significant in the white-collar area is its detailed discussion of the proper and improper use by prosecutors of the cooperation agreements their witnesses commonly enter into with the government.  Since many, probably most, white-collar cases involve cooperating government witnesses, prosecutorial introduction of and comments on cooperation agreements frequently occur in white-collar trials.  Here, the prosecutor improperly bolstered the witnesses' testimony on numerous occasions, both in the opening and closing arguments, by referring directly and indirectly to the self-serving language that prosecutors routinely place in the cooperation agreements they draft to the effect that the witnesses are obligated to tell the truth.  Prosecutors and defense attorneys would do well to review the opinion to determine when and how the government may disclose and use the truth-telling requirement language of cooperation agreements during testimony and in argument.

The opinion also excuses, but does not condone, the improper failure of the government to turn over handwritten notes by a testifying agent which were discovered in the later examination of another agent and belatedly revealed to the defense.  The notes should have been revealed earlier, says the Court, not only since they included evidence favorable to the defense, but also pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 16(a)(1)(B)(ii), a discovery rule, and 18 U.S.C. 3500, the Jencks Act.  However, since the notes were, however belatedly, turned over and the defense had an opportunity to review them, examine the later-testifying agent about their content, and recall the earlier witness if it chose, and since their timely disclosure would not have changed the verdict, in any case there was no Brady violation.  The opinion thus demonstrates that late provision of Brady (or Rule 16 or Jencks) by the government during trial will virtually never be grounds for reversal, at least not in the Second Circuit.

 (goldman)

June 2, 2014 in Environment, Judicial Opinions, Legal Ethics, Prosecutors | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, May 21, 2014

New York Legislators Propose Commission on Prosecutorial Misconduct

 Two New York State legislators have proposed the creation of a state commission on prosecutorial misconduct to review and investigate complaints of prosecutorial misconduct and to discipline prosecutors who have been found to have acted improperly.  See here.

The proposed commission would, it is said, be the first in the nation of its kind.  It will be modeled upon New York's Commission on Judicial Conduct,  which investigates allegations of misconduct by judges and, if misconduct is found, may discipline a judge by public admonition, censure or removal from the bench.

Virtually every state (but not the federal government) has a commission on judicial conduct  and these commissions,  it is generally agreed, have had a positive effect in limiting judicial misconduct, removing unfit judges who had committed serious misconduct and increasing public confidence in and awareness of the workings of the court system.  (I note that I am a past chair of New York's Commission.)  There is, I believe, no good reason that there should not be an analogous agency to review instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct, sanction offending prosecutors, and remove the most serious offenders from their positions.  Indeed, there are stronger reasons for a commission concerning prosecutorial misconduct than for one concerning judicial misconduct.  Much of the most serious prosecutorial misconduct, such as concealing exculpatory material and suborning perjury, occurs in the investigative and preparatory stages of a case and is hidden from the view of judges, defense attorneys, and the public and thus not detectable and reviewable by a court.  Almost all judicial misconduct, on the other hand, occurs on the bench in public view, is recorded and observed by lawyers and the public, and is readily reviewable by appellate courts.

With rare exception, see here, prosecutorial misconduct has gone unpunished by prosecutorial offices, bar disciplinary committees and judicial authorities.  Although grievance committees have authority over the improprieties of prosecutors as much as other lawyers, they have historically shown little interest in sanctioning prosecutorial misconduct.  See, e.g., Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. Tex. L. Rev. 685 (2006); Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions:  It is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 D.C. L. Rev. 275 (2004).  Similarly, judges, even when they reverse a conviction due to egregious prosecutorial misconduct, almost always conceal the prosecutor's identity and rarely refer the prosecutor for professional discipline.  And, prosecutorial offices themselves often defend on appeal and thus ratify even serious misconduct of line prosecutors, and fail to sanction even those prosecutors whose serious misconduct they concede.  See, Rudin, The Supreme Court Assumes Errant Prosecutors Will Be Disciplined By Their Offices or the Bar:  Three Case Studies That Prove That Assumption Wrong, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 537 (2011).

Further, potentially criminal misconduct by judges may be investigated and prosecuted by the District Attorney, an agency wholly independent from the judiciary.  However, except in the extremely rare instances where a special prosecutor is appointed, potentially criminal misconduct by prosecutors generally may only be investigated or prosecuted by the very same prosecutorial office that committed that misconduct, which in almost all instances will be hesitant to prosecute one of its own and embarrass the office.

Additionally, there is a stark imbalance in the adversarial criminal justice system where one adversary -- the prosecutor -- may criminally charge the other adversary -- the defense attorney -- when he  tampered with evidence or suborned perjury, but where the defense attorney who believes the prosecutor committed such criminal acts may only make a shout in the wilderness by a futile complaint to an overprotective disciplinary agency with no criminal prosecution power.  A commission on prosecutorial conduct will not wholly right this imbalance, but will tilt it in the right direction.

(goldman)

May 21, 2014 in Legal Ethics, News, Prosecutors | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, September 11, 2013

Dickstein Lawyer Sends "Disturbing" Email Asking Client Not Be Questioned

 A so-far publicly unidentified attorney in the lobbying group at Dickstein Shapiro reportedly sent emails to members of the House Committee on Government Reform asking them not to question Jonathan Silver, a government employee and prospective witness and Dickstein client.  Specifically, the attorney requested, "If possible, please do not direct questions to Jonathan Silver.  He's a client of my firm," adding a smiley face emoticon symbol.  See here, here and here.  The emails were sharply criticized by committee chair Darrell Issa (R-Calif.), who, displaying a copy but charitably blacking out the sender's name, demanded an explanation from Silver's counsel why "we shouldn't refer this to the American Bar Association."  (The ABA, of course, does not hear ethics complaints against individual lawyers.)  The committee's ranking Democrat, Elijah Cummings, joined in expressing his dismay, saying the requests seemed "clearly out of bounds."

Although the attorney (I suspect someone known to the Congresspersons, perhaps a former House staffer) appears to have demonstrated extraordinarily bad judgment, I question whether her conduct was unethical.  Lobbyists are allowed to privately ask Representatives to vote on matters of crucial importance, far more important often than whether a government employee will be asked questions by a committee.  I do not find an ex parte attempt to influence questioning at a hearing worse than a similar attempt to influence a vote.  Such conduct would ordinarily be unethical, however, if directed toward a judge or prosecutor or if it violated a rule governing House committee conduct.

When I last appeared with a client before a House committee hearing, the chair threatened him with contempt for having, quite appropriately, asserted his Fifth Amendment right to refuse to answer questions.  That threat, more shockingly to me, was repeated in private by Congressional staff lawyers, including the then chief counsel for the House of Representatives.  I, therefore, am somewhat amused by the self-righteousness of the Congressmen here.

(goldman)

September 11, 2013 in Congress, Legal Ethics | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, June 24, 2013

The Wall Street Journal Takes Aim At Comey

by: Solomon L. Wisenberg

In what should be a surprise to no one, the Wall Street Journal editorial page today launched an attack on James Comey, President Obama's nominee to be the next FBI Director. The primary offenses? Comey's objection to the Bush Administration's illegal warrantless wiretapping and Comey's appointment of Patrick Fitzgerald as Special Counsel to investigate the Valerie Plame leak. The editorial is here. More commentary on this in the next few days.

Coming soon: Professor Podgor's analysis of the Second Circuit's opinion afffirming Raj Rajaratnam's conviction for insider trading violations.

(wisenberg)

June 24, 2013 in Current Affairs, Legal Ethics, Media, News, Plame Investigation, Prosecutions, Prosecutors, Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)