Wednesday, March 21, 2018
Today in United States v. Marinello, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved a circuit split and significantly narrowed the reach of Internal Revenue Code Section 7212(a)'s Omnibus Clause, which makes it a felony to "corruptly or by force...endeavor[r] to obstruct or imped[e] the due administration of this title [the Internal Revenue Code]."
The Court held that the phrase "'due administration of [the Tax Code]' does not cover routine administrative procedures that are near-universally applied to all taxpayers, such as the ordinary processing of tax returns. Rather the clause as a whole refers to specific interference with targeted governmental tax-related proceedings, such as a particular investigation or audit."
Justice Breyer wrote the 7-2 opinion for the Court. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, dissented.
The majority relied in part on analogous cases from its general obstruction jurisprudence, including United States v. Aguilar and Arthur Andersen v. United States. Although the focus was on the nexus required between the obstruction and a particular act of administration, the Court also stressed the rule of lenity and the need to provide fair warning to the public. This approach could be potentially relevant to any obstruction of justice case that Special Counsel Mueller may one day bring against President Trump or administration officials. Some of the theories floating around cable television about what constitutes obstruction under the federal criminal code are unusually broad and unlikely to survive rigorous analysis based on Aguilar and Arthur Andersen.
Tuesday, March 20, 2018
Lost in the shuffle of last weekend's uproar over the McCabe firing was the astonishing disclosure of yet another unredacted series of text messages between the FBI's Peter Strzok and Lisa Page. The Federalist has the story here. These messages and others had been provided to Congress previously in heavily redacted form, but Congressmen or Congressional investigators wishing to see them unredacted had to travel to DOJ.
Strzok had a pre-existing friendship with U.S. District Court Judge Rudolph "Rudy" Contreras, of the D.C. District Court. As luck would have it, Contreras was appointed to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC" or "FISA Court") in May 2016. On July 25, 2016, Page texted Strzok, saying "Rudy is on the [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court]! Did you know that?" Strzok responded that he did, adding "I need to get together with him." The two then discussed ways in which Strzok could run into Contreras during a social setting, as a mask for some kind of substantive discussion. Strzok texted Page that “[REDACTED] suggested a social setting with others would probably be better than a one on one meeting. I'm sorry, I'm just going to have to invite you to that dinner party.” Strzok thought he needed to "come up with some other work people cover for action.” Page replied "Why more? Six is a perfectly fine dinner party." During the exchange, Strzok expressed skepticism that such a meeting could be accomplished without forcing a recusal by Conteras, while Page assured him that the bar for recusal was a high one.
Do we even need to say how utterly repulsive it is for Strzok (a high-level FBI Supervisory Special agent) and Page (an FBI lawyer) to be seriously thinking of arranging a fake social get together in order to convey information ex parte to a sitting federal judge?
Most of the press coverage of the text exchange has focused on Judge Contreras' later recusal from the Michael Flynn criminal case. This misses the point entirely. Flynn was not even being criminally investigated in July 2016 and wasn't charged until December 2017. There is no way either Strzok or Page would know that Flynn would be charged, much less who the judge would be. This is all about the FISA Court. The FBI opened its Russian collusion case in late July 2016, right around the time that Page and Strzok were texting each other about Rudy. Strzok himself opened the case. It seems likely to me that the pair hoped Contreras would be sitting on the panel that would one day review a FISA application related to the Trump campaign. That affidavit was submitted in October 2016. Sources close to Strzok have told at least one journalist that the meeting never took place.
Monday's WSJ story (subscription required) by Del Quentin Wilber on the Strzok-Page exchanges, mentions that Contreras was appointed to the FISA Court but leads with a focus on the Flynn case and does nothing to connect any dots regarding the proximity in time between the texts and the onset of the formal (or any informal) FBI investigation. The story does not even mention the FISA Court's approval of the October 2016 FISA warrant application for Carter Page. That's not surprising given Weber's Wilber's previous softball reporting on the pair. Strzok and Page were sources for Weber's Wilber's WSJ predecessor on the DOJ beat, Devlin Barrett and it was FBI leaks to Barrett in October 2016 that led in part to the recent firing of Andrew McCabe.
Sunday, January 28, 2018
The 11th Circuit affirmed the convictions of three defendants coming from a 2009 investigation of a peanut production plant that was identified as the source of a nationwide salmonella outbreak. The court in United States v. Parnell stated in an unpublished opinion:
"The jury found Stewart and Michael guilty of several counts of fraudulently introducing misbranded food into interstate commerce, interstate shipment and wire fraud, and conspiring to commit these offenses. The jury also found Stewart guilty of fraudulently introducing adulterated food into interstate commerce. The jury found Stewart and Wilkerson guilty of obstruction of justice. The district court sentenced Stewart to 336 months [28 years] in prison, to be followed by three years of supervised release; sentenced Michael to 240 months [20 years] in prison, to be followed by three years of supervised release; and sentenced Wilkerson to 60 months [5 years] in prison, to be followed by two years of supervised release."
The convictions were based on conduct related to food safety and conduct during the investigation. The appellants were found to have "not [been] forthcoming with the FDA during its investigation."
"The court rejected arguments related to "juror exposure to extrinsic evidence." The court also rejected a discovery argument made by one of the defendants. This defendant objected to the government "producing a large hard drive of documents in late June 2014 when the trial was set to begin on July 14th." The defendant argued that this was "one of many untimely data dumps, where the Government produced hard drives containing hundreds of thousands of documents..." The court found that the district court had made a finding that the documents were searchable and that the government had provided a Bates index seven months prior to trial, and that "an IT consultant helped" the defendant and counsel "search and review the documents." The Court stated that "[g]iven that [the defendant] was able to search the documents, they were not suppressed for purposes of Brady."
See also opinion - here
R. Robin McDonald, 11th Circuit Upholds Convictions in One of Nation's Largest Criminal Food Safety Prosecutions, Daily Report, Jan. 26, 2018.
Thursday, October 19, 2017
It's not every day that a federal district judge accuses the government of misleading the Court and demands corrective action. But it's happening in the Urbana Division of the Central District of Illinois. I posted here in March regarding the federal case against former Congressman Aaron Schock. Among other items of alleged government misconduct, the defense maintained that prosecutors improperly commented to grand jurors on Schock's failure to testify, in violation of his Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination. The defense relied in part on an affidavit by a dismissed grand juror. After unequivocally denying the grand juror's allegation, the government clarified the record, more than six months later, admitting that government counsel "commented on or addressed Mr. Schock's testifying or decision not to testify before the grand jury" on eleven occasions. U.S. District Judge Colin Bruce was not amused, and ordered the government to review each of its previous filings "to ensure that no more false or misleading claims were made." Judge Bruce also gave the government 14 days to file a memo "detailing any further misrepresentations or misleading statements." Here is Judge Bruce's Order Requiring Government Memorandum re Misrepresentations. The government responded yesterday, denying that it had misrepresented anything to the Court, asking the Court to reconsider its finding regarding misrepresentation, and representing further that it had not intentionally made any materially misleading statements in its prior filings. Here is the Government's Compliance with the Court's October 3 Order and Motion to Reconsider. Schock, represented by George Terwillliger, Bob Bittman, Benjamin Hatch, Nicholas Lewis, and Christina Egan of McGuire Woods in DC and Chicago and by Jeffrey Lang of Lane & Waterman in Davenport, Iowa, wasted no time, not even a day, in firing back. Here is Schock's Motion to Strike or in the Alternative Leave to File a Response. Here as well is Schock's Proposed Response to Government's Compliance. In a future post, I will examine the nature of the government's comments to the grand jurors.
Monday, April 24, 2017
Sunday, February 5, 2017
It is always difficult to predict how someone will opine if they are on the Supreme Court. This is especially true if the prior judicial opinions do not cover a wide span on issues. In the case of the nominee, Judge Gorsuch, we do have some opinions to examine.
It is clear that he has excellent credentials from schooling and prior service on the bench. Interestingly, however, is that Judge Gorsuch's ratings are below those held by Judge Merrick Garland, who never received a hearing on his nomination. (see here) And in many ways Judge Garland had superior experience as the Chief Judge for the District of Columbia. After all, his court saw many cases that involved issues of national concern, like national security, including those dealing with Guantanamo. Further Judge Garland is neither a far liberal nor a conservative, having offered to the bench a centrist that would be more appeasing to an already split nation. Everyone seems to agree that Judge Gorsuch presents a conservative approach. (see here and here)
But looking solely at Judge Gorsuch, and not the unfortunate circumstance of the failure of Judge Garland to have the hearing that Judge Gorsuch will now receive, where does Judge Gorsuch stand on white collar matters is the question.
Typically, those on the right tend to be pro-prosecution on Fourth Amendment and drug crimes. In contrast, the same position is not taken in a white collar case. Professor Kelly Strader in his article The Judicial Politics of White Collar Crime, documents this paradox. Judge Gorsuch has a strong record of supporting the prosecution. (See, e.g., United States v. Mendivil, 208 F. App'x 647 (10th Cir. 2006)(affirming drug related conspiracy). And some of these cases might be considered white collar cases (See, e.g., United States v. Carnagie, 426 F. App'x 640 (10th Cir. 2011)(affirming a sec. 1001 HUD related case).
But if one looks at cases beyond the Fourth Amendment, like a gun-related case - we see him emphasizing a strict statutory interpretation. (See United States v. Games-Perez (dissenting)). Justice Scalia was particularly strong in enforcing strict statutory interpretation in white collar cases (e.g., Skilling (concurring opinion), Sun-Diamond Growers, McCormick (concurring), Santos). Justice Scalia was not shy to use vagueness and the Rule of Lenity to accomplish having a white collar statute strictly construed. And in this regard there is a strong similarity seen with Judge Gorsuch. Judge Gorsuch's opinion in United States v. Renz, 777 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 2015) provides a glimpse of his statutory interpretation analysis. He includes in the decision a diagram as he takes apart the elements of the statute in a methodical manner. The opinion itself is well-organized, references precedent, and resorts to the Rule of Lenity when clarity is an issue. He was unwilling to accept the government's interpretation of this firearm statute.
So what can we expect if he joins the Supreme Court? It is somewhat uncertain when examining the white collar area. But it does appear that the government may have some problems if it tries to stretch statutes or if the statutes are not clear.
Saturday, February 4, 2017
An important issue to watch this year is the ongoing battle over access to data collected by companies and stored overseas. This issue heated up last year when Microsoft won its Second Circuit challenge of a 2013 warrant for emails housed in an Irish data center. In the Second Circuit decision from July 2016, the court determined that U.S. law did not allow the enforcement of warrants for customer email content housed overseas, even though Microsoft is a U.S. service provider.
Last week, the Second Circuit denied rehearing the Ireland case by a divided 4-4 vote. The decision contains a number of interesting arguments from the judges and is worth a read for those involved in cases with international data issues.
The Second Circuit decision now sets the case up for a possible Supreme Court challenge by the government. According to Orin Kerr, writing in the Washington Post, however, Senator Sessions indicated during his confirmation hearings that he might seek a legislative remedy to address the Microsoft issue. Either way, this topic is one to keep an eye on in 2017.
Sunday, January 8, 2017
Friday, December 30, 2016
Each year this blog has honored individuals and organizations for their work in the white collar crime arena by bestowing "The Collar" on those who deserve praise, scorn, acknowledgment, blessing, curse, or whatever else might be appropriate. With the appropriate fanfare, and without further ado, The Collars for 2016:
The Collar for the Best Left Hand Turn – To the Supreme Court following Justice Scalia’s death in affirming both insider trading and bank fraud convictions.
The Collar for Failing to Deliver the Goods – To the government for prosecuting Fed Ex and then needing to dismiss the case following opening statements.
The Collar for Needing New Glasses – To James Comey so that he can read Agency policy to not do anything election related within 60 days of an election.
The Collar for Sports MVP – To the world of tennis, which stole some of the focus from FIFA this year with the BBC's allegations of significant match-fixing.
The Collar for Slow and Steady – To Britain's Serious Fraud Office, which, after announcing the implementation of DPAs in October 2012, entered into its first DPA in November 2015 and its second in July 2016.
The Collar for Quick and Steady – To the DOJ, which, according to Professor Brandon Garrett’s website, has entered into well over 100 DPAs and NPAs since October 2012.
The Collar for Best Reading of this Blog– To the Supreme Court in reversing Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell’s conviction, this blog’s 2015 case of most needing review.
The Collar for the Longest Attempt to Justify a Decision – To the 11th Circuit for its 124-page decision in United States v. Clay that attempts to justify how “deliberate indifference” meets the Global Tech standard.
The Collar for Worst Schmoozing at an Airport – To former President Bill Clinton for causing AG Loretta Lynch to accept the FBI’s decision-making after Bill Clinton came abroad her airplane.
The Collar for the Most Underreported Settlement – To Trump University’s agreement to pay $25 million settlement in the Trump University case.
The Collar for Mandating Corporate Backstabbing – To Deputy AG Sally Yates, who keeps insisting her memo that promoted a corporate divide from its constituents – widely referred to as the “Yates Memo” -- should be called the Individual Accountability Policy.
The Collar for the Pre-mature Weiner Release – To James Comey for his overly excited announcement about the former Congressman’s emails.
The Collar for Community Service to Russia – To all those who failed to investigate and release reports on computer hacking that caused the release of information during the election.
The Collar for the Quickest Backpeddling – To Rudy Giuliani for “clarifying” his statement that he knew about a confidential FBI investigation related to Hillary Clinton’s emails.
The Collar for Best Game of Hide and Seek – To Donald J. Trump for explaining that he could not release his already-filed tax returns because he was under an IRS audit.
The Collar for Best Self-Serving Confession – To the Russian Sports Federation for admitting there was systematic doping of Olympic athletes (but Putin didn't know about it).
The Collar for Quickest Recantation (aka the "Mea Culpa Collar") – To DOJ Chief Leslie Caldwell for criticizing overly aggressive AUSAs at a Federalist Society function and apologizing to DOJ attorneys a few days later.
The Collar for Best Judicial Watchdog – To Judge George Levi Russell III of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland for his post-trial decision reversing the conviction of Reddy Annappareddy and dismissing the indictment with prejudice based on prosecutorial misconduct.
The Collar for Never Giving In – To Josh Greenberg and Mark Schamel who tirelessly and brilliantly represented Reddy Annappareddy post-trial and secured his freedom.
The Collar for Best Money Laundering – To the New York City and Los Angeles real estate developers who sell eight-figure condo apartments to anonymous LLP's owned by foreign officials and their families.
The Collar for the Best Child – To Don Siegelman’s daughter, who continues to fight to “Free Don.”
The Collar for the Best Parent – Retired years ago and renamed the Bill Olis Best Parent Award –not awarded again this year since no one comes even close to Bill Olis, may he rest in peace.
(wisenberg), (goldman), (esp)
December 30, 2016 in About This Blog, Current Affairs, Deferred Prosecution Agreements, Government Reports, Investigations, Judicial Opinions, Money Laundering, News, Prosecutions, Prosecutors | Permalink | Comments (0)
Monday, December 12, 2016
In an unanimous decision, the Supreme Court in Shaw v. United States rejected defendant's argument that section 1344(1) "does not apply to him because he intended to cheat only a bank depositor, not a bank." The Court found that the defendant's scheme to cheat another "was also a scheme to deprive the bank of certain property rights." That said, the Court noted that there is no need to show "that the defendant intend that the victim bank suffer" a financial harm. The Court summed up stating:
"The statute is clear enough that we need not rely on the rule of lenity. As we have said, a deposit account at a bank counts as bank property for purposes of subsection (1). The defendant, in circumstances such as those present here, need not know that the deposit account is, as a legal matter, characterized as bank property. Moreover, in those circumstances, the Government need not prove that the defendant intended that the bank ultimately suffer monetary loss. Finally, the statute as applied here requires a state of mind equivalent to knowledge, not purpose." (citations omitted)
But the Court does leave open one important question - the jury instruction. The defendant argued that the instruction allowed for a guilty finding for one who deceives the bank but not one who "deprive[s]" the bank of anything of value. The Court stated that it is necessary that the "scheme be one to deceive the bank and deprive it of something of value." Sending it back to the 9th Circuit, the Supreme Court instructs the lower court "to determine whether the question was fairly presented to that court and, if so, whether the instruction is lawful, and, if not, whether any error was harmless in this case."
Tuesday, December 6, 2016
Friday, December 2, 2016
Readers of this Blog are no doubt familiar with United States v. Reddy Annappareddy, the District of Maryland case in which a guilty verdict was overturned (and new trial granted) with the grudging, belated concurrence of government prosecutors, because the government presented false testimony to the jury. The indictment was then dismissed with prejudice, over government objection, due to the government's destruction of potentially relevant evidence and the trial court's finding of prosecutorial misconduct. All of this was the result of the tireless and brilliant work of Annappareddy's post-trial attorneys, Josh Greenberg and Mark Schamel of Womble Carlyle. See my prior posts here, here, here, here, and here. Since my last post, the government moved to withdraw its appeal, the Fourth Circuit granted the motion, and the mandate has issued.
Now, Josh Greenberg, who played a key role in devising and implementing the post-trial strategy, has decided to open his own shop, focusing on white collar criminal defense, civil litigation, and appeals. Congratulations to Josh. We wish him the best.
Saturday, October 8, 2016
This week in U.S. v. Free, the Third Circuit sent a sentencing case back to the district court for further proceedings, because the sentencing judge appeared to have based his loss calculations on defendant's harm to "the integrity of the judicial process." Free was convicted after a jury trial on bankruptcy fraud charges. The sentencing court found that Free lied and obstructed justice throughout the bankruptcy court proceedings and hid assets totaling over $1 million. But in the end all creditors were paid in full and it appears that Free filed for bankruptcy for reasons unrelated to defrauding his creditors of the funds he owed them. The Third Circuit held that it is improper to base loss calculations on harm to the integrity of the judicial process, as opposed to real harm inflicted on the actual victims of a bankruptcy fraud. The Third Circuit, however, virtually invited the district court to upwardly vary on remand, based on Free's obstructive conduct.
Monday, September 12, 2016
I agree with my colleague Prof. Podgor that DOJ made the "right decision" to drop the prosecution of former Virginia governor Robert McDonnell. Under the narrow definition of "official act" given by the Supreme Court a re-prosecution was doomed. I further agree with Prof. Podgor that McDonnell's legal team, led by Hank Asbill and Noel Francisco, deserves plaudits for its determined and outstanding lawyering.
I do not, however, criticize DOJ for bringing this case. McDonnell's acts - accepting $175,000 in money and gifts in exchange for favorable treatment for the donor - although ultimately determined not to be "official acts" and thus not criminal, were unseemly and corrupt. That the Commonwealth of Virginia, in its wisdom or lack of it, chose not to criminalize such activity to me was a reason for federal prosecution, not for abstention. To be sure, the government should have been aware that there was Supreme Court case law arguably undermining its position. On balance, the egregiousness of McDonnell's conduct, I believe, justified a prosecution, even if it "pushed the envelope."
The McDonnell decision will allow federal prosecutions of politicians accepting things of value for favorable votes or actions on legislation or favorable decisions awarding governmental appointments, contracts and benefits, the areas within which most corruption cases fall. It will, however, eliminate or preclude almost any prosecution for payments to officials for access, referrals and introductions, allowing donors an advantage over non-payers. "Pay-for-play" systems do not guarantee winning a contract, but do allow one to be among those considered - a giant and necessary step. Thus, the decision will, like Citizens United, most benefit the rich, powerful and politically-connected.
I, like many others, was surprised by the unanimity of the court. Although I am no expert on Supreme Court internal politicking, I suspect some justices might have gone along with the decision to prevent a broader decision which would have greatly limited, or even eliminated, federal prosecutions of state and local corruption, either by finding the term "official acts" constitutionally void for vagueness, or on federalism grounds. In his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts mentioned, but did not rule on, both considerations.
I cannot dismiss an undiscussed "elephant in the room," alluded to by Prof. Podgor. The American election system commonly allows campaign contributions to be rewarded by at the least access to elected and appointed officials. It is extremely doubtful whether McDonnell would have been prosecuted for accepting campaign contributions and rewarding the donor with access to state officials. It seems to me extremely difficult to make a lawful/unlawful distinction between situations involving gifts to politicians for their personal use, as in McDonnell, and those involving gifts to politicians for campaign purposes. Absent such a distinction, an affirmance of McDonnell might have led to cases concerning campaign contributions, which might have led to an upheaval in campaign financing practices generally accepted in America. Thus, it is not surprising that a host of former Counsels to the President and Attorneys General submitted amicus briefs in support of McDonnell, a fact noted with apparent respect in the opinion.
Lastly, I wonder whether the Court was wary of allowing federal prosecutors expansive power to prosecute political officeholders. There is always a danger - at least theoretical - that a prosecutor will misuse her power to indict political opponents, as is not infrequently done in foreign nations, and perhaps occasionally done in the United States. It may well be that the case should be considered primarily as a limitation of prosecutorial and executive branch power.
Thursday, September 8, 2016
As noted here by Solomon Wisenberg, DOJ moved to remand the case against Robert F. McDonnell to the district court in order to dismiss the indictment with prejudice. Many in the media have reported about this dismissal (e.g., Washington Post here, USA Today here) The Washington Post states that this results from a "new legal definition" being given to public corruption (Washington Post). While others criticize the Supreme Court with comments such as "[w]e are now seeing that the Supreme Court's decision will in fact result in corrupt conduct going unpunished, just as we feared it would." See Statement here - Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington.
But some media and critics are missing the point here. The McDonnell decision was not a close call - it was a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court. There were no dissents.
This is not a case that puts a stop to prosecuting bribery and extortion cases. The law clearly allows such prosecutions and there have been many such prosecutions without reversals.
The McDonnell case was one we see too many times, where prosecutors push the envelope and prosecute conduct that does not meet the statute. And Hank Asbill, Noel Francisco, and the rest of McDonnell's legal team did a wonderful job showing this.
Elected officials who corruptly take money or items of value for an official act can be prosecuted. And prosecutors need to focus on bringing cases that meet the language of this statute. But the receipt of money or items of value alone are not a crime. If a politician's merely taking money is considered to be a crime, then politicians would be unable to accept any campaign contributions. And although many may find this result good - it is not the law.
So, DOJ should be applauded for making the right decision here. Spending more time or money on a case that does not meet the legal mandates is a poor choice of how to spend limited resources. What is particularly outstanding on the part of DOJ here is that they issued a press release stating, ""[a]fter carefully considering the Supreme Court's recent decision and the principles of federal prosecution, we have made the decision not to pursue the case further."
It is rare that DOJ issues a press release noting a not guilty verdict, a court dismissal, or something other than an indictment or conviction. It is hopeful that what DOJ has done with the McDonnell case, of issuing a statement of dismissal, will be replicated in non-white collar cases.
It's now official. Former Virginia Governor Robert McDonnell and his wife Maureen will not be retried and all charges are to be dropped. The Washington Post has the story here. It is unclear whether Main Justice overruled the EDVA or caused that office to change its mind regarding proceeding to a second trial. More analysis to come.
Wednesday, September 7, 2016
Finally, as promised, here is the U.S. v. Reddy Annappareddy 9-1-16 Motion to Dismiss Hearing Transcript. At the conclusion of that hearing Judge George Levi Russell dismissed the Indictment with prejudice. Judge Russell's rationale for his ruling can be found at pages 49-62 of the transcript. This was a health care fraud case and a core government theory was that Mr. Annappareddy received Medicaid reimbursement for pills that were never given to patients. The government sought to prove its theory by showing that Mr. Annappareddy's pharmacies billed for more pills than they received. The most significant evidence that the prosecutors offered in support of this allegation was a calculation of the purported “loss” from the alleged fraud. The following factors were key to the Court's finding that the government committed due process violations that shocked the conscience and rendered it impossible to put Mr. Annappareddy back on an even footing with the government: 1) the government violated Brady by failing to disclose loss calculations from its initial auditing team that were significantly smaller (in total and with respect to two key pharmacies) than the calculations of a subsequent government auditor who testified at trial; 2) the government violated Brady by failing to disclose the risk of double-counting errors in the loss calculations; 3) the government presented false testimony regarding the loss calculations due to double counting errors; 4) the government presented false testimony by a government agent, based on her examination of the wrong set of phone records, that Mr. Annappareddy had NOT made any calls to a key individual in response to a material email from that individual, when in fact Annappareddy had several phone contacts with the individual within minutes of the material email; and 5) the government destroyed potentially key exculpatory evidence without a court order or the defense's permission. The Court also sent a not so subtle warning to the government: "In the event that my record is not clear or exercise of my discretion too broad, this Court will conduct an extensive time-consuming and costly hearing as to these matters and the other grounds supporting the motion to dismiss and other motions which have already been filed. To that end, the balance of all other motions in this case are denied as moot." Translation: If you appeal this ruling and I am reversed, we will delve in detail into the other grounds of error raised by the defense. And it will not be a pleasant process. Hat Tip to David Debold of Gibson Dunn for sending along the transcript.
Thursday, September 1, 2016
The case against Reddy Annappareddy is over. The Government's case has been dismissed with prejudice by U.S. District Court Judge George Russell because of a pattern of government misconduct that shocks the conscience. As soon as I obtain a copy of today's hearing transcript we will post it. Congratulations are in order for Mr. Annappareddy and his Womble Carlyle defense team of Mark Schamel and Josh Greenberg. Greenberg's relentless motions work over the past 11 months has been particularly brilliant. Anybody who does white collar work in the federal courts knows how difficult it is to obtain a result like this, post-trial. This is a magnificent victory.
As we write this post U.S. District Court Judge George Russell is holding a hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with prejudice. I have previously discussed this case here and here. The motion is bottomed on various alleged prosecutorial errors and misdeeds. In a bad omen for the Government, Judge Russell only set arguments on the Motion to Dismiss (despite the pendency of other motions) and summarily denied the Government's motion to delay the hearing. The Government wanted a delay in the wake of an onslaught of defense motions, authored by Womble Carlyle's Josh Greenberg, alleging additional Government misbehavior, including destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence at a time when the Defendant's Motion for New Trial was filed and awaiting a decision. The Government later joined in the Motion for New Trial after admitting that it presented false material testimony to the jury. Meanwhile, in a filing that can only be described as stunning, the Government yesterday attempted to defend its admitted document destruction. Here lies the Government's Response Re Document Destruction.
Wednesday, August 31, 2016
Guest Blogger: Rory K. Little (Joseph W. Cotchett Professor of Law, U.C. Hastings College of Law)
Almost all of the Court’s October arguments will be in criminal cases
In a somewhat unprecedented calendaring wrinkle, the entire first week of oral arguments at the Supreme Court this coming Term, and 7 of the 8 cases to be argued in all of October, are criminal-law-based cases. This is probably not intentional, but rather reflects hesitancy in certiorari consideration last Spring by an evenly-divided eight-Justice Court.
Although the Court normally opens with oral arguments on “the first Monday in October,” this Term, due to Rosh Hashanah, the Court will only issue Orders on that day. Then on Tuesday, October 4 the Court will open its argument Term by hearing two cases; and on Wednesday, three. Three of these five arguments are pure criminal cases; the other two are “civil” but arise directly from criminal prosecutions.
The next Monday, October 10, is the Columbus Day holiday, and Wednesday is Yom Kippur. So the only argument day that week will be Tuesday October 11, when the Court will hear three cases. Two of those are criminal (discussed below), and the third is Samsung v. Apple, October’s only completely non-criminal case (described briefly in the next paragraph).
That’s it for October -- eight cases which, given the Court’s slow pace in granting certiorari until late June, were all that could be fully briefed and ready for argument that “speedily.”
The lone civil case set for argument in October, Samsung Electronics v. Apple, is a “big” IP case, presenting an important question about the extent of damages available for patent infringement when the infringed patented design applies only to a “component” of a product. Oral arguments will be presented by two well-known Supreme Court “heavy-hitters” -- Kathleen Sullivan for Samsung, and William Lee for Apple.
Otherwise, the Court’s entire argument focus in October will be on criminal matters. Below are short (and undoubtedly simplified) summaries of the seven criminal cases set for argument in October, presented in the order they will be heard.
- Bravo-Fernandez v. United States (argument on Oct. 4): A somewhat complicated Double Jeopardy question, which invokes a favorite old chestnut of law professors, Ashe v. Swenson, and the “collateral estoppel” effects of related prosecutions. When jury convictions have been vacated on appeal, is retrial on those counts barred by (perhaps inconsistent) acquittals that were returned on other counts? Arguing: former Assistant to the U.S. Solicitor General Lisa Blatt (for Bravo) and Elizabeth Prelogar from the current U.S. Solicitor General’s office. (Specific arguing counsel have not yet been officially identified by the Court; these summaries present my best guesses as to arguing counsel.)
- Shaw v. United States (argument on Oct. 4): Does subsection (1) of the federal bank fraud statute require the government to prove that the defendant intended to obtain “bank-owned” property, as opposed to fraudulently obtaining assets of a customer that are held by the bank? The case is a follow-on from the Court’s 2014 decision in Loughrin v. United States. Arguing: Deputy Federal public Defender Koren Bell of Los Angeles (for Shaw); and Anthony Yang from the current U.S. Solicitor General’s office.
- Salman v. United States (argument on Oct. 5): An important insider trading case. Is the Second Circuit’s groundbreaking 2014 decision in United States v. Newman correct in holding that the government must prove “at least a potential gain [to the tipper] of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature;” and if so, does the gift of a “tip” to a close friend or relative satisfy this “personal benefit” requirement (derived from Dirks v. SEC, 1983)? Arguing: Alexandra Shapiro of New York (for Salman), and Deputy U.S. Solicitor General Michael Dreeben.
- Buck v. Davis (argument on Oct. 5): The case presents a technical procedural question arising from a decidedly un-technical incident of racial bias in a death penalty case. Buck’s defense counsel actually elicited “expert” testimony at sentencing that Buck was more likely to be dangerous in the future because he is black – Texas now concedes that such generic race-based testimony is “always inappropriate.” So, did the Fifth Circuit erroneously deny a Certificate of Appealability from the district court’s denial of federal habeas corpus? Such a Certificate is a statutory prerequisite to allow review of Buck’s habeas corpus claim on the merits. This same case previously attracted the Court’s attention in 2011, when the Court denied certiorari at an earlier stage and five Justices joined two opinions: three Justices concurring in, and two dissenting from, the denial of certiorari. Arguing: Christina Swarns of the NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund (for Buck); and someone from the Texas Attorney General’s office.
- Manuel v. City of Joliet (argument on Oct. 5): It is complicated to even briefly describe what question this case presents. In a §1983 civil rights complaint, filed after criminal charges against him were dropped, Manuel alleged that he was held in jail for 47 days based on false reports made by the police. Among other things he claimed damages for “malicious prosecution” after the institution of “legal process” -- and to avoid dismissal under a statute of limitations, Manuel argued that he could not legally file that claim until the prosecution against him had terminated in his favor. The central question presented is whether the Fourth Amendment, or the Due Process Clause, governs such a claim. Many federal Circuits have said Fourth Amendment, while the Seventh Circuit here said Due Process. This same question was debated, but not resolved by a majority, in Albright v. Oliver (1994) (a plurality said Fourth Amendment; Justice Kennedy joined by Thomas said Due Process), and oral argument will likely focus on the intricacies and subsequents Court statements about Albright. However, the briefs filed so far also suggest that the parties disagree about a number of preliminary wrinkles, which could sidetrack the Court at argument. Arguing: Stanley Eisenhammer of Arlington Heights, Illinois (or possibly Professor Jeff Fisher of Stanford, see the next case) for Manuel; Michael Scodro of Chicago’s Jenner & Block (and former Illinois Solicitor General and Justice O’Connor clerk) for the City of Joliet; and Assistant to the U.S. Solicitor General Ilana Eisenstein for the United States as Amicus..
- Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (argument on Oct. 11): After Pena-Rodriguez was convicted of three sexual assault misdemeanors, two jurors reported that during deliberations, another juror had made a number of racist statements against “Mexicans.” The question is whether the Sixth Amendment right to an “impartial jury” requires that such reports of “racial bias” during criminal jury deliberations be considered, despite Colorado’s (and many other jurisdictions’) “no impeachment” rule that generally bars use of evidence about things said or done inside the jury room to impeach a verdict. Something like this question was left open by the 2014 decision in Warger v. Shauers. Arguing: Jeff Fisher of Stanford Law School, for Pena-Rodriquez; Frederick Yarger, Solicitor General of Colorado; and Assistant to the U.S. Solicitor General Rachel Kovner afor the United States as Amicus.
- Manrique v. United States (argument Oct. 11): Is a notice of appeal -- filed after sentence and judgment (including a general restitution obligation) is imposed, but before restitution is precisely determined -- sufficient to challenge the details of the restitution award? Arguing: Paul Rashkind, Assistant Federal Public Defender in Miami (for Manrique); and Allon Kedem from the U.S. Solicitor General’s office.
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So stay tuned for an almost “all criminal, all the time” month of arguments at the nation’s Highest Court! (And if you really want an earful, attend the “UC Hastings Annual Supreme Court Review & Preview” panel discussion, in San Francisco at Hastings on September 26, 2016.)