Monday, May 23, 2016
Ben Shmueli & Yuval Sinai have posted to SSRN Victim Pays Damages to Tortfeasor: The When and Wherefore. The abstract provides:
Is there a reality in which the victim pays damages to the tortfeasor? This article analyzes Calabresi and Melamed’s liability rule for the damaging party (Rule 4), where the damaged party has the right to prevent pollution if the polluter is compensated first. Under the conventional application of this rule, the victim first collects the money and compensates the injurer, and only then is the injurer required to eliminate the nuisance (ex ante). There is no reference to a possibility of the injurer first eliminating the nuisance and only then receiving compensation (ex post). We argue that the timing of the payment should be changed when the activity causing the nuisance has social and economic value. Each version of the rule advances the aggregate welfare in some sense, but also harms it in another.
The primary aim of the present article is to introduce a new model for Rule 4 that would guide legislators, regulators, and judges in deciding when to order compensation as a condition for eliminating the nuisance and when to order the injurer to remove the nuisance first and only then collect the funds.
This article also introduces a comparative perspective that reveals the potential use of the ex post version of Rule 4, as manifest in sources of the Jewish legal tradition. This comparison further bolsters our proposal in favour of a division between ex ante and ex post versions of the rule.
Ultimately, offering two versions for the implementation of Rule 4 would better enable the adaptation of a suitable solution according to the circumstances and thus would widen the possibilities for the rule’s use.
Wednesday, May 18, 2016
Christopher Mueller (Colorado), who has a terrific Evidence casebook, has posted to SSRN Taking Another Look at MDL Product Liability Settlements: Somebody Needs to Do it. The abstract provides:
This Article examines the forces that lead to the settlement of product liability cases gathered under the MDL statute for pretrial. The MDL procedure is ill-suited to this use, does not envision the gathering of the underlying cases as a means of finally resolving them. Motivational factors affecting judges and lawyers have produced these settlements, and the conditions out of which they arise do not give confidence that they are fair or adequate. This Article concedes that MDL settlements are likely here to stay, and argues that we need a mechanism to check such settlements for fairness and adequacy. The best way to do so is to allow collateral review of such settlements in suits brought by dissatisfied claimants.
Tuesday, May 17, 2016
Monday, May 16, 2016
The Argus Leader has compiled what it calls a first-ever glimpse at South Dakota med mal cases. It sounds very similar to med mal data from the U.S. as a whole:
The analysis of South Dakota data show that the vast majority of claims made against health providers are dismissed or withdrawn without any payment.
In 2014, insurers reported 163 claims that were either filed or closed. Of those, 28 were dismissed. Another 24 were closed with no payment amount recorded.
In 2015 there were 148 claims filed or closed with the Division, and 48 of those were closed without payment.
In 2014, insurers paid nearly $10.9 million on 27 settlements and one jury verdict. In 2015, that number dropped to nearly $6.4 million on 18 settlements.
In those two years, the largest settlement was $3 million. The average settlement was $367,654. The settlement amounts only reflect what insurance companies paid. They do not include additional amounts paid by health providers.
But getting those settlements can take years for injured patients or their surviving loved ones. The $3 million settlement, for example, took nearly four years from date of injury to settlement.
The full story is here.
Wednesday, May 11, 2016
Nathan Miller has posted to SSRN Human Rights Abuses as Tort Harms: Losses in Translation. The abstract provides:
This Article examines the normative challenges posed by bringing international human rights claims in state courts under the common law of torts. It argues that the normative structure of the private law of torts cannot adequately address the very different concerns at stake when addressing public harms. Torts address issues that arise between two parties and those parties alone. But public law addresses harms done simultaneously to individuals and to the body politic. Redress for public harms should encompass both individual and systemic remedies, but tort law offers only the former. Instead of advancing tort claims, advocates should urge state courts to exercise their concurrent jurisdiction over the customary international legal norms incorporated into the federal common law to hear claims for violations of international human rights.
Tuesday, May 10, 2016
Dr. Patrick McKenna, of the Wisconsin School of Medicine and Public Health, has published a study on the effect of apology immunity laws in med mal cases. He found:
that mean litigation length was 3.4 years in states with apology laws compared with 5.6 years in states without such laws. In the 38 states with apology laws, the mean litigation length was 4.4 years before apology laws were enacted and 4.1 years after the laws were enacted.
Renal & Urology News has the story.
Monday, May 9, 2016
Marshall Shapo has published The Experimental Society. The blurb:
This book examines society’s responses to many kinds of experimentation, focusing on both creation of and assessment of risks. As people seek new ways to make their lives safer and happier, the widespread process of experimentation claims victims. Some of these are people who directly and willingly accept the risks of experiments. By comparison, some are effectively experimental subjects in the hands of others who often may not even think of themselves as experimenting with the lives of consumers.
The Experimental Society covers a wide spectrum of products and activities, including those that radiate into the environment like nuclear power, hydrofracking, and asbestos. The book spotlights prescription drugs and substances used in the most ordinary consumer products such as salt, caffeine, and BPA in sippy cups. It also discusses the testing of new ways of thinking, including those related to social organization and processes, and even the law itself. A particular concern is the case in which the subjects of experiments are unaware that the experiments are taking place.
This lucidly written volume will be useful to practicing lawyers who specialize in personal injury law, and law professors who teach such subjects as torts and products liability, medicine, and science. Physicians and scientists in various branches of medicine will find it provocative, as will political scientists, economists, sociologists, anthropologists, and philosophers.
Shapo is interviewed about the book here.
Friday, May 6, 2016
Yesterday, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld a $3M cap on damages against the state and its employees. The ruling caps a $12M jury verdict for a 2009 botched liver surgery that nearly killed a then 8-year-old boy. The jury found there were $6M in future medicals, at least half of which must now be absorbed by the family. OregonLive has the story.
Thursday, May 5, 2016
Two physicians at Johns Hopkins have conducted a study concluding that medical errors cause approximately 250,000 deaths every year in the United States, the third leading cause of death after heart disease and cancer. CNN has the story, including links to the study itself.
Wednesday, May 4, 2016
Cathy Sharkey has posted to SSRN The Remains of the Citadel (Economic Loss Rule in Products Cases). The abstract provides:
Though its seeds may have been planted long before, the economic loss rule in products liability tort law emerged in full force at the very same moment as the doctrine of strict products liability in the mid-1960s. This moment, fueled by the fall of privity and the rise of implied warranty earlier in the century, was of great doctrinal import — a moment when strict liability threatened to erase altogether the boundary between tort and contract in the context of defective products cases and move those cases firmly into the tort realm. The economic loss rule emerged as a crucial new levee against a flood of potentially limitless tort liability. It forged a new dividing line, keeping cases involving pure financial losses within the domain of con-tract by denying recovery for such losses under any theory of tort. Seen in this light, the economic loss rule emerged to protect the “remains” of the citadel of privity.
William Prosser, so intently focused on the dramatic siege on the citadel of privity, overlooked a few, highly significant cases, where courts continued to require privity in order for the plaintiff to recover for negligently inflicted economic losses by defective products. Over the two decades that followed Prosser’s The Fall of the Citadel, the debate over the economic loss rule in products cases continued to unfold, culminating in the U.S. Supreme Court’s embrace in East River Steamship. That case ensured the economic loss rule would keep contract from “drowning in a sea of tort” and that the wall between the “separate spheres” of tort and contract law could not be breached.
After an exploration of the evolution of, and rationales for, the economic loss rule in products cases, this Article examines whether the citadel’s last bastion should be preserved. It con-cludes that the economic loss rule in products cases may be best justified as a means to induce the putative victims — here, the parties with superior information regarding risk of financial loss — to protect themselves.
Monday, May 2, 2016
Hanoch Dagan & Avi Dorfman have posted to SSRN Against Private Law Escapism: Comment on Arthur Ripstein, Private Wrongs. The abstract provides:
Can a comprehensive theory of tort law evade the ultimate test of our moral intuitions (or reflective equilibrium)? We shall argue, first, that Ripstein’s illuminating Private Wrongs, including in particular his organizing distinctions between misfeasance and nonfeasance, between relation and comparison, and between horizontal and vertical justice, cannot escape that test; and, second, that his theory fails to meet such a test.
The Comment proceeds in four stages. We first lay out the basic structure of Ripstein’s theory of the justice of tort law and the nature of the argument he deploys in developing this theory (Part I). We then suggest that, and explain why, his effort to derive the content of the justice of tort law by taking legal doctrine at face value must fail (Part II). The next two stages of the argument consider an alternative reading of Private Wrongs (Part III) and a broader assessment of the justice of tort law against the background of public law (Part IV).
Friday, April 29, 2016
John Goldberg & Ben Zipursky have posted two pieces to SSRN. First, from this year's AALS Torts Panel, The Myths of MacPherson. The abstract provides:
For a symposium marking the centenary of Macpherson v. Buick, we identify three common characterizations of Cardozo’s famous opinion that purport to explain its importance. Unfortunately, each of these characterizations turns out to be a myth. MacPherson is worthy of celebration, but not because it recognizes that negligence law’s duty of care is owed to the world, nor because it displays the promise of an instrumental, policy-oriented approach to adjudication, nor because it embraces a nascent form of strict products liability. These myths of MacPherson reflect deep misunderstandings of tort law, and of Cardozo’s distinctively pragmatic approach to adjudication. Ironically, although they have been largely fostered by progressives, the myths lend support to the cause of modern tort reform. By contrast, an accurate appreciation of MacPherson’s virtues permits an understanding of negligence, tort law, and common law adjudication that provides grounds for resisting regressive reforms.
Next, Triangular Torts and Fiduciary Duties. The abstract provides:
When a professional is negligent in providing services to her client or patient, third parties are sometimes harmed. “Triangular torts,” as we call them, are negligence claims brought against professionals by such third parties. One common example involves a father suing a therapist for inducing his daughter to have false memories of childhood abuse, thereby causing him emotional harm. Another involves a nephew suing a lawyer for incorrectly drafting his aunt’s will, thereby causing him financial loss. Despite the general decline of privity limits on negligence liability, courts frequently reject triangular tort claims, ruling that professionals do not owe duties of care to third parties. In this chapter, we explain when such rulings are warranted — and when they are not. The answer turns on whether the recognition of a duty of care to the third party is consistent with the professional’s fiduciary duty of loyalty to the client or patient.
Thursday, April 28, 2016
Lawyers for residents of Flint, MI have filed administrative complaints, required as a step to suing government agencies, against the EPA for damage caused by lead in the water. The complaints reference an alleged email from an agency expert warning about the problem in June 2015. Reuters has the story.
Wednesday, April 27, 2016
Duquesne is hosting a legal writing conference on drafting statutes and rules on December 3, 2016. Former PA Governor Tom Corbett and Pennsylvania Senate Minority Leader Jay Costa are among the speakers. The flyer, including a call for proposals, is here: Download The Fifth Colonial Frontier Legal Writing Conference Call for Proposals (Second Announcement)
Tuesday, April 26, 2016
Monday, April 25, 2016
About two weeks ago, Bloomberg BNA had a piece on defects in firearms. No agency has the authority to force a recall, meaning voluntary recalls by manufacturers and class actions are the only effective methods. Class actions are rare. Victor Schwartz is quoted extensively on "regulation by litigation."
Friday, April 22, 2016
On Wednesday, Arkansas's attorney general approved the wording of a proposed ballot item to amend the constitution that would instruct the state's legislature to set a cap on punies in med mal cases at no less than $250,000. It would have to be adjusted for inflation every 2 years. Lawyers would also be prohibited from charging over one-third as a contingency fee. With the approval, the sponsor can begin gathering the 84,859 signatures needed to place the proposal on the November ballot. (Via Arkansas News) Punies in med mal cases are extremely rare, but, if awarded, tend to be in high amounts.