Thursday, September 3, 2015
Howie Erichson has posted to SSRN Judge Jack Weinstein and the Allure of Antiproceduralism. The abstract provides:
In one sense of the word proceduralist — a person with expertise in procedure — Judge Jack Weinstein is among the leading proceduralists on the federal bench. But in another sense of the word proceduralist — an adherent of proceduralism, or faithfulness to established procedures — he falls at a different end of the spectrum. Looking at four examples of Judge Weinstein’s work in mass litigation, this Article considers what it means to be an antiproceduralist, someone unwilling to let procedural niceties stand in the way of substantive justice. The allure of antiproceduralism is that it eschews technicalities in favor of substantive justice, but technicalities are in the eye of the beholder, and this Article asks what is lost when a judge steers around procedural constraints.
Wednesday, September 2, 2015
As part of the Clifford Symposium, John Goldberg has written a piece on Judge Weinstein, for whom he clerked. Entitled Judging Responsibility, Responsible Judging, the abstract provides:
This essay, published in the Twentieth Annual Clifford Symposium, sketches two ways in which Judge Jack Weinstein’s judicial performance raises issues of responsibility. First, it considers how he has deployed responsibility concepts that are central to tort law. Unsurprisingly, it concludes that, in his efforts to do “equity” through mass tort litigation, he has stretched these concepts quite far. This conclusion raises a second set of questions about responsibility—namely, questions about the role responsibilities of federal district court judges. As to these, the essay contends that Judge Weinstein’s tort decisions are consistent with a familiar and plausible account of judicial decision-making. It also notes ways in which he has been especially responsible in his handling of claims and claimants.
Tuesday, September 1, 2015
The AALS Section on Insurance Law will hold a program on Insurance and Litigation during the AALS 2016 Annual Meeting in New York. The program is scheduled for Sunday, January 9, 2016, from 10:30 AM to 12:15 PM. The program will feature a panel of leading research on the relationships between insurance and litigation. For a longer description of the topic, see below
Submissions: To be considered, a draft paper or proposal must be submitted by email to Ezra Friedman, Program Chair, at firstname.lastname@example.org. A proposal must be comprehensive enough to allow for a meaningful evaluation of the proposed paper. Submissions must be in Micorsoft Word or PDF format.
Deadline: The deadline for submissions is Friday, October 9. Decisions will be communicated by Friday, October 23.
Eligibility: Full-time faculty members of AALS member law schools are eligible to submit. Faculty at fee-paid law schools; foreign, visiting and adjunct faculty members; graduate students; fellows; and non-law school faculty are not eligible to submit. Papers may already be accepted for publication, provided that the paper will not be published before the AALS meeting.
Expenses: The panelist selected through this Call for Papers will be responsible for paying his or her own annual meeting registration fee and travel expenses.
Inquiries: Inquiries about this Call for Papers may be submitted to Ezra Friedman, Northwestern University, School of Law, email@example.com, (312) 503-0230.
“Insurance and Litigation, Risk and Incentives”
Appreciating the role that insurers and insurance plays in litigation is fundamental to understanding both insurance markets and the legal system. Insurers participate in litigation directly as parties to conflicts or as agents of their policyholders, and indirectly by affecting the financial stakes of the parties. Third party litigation finance firms act as de facto insurers of litigation outcomes. This session will address various subjects regarding the relationship between insurance, risk, and litigation. Possible questions include: How can law makers best address the conflicts of interest between insurers and policyholders in litigation? How does the prospect of litigation between the insurer and policyholder affect the drafting and performance of insurance contracts? What effects do the prospect of litigation have on the value and cost of providing Insurance? What can understanding insurance law and regulation tell us about how to regulate litigation finance?
Monday, August 10, 2015
Alexandra Lahav has posted to SSRN Participation and Procedure. The abstract provides:
How much participation should a procedurally just court system offer litigants? This question has always been especially difficult to answer in complex litigation such as class actions and mass torts because these cases involve so many litigants that it would be impossible for each of them to be afforded the kind of individualized hearing that we associate with the day in court ideal. To address the problem, we need to go back to first principles and ask what purposes participation in litigation is meant to serve. Participation serves two purposes: as a predicate to litigant consent and to engage public reason. This Article, written for the Clifford Symposium honoring Judge Jack Weinstein, argues that the public reason rationale offers the best normative underpinning for participation in large-scale litigation and demonstrates how public reason can be realized through procedural innovations such as those Judge Weinstein has pioneered.
Wednesday, July 29, 2015
Saturday, July 18, 2015
Jay Feinman sends the following:
The Rutgers Center for Risk and Responsibility is holding its fourth annual insurance workshop on Friday, October 2, 2015. This is a day-long event on the Camden campus with an opportunity to present and receive comments on drafts or less fully formed works-in-progress on topics related to insurance law or other aspect of managing or regulating risk. For more information, contact Professor Rick Swedloff, firstname.lastname@example.org
Friday, June 5, 2015
Greetings! In my capacity as Secretary of the AALS Torts & Compensation Systems section, I am writing to pass along two important notices.
1. Torts and Compensation Section Newsletter As most of you know, our section publishes a newsletter each fall listing: (1) symposia related to tort law; (2) recent law review articles on tort law; (3) selected articles from Commonwealth countries on tort law; and (4) books relating to tort law. If you know of any works that should be included, please forward relevant citations and other information to me at email@example.com. The deadline for inclusion is August 17, 2015.
2. 2016 William L. Prosser Award This is the first call for nominations for the 2016 William L. Prosser Award. The award recognizes “outstanding contributions of law teachers in scholarship, teaching and service” in torts and compensation systems. Recent recipients include Mike Green, James Henderson, Jane Stapleton, Guido Calabresi, Robert Rabin, Richard Posner, Oscar Gray, and Dan Dobbs. Past recipients include scholars such as Leon Green, Wex Malone, and John Wade.
Any law professor is eligible to nominate another law professor for the award. Nominators can renew past nominations by resubmitting materials. Living tort scholars and those who have passed away within the last five years are eligible for the award. Selection of the recipient will be made by members of the Executive Committee of the Torts & Compensation Systems section, based on the recommendation of a special selection committee. The award will be presented at the annual AALS meeting in January 2016.
Nominations must be accompanied by a brief supporting statement and should be submitted no later than July 13, 2015. Email submissions to firstname.lastname@example.org are preferred. If you would rather mail hard copies of nomination materials, please mail to: Chris Robinette, Widener University School of Law, 3800 Vartan Way, P.O. Box 69380, Harrisburg, PA 17106-9380.
Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions.
Friday, April 3, 2015
Thursday, February 5, 2015
Rutgers Camden in hosting a conference on the ALI's Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance on Friday, February 27th. Reporters Tom Baker and Kyle Logue are speaking, along with numerous influential academics and practitioners.
Saturday, January 3, 2015
The AALS Torts & Compensation Systems Section has its panel at the Annual Meeting tomorrow from 4:00 until 5:45 in Maryland Suite C, Lobby Level, at the Marriott Wardman Park Hotel. Andy Klein led the Section this year and set up a great panel:
Tort Law and a Healthier Society
Andrew R. Klein, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law
Michelle Mello, Stanford Law School
Dorit Reiss, University of California, Hastings College of the Law
Diana Winters, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law
Section on Torts and Compensation Systems William L. Prosser Award Winner:
Michael Green, Wake Forest University School of Law
The section will present a program on leading issues at the intersection of tort and health law. Professor Mello will discuss medical malpractice alternatives for hospitals. Professor Reiss will discuss liability issues related to vaccine-preventable diseases. Professor Winters will discuss food safety impact litigation. The section will also honor the winner of its annual William L. Prosser Award for outstanding contribution in scholarship, teaching, and service related to tort law.
Business meeting at program conclusion.
I regret I can't attend, but I extend my warm congratulations to Mike Green.
Wednesday, December 3, 2014
If you have 7 or fewer years of teaching experience, you are eligible for the Yale/Stanford/Harvard Junior Faculty Forum, this year including Torts as a subject matter. The deadline is March 1, 2015. Details are here: Download JFF final call for submissions
Tuesday, October 28, 2014
On October 6th in Buffalo, Ken Feinberg was the keynote speaker at a conference on cutting-edge tort issues. He both praises and damns tort law in his remarks to the Buffalo Law Journal.
Wednesday, October 22, 2014
The AALS Torts & Compensation Systems Section Newsletter is available here: Download Torts_Newsletter_2014. Section Secretary Leslie Kendrick drafted it, with the help of Kristin Glover, Research Librarian at UVa Law.
Monday, September 29, 2014
...includes a paper presentation by Ben Zipursky ("Reasonableness in and out of Negligence Law") and Greg Keating as a panelist. The symposium is October 24th and 25th. The program is here and you can RSVP. Thanks to Karen Wong of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review for the tip.
Thursday, September 11, 2014
The AALS Torts & Compensation Systems Section has announced that Mike Green (Wake Forest) will receive the 2015 Prosser Award. From the announcement:
Wednesday, September 3, 2014
Todd Brown (Buffalo) is chairing a conference entitled "Recent Developments in Tort Law and Practice" with Kenneth Feinberg as the Gerald S. Lippes Lecture Speaker. The conference is October 6, 2014 from 8:45 until 5:00 at the Hyatt Regency Buffalo. Registration is here. The schedule:
7:30 a.m. Conference and keynote registration begins
8:45 –10:00 a.m. Breakfast and Gerald S. Lippes Lecture featuring Kenneth R. Feinberg. Mr. Feinberg is an attorney who has overseen the payouts of billions of dollars to the victims of the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund, the BP oil spill, and the Boston Marathon bomb victims, among other highly visible settlements.
10:20 – 11:20 a.m. Aggregation and Disaggregation in Mass Torts: Panelists discuss the recent trend in some mass tort MDLs away from global settlement in favor of individual claim litigation and settlement in state court.
11:30 a.m. –12:15 p.m. Lunch
12:15 – 1:30 p.m. Judges from New York City and Western New York discuss their experience with asbestos litigation.
1:40 – 2:40 p.m. Asbestos Litigation in New York: Panelists discuss legislative reforms at the state and federal levels and recent changes to asbestos practice in NYS courts.
2:50 – 3:50 p.m. Update on the RAND ICJ Asbestos Bankruptcy Project: Early findings from the RAND study on the impact of the bankruptcies of asbestos defendants on asbestos litigation in state court, with commentary from panelists.
4:00 – 5:00 p.m. The Past, Present and Future of the New York “Scaffold Law”: A detailed examination of New York’s unique approach to strict liability in construction accident cases, including the origins and evolution of the law in recent years.
5:00 p.m. Reception. Sponsored in part by the SUNY Buffalo Law Alumni Association.
Tuesday, September 2, 2014
Richard Wright (Chicago-Kent) has posted to SSRN Moore on Causation and Responsibility: Metaphysics or Intuition?. The abstract provides:
This paper was prepared for a festschrift in honor of Michael Moore to be published by Oxford University Press. Moore's magnum opus, Causation and Responsibility, amply demonstrates his encyclopedic knowledge of the relevant sources in law and philosophy and his analytical skill. Much can be learned from careful, critical reading.
However, I argue, Moore relies too much on intuition -- more specifically, his own -- in developing his account of causation and its pervasive and (he claims) dominant role in attributions of legal responsibility. Focusing on the NESS account that I have elaborated, he rejects "generalist" accounts of causation, which analyze singular instances of causation as instantiations of causal (natural) laws, instead opting for a "primitivist singularist" account, according to which we simply recognize causation when we see it in each particular instance without any even implicit reference to causal laws or any other "reductionist" test. He erroneously treats the "substantial factor" criterion in the first and second Restatements of Torts (which is properly strongly criticized and rejected in the third Restatement) as being such a primitivist singularist account. In addition, he seeks to replace all of the traditional normative limitations on legal responsibility with a supposed causal analysis, based on the "scalarity" of causation.
Yet, Moore believes, intuitions come into conflict with metaphysics when considering omissions or other absences as causes, which is routinely assumed to be true in law and life but which Moore insists is fundamentally erroneous from a metaphysical standpoint. His insistence on this point, while admirable from an intellectual integrity standpoint, completely undermines the fundamental premise of his book -- that causation is the pervasive and dominant determinant of legal responsibility -- since omissions/absences are part of every causal chain involving human action and many not involving human action.
In this paper, I defend a specific "generalist" account of causation (the NESS account) and criticize Moore's primitivist singularist account. Along the way, I address a number of issues regarding causation and legal responsibility, including the metaphysical basis for treating omissions as causes.
Monday, August 25, 2014
Jason Solomon has posted two pieces to SSRN. First is a symposium introduction to The Civil Jury as Political Institution. The abstract provides:
More than two hundred years after the Seventh Amendment enshrined the civil jury right, the debate over the role of the civil jury in the United States continues unabated. But even as questions about the civil jury’s competence as an adjudicative institution continue, questions surrounding the civil jury’s justification and role as a political institution are under explored.
To explore these questions in contemporary society, the Bill of Rights Institute and Law Review at William & Mary Law School hosted a symposium on The Civil Jury as a Political Institution. For two days in February 2013, scholars from an array of disciplines gathered to consider the extent to which the civil jury played a meaningful role as a political institution historically, whether it still serves that purpose today and, if so, what measures can or should be taken to ensure its continuing significance.
This short essay is the introduction to the symposium issue of the William & Mary Law Review on this topic. The essay provides a brief summary and exploration of some of the themes that arose in the papers and during the discussion.
Second is Juries, Social Norms, and Civil Justice. The abstract provides:
At the root of many contemporary debates and landmark cases in the civil justice system are underlying questions about the role of the civil jury. In prior work, I examined the justifications for the civil jury as a political institution, and found them wanting in our contemporary legal system.
This Article looks closely and critically at the justification for the civil jury as an adjudicative institution and questions the conventional wisdom behind it. The focus is on tort law because the jury has more power to decide questions of law in tort than any other area of law. The Article makes three original contributions.
First, I undermine the claim that the breach question in negligence is inevitably one for the jury by revisiting a famous debate between Cardozo and Holmes about the possibility of judge-made rules around breach in tort. Second, I draw on social and cognitive psychology to question the conventional wisdom that juries applying general standards are ideally suited to identify and apply social norms. And third, I sketch a middle-ground approach on breach, which involves presumptive rules that defer to indicia of social norms such as statutes and regulations, custom, and the market.
In making the argument, this Article begins to point the way towards a tort system that recognizes the value of recourse but better serves rule-of-law values.
Thursday, August 7, 2014
The Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law School and the Food and Drug Law Institute have announced a joint symposium on "Emerging Issues and New Frontiers for FDA Regulation," to be held on October 20, 2014, in Washington. Topics include food regulation, drug shortages, stem cells, and synthetic biology.
Tuesday, July 29, 2014
John Oberdiek (Rutgers-Camden) has posted to SSRN Putting (and Keeping) Proximate Cause in Its Place. The abstract provides:
Before one can recover for an injury sounding in negligence, one must establish that the defendant more likely than not proximately caused the injury. That the positive law of negligence imposes this requirement is beyond controversy. What is more controversial is whether the requirement is conceptually and morally defensible. Michael Moore, singly as well as in tandem with Heidi Hurd, powerfully argues that it is neither. Specifically, Moore contends that the harm-within-the-risk test of proximate causation, despite its venerable history in tort law and reaffirmation in the latest Restatement, is “incoherent” and “morally undesirable.” It is bad enough, on Moore’s view, that negligence law bifurcates its causal inquiry, distinguishing as it does the question of actual causation from that of proximate causation, rather than pursuing a unified naturalistic inquiry into the substantiality of causal contribution. What is worse is that tort law can’t even get its own misguided causal inquiry half-right.
I do not share Moore’s jaundiced view of the harm-within-the-risk test of proximate cause – what I will call the “risk rule” for short. I begin by questioning his understanding of the risk rule as it figures in tort law, and go on to argue that neither his conceptual nor his moral criticism of the risk rule is decisive. In the course of rebutting Moore’s criticisms, I outline what I take to be the most compelling account of the risk rule in the law of torts. What emerges is a conception of proximate cause that is thoroughly moralized. Of course moral premises must be invoked to defend the risk rule’s moral merit, but, I argue, they must also be invoked to defend its conceptual coherence. In my view, the risk rule is both morally and conceptually sound.