Thursday, October 8, 2009
Monday's guest blogger is John Oberdiek. Oberdiek is currently an Associate Professor of Law at Rutgers School of Law - Camden. He teaches Torts and Administrative Law as well as several upper-level law and philosophy courses, including a survey of political and legal philosophy and two seminars on the political theory of administrative law and on tort theory, respectively.
Oberdiek joined the Rutgers faculty from the Washington, D.C. law firm of Arnold & Porter LLP in 2004. After receiving his B.A. from Middlebury College, he pursued graduate study in philosophy, first at Balliol College, Oxford, then at NYU, where he received his M.A., and finally at the University of Pennsylvania, where he received both his J.D. and Ph.D through the University's Joint Program in Law and Philosophy. In 2005-06, Professor Oberdiek was on leave at Princeton University, where he was a Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Fellow in the University Center for Human Values as well as a Fellow in the Program in Ethics and Public Affairs.
Oberdiek is also Associate Graduate Faculty in the Rutgers-New Brunswick Department of Philosophy and Co-Director of the Rutgers Institute for Law and Philosophy.
His research focuses on normative legal theory, general jurisprudence, as well as moral and political philosophy. Some of his recent work includes Arguing About Law (Routledge, 2009) (co-edited with Aileen Kavanagh), a 600-page anthology of leading articles in philosophy of law and jurisprudence with significant editorial content; "Risk," in Dennis Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Second Edition (Blackwell, forthcoming); "Towards a Right Against Risking," 28 Law and Philosophy 367 (2009); "Philosophical Issues in Tort Law," 3 Philosophy Compass 734 (2008) (solicited); "What's Wrong with Infringements (Insofar as Infringements are Not Wrong): A Reply," 27 Law and Philosophy 293 (2008); "Specifying Rights Out of Necessity," 28 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 127 (2008); and "Culpability and the Definition of Deontological Constraints" 27 Law and Philosophy 105 (2008).