January 24, 2009
Hylton on the Economics of Nuisance Law
Keith Hylton (Boston) has posted The Economics of Nuisance Law on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Economic analysis of nuisance law can be divided into two branches: the transaction cost model and the externality model. The two models provide a relatively complete positive theory of nuisance law. Under the externality model, nuisance law optimally regulates activity levels. Nuisance law induces actors to choose socially optimal activity levels by imposing liability when externalized costs are far in excess of externalized benefits or not reciprocal to other background external costs. Proximate cause doctrine plays an important role in inducing optimal activity levels.
TrackBack URL for this entry:
Listed below are links to weblogs that reference Hylton on the Economics of Nuisance Law: