Thursday, February 28, 2008
Jacob Nussim (Bar-Ilan University-Faculty of Law) has posted Distributive Aspects of Legal Standards on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
There are various differences between a negligence regime and a strict liability regime; there are various differences between price and quantity controls of behavior. This study shows that, typically, these legal mechanisms differ in their distributive outcome as well. In reality, tort victims as well as externality victims are heterogeneous in the potential harm they would suffer if injured, but potential injurers cannot observe individualized harm ex ante (e.g., car accidents, pollution). Therefore, a uniform rather than individualized legal standard of behavior is applied. It is shown that a negligence regime with a uniform care standard redistributes among potential victims, while an equally (second best) efficient strict liability regime does not. A similar conclusion follows for the choice between quantity and price instruments.
Via Solum/Legal Theory Blog.