More Recent Articles of Note

Sydney Foster, SHOULD COURTS GIVE STARE DECISIS EFFECT TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION METHODOLOGY?, 96 Geo. L.J. 1863 (2008).  The SSRN version is here.  The (another one I'm to read) abstract:

Fifty years ago, Henry Hart and Albert Sacks famously observed that the methods that courts use to interpret statutes are unpredictable and inconsistent, a conclusion that scholars and judges agree remains equally true today. While there is vehement disagreement over which doctrines of statutory interpretation are best, there is widespread consensus that increased consistency would be superior to the status quo. Scholars and judges have considered a range of ways to remedy this situation, but they have overlooked a path to consistency that is tailor-made to render the unpredictable more predictable: stare decisis doctrine. This Article argues not only that courts should give doctrines of statutory interpretation methodology stare decisis effect, but also that courts should give even stronger stare decisis effect to doctrines of statutory interpretation than they give to doctrines of substantive law. The interests that stare decisis doctrine serves in the substantive law setting are served equally well in the statutory interpretation methodology setting; moreover, stare decisis serves important rule-of-law and coordination interests in the statutory interpretation methodology setting that it does not serve in the substantive law setting. Because the case for giving stare decisis effect to doctrines of statutory interpretation is stronger than the case for giving stare decisis effect to doctrines of substantive law, courts should give doctrines of statutory interpretation stronger stare decisis effect than their substantive law counterparts.

Webster, Walbolt & Davis, Statutory Construction in Florida: In Search of a Principled Approach, 9 Fla. Coastal L. Rev. 435 (2008).

Brian G. Slocum, The Problematic Nature of Contractionist Statutory Interpretations, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 307 (2008).  The SSRN version is here.  The abstract:

The main thesis of Daniel B. Rodriguez and Barry R. Weingast's recent article, The Paradox of Expansionist Statutory Interpretations, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1207 (2007), is important: the voting decisions of legislators can be influenced by the activist statutory interpretations of courts. Specifically, the authors demonstrate that the broad interpretations of progressive legislation made by courts in the 1960s and 1970s undermined the legislative deals struck between ardent supporters of progressive legislation and the moderate legislators necessary for passage of the statutes. Although these expansionist interpretations broadened the reach of important progressive legislation, they had the effect of discouraging moderate legislators from supporting progressive legislation and are partly to blame for the current polarization of Congress and the paucity of such legislation.

Rodriguez and Weingast explain that courts in the 1960s and 1970s were able to achieve expansionist interpretations of progressive legislation by misusing legislative history to support inaccurate conclusions about the intent or purpose of Congress. While the article's insights about expansionist interpretations and the misuse of legislative history are an important contribution to statutory interpretation scholarship, the interpretive mistakes made by courts are largely different now than in the 1960s and 1970s. For some time, the dominant trend has been for judges to rely more on rules of interpretation that typically narrow statutory meaning and less on pragmatic analysis or conclusions about likely congressional intent or purpose. This Essay criticizes the current judicial predilection for contractionist statutory interpretations. The Essay argues that while contractionist interpretations may not discourage moderate legislators from supporting legislation, they are problematic because they are inconsistent with the judiciary's role as faithful agents of Congress