Securities Law Prof Blog

Massachusetts Fines Citi $2 Million for Tech Analyst's Improper Disclosures

Massachusetts Securities Division fined Citigroup $2 million for failing to supervise tech analyst Mark Mahaney and a junior analyst who improperly disclosed confidential information about Facebook's IPO and Google's revenue estimates.  Citigroup fired Mahaney, who is a top-ranked internet analyst.  Citigroup admitted to the statement of facts and agreed to cease and desist from violating state securities laws.

WSJ, Citi Analyst Fired After Facebook Disclosure

NASAA Reports Increase in Enforcement Actions Against Investment Advisers

NASAA released its annual enforcement report, compiling statistics on enforcement actions by state securities regulators for 2011.  The survey reports a significant increase in enforcement actions against investment adviser firms last year:  they nearly doubled to 399 in 2011 and accounted for 15 percent of all enforcement actions handled by state securities regulators.

The majority of the investment fraud cases reported by state securities regulators featured unregistered individuals selling unregistered securities. More than 800 reported actions involved unregistered securities, and more than 800 actions involved unregistered firms or individuals. For the second consecutive year, Regulation D Rule 506 private offerings and real estate investment schemes were the most reported products at the heart of state securities enforcement actions.(Download 2012-Enforcement-Report-on-2011-Data[1])

 

FINRA Fines David Lerner Associates for Unfair Sales Practices: CEO is Suspended for One Year

FINRA has ordered David Lerner Associates, Inc. (DLA) to pay approximately $12 million in restitution to affected customers who purchased shares in Apple REIT Ten, a non-traded $2 billion Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) DLA sold, and to customers who were charged excessive markups. As the sole distributor of the Apple REITs, DLA solicited thousands of customers, targeting unsophisticated investors and the elderly, selling the illiquid REIT without performing adequate due diligence to determine whether it was suitable for investors. To sell Apple REIT Ten, DLA also used misleading marketing materials that presented performance results for the closed Apple REITs without disclosing to customers that income from those REITs was insufficient to support the distributions to unit owners.

FINRA also fined DLA more than $2.3 million for charging unfair prices on municipal bonds and collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) it sold over a 30 month period, and for related supervisory violations.

In addition, FINRA fined David Lerner, DLA's founder, President and CEO, $250,000, and suspended him for one year from the securities industry, followed by a two-year suspension from acting as a principal. David Lerner personally made false claims regarding the investment returns, market values, and performance and prospects of the Apple REITs at numerous DLA investment seminars and in letters to customers. To encourage sales of Apple REIT Ten and discourage redemptions of shares of the closed REITs, he characterized the Apple REITs as, for example, a "fabulous cash cow" or a "gold mine," and he made unfounded predictions regarding a merger and public listing of the closed Apple REITs, which he inappropriately claimed would result in a "windfall" to investors.

FINRA also sanctioned DLA's Head Trader, William Mason, $200,000, and suspended him for six months from the securities industry for his role in charging excessive muni and CMO markups. The sanctions resolve a May 2011 complaint (amended in December 2011) as well as an earlier action in which a FINRA hearing panel found that the firm and Mason charged excessive muni and CMO markups.

 FINRA also required DLA to retain independent consultants to review and propose changes to its supervisory systems and training on both sales of non-traded REITs and pricing of CMOs and municipal bonds. In addition, DLA agreed to revise its advertising procedures, including videotaping sales seminars attended by 50 or more people for three years, and is required for one year to pre-file all advertisements and sales literature with FINRA at least 10 days prior to use.

 

 

FINRA Expels EKN for Defying SEC Order

FINRA has expelled EKN Financial Services, Inc. of Melville, NY, for numerous compliance violations and for allowing its CEO, Anthony Ottimo, to act as a supervisor after being barred from acting in that capacity by the SEC in June 2008. FINRA barred Ottimo from the securities industry and barred the firm's former President, Thomas Giugliano, from acting in a principal capacity, suspended him from the securities industry for one year and fined him $150,000. EKN, through Ottimo and Giugliano, also violated numerous NASD/FINRA and SEC rules and federal securities laws, including anti-money laundering (AML) violations, net capital deficiencies and widespread reporting failures.

FINRA found that from 2008 through 2011, Ottimo acted in a supervisory role despite an SEC order that barred him from associating with any broker or dealer in a supervisory capacity, and acted as CEO despite not being registered as a principal. During the relevant period, EKN and Giugliano repeatedly misrepresented to FINRA that Ottimo was no longer acting as EKN's CEO, as a principal or as a supervisor. In 2011, EKN lied to FINRA examiners, reporting that since 2008, it had "never filled" the CEO position when, in fact, FINRA's investigation revealed that EKN's own documents indicated that from 2008 through 2011, Ottimo was listed as EKN's CEO and was operating in that capacity. As CEO, Ottimo supervised other EKN personnel, negotiated and executed agreements, controlled its finances, retained signatory authority over its bank accounts, and represented himself as EKN's CEO to its clearing firm and other third parties.

In addition, FINRA found that EKN, Ottimo and Giugliano, who was aware of EKN and Ottimo's regulatory violations, committed numerous AML violations, including failing to establish an adequate AML compliance program to detect and report suspicious activity, and failed to meet minimum net capital requirements during certain periods from September 2008 to November 2010 

 

 

SEC Grants Accelerated Approval to FINRA's JOBS Act Rule Changes

On October 11, 2012, the SEC posted on its website a Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Proposed Rule Change to Amend NASD Rule 2711 and Incorporated NYSE Rule 472 to Conform with the Requirements of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act and Related Changes (Download 34-68037[1]).  Comments are due 21 days after publication in the Federal Register. 

FINRA Requests Comments on Revised Proposal on Debt Research

FINRA seeks comment on a revised proposal addressing debt research conflicts of interest that includes amended exemptions for research distributed to certain institutional investors and for firms with limited principal debt trading activity. The revised proposal also includes other changes in response to comments on the prior proposal set forth in Regulatory Notice 12-09.

The text of the proposed rule can be found at www.finra.org/notice/12-42.

The comment period expires Dec. 10, 2012.

FINRA Fines Guggenheim Securities for Failing to Supervise CDO Traders

FINRA fined Guggenheim Securities, LLC of New York $800,000 for failing to supervise two collateralized debt obligation (CDO) traders who engaged in activities to hide a trading loss. FINRA sanctioned the two traders: Alexander Rekeda, the former head of Guggenheim's CDO Desk, was suspended for one year and fined $50,000; Timothy Day, a trader on Guggenheim's CDO Desk, was suspended for four months and fined $20,000.

In October 2008, as the result of a failed trade, Guggenheim's CDO Desk acquired a €5,000,000 junk-rated tranche of a collateralized loan obligation (CLO). After unsuccessful attempts by Guggenheim's CDO Desk to sell the position, Rekeda and Day persuaded a hedge fund customer to purchase the CLO for $950,000 more than it had previously agreed to pay by falsely presenting the CLO as part of a package of securities a third party offered for sale. FINRA found that in an attempt to hide the trading loss on the CLO position, the traders provided the customer with order tickets that increased the price for the CLO position and decreased the price of the other positions that were part of the transaction. When the customer inquired about the pricing adjustments, Day, at Rekeda's direction, lied and said a third-party seller of the CLO position had already settled the trade at a higher price and requested the customer pay this higher price. The customer agreed to overpay for the CLO and in return, Day and Rekeda agreed to compensate the customer through other transactions, including pricing adjustments on six other CLO trades, a waiver of fees the customer owed in connection with resecuritization transactions, and a cash payment to the customer. The records created to document the transactions did not indicate any connection to the overpayment for the CLO.

FINRA found Guggenheim failed to conduct adequate review of the CDO Desk's trades, documentation concerning transactions by traders on the desk, and the traders' email communications. As part of the settlement, Guggenheim must retain an independent consultant to review and make recommendations concerning the adequacy of its supervisory procedures.

NASAA Urges SEC to Rethink Proposal to Eliminate Ban on Advertising in 506 Offerings

Yesterday the president of NASAA, Arkansas Securities Commissioner Heath Abshure, joined three investor advocates in sharply criticizing the SEC's proposed JOBS Act rulemaking that implements the elimination of the prohibition against general solicitation in Rule 506 and Rule 144A offerings.(Download 33-9354[1])

Abshure, along with representatives from AARP, the AFL-CIO, and the Consumer Federation Of America, called on the SEC to withdraw its proposal and craft a new rule that promotes capital formation without sacrificing investor protection. (The comment period on the rule expired last week.)

“People don’t seem to think so, but this is a drastic change to the face of securities regulation,” Abshure said. “Rule 506 offerings already are the most frequent financial product at the heart of state enforcement investigations and actions. Lifting the advertising ban on these highly risky, illiquid offerings, without requiring appropriate safeguards, will create chaos in the market and expose investors to an even greater risk of fraud and abuse. Without adequate investor protections to safeguard the integrity of the private placement marketplace, investors should and will flee from the market, leaving small businesses without an important source of capital.”

New York AG Sues Over Bear's Role in Marketing Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities

Yesterday the New York State Attorney General brought a civil suit against Bear, Stearns & Co. (now J.P. Morgan Securities LLC) under the state's Martin Act arising out of Bear's role in connection with the creation and sale of residential mortgage-backed securities ("RMBS" to investors prior to the firm's 2008 collapse.  AG Eric Schneiderman is co-chair of the Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Group formed by the DOJ in January 2012.  According to the complaint:

At the heart of Defendants' fraud was their failure to abide by their representations that they took a variety of steps to ensure the quality of the loans underlying their RMBS, including checking to confirm that those loans were originated in accordance with the applicable underwriting guidelines, i.e., the standards in place to ensure, among other things, that loans were extended to borrowers who demonstrated the willingness and ability to repay.

As a result, the complaint alleges, defendants' misconduct constituted "a systemic fraud on thousands of investors."  The complaint does not set forth with specificity the requested relief beyond an injunction, an accounting, disgorgement, restitution and damages.

The AG's allegations are similar to those made in a number of private lawsuits currently before the courts.

AG's complaint (Download 108632018-nyagvjpmc[1])

GMorgenson, NYTimes, JPMorgan Unit Is Sued Over Mortgage Securities Pools

AG's Press Release, A.G. Schneiderman Sues JPMorgan For Fraudulent Residential Mortgage-backed Securities Issued By Bear Stearns
 

 

FINRA Fines Merrill $500,000 for Failing to File Customer Complaints

FINRA censured and fined Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. $500,000 for supervisory failures that allowed widespread deficiencies in filing hundreds of required reports, including customer complaints, arbitration claims, and related U4 and U5 filings, and for its failure to file the required reports. 

FINRA found that:

• From 2007 to 2011, Merrill Lynch failed to file or timely file more than 650 required reports, including customer complaints and customer settlements.
• From 2005 to 2011, Merrill Lynch failed to report or timely report customer complaints, and related Forms U4 and Forms U5 between 23 percent and 63 percent of the time.
• Merrill Lynch failed to adequately train and supervise personnel responsible for customer complaint tracking and reporting, and did not have systems in place to identify the high volume of customer complaints that were not being acknowledged or reported as required. As a result, Merrill Lynch failed to acknowledge nearly 300 customer complaints in a timely manner.
• Merrill Lynch failed to file or timely file approximately 300 non-NASD/FINRA arbitrations and criminal and civil complaints that it received for approximately three years.
• From July 2007 to June 2009, and again from October 2009 to February 2010, Merrill Lynch failed to make these filings 100 percent of the time.
• From 2007 through 2010, Merrill Lynch failed to file related Forms U4 and U5 between 28 percent and 79 percent of the time.

GAO Issues Report on Customer Outcomes in Madoff Liquidation

The GAO today issued a report on Customer Outcomes in the Madoff Liquidation Proceeding (GAO-12-991).  Here is what it found:

GAO's analysis of Madoff account data shows that more than three-fourths of the firm's customers were individuals and families (individuals). The remaining accounts were held by institutions, such as pension funds and charities. A higher proportion of accounts held by an individual (60 percent) were "net winners" based on their net equity position--meaning they had withdrawn more from their accounts than they had deposited--compared to accounts held by institutions (50 percent). Correspondingly, 40 percent of institutional accounts were "net losers" that had deposited more into their accounts than they had withdrawn, compared to 29 percent of individuals' accounts that were net losers. However, individual and institutional accounts had similar deposit and withdrawal activity from 1981 through 2008, including increased withdrawals immediately before the firm's failure in December 2008.

GAO's analysis shows that the Trustee's decisions to accept or reject claims were similar for individual and institutional account holders. Of the more than 16,000 claims, about 66 percent were denied because the customers were not direct account holders of the Madoff firm, but instead had invested in funds or other vehicles that held accounts directly with the firm. For the remaining claimants who were directly invested, the Trustee generally used the customers' net investment positions--that is, whether they were net winners or net losers-- to determine claims. In examining claims decisions by customer type, GAO found the Trustee denied claims filed by individuals and institutions determined to be net winners in similar proportions. Similarly, most claims filed by individuals or institutions determined to be net losers were allowed.

The Trustee has been pursuing litigation to recover, or "claw back," assets from net winner customers and others that can be used to reimburse customers that did not withdraw all of their principal investments. For those customers that withdrew fictitious profits--net winners--the Trustee has been pursuing more than 1,000 lawsuits to recover funds, as allowed under federal bankruptcy law and state law. In about 60 suits, the Trustee has sought more than fictitious profits, to include principal or other funds received, arguing the parties knew or should have known of the fraud. Thus far, the Trustee said he has recovered about $9.1 billion of the $17.3 billion in principal investments lost by customers who filed claims, including $8.4 billion from settlement agreements.

Because the Madoff fraud affects customers' taxable income, it also affects tax collections by the Department of the Treasury. Under Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rules, Madoff customers can deduct lost principal and fictitious profits on which they paid taxes while holding their accounts. However, IRS does not maintain statistics on specific frauds or their impacts on tax collections, and the tax impact may be reduced because some taxpayers may not be able to fully use this tax relief, such as those that lack other income that can be offset by these deductions. Tax experts expressed concerns about the lack of clarity over how payments stemming from fraud-related avoidance actions filed by the Trustee will be treated for tax purposes. In response to a recommendation in a draft report that IRS provide guidance to help limit taxpayer errors resulting in over- or underpayment of taxes, the agency issued such guidance on September 5, 2012, in the form of "frequently asked questions" posted to its website.

 

FINRA Fines Rodman & Renshaw for Interactions between Research and Investment Banking

FINRA announced that it fined Rodman & Renshaw LLC $315,000 for supervisory and other violations related to the interaction between the firm's research and investment banking functions. Rodman's former CCO, William A. Iommi Sr., was fined $15,000, suspended from acting in a principal capacity for 90 days and must requalify as a general securities principal.

FINRA found that, because of deficiencies in the firm's supervisory system, there were at least two incidents where a research analyst participated in efforts to solicit investment banking business, and another incident where a research analyst attempted to arrange a payment from a public company. FINRA also sanctioned the two research analysts involved. 

Rodman, the New York-based broker-dealer subsidiary of Direct Markets Holdings Corp., provides investment banking services, including Private Investments in Public Entities (PIPEs) and registered direct offerings, to public and private companies. It also provides research, sales and trading services to institutional investors and therefore must have supervisory and compliance procedures to monitor potential conflicts of interest between research and investment banking, given concerns that research analysts could be pressured to tailor their coverage to the interests of a firm's current or prospective investment banking clients.

 

NASAA's Top Investor Threats

NASAA released its annual list of financial products and practices that threaten to trap unwary investors. State securities regulators are particularly concerned about two provisions of the recently passed JOBS Act that, NASAA says, "could unwittingly open a floodgate of fraud": the provisions to expand crowdfunding to allow businesses to raise money from investors and to allow the general solicitation and advertising of private placement offers.

The following list of the Top 10 financial products and practices that threaten to trap unwary investors was compiled by the securities regulators in NASAA’s Enforcement Section:

New Threats

Crowdfunding and Internet Offers
Inappropriate Advice or Practices from Investment Advisers
Scam Artists Using Self-Directed IRAs to Mask Fraud
EB-5 Investment-for-Visa Schemes

Persistent Threats

Gold and Precious Metals
Risky Oil and Gas Drilling Programs
Promissory Notes
Real Estate Investment Schemes
Reg D/Rule 506 Private Offerings
Unlicensed Salesmen Giving Liquidation Recommendations

FINRA Expels WJB Capital for Misstating Financial Records

FINRA expelled WJB Capital Group, Inc. for misstating its financial records and for engaging in securities transactions while it was below its required net capital. FINRA also barred the firm's Chief Executive Officer, Craig A. Rothfeld, from the securities industry, and barred the firm's Chief Financial Officer, Gregory S. Maleski, from acting in a principal capacity.

FINRA found that from 2009, when WJB Capital began to experience financial difficulties, through 2011, Rothfeld and Maleski misstated WJB's financial position on the firm's balance sheet. In one example, Rothfeld and Maleski converted $9.8 million in compensation previously paid to 28 employees into forgivable loans. As a result, the firm also failed to provide for the appropriate payment of taxes. Had WJB appropriately recorded these loans and tax obligations, its balance sheet would have reflected substantial losses in addition to those that it was already experiencing.

In addition, Rothfeld and Maleski misclassified certain items as allowable for net capital purposes; as a result, at various times in 2011, WJB engaged in securities transactions when it was below its minimum required net capital. For example, the firm improperly included receivables related to "non-deal road-shows" when they were not allowable assets under the net capital rule. As a result of the misclassification of these receivables, WJB misstated its FOCUS report and net capital calculations by at least $1 million on a monthly basis for approximately two years. The firm also misclassified a $1.5 million loan it received from its clearing firm as an allowable asset for net capital. Rothfeld, Maleski and WJB also failed to reasonably supervise the firm's financial and accounting functions.

Debate over Adviser SRO Heats Up Again

Representative Spencer Bachus, Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, has an op-ed piece in today's Wall St. Journal called "Financial Advisers, Police Yourselves," in which he calls for support of the Investment Adviser Oversight Bill that would authorize the establishment of one or more SROs to supplement the SEC's examinations for investment advisers.  The alternative that has been floated is allocation of additional funds so the SEC can conduct more exams.  Rep. Bachus, in response to this, states:

But the SEC has informed Congress that even if it received increased funding this year, it would be able to examine only one in 10 investment advisers annually. This is unacceptable.

Additionally, this approach ignores the SEC's poor track record leading up to the financial crisis. The SEC failed to protect investors and detect fraud even though evidence about the Madoff and Stanford Ponzi schemes was handed to them by insider informants on a silver platter.

As Investment News notes, on July 25 Rep. Bachus suspended his bill after Rep. Maxine Walters introduced a bill that would allow the SEC to charge advisers user fees to fund exams and said that no legislation would move forward until consensus was reached.  Representatives of the investment adviser industry expressed disappointment with Mr. Bachus's statement.  Inv News, Game on: Bachus reopens SRO debate, snipes at advisers 

 

FINRA Expels Day-Trading Firm for Supervisory Violations

FINRA announced that it expelled Biremis, Corp., formerly known as Swift Trade Securities USA, Inc., and barred its President and Chief Executive Officer, Peter Beck, for supervisory violations related to detecting and preventing manipulative trading activities such as "layering," short sale violations, failure to implement an adequate anti-money laundering program, and financial, operational and numerous other securities law violations.

FINRA found that during various periods from June 2007 to June 2010, Biremis and Mr. Beck failed to establish a supervisory system reasonably designed to achieve compliance with the applicable laws and regulations prohibiting manipulative trading activity. Among other things, Biremis' supervisory system failed to include policies and procedures designed to detect and prevent layering on U.S. markets.  

FINRA found that despite the fact Biremis' only business was to execute transactions on behalf of day traders around the world, Biremis and Mr. Beck failed to implement an adequate anti-money laundering (AML) program to comply with the Bank Secrecy Act.  

Biremis and Mr. Beck also violated a number of additional securities laws and rules. Biremis failed to maintain a margin system and margin accounts, and did not have policies and procedures in place related to the use of margin. The firm also failed to prepare customer reserve computations and failed to maintain a special reserve bank account for the exclusive benefit of customers. In addition, Biremis placed thousands of short sale orders, which was in violation of an emergency order issued by the SEC that temporarily banned short selling in certain securities. Also, between at least April 2008 and May 2009, Biremis improperly calculated its net capital, operating in net capital deficiency by up to $25 million. Additionally, the firm failed to maintain all required emails and instant messages over a five-year period.

No SRO for Investment Advisers Anytime Soon

Controversial legislation that would create an SRO for investment advisers -- a proposal that investment advisers hate -- has been put on hold, says its sponsor, Rep. Spencer Bachus, Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, because of lack of consensus about how to improve the examination of investment advisers.  Yesterday Rep. Maxine Walters introduced a bill that would allow the SEC to charge user fees for exams, an approach that in the past has gone nowhere.  InvNews, SRO bill dead for now

Happy Birthday to Dodd-Frank

On the second anniversary of the enactment of Dodd-Frank, Treasury has posted on its website an "overview of where reform stands and the changes it has affected.  According to the report (Download Reforming Wall Street):

Since Wall Street Reform was enacted in July 2010…
…our financial system is safer and stronger.

 …consumers are more empowered and protected.

 …financial markets are more transparent.

 …regulators have new tools to monitor and mitigate threats to the financial system.

 …implementation steadily continues despite attempts by opponents to roll back, delay, and defund reforms.

These reforms are helping build a sound foundation to support economic growth.

If only wishing could make it so.

 

 

 

Treasury's Office of Financial Research Issues Progress Report

The Office of Financial Research, within the U.S. Dept. of Treasury, was created by Dodd-Frank to serve the needs of the Financial Stability Oversight Council and member agencies, to collect and standardize financial data, to perform essential research and to develop new tools for measuring and monitoring risk in the financial system.  It has issued its first Annual Report to describe how it is working to meet its statutory mandate in four areas:

• to analyze threats to financial stability
• to conduct research on financial stability
• to address data gaps
• to promote data standards

Its agenda going forward includes

work to develop more robust analytical frameworks for analysis to assess and monitor threats to financial stability, to evaluate mitigants to those threats, and to improve the scope and quality of financial data required for that work. Accordingly, we will focus on the forces that promote the migration of financial activities, including maturity transformation and the creation of money-like liabilities, into unregulated or lightly regulated markets—the so-called shadow banking system—and we will investigate in depth the behavior of short-term funding markets and collect better data on repo markets. We will build on the work on the three topics outlined in this report— indicators of threats to financial stability, stress testing, and risk management. We will employ network analysis and new data to research interconnectedness among financial institutions. Our data agenda is tied closely to our research agenda and includes further work on data standards to improve the quality of existing and new information.

GAO Reports on Conflict Minerals Disclosure Rule and Stakeholder Initiatives

The GAO recently released a report on the Conflict Minerals Disclosure Rule:  SEC's Actions and Stakeholder-Developed Initiatives.(Download GAO.ConflictMinerals.592458[1])  Here is what the Report found:

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has taken some steps toward developing a conflict minerals disclosure rule, but it has not issued a final rule. For example, SEC published a proposed rule in December 2010 and has gathered and reviewed extensive input from external stakeholders through comment letters and meetings. SEC has also announced, on several occasions, new target dates for the publication of a final rule. In July 2012, SEC announced that the Commission will hold an open meeting in August 2012 to consider whether to adopt a final rule. According to SEC officials, various factors have caused delays in finalizing the rule beyond the April 2011 deadline stipulated in the act, including the intensity of input from stakeholders and the public; the amount of time required to review this input; and the need to conduct a thorough economic analysis for rule making.

Various stakeholders have developed initiatives that may help covered companies comply with the anticipated rule, but some initiatives have been hindered by SEC’s delay in issuing a final rule. Industry associations, multilateral organizations, and other stakeholders have developed global and in-region sourcing initiatives, which include the development of guidance documents, audit protocols, and in-region sourcing systems. These initiatives may support companies’ efforts to conduct due diligence and to identify and responsibly source conflict minerals. In the absence of SEC’s final rule, however, stakeholders note that uncertainty regarding SEC’s reporting and due diligence requirements has complicated their efforts to expand and harmonize their initiatives. For example, in the absence of a final rule, one initiative is facing difficulty engaging additional participants, while stakeholders’ efforts to harmonize two initiatives have been hindered.

Little additional information on the rate of sexual violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and neighboring countries has become available since GAO’s 2011 report on that subject. For example, only one population-based survey has been published on sexual violence in Rwanda, and it reports that 22 percent of women ages 15-49 have experienced sexual violence there in their lifetimes. No additional surveys have been conducted in eastern DRC; however, one organization is currently conducting a survey and another is planning to conduct a survey there in 2012.