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Univ. of Toledo College of Law

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Saturday, April 27, 2013

Brams & Mitts on M&A Auctions

Mechanism Design in M&A Auctions, by Steven J. Brams, New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics, and Joshua Mitts, Yale Law School, was recently posted on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

The recent controversy over “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” standstills in M&A practice highlights the need to apply mechanism design to change-of-control transactions. In this Essay, we propose a novel two-stage auction procedure that induces honest bidding among participants while potentially yielding a higher sale price than an open ascending, a sealed-bid first price, or a Vickrey second-price auction. Our procedure balances deal certainty with value maximization through the Nobel Prize-winning principle of incentive compatibility, making participation in the M&A auction and honest disclosure of reservation prices in the parties’ interests rather than relying solely on heavy-handed ex-post enforcement. Moreover, the social benefits of our two-stage auction mechanism - greater transparency regarding the distribution of bids, avoidance of the winner’s curse, certainty in the M&A auction environment, and fairness to buyers and sellers - justify reduced judicial scrutiny of transactions utilizing the procedure under Revlon and Chancellor Strine’s recent dicta in Ancestry.com.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/securities/2013/04/brams-mitts-on-ma-auctions.html

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