Cain & Davidoff on State Competition for Corporate Litigation

A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation, by Matthew D. Cain, University of Notre Dame - Department of Finance, and Steven M. Davidoff, Ohio State University (OSU) - Michael E. Moritz College of Law, was recently posted on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

We provide a multi-dimensional picture of jurisdictional competition for corporate litigation by examining merger litigation in a hand-collected sample of 955 takeovers from 2005-2010. We find that entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ attorneys drive this competition by bringing suits in jurisdictions which have previously awarded more favorable judgments and higher fees and by avoiding unfavorable jurisdictions. States with an interest in attracting corporate litigation respond in-kind by adjusting judgments and awards to re-attract litigation. Competing states award higher attorneys’ fees and dismiss fewer cases when attorneys have been migrating to other jurisdictions. Our findings illuminate the dynamics of jurisdictional competition for corporate litigation