Sunday, December 4, 2011
Corporate Monitorships and New Governance Regulation: In Theory, in Practice, and in Context, by Cristie L. Ford, University of British Columbia Faculty of Law, and David Hess, University of Michigan - Stephen M. Ross School of Business, was recently posted on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Over the last few years, it has become increasingly common for government agencies to resolve corporate criminal law and securities regulations violations through the use of settlement agreements that require corporations to improve their compliance programs and hire independent monitors to oversee the changes. Based on our interviews with corporate monitors, regulators, and others, we find that these monitorships are failing to meet their full potential in reforming corrupt corporate cultures. After reviewing potential reforms to improve monitorships from a new governance perspective, we discuss the limits of these reforms that are due to the sociological and institutional environment in which monitorships are embedded.