Sunday, September 25, 2011
Enforcement and Disclosure under Regulation FD: An Empirical Analysis, by Paul A. Griffin, University of California, Davis - Graduate School of Management; David H. Lont, University of Otago - Department of Accountancy and Finance; and Benjamin Segal, INSEAD - Accounting & Control Area, was recently posted on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
While Regulation FD was designed to benefit investors by curbing the selective disclosure of material non-public information to “covered” investors, such as analysts and institutional investors, it can also impose costs. This paper finds that FD levies three kinds of enforcement and disclosure costs. First, investors cannot recover as part of an SEC enforcement action the gains to covered investors from their alleged use of the non-public information. Second, investors lose because the market responds negatively to an SEC enforcement announcement. Third, investors suffer because some companies post their FD filings well after the due date, without earlier public disclosure.