Securities Law Prof Blog

Editor: Eric C. Chaffee
Univ. of Toledo College of Law

A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network

Sunday, March 6, 2011

Barry & Hatfield on Takeover Defenses

Pills and Partisans: Understanding Takeover Defenses, by Jordan M. Barry, University of San Diego School of Law, and John William Hatfield, Stanford Graduate School of Business, was recently posted on SSRN.  Here is the abtract:

Corporate takeover defenses have long been a focal point of academic and popular attention. However, no consensus exists on such fundamental questions as why different corporations adopt varying levels of defenses and whether defenses benefit or harm target corporations' shareholders or society generally. Much of the disagreement surrounding takeover defenses stems from the lack of a fully developed formal analytical framework for considering their effects. Our Article presents several formal models built upon a common core of assumptions that together create such a theoretical framework. These models incorporate the reality that target corporate insiders have superior information about the target but are imperfect agents of its shareholders. They suggest that modern defenses enable target shareholders to extract value from acquirers by empowering corporate insiders, but that takeover defenses do not benefit society as a whole. They also suggest why corporations with different characteristics may choose to adopt varying levels of takeover defenses. Our findings have implications for the longstanding debate about who is best served by state-level control of corporate law and the desirability of increased federal involvement in corporate law.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/securities/2011/03/barry-hatfield-on-takeover-defenses.html

Law Review Articles | Permalink

TrackBack URL for this entry:

http://www.typepad.com/services/trackback/6a00d8341bfae553ef014e8687f1c9970d

Listed below are links to weblogs that reference Barry & Hatfield on Takeover Defenses:

Comments

Post a comment