May 1, 2010
Choi et alia on Judicial Ability and Securities Class Actions
Judicial Ability and Securities Class Actions, by Stephen J. Choi, New York University - School of Law; G. Mitu Gulati, Duke University - School of Law; and Eric A. Posner, University of Chicago - Law School, was recently posted on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
We exploit a new data set of judicial rulings on motions in order to investigate the relationship between judicial ability and judicial outcomes. The data set consists of federal district judges’ rulings on motions to dismiss, to approve the lead plaintiff, and to approve attorneys’ fees in securities class actions cases, and also judges’ decisions to remove themselves from cases. We predict that higher-quality judges, as measured by citations, affirmance rates, and similar criteria, are more likely to dismiss cases, reject lead plaintiffs, reject attorneys’ fees, and retain cases rather than hand them over to other judges. Our results are mixed, providing some but limited evidence for the hypotheses.
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