Sunday, November 15, 2009
The Peril and Promise of a Multi-Enforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Framework for Analysis, by Amanda M. Rose, Vanderbilt University Law School, was recently posted on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Participants in the United States’ national securities markets face potential fraud liability at the hands of the SEC, class action plaintiffs, and state regulators. Does this “multi-enforcer” approach to securities fraud deterrence make sense? How does one even go about answering that? This Article tackles the second question, filling a current void in the securities fraud literature by elucidating the circumstances that must prevail in order for a multi-enforcer approach to serve the cause of optimal deterrence. It thus situates debates over the preemption of state securities fraud enforcement authority and the desirability of private Rule 10b-5 enforcement within a framework of rational inquiry, and clarifies the empirical questions that must ultimately drive their resolution.