PropertyProf Blog

New Jersey Case Invalidating Blight Taking

Ilya Somin has the details on City of Long Branch v. Anzalone at the VC.

Ben Barros

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Update on the Trees v. the Solar Panels

A while back, we noted an interesting California case that involved a conflict between redwoods and solar panels.  The Times has an update on the story.  An excerpt:

More than six months after two Santa Clara residents were convicted under a state nuisance law for letting their redwoods cast shade on a neighbor’s solar panels, the governor signed into law a bill that gives trees the right to grow as they please — as long as they predate any solar panels they might be shading. . . .

The new law is not retroactive; the original conviction stands. But the neighborhood fight is not over. Mr. Vargas has gone back to civil court, suing his neighbors in part because of the solar-panel issue, but also because he claimed the trees’ roots damage an underground storm drain and because they violate state laws prohibiting spite fences.

Ben Barros

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Heller and the Home

I just skimmed through the Supreme Court's decision in D.C. v. Heller.  I was struck by how narrow the opinion is, and how much it is focused on self defense in the home.  We talk a lot about homes here on Propertyprof.  It seems to me that Heller falls within the long tradition of cases that privilege homes as compared to other types of property.

Ben Barros

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Specific Performance of the Seattle Sonics' Lease

Out in Seattle Judge Marsha Pechman (W.D. Wash) has been conducting a trial over whether the Seattle Sonics must abide their lease with of the city's KeyArena for the next two years or whether they can move immediately to their new home of Oklahoma City.  Interesting stuff, whether the city can require specific performance of the lease; I think the case for specific performance is strong here.  It looks like there isn't a material breach of the lease by the city, only by the team, so the question is one of remedies. 

Which will it be, then, damages or specific performance?  Now, courts are obviously (and for good reason) reluctant to give affirmative injunctions.  I wouldn't be holding my breath for an affirmative injunction requiring the team to play in the KeyArena.  But I think here that a negative injunction--you can't play anywhere else when you're scheduled to play home games--may be appropriate.  Why would a negative injunction be superior to damages?

The question is whether harm is irreparable (with apologies to Doug Laycock!)--and irreparable injury is determined by whether we can measure the damage in dollars.  I don't think we can--or at least we can't with the specificity that we usually demand.  The damages to the city are going to be somewhat are to compute--how much lost revenue will there be (not just from the stadium lease, but from the Sonics overall)?  There's been a lot of talk in the trial of how difficult (or not) it will be to gauge the lost revenue--and no surprise here the Sonics' owners say it'll be easy and the city says it'll be hard.  The difficulty of computing damages is one of the key factors in determining whether you're entitled to an injunction and I think all the city needs to do here is make the case for computing damages look murky.

Of course, we also balance the equities in determining injunctive relief--do we think that the harm to the city of not granting the relief is substantially outweighed by the harm to the Sonics of granting relief?  On this there's some important evidence.  The city's interest is substantial--their beloved team is leaving; many people whose livelihood depends on the team are going to be hurt; the ripples will go out for a long way.  What about the harm to the team?  They claim they're going to lose $60 million over the next two years--that's a substantial harm, of course.  But remember two things--first, that's their allegation.  Second, that's balanced against the harm to the city. 

For me (fan of aloha jurisprudence and other populist strains in property law) perhaps the most exciting piece of this equity puzzle is the public interest--which we typically consider in cases where there are interests at stake beyond the parties to the litigation.  This is a great example of one of those cases and I think it points in favor of a negative injunction.  The community's interest here (and remember this is an equitable question of whether we're going to allow a company to breach a contract and only pay money damages) is in favor of keeping the team for the fans, as well as the people in the city who need the work the home games generate.  Anyway, we'll all know soon enough!

Jim Brunner of the Seattle Times has a great article in this morning's paper on the case.  You can also follow the trial on Jim's blog.

Alfred Brophy

Landlord Conversion of 20-unit Building Into Private Residence

Over at the Co-op, Frank Pasquale has an interesting post on a NYC dispute featuring a landlord who is trying to convert a 20-unit building into a private residence.

Ben Barros

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On-Line Ad Housing Discrimination Case

Eugene Volokh has a post on Fair Housing Council v. Roomates.com.  The case is mostly about some on-line immunity issues, but an underlying issue about expressing preferences for roomates will be a familar one to propertyprofs.

Ben Barros

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Supreme Court Decision in New Jersey v. Delaware

Yesterday, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Delaware in its riparian use dispute with New Jersey.  The New York Times has an article on the case.  The opinions are available here.  Choice quote from the Times about Justice Scalia's dissent:

What was so “extraordinary” about a wharf to unload liquefied natural gas, he asked. “Would a pink wharf, or a zig-zagged wharf qualify? How about one for the transfer of “tofu and bean sprouts”?

Ben Barros

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Goldstein v. Pataki

Ilya Somin has a good post at the VC about this interesting Second Circuit case.  An excerpt:

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently decided Goldstein v. Pataki, a case challenging the condemnation of homes and other property in Brooklyn for the purpose of transferring them to developer Bruce Ratner, owner of the New Jersey Nets. Ratner plans to use the land to build a new stadium for the Nets, as well as other facilities, including some 2250 new housing units.

Not surprisingly, the Second Circuit upheld the condemnations. Under Kelo v. City of New London, they had very little choice. As I discuss in great detail in this article, Kelo mandates very broad judicial deference to the government in determining whether a condemnation is a genuine "public use" under the Fifth Amendment. Any potential benefit to the general public is sufficient, even if it is greatly outweighed by the project's cost.

The case nonetheless reveals some of the serious shortcomings of Kelo and related precedents. Goldstein v. Pataki is a correct application of Kelo; it is also an example of the sort of abuse that more robust judicial protection of property rights could prevent.

Ben Barros

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Ceded Lands in Hawaii

In 1893, the government of the Kingdom of Hawaii, a constitutional monarchy, was overthrown by a group of mostly American planters and businessmen, supported by a contingent of U.S. Marines.  The revolutionaries subsequently established the Republic of Hawaii and entered into negotiations with the United States to seek Hawaii's annexation.  When Hawaii was annexed by the United States in 1898, the Republic of Hawaii ceded the public lands of Hawaii to the United States.  When Hawaii became a state in 1959, the United States conveyed more than a million acres of land this land to the new state, to hold in trust for five specified purposes, including "the benefit of native Hawaiians."  This "Ceded Lands Trust" is analogous to the school lands trusts established in the admission acts of most states admitted to the Union after about 1820.  Earlier this week, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the State cannot convey lands from the Ceded Lands Trust to private parties until the claims of Native Hawaiians to these lands have been resolved.   Newspaper articles on the case can be accessed here and here. The opinion itself, Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Housing and Community Development Corporation of Hawaii, can be accessed here (careful; the file is enormous). 

Carl Christensen
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Buyer Sues Broker for Failure to Disclose Declining Market

From a NY Times article; particularly notable for the impact of the recent shift to buyer's agents:

Marty Ummel believes she paid too much for her house. So do millions of other people who bought at the peak of the housing boom.

What makes Ummel different is that she is suing her agent, saying it was all his fault.

Ummel claims that the agent hid the information that similar homes in the neighborhood were selling for less because he feared she would back out and he would lose his $30,000 commission.

Real estate lawyers and brokers say the case, which goes to trial in North County Superior Court on Monday, is likely to be the first of many in which regretful or resentful buyers seek redress from the agents who found them a home and arranged its purchase.

"When your house appreciates $100,000 in the first six months, you're not quite as concerned that maybe the valuation was $25,000 or $50,000 off," said Clifford Horner of the law firm Horner & Singer. "But when your house goes down, you ask: 'Who might have led me astray here?'"

Agents representing buyers rarely had the opportunity to make mistakes during the last real estate boom, in the late 1980s, because the job hardly existed then. For decades, residential transactions almost always involved brokers who, whatever assistance they gave the buyer, legally represented only the seller. The long boom that began in the late 1990s put an end to that one-sided world. As prices spiked, buyer's agents and brokers became popular as sounding boards, advisers and negotiators. The National Association of Realtors estimates they are now involved in two-thirds of all residential purchases.

That makes this the first housing collapse in which large numbers of buyers had a real estate professional explicitly looking after their interests. The Ummel case poses the question: In a relationship built on trust, where promises are rarely written down and where -- as in this case -- there is no signed contract, what are the exact obligations of these representatives in guiding their clients through a sizzling market?

"Agents have a lot of fiduciary duties, but they don't make money unless they close the sale," said Joel Ruben, a real estate lawyer in Manhattan Beach, Calif. "In an inflated market, there are built-in temptations to cut corners."

Ben Barros

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Purpresture in Hawaii

Thanks to the extraordinary Carl Christensen for calling to my attention what I did not know, but should have:  Hawaii v. Kerr, 16 Haw. 363 (1905), a case about purpresture.  Looks like purpresture may be a piece of aloha jurisprudence.  In this case, a structure encroached on a public beach.  The syllabus to the case states:

The defendant whose lot, as shown by its land commission award, is bounded “along the sea” constructed a concrete wall on the shore in front of his lot between high and low water, a corner of the wall projecting a few feet beyond low water, and was filling the space enclosed by the wall with coral and sand so as to raise the surface above the low water line, with the intention of making a house lot for a seaside residence. Held: Following Gay v. Halstead, 7 Haw. 587 (1889), that the defendant's land extended to and along the line of high water.

The defendant's concrete wall is a purpresture, encroaching upon public territory and rights in the shore. A bill for injunction requiring the removal of the obstruction caused by the wall and enjoining its renewal can be maintained by the Territory under the provisions of section 91 of the Organic Act, giving it the possession, control, maintenance and care of all public property ceded to the United States by the Republic of Hawaii. The bill sufficiently avers irreparable damage.

Time to dust off this doctrine and put it up there alongside spite fences and cemetery access--and, of course, implied trust beneficiaries, as doctrines that protect community rights in property.

Carl writes:

For a look at a modern purpresture case (though it doesn't use the word), also in the beach context, look at Diamond v. State of Hawaii, Board of Land and Natural Resources, 145 P.3d 704 (Hawaii 2006).  Here the unauthorized purpresture is in the form of vegetation artificially induced to grow out onto a publicly owned sandy beach by a shoreline landowner who hopes to gain a more favorable shoreline setback line based on the new vegetation.

In fact, this doctrine is surprisingly vibrant.  Carl continues:

A WestLaw search in the Allstates database on "Purpresture & beach" yields 93 hits, among them Trepanier v. County of Volusia, 965 So.2d 276 (Fla. App. 2007), Lowcountry Open Land Trust v. State, 552 SE.2d 778 (S./C. App. 2001), and Scott v. City of Del Mar, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 317 (Cal. App. 1997). 

It seems, one might conclude, that the dern' things pop up all over the place.

Al Brophy
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Finding Law in the News

From an AP Story:

A contractor who helped discover bundles of cash totaling $182,000 hidden behind bathroom walls says the homeowner should turn the money over to him — or at least share it.

Bob Kitts said his feud with the owner of the house, a former high school classmate, has deteriorated to the point where they speak to each other only through lawyers.

Kitts said his lawyer has drafted a lawsuit that he hopes will force Amanda Reece to turn over the money she has kept. Meanwhile, Reece accuses Kitts of shaking her down.

Most of the currency, issued in 1927 and 1929, is in good condition, and some of the bills are so rare that one currency appraiser valued the treasure at as much as $500,000, Kitts said.

The fight began in May 2006 when Kitts was gutting Reece's bathroom and found a box below the medicine cabinet that contained $25,200.

"I almost passed out," Kitts recalled. "It was the ultimate contractor fantasy."

He called Reece, who rushed home. Together they found another steel box tied to the end of a wire nailed to a stud. Inside was more than $100,000, Kitts said. Two more boxes were filled with a mix of money and religious memorabilia.

"It was insane," Kitts said. "She was in shock — she was a wreck."

The bundles had "P. Dunne" written on them, probably a reference to Peter Dunne, a businessman who owned the home during the Depression.

Kitts said he took some of the currency for an appraisal and learned that many of the $10 bills were rare 1929-series Cleveland Federal Reserve bank notes, worth about $85 each. There also were $500 bills and one $1,000 bill.

John Chambers, an attorney for Reece, said Kitts rejected his client's offer of a 10 percent finder's fee and demanded 40 percent of the small fortune.

Kitts asserts he found lost money, and court rulings in Ohio establish that a "finders keepers" law applies if there's no reason to believe any owner will reappear to claim it.

I don't know enough about Ohio law to comment on that last sentence.  The prior cases that Kitts referenced may not have presented facts like this one, where the finder was on the property as an agent of the property owner.  Finding cases are all over the place in their results, but this one reminds me of the case involving two workers who found gold on Jann Wenner's property; the judge awarded the gold to Wenner in part because the workers were on the property to act on Wenner's behalf.  These issues are discussed in notes 3 and 4 on p. 106 of the sixth edition of Dukeminier & Krier.

Ben Barros

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Private Road Act Litigation

Pennsylvania has a Private Road Act that allows owners of landlocked parcels to condemn a private road for access to a nearby public road.  The Pennsylvania courts have interpreted the Private Road Act as requiring a degree of necessity that is short of strict necessity but that still imposes a fairly high hurdle for the petitioner.  In re Packard, 926 A.2d 557 (Comm. Ct. 2007) is an interesting example.  Petitioners had access to their property through a run-down private road.  They argued that use of this road was impractical; the court rejected their claim because they had not met their burden to prove necessity.  The case is discussed in this story from the Harrisburg Patriot News, though the story doesn't really capture the role of necessity in the court's analysis.

Ben Barros

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Prescriptive Easement Beach Access Case From My Hometown

From the Boston Globe:

In a case that may send legal ripples across the South Shore, some Hingham homeowners have won the right to use a crescent-shaped sliver of beach, defeating property owners who erected a locked gate and tried to deny them access.

The three-year legal battle ignited a storm of controversy in the quiet Crow Point section of town, pitting neighbor against neighbor in a battle over who could use the rocky beach, which has spectacular views of the harbor and its islands.

The Dec. 12 ruling by Land Court Judge Alexander H. Sands III was in some ways a split decision. He ruled that the plaintiffs had no deeded rights to the beach. However, those who had used the beach for 20 years or more had established a right-of-way and could continue using it.

The ruling meant that seven families obtained an easement to the beach, while three families did not, including one family that had used the beach for 19 1/2 years. The easement continues with their houses when they are sold.

Ben Barros (Hingham High School '87)

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Federal Court Imposes Large Inverse Condemnation Award

The case is Yamagiwa v. City of Half Moon Bay.    Ilya Somin has a post on the case at the VC.  Gideon Kanner also has two posts on the case, here and here.  In case you're wondering why this case was in federal court, it appears that the City removed it from state court.

Ben Barros

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Third Circuit RLUIPA/Eminent Domain Case

A divided Third Circuit panel recently decided Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism v. City of Long Branch, a RLUIPA case with a redevelopment/eminent domain twist.  The New Jersey Eminent Domain Blog has a recap of the case.  An excerpt:

In its precedent setting 96-page opinion, the Third Circuit ruled 2-1 in favor of the City of Long Branch against Reverend Kevin Brown and the Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism in their attempt to establish a church at 162 Broadway within the Broadway Corridor Redevelopment area. However, the court remanded the case to Judge William Walls in the U.S. District Court for further findings on the plaintiff's challenge to the C-1 ordinance, the zoning for the subject property prior to the adoption of the redevelopment ordinance and plan, under RLUIPA's Equal Terms provision. The court was unanimous that the C-1 ordinance violated RLUIPA. This will entitle the plaintiffs to damages, counsel fees, and costs. . . .

The majority opinion, written by senior Judge Jane Roth, affirms the entry of summary judgment by Judge William Walls of the U.S. District Court. The dissent, filed by Judge Kent A. Jordan, disagreed with the majority regarding the redevelopment plan ordinance. Judge Jordan said that both ordinances failed to treat religious and non-religious assemblies on equal terms and, therefore, violate the very purpose for which the RLUIPA statute was enacted.

Judge Jordan noted that both ordinances, as interpreted by Long Branch,  prohibit religious use categorically. Judge Jordan reasoned that, if the majority reading of RLUIPA were correct, local governments could effectively render RLUIPA meaningless. Both the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty and the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division argued as amicus in support of Reverend Brown and the Lighthouse Mission. This decision is at odds with other decisions regarding RLUIPA in other circuit courts and may well end up before the United States Supreme Court.

The location of houses of worship, temples, mosques, and evangelical congregations is an issue that comes up frequently in New Jersey. Protracted battles in Rockaway Township ensued over the site selection by Dr. David Ireland, pastor of the 5000-member Christ Church. That church, a predominantly African American evangelical congregation, sought to move from its Montclair location to the former Agilent site in Rockaway. The relocation of the church was vigorously contested by a group of local residents. In Wayne, an Albanian mosque pursued litigation against the township of Wayne because the planning board delayed the plaintiff’s land use application.

Ben Barros

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PA Supreme Court Overrides Zoning Objections to Casinos

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently ordered Philadelphia to approve the zoning for a casino.  From the Philadelphia Inquirer:

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court went over Philadelphia's head yesterday and cleared the way for construction to begin on the $550 million SugarHouse casino in Fishtown and Northern Liberties.

Finding "deliberate inaction" in City Council's longstanding failure to vote on SugarHouse's zoning and land-use requests, the court took it upon itself to issue the go-ahead. . . .

The city "ultimately has no discretion to preclude gaming," the court's opinion stated. "We conclude that the undisputed documentation establishes the deliberate inaction by Council for the purposes of delay."

The court ordered that SugarHouse's site, approved last December by the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, be granted the requisite zoning as a commercial entertainment district.

It also declared that SugarHouse's development plan, approved in May by the city Planning Commission, be given final approval with no further input from Council. . . .

"This really does not deter us. This actually infuriates us," said Debbie King, vice president of the Northern Liberties Neighbors Association. "We are outraged by the courts and the city government officials that are trying to jam these casinos down our throats. Where are our rights?"

Ben Barros

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Colorado Redevelopment Case

The Colorado Supreme Court recently decided Wheat Ridge Urban Renewal Authority v. Cornerstone Group, an eminent domain case involving the ability of the government to change its mind and back out of a redevelopment condemnation.  Ilya Somin and Tim Sandefur both have comments on the case.

Ben Barros

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Interesting Sign Dispute, With Eminent Domain Twist

From the Saint Louis Post-Dispatch:

Supporters say it's a political statement, maybe even art. The city says it's too big, a nuisance that needs to be removed.

Either way, a two-story mural decrying eminent domain is testing the boundaries of the First Amendment, sparking a federal lawsuit that challenges the city's intricate zoning code.

At issue is a tricky constitutional dilemma — fighting clutter versus protecting free speech — that experts say could force St. Louis to rewrite its laws regarding outdoor signs. . . .

Painted on the side of a brick apartment building near Soulard, the mural faces drivers heading downtown on Gravois Avenue. It advocates an end to "eminent domain abuse," the mantra of veteran activist Jim Roos.

Roos is among the state's leaders in the fight against eminent domain, an issue that has gained visibility since a 2005 Supreme Court ruling that cities can use eminent domain to promote economic development. He has testified in Jefferson City and clashed with city officials who support eminent domain. . . .

In April, the building division cited Roos for having an illegal sign. At about 360 square feet, the eminent domain mural is more than 10 times larger than the size allowed for signs in that section of the city.

Three surrounding neighborhood associations have submitted letters opposing the sign, as did the local alderman, Phyllis Young.

"He should rent a billboard," Young said.

Roos fought the citation, claiming the city was targeting him not because of the size of his sign, but because of its message.

"I think if it said, 'Go Cardinals,' we wouldn't have any problems," Roos said.

The city routinely approves exemptions for large signs. On the same day a city panel rejected Roos' claim, it granted an appeal by Laclede Gas to display a sign of over 1,000 square feet on the utility's downtown headquarters.

Even so, content is not the issue, city officials say — it's keeping the city tidy.

"Can you imagine what our city would look like if everyone were allowed to paint a 363-square-foot, two-story sign on their buildings?" asked City Attorney Patti Hageman.

Roos has taken his case to federal court, where he has drawn the aid of the Institute for Justice, a libertarian advocacy group in Arlington, Va.

Ben Barros

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New Jersey v. Delaware

I'm not sure how I missed it up until now, but a fascinating property case was argued this week in the Supreme Court.  The case involves a dispute related to the border between New Jersey and Delaware.  New Jersey wants to allow a large natural gas storage plant on its side of the Delaware river.  To make the plant workable, it needs to put in a 2,000 foot pier, which presents a problem. From the NY Times story on the argument:

Under a 1934 Supreme Court decision that settled a long-disputed boundary, Delaware owns the entire riverbed, from its own shoreline up to the low-water mark on the New Jersey side. But that fact, which neither side in the current case disputes, is not the end of the case, but only the beginning, as the argument on Tuesday made clear.

A major complicating factor is that in 1905, before the boundary was settled, the two states entered into a compact that is still in effect. It provides that “each state may, on its own side of the river, continue to exercise riparian jurisdiction of every kind and nature” under its own laws.

The word riparian refers to shoreline, and under traditional land-use law, ownership of shoreline property conveys the right to build a pier or wharf extending far enough into the water to make the property accessible.

To New Jersey, permitting the BP project is simply an exercise of “traditional riparian authority” recognized under the compact, its lawyer, H. Bartow Farr III, told the justices.

But “the question that’s really at the rub of this case,” Delaware’s lawyer, David C. Frederick, said when his turn came, “is what you do on the wharf.”

The “crucial distinction here,” he said, was that Delaware was entitled to exercise its police power to block an activity that it considers dangerous or a “nuisance.”

The justices’ many questions during the animated session indicated that they found neither argument completely persuasive.

“Obviously, the right to ‘wharf out’ does not include the right to use the wharf for whatever you like,” Justice Antonin Scalia said to Mr. Farr.

And Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. objected to Mr. Frederick that if Delaware was entitled to a veto power over the uses of New Jersey-based piers and wharves, then the effort in the 1905 compact to preserve New Jersey’s riparian rights was “worthless” and “meaningless.” Could Delaware declare that docking a sailboat was a “nuisance”? he asked.

As an added bonus, Justice Breyer has recused himself from this original jurisdiction case, raising the possibility of a 4-4 tie.  What happens with a tie vote in an original jurisdiction case?  Who knows.

Ben Barros

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Post-Lingle Substantive Due Process Case

Over at Law of the Land, Patty Salkin has a post on a recent Ninth Circuit decision in Crown Point Development, Inc. v. City of Sun Valley.  The Circuit had previously barred land-use substantive due process claims, under the reasoning that if a land use regulation did not substantially advance a legitimate interest, it was a taking.  So under the prior Ninth Circuit law, a substantive due process claim would be replaced by a takings claim.  This reasoning was always suspect, but is clearly wrong after Lingle.  So in Crown Point, the Ninth Circuit has correctly recognized that a landowner can maintain a substantive due process challenge to a land-use regulation.

Ben Barros

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Claims of Pretextual Takings Post-Kelo

The D.C. Court of appeals recently held that a property owner can challenge a taking based on a blight designation as pretextual.  I've had some e-mail discussion with some folks about the case (Franco v. National Capital Revitalization Corp, 930 A.2d 160 (D.C. 2007)) and whether this type of challenge is the kind of claim of pretext that the Kelo majority expressly contemplated or whether it is an end-run around Kelo.  I'm waffling, and need to think about it more, but wanted to note the decision.  Another interesting issue, which I also need to think about more, is whether this creates a split with the Second Circuit's recent Didden decision.

UPDATE:  Ilya Somin at the VC has a very thoughtful post on this case.  Ilya is more up on this issue than anyone I know.  Check it out.

Ben Barros

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Interesting Eminent Domain Compensation Case

The Columbus Post-Dispatch has a report on an interesting eminent domain damages case.  An excerpt:

Canal Winchester wants the land to link a bike path between Rager Road and the village swimming pool. It used eminent domain to take a strip of Stebelton's 80-acre property and hired an appraiser who determined that the $9,249 would be enough compensation.

"It wasn't fair at all," Stebelton, 75, remembers thinking.

Stebelton was the only one of eight property owners who didn't agree to sell his land to the village for the path. Instead, he went to court to challenge the village's valuation.

The jury decided Sept. 20 that the land the village wants, along the northern edge of his property, is worth $37,000. But the jury also decided that by taking it, the village was closing off a back entrance to the property and damaging the value of the rest of Stebelton's land by $558,625.

Ben Barros

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Defeasible Estates in the News!

A school renovation project was put in jeopardy when 100-year old deeds surfaced showing that part of the relevant property had been granted for school playground purposes only, otherwise to revert to grantor's family.  The best quote, from the counsel for the title insurance company that didn't find the deeds and ended up on the hook:  "I would have to say, in my 30 years in this business, this is the first time I've seen a right of reverter anywhere but in a law school exam."

Ben Barros

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Changes in Tree Law

Thanks to Carl Christensen for this story from the Washington Post about the Virginia Supreme Court's decision to change its law regarding neighbors and trees.

In the suburbs, there are few issues that can cause as much rancor and neighborhood discord as a deep-rooted, mature tree that has no regard for the neat boundaries of a property line.

Who pays if your neighbor's tree damages your house?  Yesterday, the Virginia Supreme Court weighed in on the contentious issue with a decision that overturns a nearly 70-year-old precedent. Now, for the first time, homeowners can sue to force a neighbor to cut back branches or roots or take out the tree altogether if it poses a risk of "actual harm" or an "imminent danger" to their houses, the court ruled. Tree owners can now be held liable for any damage caused by the tree. ...

In the past, most states used the "Massachusetts rule," which held that if a tree grew on your property but the branches hung into your neighbor's yard, that neighbor could cut them back as far as the property line. If the roots cracked the neighbor's patio or if the branches ripped their siding, it was their problem. And if the neighbors' pruning killed your tree, you could sue them for damages.

Maryland and the District still follow the Massachusetts rule, according to officials there. ...

[Virginia's new] rule, modeled after a 1981 case in Hawaii, says that a neighbor can't sue a tree owner for the little annoying things -- "casting shade or dropping leaves, flowers, or fruit." But it's a different story if the tree becomes a nuisance. The owner of a nuisance tree "may be held responsible for harm caused to [adjoining property], and may also be required to cut back the encroaching branches or roots, assuming the encroaching vegetation constitutes a nuisance," the court said.

Sounds like a fabulous topic for a student note!

Alfred L. Brophy
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New Jersey Post-Kelo Eminent Domain Case

Last week, a New Jersey intermediate appellate court issued an opinion in Vineland Const. Co., Inc. v. Township of Pennsauken upholding a Kelo-style taking for private development.  The town had selected a private entity to redevelop an area of waterfront that included plaintiff's land.  Plaintiff wanted the option of redeveloping the property on its own.  The taking was upheld under Kelo and New Jersey equivalents.

Ben Barros

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More on Wilkie v. Robbins

On the subject of Nestor's post immediately below, Jonathan Adler at the VC notes that the most pro-property rights opinion in Wilkie was Justice Ginsburg's dissent.  Also at the VC, Ilya Somin has a skeptical analysis of the Court's reasoning.

Ben Barros

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Retaliation and the Takings Clause

The Supreme Court yesterday decided Wilkie v. Robbins, a case that involved assertions that officials of the Bureau of Land Management had harassed and intimidated the owner of a Wyoming guest ranch in order to extract an easement that had been lost by the BLM's failure to record prior to a transfer of ownership.  In an opinion by Justice Souter for a 7-2 majority, the Court held that the landowner had neither a private right of action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents nor a claim under RICO.

One interesting aspect of the case is the contrast between Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg in a partial dissent (joined by Justice Stevens) in their evaluation of the owner's argument that the BLM had retaliated against him for "standing on his right as a property owner to keep the Government out" of his property (because the government was, he asserted, trying to force him to grant an easement without compensation).  Justice Souter rejects the argument in part with the proposition that, unlike other instances of retaliation the Court had recognized, "trying to induce someone to grant an easement for public use is a perfectly legitimate purpose."  To the majority the acts of the officials in this instance amount to "hard bargaining."  In the course of discussing qualified immunity, Justice Ginsburg asserts, by contrast, that the Takings Clause "surely" contemplates "the right to refuse to submit to a taking where no compensation is in the offing."  Justice Ginsburg offers a cf. to Dolan and Nollan, raising an intriguing link to exactions. 

Rejecting a Bivens claim does not say much about other avenues of relief (and the Court makes clear that the owner had recourse to a variety of administrative and judicial remedies), but the Court does in fairly broad terms question the concept of relief for retaliation based on the assertion of rights under the Takings Clause.

Nestor Davidson

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Property, Indigeneity and Immigration

Thanks to Ben and Al for inviting me to guest-blog here. As Ben mentioned, I am an assistant professor of law at Southern Methodist University (SMU) in Dallas, Texas. I just finished my first year of teaching property and immigration law. My research interests include, among other things, indigenous peoples' property rights and the intersection between property and immigration. I look forward to blogging about property laws in exotic places such as American Samoa and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. In these two U.S. territories, for example, only indigenous peoples who have the requisite amount of blood quantum may own property or lease land for more than 55 years. I examine the complex questions of indigeneity, culture, property rights and constitutional issues that these land alienation restriction laws raise in a forthcoming piece entitled, "Exploring the Meaning of Blood Quantum Laws." (I will post the paper on SSRN soon.)

I will also be blogging about not-so-exotic places like Farmers Branch, Texas and Hazleton, Pennsylvania, which have been entangled in lawsuits because of their recently enacted ordinances available here and here that prohibit undocumented immigrants from renting property.

Thanks again for the invitation.

Rose Cuison Villazor
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Another Fun Adverse Possession Case

Bruce Ziff (U. Alberta) pointed me to this story about a great adverse possession case in London:

A homeless pensioner who has slept rough in one of London's plushest beauty spots since 1986 was celebrating Thursday after winning ownership of his plot of land, turning him into an instant millionaire.

Harry Hallowes, 71, secured ownership to a 800 square-metre plot in Hampstead Heath, after a two-year legal battle with developers who tried to evict the pensioner from the grounds of a former nursing home.

A building developer had tried unsuccessfully to evict Hallowes from his makeshift shack since March 2005 as it sought to transform the building into luxury flats.

The feisty pensioner dug his heels in and consulted lawyers who provided evidence which showed that he had been living unchallenged on the plot for 21 years, and thus could claim the land as his own.

The area around Hampstead Heath is well known as an expensive place to live, even by London's inflated property prices, and is home to many stars, celebrities and liberal professionals.

"Someone mentioned a million and someone else said two million, but I'm not impressed with figures. I just wanted a place to live," a very composed Hallowes said after hearing the news.

Ben Barros

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Fun Fact Pattern

Boston.com has an article on an interesting dispute involving adverse possession, unbuildable lots, and more:

HOLBROOK -- In 1908, a downtown Brockton store owner offered his customers a deal: buy a men's suit and he would throw in a tiny plot of land out in the country.

Daniel W. Baker of Besse, Baker, and Co. clothiers had purchased 40 acres of open land known as Edgewood Park in then-rural Holbrook. He divided the property into lots of about 85-by-20 feet or smaller and gave away hundreds. He kept the ones left over when the promotion ended.

This unorthodox marketing ploy has today left a tangle of claims and conflict that could take another century to unravel.

Many of the approximately 500 unbuildable lots are orphans; the town does not know who owns them, and isn't collecting some $750,000 in taxes owed on the parcels.

Moreover, a local sewer contractor who does own a few of the lots is claiming squatter's rights to the entire 40-acre parcel, setting off a confrontation with Daniel Baker's surviving heirs, and some nearby residents who say he's barred them from woods that had been accessible for decades.

"As far as I'm concerned, I own it," said Wayne D. Crosby, who has operated Tri-Town sewerage and other business operations on a portion of the property since 1976.

But Baker's surviving heirs, brothers Peter and John Blatchford, own about 136 lots, according to town records, which they would like to donate to the town. But they have been deadlocked with local officials over a $130,000 bill for back taxes.

In the meantime, the Blatchfords and Crosby have locked horns over access to the property. Crosby has installed a locked gate across one entrance to the property, fences on part of the perimeter, and posted no trespassing signs on some of the disputed land. He has also threatened to call police if anyone comes onto the property, and more pointedly barred Peter Blatchford after he tried to go on the land.

"There's a squatter on the land, and he's locked everyone out," said Peter Blatchford. "I don't want to pay taxes on land I have no access to."

The intensity of the battle has some Holbrook officials leery.

"It almost reminds me of the Hatfields and the McCoys," said Selectman Richard McGaughey.

There's a lot at stake. Land values in this small community have shot up as home buyers have reached deeper into the suburbs to find available and more affordable housing stock. A typical house lot in town might sell for around $250,000, said Kimberly Allard-Moccia , former president of the Plymouth and South Shore Association of Realtors. So 40 acres of mostly undeveloped land is probably worth millions to whomever ends up controlling it.

Squatter's rights, or in legal terms "adverse possession," stem from English common law and allow an individual under certain circumstances to obtain ownership of property without a title after occupying it for a specified number of years. In Massachusetts, the requirement to claim squatter's rights is 20 years.

Ben Barros

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Zoltek Amicus Brief

Adam Mossoff (Michigan State) has posted the amicus brief that he drafted in support of cert. in  Zoltek Corp v. U.S.  The brief was joined by 27 law profs in addition to Adam, including yours truly.  The list of professors is a great illustration of the oddities of alphabetical order -- I'm up near the top of the list, and such luminaries as Henry Smith and Eugene Volokh are towards the bottom.

Ben Barros

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Ninth Circuit Escheat/Procedural Due Process Case

Eugene Volokh at the VC has an interesting, and delightfully titled, post on Taylor v. Westly, a Ninth Circuit case on California's escheat statute.

Ben Barros

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Wilkie v. Robbins

Over at the VC, Jonathan Adler has an interesting post on Wilkie v. Robbins, a potentially important property case that was argued before the Supreme Court yesterday.  An excerpt:

The facts of the case are straightforward: The federal Bureau of Land Management acquired an easement on a ranch, but neglected to record it. Robbins subsequently purchased the ranch and, due to the BLM's mistake, acquired the property sans easement. BLM officials demanded that he sign it over anyway, and when Robbins refused the government officials sought to give him a "hardball education" and retaliated by, among other things, harassing Robbins and his guests, filing trumped up charges against him. After this conduct continued for some time, Robbins had enough and sued the BLM agents involved for damages, and won.

The issue is whether the Fifth Amendment protects property owners against this type of retaliation.  The case has some takings aspects and some substantive due process aspects.  It will be interesting to see what the Court does with it.

UPDATE:  ScotusBlog also has a detailed post on the case.

UPDATE2:  Ilya Somin has some additional comments at the VC.

Ben Barros

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Hershey Trust

We talk a lot here at propertyprof about new cases to add to the property curriculum, like what case ought to be first, a Hawaii substitute for Pierson v. Post, how to teach environmental justice, and RLUIPA. 

I'm teaching an advanced wills and trusts class for the first time this semester and am more excited about it than any class I've taught in years--in part because it has a seminar-like enrollment and I'm able to have a conversation with the students in a way that is difficult in lecture classes.  I'm also excited, though, because we're doing a bunch of fun stuff.  Much is on charitable trusts, though I'm also incorporating a practical component.  Working with a couple of colleagues in our clinic, the students work on quieting title to land that was inherited years ago (and now has a bunch of co-tenants), as well as a bunch of related issues.  Suffice it to say, I'm really enjoying the experience.

A few weeks ago we talked about the Hershey Trust case.  I thought that would be a great way to begin, because it deals with a company near and dear to the heart of this Pennsylvania boy.  And also because it's such an unusual case.  Perhaps this post would go better over at Gerry W. Beyer's shop, but I'm so excited by the case and our discussion that I thought I'd talk a little about it here.

The case arose back in the fall of 2002 when the Hershey Trust Company--perhaps at the instigation of Pennsylvania Attorney General--decided that it ought to diversify and, thus, moved to sell its controlling interest in the Hershey Chocolate Company.  That, then, led to a request for a preliminary injunction by the Pennsylvania Attorney General, under its parens patria power.  Not surprisingly, the trial court granted a preliminary injunction (the harm of sale was enormous), which was affirmed by the Commonwealth Court (over a vigorous and thoughtful dissent).  (The trial court's opinion is reprinted in an appendix to the Commonwealth Court's opinion available here.)  What particularly interests me about this case was the assertion of some kind of public right in the trust.  And while I certainly understand that the A.G. has the authority to look out for the trust beneficiaries, I was somewhat surprised to see the assertion of the public's right in the Hershey Company.

Seems to me that this is a great example of Joseph Singer's Reliance Interest in Property in action--and that the case has a lot of possibilities for future assertion of public rights.  Or maybe not, given how even the trial court judge recognized how unusual it is to have a charitable trust, established by the person for whom the town is named, which owns the major business in the town.  And even more unusual to then have the trust contemplating selling its business, when there is no apparent need for the money.  Here's a thoughtful and balanced and brief analysis of the case.  There have been three law review pieces devoted to the case--one by Mark Sidel in the Pitt Law Review (available through hein online here),one  by Evelyn Brody in the Indiana Law Journal (available here) and one by Jennifer L. Komorowski in the William and Mary Law Review (available through hein online here).

Anyway, it may be hard to work that case into the first year property class; it's unusual to do that much with trusts in the first year class; I hope that casebook authors will at least think about noting it.  It's an important example of progressive property jurisprudence, I think.

The image of Milton Hershey is from the Hershey Company website.

Alfred L. Brophy
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Class Certified, Summary Judgment to Plaintiffs in Option ARM Case

I've posted before about the potential for sales-practices litigation arising out of the sale of Option-ARMs and other specialized mortgages.  Yesterday, a federal judge issued an order in Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank certifying a class and granting plaintiffs summary judgment on their Truth in Lending Act disclosure claims.  The judge's order is here; the disclosure statement is here.  The judge also ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to rescission.  I wouldn't be surprised to see an appeal, but the District Court's opinion seems to be well reasoned.  If duplicated in other cases, the District Court's general approach to the Truth in Lending Act -- the TLA is a remedial statute, and disclosures have to be crystal clear to protect lenders -- could spell trouble for a lot of lenders.  As I observed in my first post on the subject (follow the link above), mediocre disclosure is not going to offer much protection in the consumer context.

I've posted plaintiffs' counsel's press release after the jump.

Ben Barros

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A Federal Judge has certified a class action and ruled on summary judgment that the Chevy Chase Bank, FSB violated the Truth in Lending Act in connection with its “option” ARM loans.  The Judge has ruled that several thousand class members will be able to rescind their loans, a remedy whereby the bank will be ordered to return all of the wrongfully collected interest and closing costs it has received on the loans, and will be ordered to pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys fees.  The case has been pending for nearly two years. 

The loans at issue in the case are “option” mortgages, whereby the borrowers’ minimum payments were fixed during the first five years, but the actual interest rates being charged on the loans adjusted every month, beginning in the 2nd month of the loan program. 

In issuing Summary Judgment of liability in favor of the Plaintiff Class Members, the Judge ruled that Chevy Chase failed to properly disclose the payment schedule on the loans, failed to properly disclose the cost of the loans as an annual percentage rate, and failed to disclose the variable rate feature in the first 5 years of the loans.  The Judge further ruled that the bank inserted in their disclosures misleading  “teaser” rates that were only available for one month, and language directly above suggesting the loans were “5 year fixed.”

The Court has requested that the parties submit a suitable proposed notice to all class members.

Kevin Demet and Donal Demet of the law firm of Demet & Demet SC, Milwaukee, are representing the class members; they can be reached by telephone at (414) 291-0800 or by email at KDemet@Demetlaw.com or DDemet@Demetlaw.com.

NY Court of Appeals Ruling on Property in Organs

The New York Court of Appeals has issued its ruling in Colavito v. New York Organ Donor Network, Inc.  I described the case in a previous post:

Widow of deceased donor gave both of his kidneys to his friend who was suffering from end-stage renal disease.  One kidney was sent to Florida for implantation into donee, but doctors determined that the kidney was damaged.  The doctors then requested the second kidney, but were informed that it had already been implanted into another patient.  The intended donee sued on a number of theories.  The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants.  The Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment on plaintiff's fraud count but certified questions regarding the donee's ability to maintain a private action against the defendants to the New York Court of Appeals.  Judge Jacobs dissented from the certification, asserting that under the facts presented, the intended donee was only entitled to one kidney.

In its opinion, the NY Court of Appeals answered the certified question by holding that plaintiff did not have any claim to the other kidney.  Slate (here) and the NY Sun (here) both have articles about the case.

Ben Barros

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Meaning of "Lawn Jockey"

Back on September 21, Al Brophy posted a note on the history of lawn jockeys in which he noted differences of opinion as to their possible status as a remnant of white supremacist attitudes.  Evidence favoring the less benign conclusion can be found in a recent post on Slate by Seth Rosenthal, in which he argues that some federal judges are improperly granting summary judgment in cases where, in Rosenthal's view, a reasonable jury could have found for the non-moving party.  One example he cites is an Eighth Circuit case in which "the majority concluded that a black Wal-Mart employee whose supervisor routinely used racially offensive language, including repeatedly calling him a 'lawn jockey,' didn't present enough evidence to get his claims of racial discrimination to a jury."  Notwithstanding the court's decision, it is probably safe to conclude that the supervisor whose conduct was at issue did not view lawn jockeys as memorials to the Underground Railroad.  The case is Canady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 440 F.3d 1031, 1033 (8th Cir.), rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, 452 F.3d 1020, 1021 (8th Cir. 2006).

Carl Christensen
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