Saturday, August 26, 2006

Milestone: 33,333 vistors



We have just passed a milestone here at Properyprof--33,333 visitors.  Thanks for stopping by and contributing to the discussion of property law.  I hope you'll continue to stop by--and send your students here, too--and especially that you'll participate in the comments.  We're talking about all sorts of cool stuff: recent scholarship, recent cases (and some old ones, too), teaching methods, takings, note topics....  And I'm sure that Ben, Rachel, Calvin, and Carl are going to be saying a lot more worth reading.

Credits: The picture of a Roman milestone from St Margarethen Austria is courtesy of our friends at wikipedia.  The idea for this post came from Dave Hoffman, over at co-op.

Alfred L. Brophy

August 26, 2006 in About This Blog | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, August 25, 2006

Art and Property

Today's New York Times carries a review of a new exhibit of Walker Evans photographs, Walker Evans. Or is It?, that raises some interesting questions about the nature of intellectual property.  (The reviewer's focus is on the questions raised about the nature of photography; I merely extend the inquiry a bit here.)  Some of Walker's prints from the 1930s that are in the public domain were digitally scanned and printed in an enlarged format, now on display until November 17 at the UBS Art Gallery on Sixth Ave. in New York.  The result, as the reviewer tells us, are images that are "seductive and luxurious -- velvety, full of rich detail, poster-size in a few cases and generally cinematic." Because they are unlike the smaller-format silver gelatin prints that Evans made "the pictures are read differently, more piecemeal, in a way that film in a theater is viewed differently from an image on television or on a computer screen."  From an artistic standpoint, the reviewer wonders whether photography is closer to music and theater, where each performance is an interpretation of an original score or text, or painting, where there is but one object, and copies are fraudulent.  From a property perspective, what is the property that inheres in a photographic image?  The economic rights are fairly obvious.  I'm more interested in what the civil law terms the moral rights of artists. Of course, the artist can control this by retaining the copyright, and because these Evans prints are in the public domain there is no issue of whether Evans's economic property rights have been violated.  That raises the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, which brings into federal law a portion of the civil law notion of moral rights of artists, and provides at 17 U.S. C. 106A (a)(3)(A) that a visual artist has the right "to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation . . . ."  From viewing the photos on display in today's Times, in my humble view, the digitial prints surely don't violate this statute.  But what of the larger, more philosophical, point?  What does a photographer own?  Is a photographic image more like a painting or a musical score? 

Calvin Massey

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August 25, 2006 in Intellectual Property | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Zoning, Lawns and Salt Lake City

From an article in today's NY Times:

Covered as it is by red bark and dotted with ornamental grasses and purple sage shrubs, the front yard of Salt Lake City’s mayor stands out in contrast against the other, uniformly green lawns on the tree-lined street.

Not only is Mayor Rocky Anderson’s yard distinctive, though. It is also illegal, one of hundreds of drought-friendly yards and gardens here that are in violation of zoning ordinances.

In light of a five-year drought that meteorologists say ended last year, Mr. Anderson is one of a growing number of homeowners in desert cities across the West who have traded in their manicured lawns and colorful flower beds for ground cover and gardens that require little water.

In Salt Lake City, though, all front yards must be completely covered with flat green grass, which needs to be watered often to keep it from turning brown and strawlike. Although the zoning ordinance is rarely enforced, some Salt Lake City leaders — including the mayor — want to bring the letter of law in line with current landscaping trends.

“I think the zoning ordinance is ridiculous,’’ Mr. Anderson said. “It clearly needs to be changed.”

The mayor is working with environmentalists to come up with an amendment to the ordinance. The final language has not been settled on, but so far, the mayor and other city officials said, it would require vegetation on only one third of a front lawn, and that third could be covered with any plant including drought-resistant ones. The rest of the lawn could be covered with mulch or gravel. . . .

In some Southwest cities, low-water landscapes, known as xeriscapes, have become the norm, and zoning ordinances have been changed accordingly. . . . Within the next 10 years, xeriscapes will be standard in Salt Lake City, too, Mr. Anderson said, if only because they are so much more affordable. He said that after he planted his, his water bill dropped 65 percent.

Ben Barros

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August 25, 2006 in Land Use | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, August 24, 2006

Questions on Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Hohfeld's Fundamental Legal Conceptions

I taught the first class of my property theory seminar today.  The material for the first class focuses on different ways to conceptualize property, and includes short readings on Hohfeld's fundamental conceptions and Calabresi & Melamed's property, liability, and inalienability rules.  Trying to draw the two together, I asked the students to think about how to express property, liability, and inalienability rules in Hohfeldian terms.  In A Theory of Property, Stephen Munzer has this to say on the subject (p.27, n.14):

Statements in Calabresi and Melamed's terminology can be paraphrased in Hohfeld's language.  If A's entitlement is protected by a property rule, then others have a disability (a no-power) in regard to obtaining the entitlement except at a price agreed to by A.  If A's entitlement is protected by a liability rule, then others have a disability in regard to obtaining or reducing the value of the entitlement unless they discharge a duty to compensate A ex post by a collectively determined amount.  If A's entitlement is protected by a rule of inalienability, A has a disability in regard to transferring the entitlement to others.

Munzer's approach seems accurate to me.  But are there other ways of doing it?  Take the basic facts of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement, with a polluting cement factory and complaining neighbors.  If the neighbors' entitlement not to be polluted-upon is protected by a property rule, could you say that the neighbors have a privilege not to be polluted-upon, and that the cement factory has a correlative no-right to pollute?  Similarly, with a liability rule, could you say that the cement factory has the power to alter the neighbors' position and the neighbors have a corresponding liability?  It seems that if the same relationships can be characterized in different ways, the usefulness of Hohfeld's approach is reduced -- the whole point is to have precision in the description of legal relationships.  So am I missing something in my understanding of Hohfeld's system when I characterize property rules and liability rules in this way?

Ben Barros

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August 24, 2006 in Property Theory | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Another Body Parts Scandal

From an AP article:

A leading medical firm has quietly recalled hundreds of human tissue products destined for transplants around the nation that were supplied by a North Carolina body parts broker believed to have a tainted history.

The broker used an unsterile embalming room to carve up dozens of corpses to procure tissue, a Raleigh funeral home director said Tuesday. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration shut down the body broker on Friday, but refuses to say how many people may have received potentially risky tissue.

It is the second scandal in less than a year in the booming tissue transplant industry. Cadaver tissue is used in more than a million transplants each year in such routine operations as back surgery and knee repairs. While such donated tissue does tremendous good, it is also little regulated, a three-month Associated Press investigation found earlier this year.

On the same subject, this article has details on the growing trade in human tissue.

Ben Barros

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August 24, 2006 in Property Theory | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Two from the VC

There are two interesting property-related posts up at the VC.  First, David Bernstein notes a Wall Street Journal article suggesting that the housing market might be headed for a hard landing.  Second, Ilya Somin discusses the use of eminent domain to take religious property.

Ben Barros

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August 24, 2006 in Real Estate Transactions, Takings | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, August 23, 2006

Two New Articles On Takings

Mark Fenster and Eric Claeys have both posted new articles on takings on SSRN.  Both are very perceptive commentators on takings issues.  Fenster gets an extra shout-out as a founding member of the "Association For The Preservation Of Takings As a Property Issue" -- the Association's motto is "Con-Law Profs Keep Your Grubby Hands Off".  Maybe I'll make up some membership cards and hand them out at AALS.  Anyway, Here's the info:

Mark Fenster (University of Florida - Fredric G. Levin College of Law), Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional Contexts of Exactions:

In a refreshingly clear and comprehensive decision issued towards the end of its 2004 Term, the Supreme Court explained in Lingle v. Chevron (2005) that the Takings Clause requires compensation only for the effects of a regulation on an individual's property rights. Under the substantive due process doctrine, by contrast, courts engage in a deferential inquiry into both a regulation's validity and the means by which the regulation attempts to meet the government's objective. Lingle's explanation appeared to cast doubt on the doctrinal foundation and reach of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994), two regulatory takings decisions that reviewed “exactions,” regulatory conditions placed on proposals to develop land. These decisions required courts to apply the heightened scrutiny of their “nexus” and “proportionality” tests to review not only the challenged condition's effects but also its validity and means. In a somewhat oblique final section of Lingle that could be dismissed as non-binding dicta, the Court characterized its exactions jurisprudence as a limited effort to protect owners from extortionate exactions that single out individual property owners and confiscate their land and right to exclude the public. Lingle explained that the Court's rigorous tests for exactions, and their focus on regulatory means, apply only when an exaction's effects constitute a clear taking of property.

Lingle's description of its exactions decisions left important matters open for debate - matters that this Article attempts to resolve. Lingle's narrow characterization of its exactions decisions is not dicta because Lingle aimed to provide a comprehensive, unifying explication of the entirety of the Court's takings jurisprudence; and even if dicta, Lingle repeats similar statements in recent decisions about the limited nature of Nollan and Dolan and therefore makes plain what the Court assumes it has already settled. Furthermore, when read as Lingle requires, Nollan and Dolan fit within the broader approach to the Takings Clause that the Court articulated in Lingle and its other Takings Clause decisions from the same term, San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco (2005) and Kelo v. City of New London (2005). A narrow understanding of Nollan and Dolan is thoroughly consistent with the Court's effort to establish an institutionalist approach to the Takings Clause that defers to the properly derived decisions of competent, settled institutions. Nollan and Dolan can be read narrowly because judicial enforcement of the federal constitution is merely one institutional check among a web of public and private institutions that constrain local regulatory discretion. The powerful constitutional protection that “nexus” and “proportionality” provide may be limited, but in their shadow public actors in state courts and legislatures and in local governments, as well as voters, property owners, developers, and homebuyers offer a more complex, responsive, and locally sensitive web of legal, political, and market controls than the broad, formal rules established in Nollan and Dolan.

Eric Claeys (Saint Louis University - School of Law), That '70s Show: Post-Kelo Eminent Domain Reform and the Administrative Law Revolution:

This Essay contributes to a conference on Kelo v. City of New London sponsored by the Santa Clara University School of Law in February 2006. The Kelo decision has prompted many state legislatures to reconsider the organic statutes that enable local governments to use eminent domain to transfer land between private parties. This Essay suggests that these legislatures update these enabling statutes to the 1970s. Most state eminent-domain enabling statutes give localites extremely broad powers to decide when to condemn and transfer land. Courts typically read these statutes to trigger extremely deferential judicial review. During the 1960s and 1970s, in both state and federal case law, courts developed hybrid doctrines of administrative law to increase the scrutiny they apply to agency decisions in many areas of law, including spot zoning. These principles, however, have not really been applied to eminent domain, and particularly not to blight and economic-redevelopment actions.

The backlash against Kelo provides an opportune time to bring the '70s' administrative law revolution to eminent domain. Many of the complaints about local eminent-domain policy echo the public-choice concerns that fueled the '70s administrative-law revolution. If state legislatures update eminent-domain statutes to incorporate these principles of means-end scrutiny, they will probably make modest improvements in eminent-domain practice, by making decision making more rational and transparent, and less likely to be influenced unduly by special interests. These improvements are also politically realistic. The administrative-law doctrines in question do not categorically rule out any types of private land transfers. Moreover, because policy and legal elites are familiar with and largely accept the hybrid administrative-law doctrines in question, those doctrines should not threaten any of the major constituencies with an interest in eminent domain.

Ben Barros

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August 23, 2006 in Recent Scholarship, Takings | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Five Minute Property Class

Iupuiclassroom Last fall, Michael Dorf of Columbia Law School wrote an article on FindLaw, aimed at incoming students, entitled “The Five Minute Law School.”  In it he attempted to summarize in a very brief compass what students would study in the first year.  Dorf took his inspiration for the article from two rather divergent sources: the pre-law school summer courses that I guess are being sold to lots of students these days and Father Guido Sarducci’s Five Minute University.  The former I know less about than I ought to; the latter I was completely ignorant of.  But now I see that it (like virtually everything else) is available on the web.  Here are some great excerpts:

I find that education, it don't matter where you go to school, Italy, America, Brazil, all are the same -- it's all this memorization and it don't matter how long you can remember anything just so you can parrot it back for the tests.

I got this idea for a school I would like to start, something called the Five Minute University. The idea is that in five minutes you learn what the average college graduate remembers five years after he or she is out of school. . . .

You know, like in college you have to take a foreign language. Well, at the Five Minute University you can have your choice, any language you want you can take it. Say if you want to take Spanish, what I teach you is "¿Como está usted?" that means, "how are you", and the answer is "muy bien," means "very well." And believe me, if you took two years of college Spanish, five years after you are out of school "¿Como está usted?" and "muy bien" about all you're gonna remember. . . .

Theology, I'm gonna have a theology department, you know, since I'm a priest, and what you have to learn in theology is the answer to the question, "Where is God?", and the answer is, "God is everywhere." Why? "Because he likes you." That's kind of a combination of the Disney and Roman Catholic philosophy. It's just perfect for the late 70s or early 80s you know, just perfect.. . .

Great skit.  I love it--it's worth reading in its (blessedly short) entirety.  And you know what, it’s from the days when Saturday Night Live skits were the right length.  Now that was entertainment. 

(Much like SNL, I think my teaching’s gone downhill in recent years).

Professor Dorf did a very nice job for a couple of subjects, like torts and contracts.  Of torts he had this to say:

The law of torts can be reduced to three principles. First, as used in the first-year law-school curriculum, a "tort" is not a pastry. If someone had pointed this important principle out to me before I started law school, I might not have gained those ten pounds in the first couple of weeks. "Tort" literally means "injury" or "wrong," and, as a technical matter, means the breach of a legal duty imposed by law (rather than voluntarily undertaken by contract). That's about a third of the course.

Second, in order for a plaintiff to win her torts case, she must prove not only that the defendant committed a legal wrong against her, but also that the wrong caused an injury to the plaintiff. As anybody who has ever read any science fiction knows, in some sense, almost every past event caused every subsequent event. If you go back in time millions of years and kill a butterfly, you unleash a chain of events culminating in your own disappearance in a puff of logic.

But the law does not traffic in such absurdities, so you can't sue for every past legal wrong that anybody committed. For example, suppose Joe is driving down a divided highway when his attention is drawn to the wreckage of an accident that occurred when Dave, who was driving drunk in the other direction, plowed his car into the guard rail. As a result, Joe takes his eyes off the road for a second, and when he looks back, it is too late for him to avoid rear-ending a car driven by Paul, who has also slowed his car to rubber-neck. Can Paul successfully sue Dave? (Most characters in law school examples have names beginning with the same letter as the name of the parties they become. Thus, "P" is for Paul and plaintiff, while "D" is for Dave and defendant. Amazingly, this phenomenon holds true in real life as well. Con!)

No, Paul cannot bring a successful claim against Dave. To be sure, absent Dave's wrongful drunk driving, Paul would have escaped injury, but the courts will say that the causal chain was too attenuated to hold Dave responsible. In torts jargon, we say that Dave's drunk driving was not the "proximate cause" of Paul's injury.

How close a relationship must there be between cause and effect for the former to count as the proximate cause of the latter? The law does not attempt to quantify the answer; it's a matter of judgment and common sense. That drives law students nuts. But if you remember that "proximate cause" is simply a fancy way of saying "use your common sense," you'll spend less time trying to reconcile all the nonsense written about proximate cause, which will leave you more time to sing the praises of your professors on your blog.

Speaking of time, the essentials of torts don't take much time to teach or learn. Accordingly, many torts professor fill most of their class time teaching something called "law and economics." As you would expect from the term, the discipline applies economic analysis to law. In practice, law and economics can yield some pretty odd conclusions. For example, if it would be cheaper for people who live downwind from a pig farm to purchase and wear gas masks, than for the pig farmer to prevent noxious fumes from escaping his farm, then, some law and economics scholars would say, the farmer should not be held liable for the tort of nuisance.

But when it comes to property law, Professor Dorf trails off into a short (and to us property profs, a not very funny) joke:

Continue reading

August 23, 2006 in Law Schools | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, August 22, 2006

Rebuilding Post Katrina: Homeowner Autonomy or Planning Anarchy?

The media is providing a dizzying array of material devoted to post-Katrina New Orleans this week.  Spike Lee's HBO movie "When the Levees Broke" aired last night and tonight.  This week's New Yorker includes a carefully crafted Letter from New Orleans, by Dan Baum, and Fortune has published a special report, entitled "The Long, Strange Resurrection of New Orleans."

I spent a few days in New Orleans this summer as part of a public health and environmental justice meeting.  The city is not wholly recovered, but as the media has reported, the real devastation is in the Lower Ninth Ward and New Orleans East.  Both areas are predominantly African American.  New Orleans East is an affluent community and the rebuilding has clearly begun there.  The Lower Ninth is a much more complicated story.

The Lower Ninth is known for its high poverty and crime rates -- but pre-Katrina, it was also home to families who had been present for generations.  Baum reports that sixty percent of homes were inhabited by homeowners.  In the early days after the flooding, many people, including Mayor Roy Nagin, were skeptical that the Lower Ninth should be rebuilt.  The Bring New Orleans Back Proposal proposed "shrinking the footprint" of the City.  Some discussed using eminent domain to force buy-outs of areas that would better serve the City as wetlands or green space.  Eminent domain was a political non-starter, however, and the idea of shrinking the footprint was widely criticized by residents of the Ninth as well as civil rights leaders.  Shrinking the footprint was replaced by the mantra "let the homeowners decide." 

The State of Louisiana has adopted a plan, the Road Home Plan, that in some sense lets homeowners decide whether to rebuild.  It awards funding to rebuild or repair homes, or offers state buy out for homeowners who would prefer to relocate.  But in small print, it also gives the state and local government the option of limiting some homeowners to the buy out provision "in areas where a high proportion of homeowners are choosing not to invest." 

This tactic seems reasonable in some respects.  If few homeowners plan to rebuild in a particular area, it will become blighted.  But it raises many troubling questions as well.  The document gives no guidance on how the government will determine what constitutes a "high proportion."  And, this portion of the plan has gotten little attention that I can see.  If displaced homeowners don't know that their fate is tied to their neighbors, they have no incentive to work collectively to decide whether to rebuild.  They may simply find themselves forced to sell.  But the state and local government are protected from the claim that they chose to shrink the footprint. 

In light of New Orleans' recent experience with governmental failure, the distrust of any governmental land use planning that will force people out of their homes is not surprising.  However, the government's abdication of rational land use planning in favor of a non-plan that nevertheless may force people from their homes seems far worse. 

Rachel Godsil

August 22, 2006 in Land Use, New Orleans | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Broken Trust: You Can Say That Again!

With the arrival of Carl Christensen of the University of Hawai'i as a fellow guest blogger, I thought mention should made of Broken Trust, the recently published book by the University of Hawai'i Press, by Carl's colleague Randall Roth and U.S. District Judge Samuel King.  As most T&E folks know, Roth, King, and several other people brought to light the astonishing scope of the breaches of fiduciary duty engaged in by the trustees of the Bishop Estate, the trust established by the will of Bernice P. Bishop, Princess Pauahi.  Though the trust was explicitly for the purpose of creating and maintaining the Kamehameha Schools, by the 1990s the trustees were operating the trust as a private investment fund.  That's what the IRS charged was the case when it sought to rescind the trust's charitable status, after the scandal broke into the open.  Now, in this book, Roth and KIng describe the development of the trust, the history of the Kamehameha Schools (which is also a history of the struggle of the indigenous Hawaiians following the arrival of European settlers), and the slide into corruption, greed, and colossal mismanagement that eventually resulted in removal of all five of the trustees.  One of the delicious ironies of the tale is the fact that the land redistribution program approved by the US Supreme Court in Midkiff resulted in the infusion of billions and billions of cash into the BIshop Estate, thus providing a ready temptation for the unscrupulous trustees.  Any property professors who dabble in trusts and the fiduciary duties of trustees in their property courses will want to read this.  The T&E people are no doubt already familiar with this sad tale.

Calvin Massey

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August 22, 2006 in Books | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Carl Christensen Blogging With Propertyprof

PioneeruhIt is my pleasure to introduce Professor Carl Christensen of the University of Hawaii Law School.  Carl will be blogging with us for a while, mostly I suspect on topics of Native Americans and Native Hawaiians.  After graduating from Harvard Law School, Carl practiced with a firm in Honolulu and then with the Native Hawaiian Legal Corporation, where he argued among other cases Pioneer Mill, which we're spoken about a little.  He also spent time on the Hill, before moving to the University of Hawaii, where he teaches Native American Law, as well as historic preservation law.  Oh, yes, and before law school Carl was a biologist; he studied snails.  And as I've said before, he's a great humanitarian.

Close readers of propertyprof will recall that Carl tiped me off to a lot of posts, including the ones on Pioneer Mill and on taro.  I'm sure he'll have a lot to say about aloha jurisprudence.  You're in for a real treat--like Rachel and Calvin, Carl's a terrific conversationalist and an extraordinary lawyer.  I know his posts will be most interesting and I guarantee many will be on topics you haven't heard much about, but once you read them you'll realize you need to know all about them.

These days we've assembled an awesome group of bloggers--Ben, our leader, and our vistors (who I hope will stay for a long while) Calvin Massey, Rachel Godsil, and Carl Christensen.  We're gonna have some fun.

Endnote: The image of Pioneer Mill is from the University of Hawaii Center for Oral History.

Alfred L. Brophy

August 22, 2006 in About This Blog | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, August 21, 2006

Generation shift?

It appears from conversation with my students that Legally Blonde (especially the scene where Elle shows up for the first day of class unprepared and is kicked out) has now replaced The Paper Chase as the iconic movie to watch before starting law school.  Just thought you'd like to know.

Ben Barros

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August 21, 2006 in Teaching | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

First Day of Class

Well, my first property class is done.  I have to say that I absolutely love teaching first year students -- it's great to have them before the great attitude decline sets in.  The class also worked very well -- I start with a pretty lengthy discussion of Pierson v. Post, before having some abstract discussion of possession.  I then give them the facts of Popov v. Hayashi (the Barry Bonds baseball case) and break them into small groups to discuss how that case should come out in light of our Pierson v. Post discussion.  Both of the cases have fun facts, and it is a great introduction to legal reasoning -- taking the rules and policies from one case and thinking about how they should or should not apply in another context.  'Course, I can't teach about foxes and baseballs every day, so it's all downhill from here . . .

Ben Barros

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August 21, 2006 in Teaching | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Psychological Defects?

Stjameshotel The New York Times has an engaging article on home buyers who regret not asking whether anyone died in the house they purchased.  Ah, latent and patent defects.  This may be part of a post I'm planning as we get closer to Halloween....

Hat Tip: Carl Christensen.

The image of the St. James Hotel in Selma--which looks like it might be haunted! and is rumored to be (nice article from the Selma Times-Journal, one of our nation's oldest newspapers)--comes from our friends at the Library of Congress' Historic Buildings Survey, conducted during the 1930s.  Check out their website for some great photographs.  They're a source I often use when looking for public domain illustrations for propertyprof entries.

Alfred L. Brophy

August 21, 2006 in Real Estate Transactions | Permalink | TrackBack (1)

Sunday, August 20, 2006

Moonlighting at MoneyLaw: Law Review and Law School Rankings

Nasamoon Jim Chen has been kind enough to invite me to join his shop MoneyLaw.  I'm pleased and honored to be joining them there--along with one of my employer's here at the lawprof blog network, Paul Caron, and two people whose work I respect greatly: Ronen Perry and Tom Bell.  And I understand from Jim that a few other people will also be joining them shortly.

So I'm going to be posting a little bit over there, as well as my usual property stuff here.  I think, actually, I'll be cross-posting much of the stuff on moneylaw here as well, since moneylaw is dedicated to refining measures of quality in the legal academy.  (The motto of moneylaw is "the art of winning an unfair academic game.") 

My first post over at moneylaw talks a topic I've posted on a bunch here at propertyprof, as well: the relationship between law review citations and law school ranking.  I hope you'll visit moneylaw; it's certain to get lots and lots of attention.

(Dig the Alabama mascot in the post over at moneylaw.  Every time I see the elephant I am reminded of a conversation I had with Barbara Fedders of Harvard Law School shortly before I moved to Alabama.  She asked me what the school's mascot is.  And I had to admit that I didn't know.  But I soon found out.  Now I think of her every time I see a statute or picture of an elephant around town--which, as you might expect, is rather often.)

The image of the moon is courtesy of our friends at NASA.

Alfred L. Brophy

August 20, 2006 in About This Blog | Permalink | TrackBack (0)