Tuesday, January 5, 2016
The Chicago Tribune reports that Caryn Benson, a former data records supervisor for Chicago’s Field Museum, has admitted in federal court to embezzling in excess of $400,000 from the Museum. In the plea agreement that she has entered, Benson admits to having embezzled approximately $33,014 of the Museum’s funds in 2014, as well as $376,986 in funds between June 2003 and January 1, 2014. The government contends that the total amount embezzled exceeds $900,000. For purposes of sentencing, the plea agreement provides that “[e]ach party is free to present evidence and argument to the Court on this issue [i.e., the actual amount embezzled]” and that the defendant will pay restitution in an amount ultimately determined by the court.
According to the Tribune piece, Chief Marketing Officer for the Museum, Ray DeThorne, believes that $903,000 was embezzled, an amount “confirmed in the Field’s own audit and in one conducted by the museum’s insurance company before it made restitution to the museum, less a $10,000 deductible.” DeThorne is also quoted as saying that the Museum “has since put into place much stricter oversight over cash transactions.”
Friday, June 26, 2015
We have been following the Sweet Briar College litigation and settlement on this blog (see here and here). I thought readers might be interested in knowing precisely what the Virginia Supreme Court stated in its order leading up to the settlement. First, let’s be clear on the context of the Virginia Supreme Court order. This high court was considering an order of the circuit court (a lower court) that had granted in part and denied in part a motion for a temporary injunction, filed by the Commonwealth, to restrain the college from facilitating its closure during the legal proceedings. The state supreme court characterized the lower court’s order as having been based, “at least in part, upon the legal conclusion that the law of trusts cannot apply to a corporation.” The Virginia Supreme Court called this conclusion of the lower court “erroneous.” Said the high court:
The law of trusts can apply to a corporation. Jimenez v. Corr, 288 Va. 395, 411, 764 S.E.2d 115, 122 (2014) ("When . . . a trust exists, it is not a separate legal entity being referred to, but a fiduciary relationship between already existing parties, be they real persons or other legal entities."); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 96(1) (1959) ("The extent of the capacity of a corporation to take and hold property in trust is the same as that of a natural person except as limited by law."); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 33(1) (2003) ("A corporation has capacity to take and hold property in trust except as limited by law, and to administer trust property and act as trustee to the extent of the powers conferred upon it by law."); see also, e.g., Code § 64.2-706(C) (establishing rules governing the principal place of administration for certain "corporate trustee[s]"). The charitable, non-profit, or non-stock status of a corporation does not alter this legal principle. See Dodge v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon Women’s College, 276 Va. 10, 16, 661 S.E.2d 805, 809 (2008) (holding that Randolph-Macon Woman's College was not subject to the Uniform Trust Code because the College was not a trustee of a trust to which the Uniform Trust Code applies, and not simply because the College is a non-stock charitable corporation).
Accordingly, the circuit court erred to the extent it exercised its discretion in acting upon the motion for a temporary injunction based upon this erroneous legal conclusion.
What the Virginia Supreme Court ruled is not that a charitable corporation is necessarily governed by the law of charitable trusts. Rather, the Court concluded that a charitable corporation can serve as the trustee of a charitable trust under state law. The two are very different legal propositions.
Tuesday, June 23, 2015
We previously blogged about the legal challenge to the attempted closing of Sweet Briar College. As reported in the Richmond Times-Dispatch, Bedford County Circuit Judge James Updike approved a mediated settlement to three lawsuits that had been filed to prevent the closing of the private women’s college. The story reports the following salient details:
[Judge] Updike accepted three consent orders presented by Attorney General Mark R. Herring, whose office brokered a mediation effort that continued over nearly six weeks.
The orders, which take effect today, will allow the transfer of leadership to a new president and board of directors under a plan that requires the alumnae group Saving Sweet Briar Inc. to provide $12 million, with $2.5 million due by July 2.
Herring will release restrictions on $16 million from the college’s endowment, which he said will be a sufficient amount to operate the college for the next academic year.
According to the article, the new president of the school will be Phillip C. Stone Sr.
For a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding serving as the basis of the settlement agreement, click here.
Wednesday, June 10, 2015
One of my least favorite days in Nonprofits class is the day that we discuss the difference between trust and corporate fiduciary duties (Sibley Hospital, anyone?). Lest one think that the distinction is purely academic, along comes the sad case of Sweet Briar College to reaffirm that this area of law remains completely and utterly confusing.
If you’ve not been following the story, Sweet Briar College’s operating entity is a “non-profit corporation” (Complaint, Para. 6) which was created by the Virginia General Assembly “to administer the trust created by the will” of its primary funder, Indiana Fletcher Williams. The Complaint also asserts that SBC is a charitable organization under the Virginia Charitable Solicitation laws and is a “trustee” under Virginia’s version of the Uniform Trust Code. (So I’m confused already….)
According to the Complaint, the provisions of Mr. Williams’ will place his residuary estate in a trust. The trustees of that trust were instructed to create a corporation to run a women’s college in perpetuity. It would appear that in 1901 in Virginia, a nonprofit corporate charter could only be obtained by act of the General Assembly, and so it was. (Complaint, p. 17). The corporate charter incorporated the terms and conditions of Mr. Williams’ will, which required the assets to be held in perpetuity for the women’s college and directed that the assets not be sold.
Fast forward to March, 2015, when the current Board of Directors of the college announced that it would close the doors of the college, and liquidate its assets, including its endowment (Complaint, p. 26) due to the college’s poor financial condition. Litigation, of course, ensued.
The Complaint alleges violations of the Uniform Trust Code, which it asserts is applicable not only the original funding of the College occurred through the trust under Mr. Williams’ will, but also because “the Act of the Assembly creating the College requires that the College be administered in the manner of an express or charitable trust” (Complaint, p. 55). It then states, “Because the College is a charitable corporation, the assets held by Defendants are deemed to be held in trust for the public.” (Complaint, p. 56). Among other things, the original Complaint requested a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction restraining actions in furtherance of closing the school.
So the question then becomes, Sweet Briar College a trust? Is it a corporation? Does it matter? Should it?
More on this Nonprofit Law Prof Blog Cliffhanger next time….
Wednesday, May 13, 2015
The oral argument before the Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges (the same-sex marriage case) included the following exchange between Justice Alito and Solicitor General Verrilli (on page 38 of the transcript):
JUSTICE ALITO: Well, in the Bob Jones [University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)] case, the Court held that a college was not entitled to tax-exempt status if it opposed interracial marriage or interracial dating. So would the same apply to a university or college if it opposed same-sex marriage?
GENERAL VERRILLI: You know, I -- I don't think I can answer that question without knowing more specifics, but it's certainly going to be an issue. I -- I don't deny that. I don't deny that, Justice Alito. It is -- it is going to be an issue.
The possibility that the contrary to fundamental public policy limitation found by the Court in Bob Jones to be included in Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) might prohibit 501(c)(3) organizations from engaging in discrimination based on sexual orientation had been raised before this argument, including by fellow blogger Nicholas Mikay (Creighton) in a 2007 article (where he concluded a statutory amendment prohibiting discrimination would provide a stronger legal basis for such a prohibition). This exchange highlights the fact that how the Supreme Court decides the same-sex marriage case could have strong ripple effects for tax-exempt organizations, even though the IRS has for more than 30 years been reluctant to apply Bob Jones beyond the context of racial discrimination and even though any supporters of LGBT rights will have difficulty establishing their standing to force the IRS' hand in this area.
In another court in DC, the government found itself on the defensive as a three-judge panel expressed shock that the Justice Department would even assert that the IRS' treatment of applications for recognition of exemption under section 501(c)(3) during the 270 days before such applicants gained the right to go to court (assuming no substantive interaction with the IRS during that period) could somehow escape scrutiny under the Constitution. During oral argument (large MP3 file) before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in case involving the application of Z Street, judges repeatedly expressed skepticism that somehow the application process was shielded from constitutional requirements, including First Amendment concerns. Additional coverage: Wall Street Journal (opinion); see also previous blog post.
Finally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently upheld a preliminary injunction barring the enforcement of a local ordinance that banned outdoor, unattended donation bins. The court found that plaintiff Planet Aid (a 501(c)(3) organization) had demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits of its constitutional claim under the First Amendment, finding that the ordinance was a content-based regulation of speech because it only applied to outdoor receptacles with an express message relating to charitable solicitation and giving. As such, it is subject to strict scrutiny, and the court concluded that the ordinance likely would not survive such scrutiny given the weak relationship between the ban and the city's interest in aesthetics and preventing blight and the availability of other, lesser content-neutral restrictions that could further the same interest.
Thursday, April 2, 2015
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has decided to consider an issue that could have far-reaching consequences for the way attorneys and charities interact. The issue before the court is whether an attorney who has reason to believe that charitable assets are being diverted to private individuals may inform the Attorney General. This issue deals with Rule 1.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which permits breaching attorney-client confidentiality in very limited cases, e.g., to prevent death or serious bodily harm. Not surprisingly, a cloud of secrecy has surrounded the case since late last year, and the order permitting consideration of this issue was only made public in March. A recent article explores this case and its possible implications.
Interestingly, the petitioner’s argument is not based upon Rule 1.6 but rather on the idea that counsel has a fiduciary duty to report unlawful diversions of charitable assets to the Attorney General since the general public is affected. In addition, the petitioner claims that since the charity is a tax-exempt entity supported by the public, it has waived its rights under Rule 1.6. As pointed out in the article, Rule 1.13 is also relevant. Rule 1.13 details the steps an attorney may take within an organization before going outside of it. For example, an attorney may choose to report the matter to higher-ups within the organization. As noted, attorney-client confidentiality serves an important purpose in our society. Overall, we want to promote the seeking out of legal counsel when there is a problem, and this will not happen if potential clients are afraid their confidences will be shared. As noted above, limited, dire circumstances must exist for an attorney to breach attorney-client confidentiality.
At the same time, one must ask whether the attorney-charity relationship calls for a different rule, particularly in the case of public charities. After all, these charities are accountable to the public. Also, given the recent problems associated with IRS oversight and the growing number of charities, attorneys may provide a more helpful, rather than hurting, hand in the quest to monitor an ever-increasingly large number of organizations.
Monday, January 19, 2015
The Nebraska Supreme Court last week faced the issue of whether records held by Falls City Economic Development and Growth Enterprise, Inc. (EDGE), a Nebraska nonproit corporation, were "public records" within the meaning of Nebraska's disclosure laws because of the relationship EDGE has with the City of Falls City, Nebraska and other governmental entities. In a unanimous decision, the court concluded EDGE's records were not public records and so were not subject to disclosure, reversing a state trial court.
Citing an earlier opinion as well as similar tests applied by courts in other states, the Nebraska Supreme court stated that records held by a private party are public records if: "(1) The public body, through a delegation of its authority to perform a government function, contracted with a private party to carry out the government function; (2) the private party prepared the records under the public body’s delegation of authority; (3) the public body was entitled to possess the materials to monitor the private party’s performance; and (4) the records are used to make a decision affecting public interest." Finding that EDGE was not controlled by government officials, although two city officials served among the 21 voting members of EDGE's board of directors and another official served in a non-voting, ex-officio capacity, that the government funding provided to EDGE was under the control of its board, and that EDGE had separate financial records, separate offices, and separate employees from the governments with which it worked, the court concluded that EDGE was not the functional equivalent of a government agency and so its records were not public records subject to legally required disclosure. If, as the court suggested, the test it applied represents a growing consensus among state courts regarding how to approach this issue, this decision likely has ramifications beyond the State of Nebraska.
In 2012 the nonprofit Avera Marshall Regional Medical Center's board of directors unilaterally decided to repeal and replace the hospital's medical staff bylaws. Two individual physicians and the Medical Staff as a whole objected, eventually filing a lawsuit against the hospital that reached the Minnesota Supreme Court on two important governance issues for nonprofit hospitals. First, did the Medical Staff, as an unincorporated association, have the legal capacity to sue? Second, did the medical staff bylaws constitute an enforceable contract between the hospital and the Medical Staff? In a December 31, 2014 opinion, the Minnesota Supreme Court answered both questions in the affirmative.
With respect to the first question, the court acknowledged that the common law rule in Minnesota is that unincorporated associations are not legally distinct from their members and so do not have legal capacity to sue or be sued in their own right. The court found, however, that the Minnesota legislature had overridden this rule when it enacted Minnesota Statute section 540.151, reading that statute as granting an unincorporated association that met the criteria described in the statute the capacity to sue and to be sued. Those criteria are having two or more persons associate and act under a common name, criteria that the court found the hospital's "Medical Staff" satisfied.
With respect to the second question, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that even though the hospital had a legal obligation under Minnesota administrative rules and the hospital's corporate bylaws to adopt medical staff bylaws, both sides still provided consideration. More specifically, the hospital granted privileges at the hospital in exchange for the prospective Medical Staff member agreeing to abide by the bylaws. The court therefore concluded that there was a bargained-for exchange of promises and mutual consent to the exchange, creating an enforceable contract. The court therefore remanded the case for consideration of the plaintiffs' claims that the repeal and and replacement of the medical staff bylaws violated the terms of that contract.
The result in this case, which may be significant to many hospitals, for-profit and nonprofit, was not a foregone conclusion as both the state trial court and the state appellate court had reached the opposite result on both questions. Indeed, two members of the Minnesota Supreme Court dissented from the five justice majority's opinion.
Thursday, November 20, 2014
The Boston Globe reports that seven Harvard students (including some at the Harvard Law School) have filed a lawsuit in Suffolk County Superior Court against the president and fellows of Harvard College for its investment in stocks of companies that produce fossil fuels. The complaint – said to contain 167 pages of exhibits – reportedly alleges “mismanagement of charitable funds” and asserts a tort, “intentional investment in abnormally dangerous activities.” The story states that the 11-page complaint seeks a judicial order to compel divestment.
Relatedly, the law students filing the complaint have taken the opportunity to publicize their effort through an op-ed, also appearing in the Boston Globe. Among the more interesting remarks:
Our legal claims are simple. Harvard is a nonprofit educational institution, chartered in 1650, to promote “the advancement and education of youth.” By financially supporting the most dangerous industrial activities in the history of the planet, the Harvard Corporation is violating commitments under its charter as well as its charitable duty to operate in the public interest.
Our suit charges that the Harvard Corporation is breaching its duties under its charter by investing in fossil fuel companies. Our second count is a novel tort claim, intentional investment in abnormally dangerous activities, that is based in well-established legal principles regarding liability for promoting especially hazardous behavior.
I certainly appreciate that the filing of this lawsuit has given these students a springboard for publicizing their viewpoint. While I would benefit from a review of the complaint (which I do not have), just by reading the press reports, I believe the suit clearly faces obstacles, both procedural and substantive.
The most obvious procedural issue is whether the students have standing. Although some have argued for student standing to bring lawsuits alleging mismanagement by university fiduciaries, see, e.g., Sara Kusiak, Comment, The Case for A.U. (Accountable Universities): Enforcing University Administrator Fiduciary Duties Through Student Derivative Suits, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 129 (2006), I am skeptical that a court would grant standing to the students in this case. For one thing, I doubt that they are harmed more particularly, in any material way, by Harvard’s investment policy than is the public at large – assuming that the public is harmed in the first place.
Even more important, it seems to me, is the difficulty of convincing a judge that the claims of the students have substantive merit. One could plausibly argue that an environmental organization is violating its mission by investing in fossil fuel company stocks solely for the prospect of earning profits. But Harvard? It is far from clear that Harvard’s investment policies are anti-educational. Of course, one could argue more broadly that all charities must operate in a manner consistent with the public interest by not violating public policy (remember Bob Jones in the tax-exemption qualification context?). However, could we really expect a court to conclude that buying oil company stocks is contrary to established public policy? Imagine the implications! (I say that with a modest chuckle, for “imagining the implications” may be precisely what is driving the legal action.)
And as for that “novel tort claim, intentional investment in abnormally dangerous activities” – I do not know what sanctions apply for raising frivolous claims in Massachusetts state courts, but if I were one of the plaintiffs, I would be concerned enough to research the issue thoroughly (if I had not yet done so) and prepare myself to drop that one from the complaint.
One final point. To doubt the legal merits of the students’ claims is not to deny the ability of charities, such as Harvard and its nonprofit affiliates, to engage in socially conscious investing. There is a major difference between (1) maintaining that charity fiduciaries are free to engage in socially conscious investing without violating their duties to the nonprofit corporation/its charitable purposes, and (2) asserting that charity managers violate their fiduciary duties by making investments that some consider contrary to socially conscious investing. The former respects the right of charity managers to exercise discretion on the matter. The latter can easily take the form of supplanting fiduciaries’ judgment with the judgment of others.
Those interested may wish to consult additional coverage in the New York Times.
Wednesday, September 24, 2014
March of the Benefit Corporation: So Why Bother? Isn’t the Business Judgment Rule Alive and Well? (Part III)
(Note: This is a cross-posted multiple part series from WVU Law Prof. Josh Fershee from the Business Law Prof Blog and Prof. Elaine Waterhouse Wilson from the Nonprofit Law Prof Blog, who combined forces to evaluate benefit corporations from both the nonprofit and the for-profit sides. The previous installments can be found here and here (NLPB) and here and here (BLPB).)
In prior posts we talked about what a benefit corporation is and is not. In this post, we’ll cover whether the benefit corporation is really necessary at all.
Under the Delaware General Corporation Code § 101(b), “[a] corporation may be incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes . . . .” Certainly there is nothing there that indicates a company must maximize profits or take risks or “monetize” anything. (Delaware law warrants inclusion in any discussion of corporate law because the state's law is so influential, even where it is not binding.)
Back in 2010, Josh Fershee wrote a post questioning the need for such legislation shortly after Maryland passed the first benefit corporation legislation:
I am not sure what think about this benefit corporation legislation. I can understand how expressly stating such public benefits goals might have value and provide both guidance and cover for a board of directors. However, I am skeptical it was necessary.
Not to overstate its binding effects today, but we learned from Dodge v. Ford that if you have a traditional corporation, formed under a traditional certificate of incorporation and bylaws, you are restricted in your ability to “share the wealth” with the general public for purposes of “philanthropic and altruistic” goals. But that doesn't mean current law doesn't permit such actions in any situation, does it?
The idea that a corporation could choose to adopt any of a wide range of corporate philosophies is supported by multiple concepts, such as director primacy in carrying out shareholder wealth maximization, the business judgment rule, and the mandate that directors be the ones to lead the entity. Is it not reasonable for a group of directors to determine that the best way to create a long-term and profitable business is to build customer loyalty to the company via reasonable prices, high wages to employees, generous giving to charity, and thoughtful environmental stewardship? Suppose that directors even stated in their certificate that the board of directors, in carrying out their duties, must consider the corporate purpose as part of exercising their business judgment.
Please click below to read more.
Tuesday, August 26, 2014
The Oregonian reports that lawyers have filed a class-action lawsuit in state court against Regence BlueCross BlueShield, claiming that the (taxable) nonprofit is acting like a for-profit company. More specifically, the lawsuit asserts that Regence is accumulating excess funds to support large, executive salaries instead of using those funds to benefit its members. The lawsuit points specifically to a public-purpose clause in Regence's bylaws that it claims is violated by these practices. The article further reports that Regence has responded by stating that the claim is without merit and that it intends to aggressively defend itself against the allegations.
Tuesday, August 19, 2014
The Washington Post reports that D.C. Superior Court Judge Robert Okun has approved the proposal of the Trustees of the Corcoran Gallery of Art to transfer its college to George Washington University and the bulk of its art collection to the National Gallery of Art. The Corcoran Gallery is reported to be the oldest private art museum in the nation’s capital. The proposal was the focus of a cy pres proceeding, necessitated because of the severe financial difficulties facing the nonprofit.
As discussed in Judge Okun’s opinion granting the trustee’s petition, the trustees of the Corcoran Gallery argued that continuing its operations as a stand-alone charity was impossible or impracticable. Borrowing from contracts law, the court agreed that the continued operation of the gallery by itself was "impracticable." Of special interest is the Court’s interpretation of “impracticability” under the doctrine of cy pres:
The Court’s review of the cases discussed above leads to the conclusion that a party fails to establish impracticability in the cy pres context if it merely demonstrates that it would be inconvenient or difficult for the party to carry out the current terms and conditions of the trust. Rather, a party seeking cy pres relief can establish impracticability only if it demonstrates that it would be unreasonably difficult, and that it is not viable or feasible, to carry out the current terms and conditions of the trust.
For those interested in a brief history of major events surrounding the formation and operation of the Corcoran Gallery, see A Corcoran Gallery of Art Timeline, also published in the Washington Post.
Wednesday, July 2, 2014
We previously blogged (here and here) about the lawsuit Princeton, New Jersey residents filed in 2013 against Princeton University, arguing that the University no longer qualified for exemption from property taxes because of its hundreds of millions of dollars in revenues from royalties and commercial ventures. We missed, however, the latest major development in this dispute, which was reported by Bloomberg. In late April of this year, the University announced that it had entered into an agreement with the town to pay more than $24 million, mostly in unrestricted payments, to the town on a voluntary, one-time basis over the next seven years. The amount is a significant increase over the amounts Princeton had been paying the town voluntarily.
The agreements appears designed to undermine the pending lawsuit, and it apparently surprised the residents who brought the claim and their attorney based on comments in the Bloomberg article. I am not familiar enough with the lawsuit, the agreement, or New Jersey law to know if the agreement effecctively moots the lawsuit or otherwise provides grounds for a motion to dismiss by the Unviersity, but I assume that the University's lawyers will eventually argue something along these lines.
Friday, May 30, 2014
Johnny Rex Buckles (Houston) published "How Deep Are the Springs of Obedience Norms that Bind the Overseers of Charities?," in 62 Cath. U. L. Rev. 913 (2013). Here are some excerpts from the article's introduction:
This Article explores whether and how the exercise of discretion by charity fiduciaries in recasting a charity’s direction is, and should be, limited. Analyzing this basic issue raises additional, difficult inquiries: If the law does limit the ability of charity fiduciaries to determine the charitable paths of their entities, what standards govern the exercise of fiduciary discretion? To what extent does , and should, the law treat fiduciaries of charitable trusts dissimilarly from those who govern charitable nonprofit corporations? What role should governmental actors play in monitoring these decisions by charity managers? If governmental actors should assume some monitoring role, should their review of fiduciary decisions be ex ante or ex post? Which governmental actors should be involved? Can donors and other stakeholders sufficiently protect their interests absent a strong supervisory role by the government?
These questions are not simply esoteric enigmas deisgned to tickle the ears of legal scholars. . . . Moreover, these questions are especially timely, for the law of obedience norms governing fiduciaries of charitable corporations is unsettled and in great need of refinement. Even the law governing trustees of charitable trusts, which is comparatively stable and uniform, merits reassessment once the meaning and purposes of obedience norms are thoroughly examined.
To foster the development of the law governing charity fiduciaries, this Article presents a taxonomy of obedience norms,20 a doctrinal analysis of these norms, and a policy discussion to help answer these questions. Part I explains the fundamental nature of obedience norms and articulates and illustrates the various types of obedience norms. Parts II and III discuss legal authorities supporting or rejecting various obedience norms as applied to trustees of charitable trusts and directors of charitable nonprofit corporations, respectively. Part IV this Article evaluates the policy considerations that may justify one or more obedience norms. Finally, by presenting an analytical series of questions, Part V explains how the law should develop in imposing, and declining to impose, obedience norms on charity fiduciaries.
Wednesday, May 7, 2014
Nonprofits that accept government funding can sometimes unexpectedly find themselves subject to the open meeting laws that apply to public bodies. Capital Area Legal Services Corporation (CALSC), a nonprofit corporation operating in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, faces this issue in litigation brought by a former Executive Director that has already generated two state trial court decisions and one previous state appellate court decision. The latest chapter is Wayne v. Capital Area Legal Services Corporation, 2014 La. App. LEXIS 1148 (May 2, 2014), in which the appellate court concluded that CALSC is not a public body for purposes of the Louisiana Open Meeting Law under a recently revised interpretation of that statute by the Louisiana Supreme Court. The appellate court found that the term "authorities" in the statue is limited to entities created by the government, and so the following facts led it to affirm the grant of summary judgment on this issue in favor of CALSC (footnote omitted):
We find that CALSC is not an "authority" for the purpose of the Open Meetings Law because it is not a creature of government. It is undisputed that CALSC is a private, non-profit corporation that was incorporated in 1958 by the Baton Rouge Bar Association. It is further undisputed that CALSC has never been sponsored by any governmental resolution, nor has it been designated as an agency by any political subdivision.
The decision therefore sets a relatively high bar for parties seeking to assert that a nonprofit corporation would be subject to the Open Meeting Law in Louisiana.
Friday, April 25, 2014
According to an Associated Press report, the New York Attorney General's Office intends to appeal a decision by a New York trial court that the $199,000 salary cap imposed by executives at nonprofit contractors with the Health Department by executive order exceeded the Governor's authority. Further coverage of the court decision in Agencies for Children's Therapy Services v. New York Dept. of Health can be found at the New York Nonoprofit Press. That article notes that another trial court ruled in favor of New York and upheld the salary cap, so the matter will ultimately need to be resolved by a higher court. It also notes that the salary cap also applies to nonprofits that contract with 12 other agencies.
Wednesday, April 23, 2014
Massachusettes AG Sues Former Nonprofit President for Excessive Compensation; President and Board Should Expect Deficiency Notice Soon
In a complaint that should serve (unfortunately) as an excellent teaching prop for those of you teaching the tax law of exempt organizations, the Massachusettes Attorney General accused the former president of Falmouth College of engaging in acts that at the federal level can only be described as violative of the prohibitions against private inurement and excess benefits. Acording to the Boston Globe:
Attorney General Martha Coakley sued the former president of a tiny Falmouth college on Tuesday, seeking to force him to repay the school millions that he allegedly squandered on excessive compensation, Mercedes automobiles, and a quarter-million-dollar timeshare in the Caribbean.In the lawsuit, filed in Suffolk Superior Court, Coakley also charged that President Robert J. Gee gave himself a $152,175 bonus in 2009, and then created false documents to make it appear that the school’s board members held a meeting to award Gee the money for his “superior job performance.’’ No such meeting ever occurred, according to the lawsuit. During Gee’s tenure, the college he headed, the National Graduate School of Quality Management, bought an ocean-view compound with four houses that included a presidential home for Gee. Last year, the school sold those properties at a loss of at least $1.5 million.
As with campaign intervention, private inurement and excess benefit at this level is so obvious as to lack instructional value. The complaint is useful to demonstrate the role of local AG's in regulating nonprofits. And their is also a useful practical lesson. In my experience, one of the enduring truisms of nonprofit governance is that the founder can never, ever, ever be trusted years down the road when his or her zeal for whatever mission provoked the nonprofit's founding has worn off but the nonprofit is still bringing in serious revenue. It is a recipe for disaster and almost always leads to the founder treating the organization as his own private sugar daddy. And the board members, probably all the President's golfing buddies, better get set for the notices that derive from IRC 4958.
Thursday, February 6, 2014
Both the Boston Globe and the Wall Street Journal report that a dispute in Massachusetts over a $172.87 property tax bill could undermine tax exemption for millions of acres held by land trusts nationwide. At immediate stake is the tax status of 120 acres of woodland owned by the New England Forestry Foundation. The bigger issue is whether merely preserving land for public use is sufficiently in the public interest to justify exempting them from property tax under applicable state and local laws, or whether instead some level of actively encouraging public use or otherwise providing public benefit is also required. Both property tax assessors for cash-strapped jurisdictions and nonprofit land trusts are closingly following the case. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court heard arguments last month, and similar cases are working their way through the courts in a number of other states.
Wednesday, February 5, 2014
An Illinois Appellate Court recently affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Attorney General against Maxwell Manor, a charitable nonprofit corporation that operated a nursing home, and several of its directors and officers. The decision, People v. Manor, 2013 IL App. (1st) 113132-U, provides a case study of failure to comply with state law duties, including not only fiduciary duties but also registration and annual report requirements. The heart of the case was the decision by Executive Director JoeAnn McClandon to cause Maxwell Manor and the family partnership that owned the nursing home's building and land to jointly sell the nursing home to a third party for $13,500,000, followed by not only a failure to report the sale to the Attorney General but also a decision by Ms. McClandon to write a check to herself for $2 million, allegedly in repayment of previous personal loans she had made to Maxwell Manor. The court's opinion details the repeated failures under state law, including not reporting the alleged personal loans to Ms. McClandon on the required annual reports, the failure to report the sale or to file the required annual reports for the years after the sale occurred, and the failure to properly account for the $2 million transferred to Ms. McClandon. Not surprisingly, the court affirmed a $2 million judgment against Ms. McClandon, and also the removal of Ms. McClandon and two directors and officers, the dissolution of Maxwell Manor, and the distribution of the organization's remaining assets pursuant to cy pres.
While such situations are fortunately relatively rare, what is rarer still is having such a detailed account of the relevant facts and circumstances and a definitive court ruling laying out both the legal violations and the sanctions imposed. I think I may have found one of my fact patterns for the next time I teach Not-for-Profit Organizations.
NY Trial Court Orders Property Tax Exemption for Drug Policy Alliance HQ Despite Alleged "Advocacy" Focus
A New York court has granted the Drug Policy Alliance's petition for real estate property tax exemption for its New York City headquarters, rejecting the previous denial by the New York City Department of Finance, which had been affirmed by the New York City Tax Commission. In Drug Policy Alliance v. New York City Tax Comm'n, NY Slip Op 33273 (U), the court rejected the city agencies' argument that the Alliance's alleged primary focus on legislative and policy change disqualified it from exemption as an "exclusively" educational organization. The court noted that the Alliance already enjoyed exempt status under federal (501(c)(3)), state, and city authorities, a fact the Commission failed to mention in its decision, and that similar organizations had been granted exemption under a liberal interpretation of the relevant regulation. Given these conclusions, the court declined to reach the Alliance's constitutional claims that the denial was based on the content of the Alliance's public advocacy, which relates to reducing the harms of both drug use and drug prohibition.
While not a surprising result, this dispute indicates the continuing struggle many otherwise tax-exempt organizations face in convincing local authorities that the term "educational" as generally used in both federal and state law is broad enough to encompass public education and advocacy, including with respect to controversial issues. Kudos to the New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation, the Asian American Legal Defense Fund, and the Lawyers Alliance for New York for supporting the Alliance in this case through amicus briefs.