Tuesday, July 29, 2014
I've been wondering about what is that has given impetus to the recent rush to expatriate firms from the US. I've heard lots of explanations, but nothing that is a really convincing story.
One story I've heard is that inversions are happening because the US corporate tax rate is high relative to other countries and that in order to compete against foreign companies, US companies either have to move or we in the US have to lower the corporate tax rate to meet other countries' -- presumably the lowest out there -- tax rates. I find that unconvincing. The taxes we're talking about here are corporate profits taxes. Taxes on corporate profits don't increase costs. That's to say, when we are talking about competition in the product market, corporate profits taxes are not relevant. Where corporate profits taxes are relevant in the capital market. But nowhere in any rationalization of inversion have I heard that firms in the US are unable to raise capital because non-US firms have cheaper access to capital. In fact, the NYSE hit an all-time high recently. So, if the result of relatively high corporate profits taxes is an anemic capital market, I'm not sure I see the evidence of that.
Another story to explain why this summer is seeing a rash of inversions is that the door on inversions is closing and Congress is going to close the inversion loophole. If you don't go now, you'll never go. Seriously? One of the reasons why I switched to sports radio is because our political system is stuck that nothing happens. I seriously doubt Congress could organize itself to tie its own shoes, let alone close the door on inversions.
A third explanation that I've heard is that the inversion is the only way for US firms to access all that tax free capital they have stored overseas. To that I'll simply say this: there is no fiduciary duty to avoid paying taxes. There simply isn't. Now, boards may not like paying taxes...who does? But, I've heard more directors than I care to admit saying things like they have fiduciary duties to their shareholders to do inversions because their fiduciary duties somehow preclude them from repatriating profits sitting in Ireland. Hmm. These board members need better lawyers. A director is not required by his fiduciary duties to pursue the most tax efficient strategies out there.
Anyway, I am quite positive there is a narrative out there that explains the summer of the inversion, I just haven't stumbled across one yet.
Tuesday, July 22, 2014
I'm not an earnout fan. They're usually more trouble than they are worth. Nevertheless ... Albert Choi has posted a new paper, Facilitating Mergers and Acquisitions with Earnouts and Purchase Price Adjustments. His studies suggests that earnouts are a good response to information problems that naturally appear in acquisition transactions. They permit parties to signal quality and thus avoid the lemons problem. I don't disagree with any of that. Here's the abstract:
This paper examines how post-closing contingent payment (PCP) mechanisms (such as earnouts and purchase price adjustments) can facilitate mergers and acquisitions transactions. By relying on verifiable information that is obtained after closing, PCPs can mitigate the problems of asymmetric information over valuation and, in contrast to the conventional understanding, this benefit applies to both earnouts and purchase price adjustments. When both the acquirer and the target are aware that there is a positive (but uncertain) surplus from the transaction, PCPs function more as an imperfect verification, rather than a signaling, mechanism and a pooling equilibrium is possible, in which all parties adopt a PCP. When the parties are uncertain as to whether a positive surplus exists, on the other hand, PCPs function as a separating device, in which the seller with a positive surplus successfully signals its valuation with a PCP. The paper also addresses the problems of post-closing incentives to maximize (or minimize) the PCP payments. When such a moral hazard is a concern, the paper shows that (1) the PCPs will be structured so as to minimize the deadweight loss and a separating equilibrium is more likely to result; and (2) when the deadweight loss is sufficiently large, the parties will forego using a PCP mechanism altogether.
Wednesday, July 16, 2014
For those of you trying to catch up on the inversion wave that has swamped the deal world this summer, here's a neat video summary of what they are all about. For those of you who don't have access to video in your cubicles, here's Liz Hoffman's short rundown on inversion deals.
Tuesday, July 15, 2014
Kraft's 2012 acquisition of Cadbury is still haunting the UK. At the time Kraft promised to maintain Cadbury's Somerdale plant in the UK as part of the deal. After the deal closed, however, Kraft had an epiphany and closed the Somerdale facility. That left many in the UK with sour feelings - not only for the US candymaker. but for foreign acquirers generally.
The recent inversion trend, with UK companies as obvious targets, ahem...sorry...acquirers, has some UK regulators nervous. They are now looking to tighten up pre-transaction promises and removing the "wiggleroom" according to teh UK's Business Secretary:
“We need a last-resort power, such that if there is something very clearly against the national interest – and the loss of our research and development in pharmaceuticals is a very good example – the government can in those circumstances intervene.”
So, it seems that not only might the recent inversion trend cause some regulatory response in the US, but it might trigger another round of it in the UK as well.
Monday, July 14, 2014
Life tip. You should never ever write anything remotely resembling the following in an email:
Well boys....went to the Sox game with a friend of mine tonight. He seems to think that AMSC has a $100 million deal with China that should be signed very shortly. It could be done in the next few days … if it is not done/announced by Thursday, it will not be announced until the week of the 12th because all of China shuts down on vacation for 10 days – starting Friday. This announcement should spike them close to 10%. Furthermore, circle October 29th for the next big day…it could/should be as good as the last one, provided the market cooperates that day.
I like Pinot Noir and love steak….looking forward to getting paid
Good Luck …. SHHHHHHHHHHHHH!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
And, after that stock tip starts to pay off, definitely don't write this in an email to your co-conspirators:
Nice profitable day for the boys. So when should I report in on which restaurant and massage parlor I want to be treated to?
Massage parlors for men is not a good look. But, do you know what is really not a good look? This:
McPhail: OK ….. I will keep this info to myself from now on.
Drohen : I’m still listening, tell dougy [Parigian] to stop whining . . . .
McPhail: I can only get the inside info … can’t control if it goes up or down (emphasis added)
Wait. It's 2014, right? People know that email and texts are forever, right? Just because you delete it on your phone doesn't mean it's gone. You know that right? I mean, what do you think they're doing in Utah?!
Anyway, the SEC filed suit against a group of Massachusetts golfing buddies for insider trading. You know the rest.
Friday, July 11, 2014
You know the drill. A merger is announced and immediately a number of lawsuits are filed. Of course, they allege Revlon duties, yada yada… But what does it take for one of these typical Revlon claims to survive a motion to dismiss? A lot. In Dent v Ramtron, Vice Chancellor Parsons reminds us just how hard it is to make a case that a board has run afoul of enhanced review under Revlon where a board has the protection of a 102(b)(7) exculpatory provision:
In that regard, if the corporation’s certificate contains an exculpatory provision pursuant to 8 Del. C §102(b)(7) barring claims for monetary liability against directors for breaches of the duty of care, the complaint must state a nonexculpated claim, i.e., a claim predicated on a breach of the directors‟ duty of loyalty or bad faith conduct.
A factual showing that, for example, a majority of the board of directors was not both disinterested and independent would provide sufficient support for a claim for breach of loyalty to survive a motion to dismiss. “A director is considered interested where he or she will receive a personal financial benefit from a transaction that is not equally shared by the stockholders.” “Independence means that a director’s decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board rather than extraneous considerations or influences,” such as where one director effectively controls another. Moreover, as to any individual director, the disqualifying self-interest or lack of independence must be material, i.e., “reasonably likely to affect the decision-making process of a reasonable person . . . .”
Well-pled allegations that the board did not act in good faith also would state a claim for breach of the duty of loyalty sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. In general, “bad faith will be found if a ‘fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.’” Alternatively, notwithstanding approval by a majority of disinterested and independent directors, a claim for breach of duty may exist “where the decision under attack is so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith.”
So, unless the suit you are filing immediately upon announcement of a deal can allege that directors didn’t act in good faith or a majority of directors were interested and that the disqualifying interest was material, then, well your claim isn’t going very far and it's going to get the business judgment presumption. Revlon is a high bar for plaintiffs.
Thursday, July 10, 2014
Ron Barusch at the WSJ points out some lessons for deploying poison pills following American Apparel's failure to use a pill to keep former CEO/Chairman Dov Charney at bay.
I won't go into the details, but let's just say the board probably felt they had good reason to let him go when they did last month. The result of the ouster has been a struggle for control of the company with Charney (founder and large bloc stockholder) seeking to fight his way back onto the board and the board resisting. Not long after being removed from the board, Standard General and Charney entered into a partnership whereby SG lent money to Charney to purchase shares of American Apparel stock from SG. Collateral for that purchase was Charney's existing bloc of APP stock. The long and short of it - SG was able to move into position where it had the ability to control 43% of APP stock.
After announcement of the partnership, APP adopted a pill. As Ron notes, that was just too late. SG and Charney were already in a position and even if they didn't acquire any more shares, they couldn't be touched.
Yesterday, the board of APP gave in and signed a support agreement with SG. That agreement provides that board will be reconstituted with five of the current seven members, including Charney, stepping down. The new board members will be chosen jointly by SG and the current board. Charney stays on as a consultant at his present salary with a determination as to what to do with him to be resolved after an ongoing internal investigation. And then finally a standstill agreement that will prevent SG and Charney from acquiring additional shares.
So, following the turmoil, Charney is still out (for the timebeing), the current board has been mostly dislodged and SG is suddenly in the cat-bird's seat.
This past year has been quite a year for activist investors. It looks like they are writing new playbooks, taking advantage of opportunities as they pop up. Maybe it's time to reconsider whether simply having a pill on the shelf ready to go is sufficient. Perhaps, boards should be considering adopting pills pre-emptively and taking their ISS lumps.
Wednesday, July 9, 2014
Monday, July 7, 2014
Once more into the breach on this topic - the impact of private equity on jobs at target firms. Economists Stephen Davis, Josh Lerner and others have released a paper, Private Equity, Jobs, and Productivity. Here's the abstract:
Private equity critics claim that leveraged buyouts bring huge job losses and few gains in operating performance. To evaluate these claims, we construct and analyze a new dataset that covers U.S. buyouts from 1980 to 2005. We track 3,200 target firms and their 150,000 establishments before and after acquisition, comparing to controls defined by industry, size, age, and prior growth. Buyouts lead to modest net job losses but large increases in gross job creation and destruction. Buyouts also bring TFP gains at target firms, mainly through accelerated exit of less productive establishments and greater entry of highly productive ones.
Talk about burying the lede... OK, from the paper, some of their conclusions:
Our establishment-level analysis yields three main findings: First, employment shrinks more rapidly, on average, at target establishments than at controls after private equity buyouts. The average cumulative difference in favor of controls is about 3% of initial employment over two years and 6 percent over five years. Second, the larger post-buyout employment losses at target establishments entirely reflect higher rates of job destruction at shrinking and exiting establishments. In fact, targets exhibit greater post-buyout creation of new jobs at expanding establishments. Adding controls for pre-buyout growth history shrinks the estimated employment responses to private equity buyouts but does not change the overall pattern. Third, earnings per worker at continuing target establishments fall by an average of 2.4 percent relative to controls over two years post buyout.
But it's not all bad news. If one looks at firm-level job creation vs. establishment-level job creation, the authors find net positive growth as target firms tend to add net jobs at greenfield establishments. Give it a read. It's an AER paper, so it's short.
Friday, July 4, 2014
Thursday, July 3, 2014
Lots of ink has already been spilt on the Hobby Lobby opinion. I won't add to any of the discussion on contraception or even much about the RFRA claim. I do want to say something about the Supreme Court's conception of the corporation, though. That's where I think this case and the cases below all went off the rails. Justice Alito describes the corporate form thusly:
A corporation is simply a form of organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends. An established body of law specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a corporation in one way or another. When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people. For example, extending Fourth Amendment protection to corporations protects the privacy interests of employees and others associated with the company. When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people...Corporations, “separate and apart from” the human beings who own, run, and are employed by them, cannot do anything at all.
This characterization is reminiscent of the Court's characterization of the corporate form in the Citizens United opinion. There, the court repeatedly describes the corporate form as an "association of citizens" or an "association of individuals".
The Supreme Court's understanding of the corporate form from both Citizens United and Hobby Lobby is ... well ... novel. I doubt there are many state courts in America that would immediately look through the corporate form to the personal interests of the officers or the employees and say that's what a corporation is all about. In fact, if a court did, I wonder what would be left of the concept of limited liability and the strong public policy of corporate separateness - even where there might be only one shareholder.
Still thinking about the implications of this. But, I'm glad that state courts won't be looking to the US Supreme Court for guidance on the corporate law anytime soon.
Oh, and given the US Supreme Court's characterization above, there is no reason why corporations should not have the full array of constitutional protections afforded natural persons. For example, corporations presently don't enjoy 5th Amendment protections, but given Alito's characterization above, there is no reason to believe they shouldn't have those rights and others.
So, now that the Chamber of Commerce has put the kibbosh on the quick fix to prohibit fee shifting bylaws following ATP, no surprise...the first of what might well be many fee shifting bylaws adopted by public companies have already been adopted. This one by Echo Therapeutics. Here is their new "Litigation Costs" bylaw:
Litigation Costs. To the fullest extent permitted by law, in the event that (i) any current or prior stockholder or anyone on their behalf (“Claiming Party”) initiates or asserts any claim or counterclaim (“Claim”) or joins, offers substantial assistance to, or has a direct financial interest in any Claim against the Corporation and/or any Director, Officer, Employee or Affiliate, and (ii) the Claiming Party (or the third party that received substantial assistance from the Claiming Party or in whose Claim the Claiming Party had a direct financial interest) does not obtain a judgment on the merits that substantially achieves, in substance and amount, the full remedy sought, then each Claiming Party shall be obligated jointly and severally to reimburse the Corporation and any such Director, Officer, Employee or Affiliate, the greatest amount permitted by law of all fees, costs and expenses of every kind and description (including but not limited to, all reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation expenses) (collectively, “Litigation Costs”) that the parties may incur in connection with such Claim.
Given that the Delaware Supreme Court has already passed on the validity of these bylaws, unless the legislature decides to prohibit them, I suspect more and more of them will get rolled out this summer.
Wednesday, July 2, 2014
OK, I'll just say it. I think David Yermack is the most talented selector of paper topics out there. His series of tailspotter papers was great. Now, he follows up with Evasive Shareholder Meetings. If you have to hold your shareholder meeting at the bottom of a well, then don't expect that the company has positive news to share. Good stuff. Here's the abstract:
abstract: We study the location and timing of annual shareholder meetings. When companies move their annual meetings a great distance from headquarters, they tend to announce disappointing earnings results and experience pronounced stock market underperformance in the months after the meeting. Companies appear to schedule meetings in remote locations when the managers have private, adverse information about future performance and wish to discourage scrutiny by shareholders, activists, and the media. However, shareholders do not appear to decode this signal, since the disclosure of meeting locations leads to little immediate stock price reaction. We find that voter participation drops when meetings are held at unusual hours, even though most voting is done electronically during a period of weeks before the meeting convenes.
Tuesday, July 1, 2014
Late last week Pershing Square settled is suit with Allergan over Alergan's poison pill. The settlement permits Pershing Square to put together a group of shareholders sufficient to call a special meeting without triggering the pill. Pershing Square, with 9;7% of Allergan, was worried that if it got the support of the required 25% of shareholders sufficient to call a meeting that it would trigger Allergan's poison pill with its 10% trigger. The settlement will allow Pershing Square to get the support to call the meeting with triggering the pill.
Thursday, June 26, 2014
Karen Valihura was confirmed yesterday to replace the retiring Justice Jack Jacobs. The changes at the Delaware Supreme Court aren't done, yet. Next up, a replacement for retiring Justice Carolyn Berger. Then, maybe things will settle down.
What with all the attention to hostile pharma deals these days, it's no surprise that names of potential targets are getting batted around in the press. This was interesting, though. A name of a firm that is not a target - Eli Lilly. Why? Because Eli Lilly is an Indiana corporation and Indiana corporations are subject to that state's control share statute. This flavor of state antitakeover prevents an acquiring shareholder from exercising the voting rights over any "control shares" without the express approval by the other shareholders of the target corporation. This particular type of antitakeover decision was approved by the US Supreme Court in CTS Corp as not pre-empted by the Williams Act and within the competence of state legislatures. Though largely superceded by Section 203, later generation antitakeover statutes, the control share statutes are still out there and they are potent defenses.
Tuesday, June 24, 2014
Now we have another in the series of videos from Rick Climan and Keith Flaum at Weil in which they negotiate provisions of a merger agreement before an audience - with some animation to keep you engaged. This series is really interesting and - especially for young associates - worth every minute of time you spend with it. This latest video revisits the issue of indemnification and damages that the pair discussed in an earlier video (Rube Goldberg). In this video they discuss negotiating waivers of consequential damages.
The case on consequential damages that Keith refers to in the video is Biotronik v Conor Medsystems Ireland.
Monday, June 23, 2014
Claudia Allen, who has been wonderful about documenting the development of exclusive forum provisions, has posted a paper on arbitratin bylaws and the issues facing corporations who might seek to roll them out for shareholder litigation. You can download her paper, Bylaws Mandating Arbitration of Stockholder Disputes?, here.
Abstract: Would a board-adopted bylaw mandating arbitration of stockholder disputes and eliminating the right to pursue such claims on a class action basis be enforceable? That question came to the fore as a result of late June 2013 decisions from the United States Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery, which, when read together, suggest that the answer to this question is yes. In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the United States Supreme Court, interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act, upheld a mandatory arbitration provision, including a class action waiver, in a commercial contract. The decision focused upon the arbitration provision as a contract subject to the FAA. Next, the Delaware Court of Chancery rendered its opinion in Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp. The decision, which emphasized that bylaws are contracts between a corporation and its stockholders, upheld the validity of bylaws adopted by the boards of Chevron Corporation and FedEx Corporation requiring that intra-corporate disputes be litigated exclusively in Delaware courts. Subsequent United States Supreme Court and Delaware Supreme Court decisions addressing forum selection and the board’s power to adopt bylaws have only strengthened the argument.
In addition to complementing each other, both American Express and Boilermakers address a similar issue, namely, the explosion in class action and derivative litigation that settles primarily for attorneys’ fees, most commonly in the context of mergers and acquisitions. Stockholders ultimately bear the costs of such litigation. Class actions and derivative lawsuits are forms of representative litigation, in which named plaintiffs seek to act on behalf of a class of stockholders or the corporation itself. The plaintiffs are customarily represented by attorneys on a contingent fee basis, making the lawyer the “real party in interest in these cases.” If mandatory arbitration bylaws barring class actions were enforceable, the logical outcome would be a marked decline in class actions, since the alleged existence of a class is a principal driver of attorneys’ fees.
This Article examines the legal and policy issues raised by arbitration bylaws, whether adopting such bylaws would be attractive to public companies, likely reaction from stockholders and opportunities for private ordering. Since arbitration is a creature of contract, this article argues that there are opportunities for corporations to craft bylaws that take into account company-specific issues, while responding to many likely criticisms. However, the inherent bias of some stockholders and corporations against arbitration is likely to make experimentation in this area slow and difficult.
Friday, June 20, 2014
A couple of weeks ago, it looked the stars were aligning in a once in a generation way that would have the plaintiffs and defendants bar stand behind an unusual amendment to the Delaware code. That amendment would effectively prohibit firms from adopting fee-shifting bylaws. Following ATP, it became possible for Delaware corporations to adopt bylaws that would put the costs of shareholder litigation on the plaintiff in the event the plaintiff is unable to get its claims successfully adjudicated on the merits. A proposal was quickly made to the Delaware legislature and it seemed like it would move through quickly. And then, the US Chamber of Commerce - not one to usually care about amendments to the Delaware code - got involved. The proposal has now been tabled.
Bill Bratton and Michael Wachter have a new paper, Bankers and Chancellors, on a topic that has attracted my attention over the past few weeks - liability of bankers for aiding and abetting board fiduciary duty violations in Revlon. Here's the abstract:
Abstract: The Delaware Chancery Court recently squared off against the investment banking world with a series of rulings that tie Revlon violations to banker conflicts of interest. Critics charge the Court with slamming down fiduciary principles of self-abnegation in a business context where they have no place or, contrariwise, letting culpable banks off the hook with ineffectual slaps on the wrist. This Article addresses this controversy, offering a sustained look at the banker-client advisory relationship. We pose a clear answer to the questions raised: although this is nominally fiduciary territory, both banker-client relationships and the Chancery Court’s recent interventions are contractually driven. At the same time, conflicts of interest are wrought into banker-client relationships: the structure of the advisory sector makes them hard to avoid and clients, expecting them, make allowances. Advisor banks emerge in practice as arm’s length counterparties constrained less by rules of law than by a market for reputation. Meanwhile, the boards of directors that engage bankers clearly are fiduciaries in law and fact and company sales processes implicate enhanced scrutiny of their performance under Revlon. Revlon scrutiny, however, is less about traditional fiduciary self-abnegation than about diligence in getting the best deal for the shareholders. The Chancery Court’s banker cases treat conflicts in a contractual rather than fiduciary frame, standing for the proposition that a client with a Revlon duty has no business consenting to a conflict and then passively trusting that the conflicted fiduciary will deal in the best of faith. The client should instead treat the banker like an arm’s length counterparty, assuming self-interested motivation on the banker’s part and using contract to protect itself and its shareholders. As a doctrinal and economic matter, the banker cases are about taking contract seriously and getting performance incentives properly aligned, and not about traditional fiduciary ethics. They deliver considerably more than a slap on the wrist, having already ushered in a demonstrably stricter regime of conflict management in sell-side boardrooms. They also usher in the Delaware Chancery Court itself as a focal point player in the market for banker reputation. The constraints of the reputational market emerge as more robust in consequence.