Thursday, June 26, 2014
Karen Valihura was confirmed yesterday to replace the retiring Justice Jack Jacobs. The changes at the Delaware Supreme Court aren't done, yet. Next up, a replacement for retiring Justice Carolyn Berger. Then, maybe things will settle down.
What with all the attention to hostile pharma deals these days, it's no surprise that names of potential targets are getting batted around in the press. This was interesting, though. A name of a firm that is not a target - Eli Lilly. Why? Because Eli Lilly is an Indiana corporation and Indiana corporations are subject to that state's control share statute. This flavor of state antitakeover prevents an acquiring shareholder from exercising the voting rights over any "control shares" without the express approval by the other shareholders of the target corporation. This particular type of antitakeover decision was approved by the US Supreme Court in CTS Corp as not pre-empted by the Williams Act and within the competence of state legislatures. Though largely superceded by Section 203, later generation antitakeover statutes, the control share statutes are still out there and they are potent defenses.
Tuesday, June 24, 2014
Now we have another in the series of videos from Rick Climan and Keith Flaum at Weil in which they negotiate provisions of a merger agreement before an audience - with some animation to keep you engaged. This series is really interesting and - especially for young associates - worth every minute of time you spend with it. This latest video revisits the issue of indemnification and damages that the pair discussed in an earlier video (Rube Goldberg). In this video they discuss negotiating waivers of consequential damages.
The case on consequential damages that Keith refers to in the video is Biotronik v Conor Medsystems Ireland.
Monday, June 23, 2014
Claudia Allen, who has been wonderful about documenting the development of exclusive forum provisions, has posted a paper on arbitratin bylaws and the issues facing corporations who might seek to roll them out for shareholder litigation. You can download her paper, Bylaws Mandating Arbitration of Stockholder Disputes?, here.
Abstract: Would a board-adopted bylaw mandating arbitration of stockholder disputes and eliminating the right to pursue such claims on a class action basis be enforceable? That question came to the fore as a result of late June 2013 decisions from the United States Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery, which, when read together, suggest that the answer to this question is yes. In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the United States Supreme Court, interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act, upheld a mandatory arbitration provision, including a class action waiver, in a commercial contract. The decision focused upon the arbitration provision as a contract subject to the FAA. Next, the Delaware Court of Chancery rendered its opinion in Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp. The decision, which emphasized that bylaws are contracts between a corporation and its stockholders, upheld the validity of bylaws adopted by the boards of Chevron Corporation and FedEx Corporation requiring that intra-corporate disputes be litigated exclusively in Delaware courts. Subsequent United States Supreme Court and Delaware Supreme Court decisions addressing forum selection and the board’s power to adopt bylaws have only strengthened the argument.
In addition to complementing each other, both American Express and Boilermakers address a similar issue, namely, the explosion in class action and derivative litigation that settles primarily for attorneys’ fees, most commonly in the context of mergers and acquisitions. Stockholders ultimately bear the costs of such litigation. Class actions and derivative lawsuits are forms of representative litigation, in which named plaintiffs seek to act on behalf of a class of stockholders or the corporation itself. The plaintiffs are customarily represented by attorneys on a contingent fee basis, making the lawyer the “real party in interest in these cases.” If mandatory arbitration bylaws barring class actions were enforceable, the logical outcome would be a marked decline in class actions, since the alleged existence of a class is a principal driver of attorneys’ fees.
This Article examines the legal and policy issues raised by arbitration bylaws, whether adopting such bylaws would be attractive to public companies, likely reaction from stockholders and opportunities for private ordering. Since arbitration is a creature of contract, this article argues that there are opportunities for corporations to craft bylaws that take into account company-specific issues, while responding to many likely criticisms. However, the inherent bias of some stockholders and corporations against arbitration is likely to make experimentation in this area slow and difficult.
Friday, June 20, 2014
A couple of weeks ago, it looked the stars were aligning in a once in a generation way that would have the plaintiffs and defendants bar stand behind an unusual amendment to the Delaware code. That amendment would effectively prohibit firms from adopting fee-shifting bylaws. Following ATP, it became possible for Delaware corporations to adopt bylaws that would put the costs of shareholder litigation on the plaintiff in the event the plaintiff is unable to get its claims successfully adjudicated on the merits. A proposal was quickly made to the Delaware legislature and it seemed like it would move through quickly. And then, the US Chamber of Commerce - not one to usually care about amendments to the Delaware code - got involved. The proposal has now been tabled.
Bill Bratton and Michael Wachter have a new paper, Bankers and Chancellors, on a topic that has attracted my attention over the past few weeks - liability of bankers for aiding and abetting board fiduciary duty violations in Revlon. Here's the abstract:
Abstract: The Delaware Chancery Court recently squared off against the investment banking world with a series of rulings that tie Revlon violations to banker conflicts of interest. Critics charge the Court with slamming down fiduciary principles of self-abnegation in a business context where they have no place or, contrariwise, letting culpable banks off the hook with ineffectual slaps on the wrist. This Article addresses this controversy, offering a sustained look at the banker-client advisory relationship. We pose a clear answer to the questions raised: although this is nominally fiduciary territory, both banker-client relationships and the Chancery Court’s recent interventions are contractually driven. At the same time, conflicts of interest are wrought into banker-client relationships: the structure of the advisory sector makes them hard to avoid and clients, expecting them, make allowances. Advisor banks emerge in practice as arm’s length counterparties constrained less by rules of law than by a market for reputation. Meanwhile, the boards of directors that engage bankers clearly are fiduciaries in law and fact and company sales processes implicate enhanced scrutiny of their performance under Revlon. Revlon scrutiny, however, is less about traditional fiduciary self-abnegation than about diligence in getting the best deal for the shareholders. The Chancery Court’s banker cases treat conflicts in a contractual rather than fiduciary frame, standing for the proposition that a client with a Revlon duty has no business consenting to a conflict and then passively trusting that the conflicted fiduciary will deal in the best of faith. The client should instead treat the banker like an arm’s length counterparty, assuming self-interested motivation on the banker’s part and using contract to protect itself and its shareholders. As a doctrinal and economic matter, the banker cases are about taking contract seriously and getting performance incentives properly aligned, and not about traditional fiduciary ethics. They deliver considerably more than a slap on the wrist, having already ushered in a demonstrably stricter regime of conflict management in sell-side boardrooms. They also usher in the Delaware Chancery Court itself as a focal point player in the market for banker reputation. The constraints of the reputational market emerge as more robust in consequence.
Thursday, June 19, 2014
The Valeant/Pershing Square challenge (Complaint and the (Motion to Expedite) to the Allergan pill just got fast-tracked in the Delaware Chancery Court. The thing to remember and what no doubt the guys over at Third Point will tell you, just because you get your pill case expedited, doesn't mean you are going to win.
For all the fireworks that accompany many transactions, it's a little sad that they almost always end with a whimper. The same was true of the Men's Wearhouse/JOSB transaction. That particular deal was the center of quite a bit of back and forth all of last year. Public letters back and forth, hostile offers, pills, litigation, etc. But, like so many other deals, that deal closed yesterday with almost no fanfare. Just a lonely associate somewhere submitting a filing.
Tuesday, June 17, 2014
I am shocked! Shocked that there is insider trading in advance of merger announcements! OK, so I'm not. But, what is surprising is just how much of that insider trading happens via equity options. Seriously. I know you can make a lot of money in equity options, but you're also going to get caught. Anyway, there is a new study by Augustin, Brenner and Subramanian, Informed Options Trading Prior to M&A Announcements: Insider Trading? I think that's a rhetorical question. Here's the abstract:
Abstract: We investigate informed trading activity in equity options prior to the announcement of corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A). For the target companies, we document pervasive directional options activity, consistent with strategies that would yield abnormal returns to investors with private information. This is demonstrated by positive abnormal trading volumes, excess implied volatility and higher bid-ask spreads, prior to M&A announcements. These effects are stronger for out-of-the-money (OTM) call options and subsamples of cash offers for large target firrms, which typically have higher abnormal announcement returns. The probability of option volume on a random day exceeding that of our strongly unusual trading (SUT) sample is trivial - about three in a trillion. We further document a decrease in the slope of the term structure of implied volatility and an average rise in percentage bid-ask spreads, prior to the announcements. For the acquirer, we provide evidence that there is also unusual activity in volatility strategies. A study of all Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) litigations involving options trading ahead of M&A announcements shows that the characteristics of insider trading closely resemble the patterns of pervasive and unusual option trading volume. Historically, the SEC has been more likely to investigate cases where the acquirer is headquartered outside the US, the target is relatively large, and the target has experienced substantial positive abnormal returns after the announcement.
Three in a trillion? Those are pretty long odds. You'd be better off buying a lottery ticket than replicating the results they find here in the absence of material inside information ... a lottery ticket! It's odd, because it's so dumb of the traders, but the authors find that in the run-up to an announcement of a merger, there is increased abnormal trading volume in single equity options of the target. If it's not obvious, that means if you are in possession of material non-public information and you are trading in single equity options prior to a merger announcement, you might as call the SEC and tell them to arrest you.
Tuesday, June 10, 2014
Well, this is unusual. In reponse to ATP - the Delaware Supreme Court opinion that ruled that fee-shifting bylaws are facially valid in Delaware - there was a rare moment of unanimity when both the plaintiffs bar and the defense bar seemed to line up behind a quick fix to Section 102(b)(6) of the corporate law that would prohibit such bylaws. Now, according to the WSJ's Liz Hoffman, the US Chamber of Commerce is weighing in on the fix:
The Delaware legislature is set to vote as soon as this week on a bill to prevent companies from sticking stockholder plaintiffs with corporate legal bills in an effort to deter lawsuits, especially those that routinely follow merger deals.
But the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, an arm of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, is opposing the bill, which it says would deprive companies of a self-help tool that could reduce corporate litigation, which has risen sharply in recent years.
This fee shifting fix and the Chamber's response to it is highly usual. First, the proposed legislative fix it is being adopted very quickly on the heels of ATP. Usually, amendments to the DGCL take time and are worked out by committee over a good deal of time. Second, by the time such amendments get proposed, they have been so fully vetted that they are extremely non-controversial. Here, the Chamber is stepping in the lobby the legislature against adoption. I guess this week just got interesting.
Friday, June 6, 2014
Governor Markell nominated Karen Valihura, a corporate litigator in Skadden's Wilmington office to the Delaware Supreme Court to replace retiring Justice Jack Jacobs. Ms. Valihura will become the second woman after Justice Carolyn Berger to sit on the court.
Ms. Valihura was interviewed for LawDragon.com just a week or so ago. Among the questions, there's this one:
Lawdragon: Is there a case/deal/client in your career that stands out as a “favorite” or one that is particularly memorable?
Karen Valihura: My favorite deal litigation was Norfolk Southern's takeover fight with CSX over Conrail, resulting in Norfolk Southern's acquisition of a substantial portion of Conrail. It was a classic hostile fight among the Class I railroad titans: Norfolk Southern (represented by Skadden), Conrail and CSX. It involved a multitiered, front-end loaded transaction spanning three preliminary injunction hearings, as well as appeals to the Third Circuit over the Christmas and New Year's holidays. I greatly enjoyed working with and learning from Morris Kramer and Steve Rothschild, who were both legendary Skadden partners; and my fellow senior associate on the matter was Eric Friedman, who is now our firm's Executive Partner. It was Skadden at its finest.
Best of luck to the nominee.
Thursday, June 5, 2014
At a speech before the Delaware Bench and Bar Conference, Chief Justice Strine raised the possibility that Delaware would revisit its Chancery Arbitration Program:
"Regrettably, a federal court in Philadelphia issued a divided ruling striking down these statutes because they violated two judges’ reading of unsettled precedent, a reading that, if good law, would invalidate long-standing dispute resolution procedures used in their own federal court system,” said Strine.
“But, consistent with our history, Delaware is not wallowing in defeat,” Strine said, adding that the governor, the Corporate Law Council and members of the bar “are working on a different approach to be ready for the consideration by the General Assembly in January.”
I could quibble, but I won't. I suspect what they will do is create an arbitration procedure that will be effectively the same as the one they had previously implemented but with some public access. Supporters believe that it won't work without confidentiality, but I suspect public access won't be as terrible as some think.
Monday, June 2, 2014
The news over the weekend that Phil Mickelson is subject of an insider trading investigation is surprising and not surprising at the same time. Celebrities and high profile athletes will naturally attract a lot of investigator attention when their names show up on lists of suspect trades. Imagine you are a FINRA staffer and your job involves scanning lists of hundreds of names of people involved in suspect trades. Frankly, it can be a boring job. Not all that different from doc review or a never ending diligence exercise. Of course, if a name that looks familiar pops up on a list, you are definitely going to stop and take a look. Who wouldn't?
Add to that the pedagogic effect of possibly catching a high profile athelete/celebrity with their hand in the cookie jar. Prosecution of such cases doesn't only make a career, but it's also going to send a much bigger message to the trading public about insider trading than prosecuting an anonymous hedge fund trader. So, there are real incentives for prosecutors to run down every lead when the name of a high profile individual pops up on a suspect trade list.
Of course, having one's name on a suspect trade list is not the same as actually engaging in insider trading. Don't get me wrong. If you are a deal lawyer, you never want to see you father's name turn up on a suspect trade list of a deal that you've been working on. That will take you down a long, dark road to be sure.
No, what I mean is that since the news of the Phil Mickelson investigation has leaked, precious little evidence beyond the fact that Mickelson may have traded in Clorox stock options in the week before Carl Icahn announced his intent to acquire Clorox in 2011. Given how thin the market for single stock options are, it's not good - really not good - that Mickelson happened to buy call options just before announcement of a potential acquisition. That's going to mean a huge legal bill for Mickelson as he explains himself to the SEC, but that, in and of itself, is not going to be enough to tag Mickelson with any liability.
To get to liability - exam review for students who just took my exam - the SEC will first have to find someone with a fiduciary duty to the source of the information. Second, the SEC will have to prove that the person with the information about Icahn's bid actually tipped Mickelson (let's make this sumple and not daisy-chain the information, yet). Third, that the when tipping Mickelson the source of the information received a "personal benefit" and therefore breached his or her fiduciuary duty to the source. And then finally, that when Mickelson traded on the information, he knew or should have known that the information he received was tainted because it was inside information received via a breach. That's a lot of dots to connect. And so far, there's not a lot of ink to connect them.