M & A Law Prof Blog

Editor: Brian JM Quinn
Boston College Law School

Friday, March 22, 2013

Live Tweeting Tulane

Morris James is doing yeoman's work live tweeting the Tulane conference for those of us who can't make it to NOLA:



March 22, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Take it outside boys

Sounds like the judicial fireworks are flying in Tulane (note to self: go next year).  At a panel discussion Chief Justice Myron Steele apparently continued his crusade to get the Chancery Court to shut up (via WSJ Deal Journal:

“Every time they open their mouth they make the law,” Steele said Thursday, discussing how he would love to get that idea into the heads of judges. Steele said it was inappropriate to force lawyers to read transcripts in order to determine the law.

Steele didn’t name names.

But we know.  It's funny.  The Supreme Court would like the Chancery Court to say less and only speak through its opinions and only on issues that are directly before the court.  All of this other stuff is just dicta.  It forces lawyers to read transcript hearings and search speeches for hints at what the law is.  As an aside - if the court were really worried about closing off access to knowledge of the state of the law, it would reconsider its Chancery Arbitration procedures.  Just saying.  

Anyway, those things that Steele thinks are bugs, are considered features by the Chancery Court.  In a paper (forthcoming in W&L Law Review) by Vice Chancellor Donald Parsons and his former clerk Jason Tyler, the authors point to dicta and judicial asides as an important component of the law making/dealmaking function of Delaware law:

To give just one small example of the organic nature of this process, in December 2011, Vice Chancellor Laster issued an opinion in In re Compellent Technologies. In dicta, he questioned the wording of a provision of a merger agreement requiring the target company’s board to give notice to the acquirer if any subsequent, superior offers arose. The Vice Chancellor did not question the general validity of this relatively common information rights provision, just the particular verbiage used to express it in the merger agreement at issue in that case.  Less than two months later, another case—In re Micromet—challenged a merger agreement containing a nearly identical provision, except for a revision in the language the court had questioned in Compellent. The court in Micromet found the revised provision unobjectionable. More important than the outcomes of those two cases, however, is what one reasonably can infer from their facts and sequence. Apparently, within a matter of weeks, transactional attorneys had read the Compellent opinion and advised their clients accordingly in connection with a later transaction that, when challenged, survived judicial scrutiny.

So, it's a bit of a judicial tug of war that will no doubt continue to play out.


March 22, 2013 in Delaware, Friday Culture | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, March 20, 2013

New DGCL 251(h) to eliminate vote in 2 step merger

According to Richards Layton & Finger, Delaware is in the process of amending the DGCL to add a new Sec. 251(h), the purpose of which will be to eliminate a required shareholder vote in the second step of a two-step acquisition:

Under new subsection 251(h), a vote of the target corporation’s stockholders would not be required to authorize the merger if: (1) the merger agreement expressly provides that the merger shall be governed by this new subsection and shall be effected as soon as practicable following the consummation of the offer described below; (2) a corporation consummates a tender or exchange offer for any and all of the outstanding stock of the target corporation on the terms provided in such merger agreement that would otherwise be entitled to vote on the adoption of the merger agreement; (3) following the consummation of the offer, the consummating corporation owns at least the percentage of the stock of the target corporation that otherwise would be required to adopt the merger agreement; (4) at the time the target corporation’s board of directors approves the merger agreement, no other party to the merger agreement is an “interested stockholder” (as defined in Section 203(c) of the DGCL) of the target corporation; (5) the corporation consummating the offer merges with the target corporation pursuant to such merger agreement; and (6) the outstanding shares of the target corporation not canceled in the merger are converted in the merger into the same amount and kind of consideration paid for shares in the offer.

Given the recent proliferation of top-up options, the back end shareholder vote has lost much of its kick, if it ever had any.  Really, by now if a target requires an actual back-end vote it's because it either doesn't have enough shares outstanding to permit a top-up option or there were just really bad lawyers working the deal.


March 20, 2013 in Delaware, Proxy, Takeovers, Tender Offer | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, March 19, 2013

GD&C on Chancellor Strine's rejection of disclosure only settlement of M&A stockholder lawsuit

This client alert from Gibson Dunn discusses Chancellor Strine's bench ruling rejecting a disclosure-only, negotiated settlement of an M&A stockholder lawsuit. According to the authors,

The decision, in In re Transatlantic Holdings Inc. Shareholders Litigation , Case No. 6574-CS, signals that the Chancery Court will carefully scrutinize the terms of negotiated settlements to ensure that named stockholder plaintiffs are adequate class representatives and that the additional disclosures provided some benefit to the purported stockholder class. At the same time, the decision represents an unmistakable warning to plaintiffs’ firms that they cannot continue to count on paydays through the settlement of meritless lawsuits filed in the wake of announced deals.


March 19, 2013 in Cases, Deals, Delaware, Litigation, Mergers | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Dell's go-shop to produce results?

As we close in on March 22 and the end of Dell's go-shop period, we're starting to hear rumors that the process might actually produce a second bid in the $15 range.  Although H-P and Lenovo are apparently also rummaging through Dell's books, if there is going to be a bid, Bloomberg is reporting that it would come from Blackstone. That would be an interesting development.  I wonder if they would be able to bring Michael Dell on board as part of a competing deal.  Just a couple more days.


March 19, 2013 in Going-Privates, Private Equity | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, March 18, 2013

Canadians reconsider the pill

There was news from up North late last week.  The Canadians are considering some adjustments in their current approach to the poison pill.  Presently, pills are permitted only as temporary devices that be held in place for only so long as to delay a hostile bid so that a target board can educate its shareholders and perhaps put together some sort of alternate strategy or transaction.   Let's call the Canadian approach to rights plans the Interco pill.  In general, Canadian approaches to takeover defenses are very much in line with Chancellor Allen approach in Interco. That is to say, in the face of an unwanted offer, the board should be motivated to either educate the shareholders of the correctness of the board's position or look to develop an acceptable alternative for shareholders.  To the extent boards deploy takeover defenses they should facilitate the ability of the board to engage in either education or in increasing value for shareholders. 

The draft amendments (here) to their rules on shareholder rights plans intend to make a number of subtle, but important changes in approach that nudge them closer to a US styled approach to poison pills. The amendment require approval of a majority of the disinterested shareholders withing 90 days of the pill being adopted.  Any material amendments to the rights plan will require an additional shareholder vote. Then, in order for a board to keep a pill in place, the board will have to go back to shareholders annually to seek approval.  Finally, a majority of disinterested shareholders could vote to terminate the rights plan at any time.

This new draft approach is a step back from the previous Canadian approach, which involved a regulator in the provincial securities regulator making a substantive determination about the reasonableness of director actions to keep a pill in place.  Guided by their Interco-like principles, the question for Canadian regulators was not if a pill should remain in place, but when it should be pulled.  Now, that may change.  Of course, this isn't necessarily a bad thing.  Nor should it necessarily be interpreted as moving towards an American (U.S.) styled approach to pills.  Up in Canada undere the proposed pill regime, disinterested shareholders will have plenty to say about whether or not a pill is permitted to remain in place.  Rather than make arguments to a regulator, boards will be required to make their case directly to the shareholders if they want to keep pills in place.  That's not a bad thing.



March 18, 2013 in Takeover Defenses, Takeovers | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)