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January 19, 2012
Corporate governance overreach by Carlyle?
The Deal Prof looks at The Carlyle Group's proposed IPO and figures it's a corporate governance dud. I agree. Carlyle's Amended and Restated Limited Partnership Agreement (Appendix A to the S-1A) has a dispute resolution provision that is reprinted in relevant part below (it's lengthy, sorry). It does two things. First, it requires that limited partners in Carlyle's soon to be publicly traded firm resolve all their dispute only in private arbitration and not in any court. Second, it prohibits any arbitration be brought in a representative capacity.
Now, I'm the first one to admit that there is plenty of abuse of shareholder litigation. These days, one can't imagine a merger announcement not being accompanied by shareholder litigation. But still, the correct answer can't be to eliminate representative shareholder litigation altogether. The way this arbitration provision is written, it's pretty clear that no one should ever bring any litigation against management at all ... ever. That can't be the correct result. For all its warts, in a world where shareholding is increasingly dominated by institutional shareholders who don't have incentives to provide intense monitoring and are not permitted to perform the "Wall Street walk", shareholder litigation is one of the few governance arrows left in the corporate governance quiver.
Sure, there are plenty of suits that aren't worth more than their nuisance value. (Steven Davidoff highlights the sheer volume of these transaction related lawsuits in his new paper examining the "Great Game" and the rise of transaction-related litigation). But, at the same time, there are other valuable cases like Delmonte or Southern Peru. If Carlyle's approach becomes the norm as firms go public there are real downsides to firms opting out of the formal legal regime.
First, there's a threat to the development and maintainence of the corporate law. This arbitration provision goes further than Delaware's optional arbitration system that I've blogged about before. If parties are required to bring all corporate litigation to private arbitrators, then corporate law litigation will quickly disappear from the courts and the law will begin to atrophy. Rather than having a deep and rich common law, the corporate law will become nothing more than an inside game with only a small number of litigators and professionals being in the "know" as to the current state of the private law.
Second, even if one accepts that a private law system is acceptable, and I don't think that's correct, then there are still important incentive effects associated with the elimination of representative litigation. If arbitration may not be pursued in a representative capacity, then the incentives for any plaintiff's counsel to be in this business quickly fall away. The result is, effectively, that shareholder arbitration for a publicly traded issuer would disappear.
Now, I guess if you are incumbent management eliminating pesky shareholders is a good thing. On the other hand, if you are an investor, you have less reason to be sanguine about managers taking away one more tool for you to monitor their behavior.
I've previously recommended exclusive forum provisions as a middle ground to reduce incentives to engage in nuisance-like shareholder litigation while leaving open avenues for litigants to bring claims before courts. That middle-ground strikes me as a better result than the more extreme route taken by Carlyle. Of course, Carlyle's managers have different incentives and care about different things than do the courts in Delaware or investors. The Deal Prof doesn't think that the SEC will permit Carlyle to go public with this provision intact. I hope he's right. In that event, Carlyle's Section 16.9(c) provides for an exclusive forum provision to govern disputes should the arbitration provision be voided by a court or otherwise be found to be as uneforceable.
-bjmq
Carlyle Amended & Restated Limited Partnership Agreement
January 19, 2012 in Litigation | Permalink
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Comments
In honor of Larry Ribstein, let me suggest that the title of this post should be "Uncorporate Governance Overreach." Importantly, Carlyle is going public as a limited partnership, and under Delaware law, limited partnerships are afforded "the maximum freedom of contract." If Carlyle were a Delaware corporation, I don't think courts would enforce this kind of arbitration provision against public shareholders.
Even in the alternative entity context, however, I'm not sure this type of arbitration provision is all that significant. As I noted over at the Deal Professor's blog, Carlyle's LP agreement already provides that (1) the firm's managers have no fiduciary duties to investors, owing only contractual duties (Section 7.9(a)), and (2) that even if the managers breach their contractual duties, they will have no liability to shareholders unless their breach satisfies some egregious standard of culpable conduct (bad faith, fraud or willful misconduct) (Section 7.8(a)). These types of provisions are largely consistent with those of other publicly traded alternative entities. For evidence of that see:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1939920
In practice, these kinds of provisions mean that virtually all shareholder lawsuits end before discovery on a motion to dismiss. The recent Gerber v. Enterprise Products decision is an excellent example of this. Given this reality, plaintiffs' counsel already have little incentive to bring an investor suit against publicly-traded alternative entities. So, Carlyle's arbitration provision may be just an unnecessary extra.
Posted by: Mohsen Manesh | Jan 20, 2012 10:56:15 AM

