Media Law Prof Blog

Editor: Christine A. Corcos
Louisiana State Univ.

Tuesday, November 8, 2016

Wiersma on Legal Incapacitation in Media Access Interdictions and the Internet

Chris Wiersman, Ghent University/Universiteit Gent, Department of Communication Sciences and Faculty of Law, has published Legal Incapacitation in Media Access Interdictions and the Internet. Here is the abstract.

In this paper I first situate the general norm in the Council of Europe countries on access to the internet by actors in the media in the context of key concerns related to the internet as a medium according to UNESCO’s Internet Study. Following on I provide analysis of media access to public events and places within the scope for protection according to recent sources from the Council of Europe’s political decision-making organs and the case-law of Human Rights Court. Further I delineate the scope for protection to digital free expression by a comparison of cases in the Netherlands on the internet as a means of access vis-à-vis a means of publication on social media and blogs. On this theme I focus on the particular motivations for protection of a wide-range of behavior related to the internet and specifics thereof in the parliamentary history of the Dutch law. Suggested by their wording, these political and judicial decisions limit the European Court’s general invocation of journalisms ethics when such is related to certain ‘increased protections’ to journalists. Some cases have - as instances of decisional law - given journalists/press the ‘benefit of the doubt’. I delineate how the Court has found the rights to seek, impart and receive up until recently, as well related to internet. Article 10 ECHR and other sources (eg. the Declarations and Recommendations of the decision-making organs of the Council of Europe) provide a scope for protection. We’re reminded that not only Article 10 defines what comes to the scope for protection, but also rights to observe protests (article 11 ECHR), eg. The case-law of the Netherlands has suggested that privacy intrusions are the most upcoming issue of media access in the field of communications and the internet. Injunctive relief with targeted, specifics for execution has been offered for certain heightened privacy protection. General laws on informational acts, such as beleaguering on the internet shouldn’t lead to denying a person of means of communication if no alternative, similar means are available. I relate the analysis finally to the question why we should define professionalism as an ongoing and timely issue. The definition attempted by the Court/Council of Europe according to different sources of international standards has been related to the concept of ‘responsible journalism’, but the European Court can be seen to use a too simple view of what sources constitute its test(s) in a case.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

November 8, 2016 | Permalink

Dogan on Bullying and Opportunism in Trademark and Right of Publicity Law

Stacey L. Dogan, Boston University School of Law, is publishing Bullying and Opportunism in Trademark and Right-of-Publicity Law in volume 96 of the Boston University School of Law (2016). Here is the abstract.

Lawyers, scholars, and even Congress have lately expressed concern about so-called “trademark bullies” — trademark holders that assert tenuous legal claims against vulnerable defendants, who often capitulate rather than incurring the expense and uncertainty of litigation. At the same time, we’ve witnessed right-of-publicity claims for acts that never would have raised an eyebrow a few decades ago. Complaints about bullying and overreaching are largely anecdotal rather than empirical, so it’s hard to gauge the extent of the behavior and to measure its costs. But the fact that it has attracted so much attention suggests a perception, at least, that some rights-holders are asserting unreasonable claims and chilling legitimate conduct. This paper contends that certain structural and doctrinal features of trademark and right-of-publicity law enable and, in some cases, reward aggressive claiming. Although the two areas of law have different roots and distinct doctrinal formulations, they share some common features that may fuel grabby behavior by rights-holders. Given these structural and doctrinal features, it’s no wonder that rights-holders test the limits of their trademark and publicity rights in lawsuits, PTO practice, and cease-and-desist campaigns. Contrary to the oft-stated trope of trademark holders, they do not have to take aggressive positions against borderline conduct to avoid loss of their trademark rights. But they can obtain benefits from taking forceful positions, both in the immediate dispute and more generally. Whether we view them as bullies, opportunists, or rational profit-maximizers, rights-holders are responding to incentives and opportunities created by judges making substantive law. This is not to condone or excuse those who assert untenable claims. The reality, however, is that few of the claims that critics cite as trademark bullying are untenable, under today’s permissive standards for infringement and dilution. And the same goes for right-of-publicity claims, even in the context of expressive works. While we might hope for voluntary restraint by rights-holders, the only way to ensure such restraint is to clarify boundaries and alter incentives. Commentators have suggested a variety of tools for shifting these incentives, and this Essay brainstorms about some more.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

November 8, 2016 | Permalink

Ramsey on a Free Speech Right To Trademark Protection?

Lisa P. Ramsey, University of San Diego School of Law, has published A Free Speech Right to Trademark Protection? at 106 Trademark Reporter 797 (2016). Here is the abstract.

This Article explores whether the right to freedom of expression requires governments to register trademarks that are immoral, scandalous, disparaging, or otherwise offensive. Many nations ban the registration of offensive marks, including the United States for the last 100 years. In the U.S. Federal Circuit’s 2015 en banc decision in In re Tam, which involved an appeal from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s refusal to register the mark THE SLANTS for an Asian-American rock band, the court held the disparagement provision in Section 2(a) of the U.S. Lanham Act violated the Free Speech Clause in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court has now agreed to address the issue. This Article first contends that international law does not require U.S. and foreign courts to recognize a free speech right to trademark protection of offensive marks. It then argues that courts and commentators often do not raise and correctly evaluate all of the issues that may arise in a free expression challenge to a trademark law. The Article provides a framework–a list of “elements” required to establish a free speech violation–that can be used to evaluate whether a trademark law violates the right to freedom of expression in a nation’s constitution or human rights treaties. This framework is then applied to the provision in Section 2(a) of the U.S. Lanham Act banning registration of marks which are immoral or scandalous, or which may disparage others, with the resulting conclusion that Section 2(a) is co

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

November 8, 2016 | Permalink

Friday, November 4, 2016

Strasser on Incitement, Threats, and Constitutional Guarantees: First Amendment Protections Pre- and Post-Elonis

Mark Strasser, Capital University Law School, has published Incitement, Threats, and Constitutional Guarantees: First Amendment Protections Pre- and Post-Elonis at 14 University of New Hampshire Law Review 163 (2016). Here is the abstract.

The First Amendment‘s protection of free expression does not extend to true threats. In Elonis v. United States, the Court had a golden opportunity to clarify true threat jurisprudence, especially in light of the standards that must be met when the state seeks to punish other (possibly terrifying) language such as that involved in incitement. Regrettably, the Elonis Court not only made the jurisprudence murkier but also cast into doubt the mens rea requirements of other federal statutes. The Court has almost guaranteed confusion in the lower courts about a variety of matters and has failed to take advantage of a great opportunity to provide direction with respect to the regulation of internet postings.

The full text is not available from SSRN.

November 4, 2016 | Permalink

Harpur and Burdon on Workplace Laws and Workplace Rights Under the Fair Work Act 2009: What About Information Privacy?

Paul Harpur and Mark Burdon, both of the University of Queensland School of Law, have published Workplace Laws and Workplace Rights Under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth): What About Information Privacy? Here is the abstract.

Workplace Laws and Workplace Rights under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth): What about Information Privacy? Australian Labour Law Association, Eighth Biennial National Conference, Melbourne, 4 and 5 November 2016

The full text is not available for download from SSRN.

November 4, 2016 | Permalink

Thursday, November 3, 2016

Giblin @rgibli on the Role of Copyright

Rebecca Giblin, Monash University Faculty of Law, is publishing Is it Copyright's Role to Fill Houses with Books? in Intellectual Property and Regulation of the Internet: The Nexus with Human and Economic Development (Susy Frankel and Daniel Gervais, 2017). Here is the abstract.

Proposed copyright reforms are typically situated as being pro-user/anti-author (or vice versa). When it comes to making normative judgments about how far copyright rights ought to extend however, we need to ask more than whether a change might make one or another interest worse off. Since copyright isn't zero sum, we need to ask who loses *how much* in exchange for who gaining *what*. This is particularly important when considering normative questions relating to copyright's role in human and economic development, which are regaining urgency as the marginal cost of copying continues to drop for the world's least advantaged populations, increasing the deadweight loss attributable to copyright. This paper adapts a Rawlsian conception of the public interest to develop an objective framework that can enable more nuanced evaluation of the merits and demerits of global copyright policy proposals. By refocusing the debate from what is being won and lost by individual stakeholders towards the broader possibilities enabled by digital abundance, it shines fresh light on copyright's potential to help vulnerable people live a 'good life', lift populations out of poverty and stimulate fresh creation.

Download the essay from SSRN at the link.

November 3, 2016 | Permalink

Adeney on Differentiating Legal From Management Norms in Research Collaborations and "Authorship"

Elizabeth Adeney, Deakin University Law School, is publishing Research Collaborations and ‘Authorship’: Differentiating Legal from Management Norms in Australian Business Law Review, volume 44 (2016). Here is the abstract.

The question of who should take credit as the authors of collaborative research papers has long been a matter for discussion, especially within scientific institutions. However, that discussion has not sufficiently taken account of the legalities of the situation. Particularly since the passing of moral rights legislation in Australia and elsewhere, institutional norms are in conflict with the legal rules concerning the attribution of authorship. Yet, when researchers take their grievances to the courts, it is the legal rules that will prevail. The present article considers the institutional rules against their legal counterparts and the steps that have been, and might in future be, taken to manage this divergence of norms.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

November 3, 2016 | Permalink

Wednesday, November 2, 2016

Gannett Abandons Purchase Of Tronc

Gannett has abandoned its proposed purchase of Tronc (the conglomerate which owns a number of newspapers including the Chicago Tribune and the Los Angeles Times). The deal began some months ago. Here's more from the Guardianhere from the New York Times.

November 2, 2016 | Permalink

Tuesday, November 1, 2016

Roberto Simanowski's New Book Data Love: The Seduction and Betrayal of Digital Technologies (Columbia University Press)

New from Columbia University Press:  Roberto Simanowski, Data Love: The Seduction and Betrayal of Digital Technologies (2016). A description of the contents from the publisher's website:


Intelligence services, government administrations, businesses, and a growing majority of the population are hooked on the idea that big data can reveal patterns and correlations in everyday life. Initiated by software engineers and carried out through algorithms, the mining of big data has sparked a silent revolution. But algorithmic analysis and data mining are not simply byproducts of media development or the logical consequences of computation. They are the radicalization of the Enlightenment's quest for knowledge and progress. Data Love argues that the "cold civil war" of big data is taking place not among citizens or between the citizen and government but within each of us.

Roberto Simanowski elaborates on the changes data love has brought to the human condition while exploring the entanglements of those who—out of stinginess, convenience, ignorance, narcissism, or passion—contribute to the amassing of ever more data about their lives, leading to the statistical evaluation and individual profiling of their selves. Writing from a philosophical standpoint, Simanowski illustrates the social implications of technological development and retrieves the concepts, events, and cultural artifacts of past centuries to help decode the programming of our present.











Data Love





November 1, 2016 | Permalink

Farber on The Efficacy of Trespass, Nuisance, and Privacy Torts as Applied To Drones

Hillary B. Farber, University of Massachusetts School of Law, Dartmouth, is publishing Keep Out! The Efficacy of Trespass, Nuisance and Privacy Torts as Applied to Drones in volume 33 of the Georgia State Law Review. Here is the abstract.
The drone industry is burgeoning and there is boundless excitement over the potential civil and commercial applications of these aerial observers. Drones are also fun recreational toys that have more capabilities than their predecessor - the remote controlled helicopter. But along with the benefits comes the potential for misuse. More and more frequently concerned spectators are reporting drones flying around the windows of homes, backyards, and at beaches and sporting events. In some places people are even shooting them down. We have entered a new frontier of aerial observation with the unmanned aircraft. As is often the case with new technology, drones (or unmanned aircraft systems as they are commonly referred) are outpacing the law. Controversies over whether a drone can hover above one’s property, capture images of those on the ground without consent, destroy a drone that is invading one's privacy are ripe legal issues. The question being asked by lawmakers, practitioners, journalists, and the general public is whether existing laws provide adequate remedies or whether this technology falls through a legal gap? This article sets out to answer that question at a time when lawmakers are feverishly proposing drone specific legislation, possibly duplicating laws already in place. At present, 45 states have considered legislation seeking to regulate drones. Twenty-five states have passed laws that limit the use of drones. The majority of these laws include civil causes of action for capturing images and recordings of individuals by a drone without consent. Before more incidents ripen in to lawsuits, we need to evaluate whether our long-standing common law torts - trespass, nuisance, intrusion upon seclusion, and publication of private facts, offer remedies of equal or greater value than the drone specific legislation being considered. To the extent that common law torts fall short of providing adequate remedies at law, understanding their shortcomings will strengthen future drone legislation.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.

November 1, 2016 | Permalink

Jann and Mueller on An Informational Theory of Privacy

Ole Jann, University of Oxford, Nuffield College, and Department of Economics, and Christoph Schottmueller, University of Copenhagen, Department of Economics, and Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC), have published An Informational Theory of Privacy as TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2016-030. Here is the abstract.

We develop a theory that explains how and when privacy can increase welfare. Without privacy, some individuals misrepresent their preferences, because they will otherwise be statistically discriminated against. This "chilling effect" hurts them individually, and impairs information aggregation. The information gain from infringing privacy (e.g. by electronic surveillance) can be much smaller than expected ceteris paribus. Overall, privacy is essential for any mechanism of information aggregation, such as markets or a democratic society. It is also redistributive: Like free speech, privacy benefits some and hurts others.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

November 1, 2016 | Permalink

Thursday, October 27, 2016

Breakey on Natural Intellectual Property Rights and the Public Domain

Hugh E. Breakey, Griffith University, has published Natural Intellectual Property Rights and the Public Domain at 73 Modern Law Review 208 (2010). Here is the abstract.

No natural rights theory justifies strong intellectual property rights. More specifically, no theory within the entire domain of natural rights thinking – encompassing classical liberalism, libertarianism and left-libertarianism, in all their innumerable variants – coherently supports strengthening current intellectual property rights. Despite their many important differences, all these natural rights theories endorse some set of members of a common family of basic ethical precepts. These commitments include non-interference, fairness, non-worsening, consistency, universalisability, prior consent, self-ownership, self-governance, and the establishment of zones of autonomy. Such commitments have clear applications pertaining to the use and ownership of created ideas. I argue that each of these commitments require intellectual property rights to be substantially limited in scope, strength and duration. In this way the core mechanisms of natural rights thinking ensure a robust public domain and categorically rule out strong intellectual property rights.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

October 27, 2016 | Permalink

Wednesday, October 26, 2016

Magazines and Journalists Go To Trial Over Publication Of Cambridge Photos

Those 2012 photographs showing the Duchess of Cambridge semi-nude while on vacation are in the news again. Half a dozen journalists, including some from the French magazine Closer, are on trial for publishing those photographs, which the Cambridges complain invaded their privacy. The photos were published in various EU countries, including France, Italy, Denmark, and Sweden.  Closer's position is that the photos are not as "shocking" as they would have been years ago.

More here from the Mail Online, here from MSN, and here from the International Business Times. 

October 26, 2016 | Permalink

Monday, October 24, 2016

Tourkochoriti @IoannaTourkocho on a Comparative Analysis of Speech, Privacy, and Dignity in France and in the United States

Ioanna Tourkochoriti, Harvard Law School and National University of Ireland School of Law, has published Speech, Privacy and Dignity in France and in the U.S.A.: A Comparative Analysis at 38 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 101 (2016). Here is the abstract.

The divide between France and the United States on the balancing between freedom of expression and privacy rights was recently revived in reference to evolutions concerning the freedom of expression on the Internet. The recent decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) spurred a lot of controversy in the United States by recognizing a “right to be forgotten.” The CJEU held that a person can request a search engine to remove from its results elements that concern them. Google interpreted the CJEU decision as obliging it to remove search results from its European sites only. Nevertheless, in June 2015 the French data protection authority, known by its French acronym, CNIL, ordered Google to remove links from its database entirely, across all locations. The CNIL adopted an expansive interpretation of the ruling which applies to all of Google’s domains and not, as Google contends, only to the company’s regional domains in Europe. Google has refused so far, and the dispute is likely to arrive to courts soon. If upheld, the French regulator’s order would mean that Americans are prevented from having access to material that is legal in the U.S. This controversy stems from the consolidated status of the law in France, and more generally in Europe, that gives primacy to the protection of the right to privacy when it conflicts with the right to freedom of expression. The recent decision of the CJEU recognizing the right to be forgotten emphasizes an attitude, which already exists in the case law concerning press freedoms on the two sides of the Atlantic. This article analyzes the long history of the balancing between speech and the right to privacy in France and the U.S.A. It aims to show that there exists a deeply rooted divide that has long origins in the state of the law. The origins of the divide lie in the particular importance of freedom of expression in the U.S. constitutional order, which sees its abuses as acceptable. They also lie in the low valuation of informational privacy in the US. Although freedom of expression is a liberty that can be abused according to the dominant conception in the U.S., French law accepts limitations in order to protect other competing rights, like the right to privacy. This article presents the history of the protection of freedom of expression in France and in the U.S. as well as of the right to privacy to help understand the more recent controversies on these issues.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

October 24, 2016 | Permalink

Friday, October 21, 2016

UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression: Governments Attempting To Suppress Information, Ideas

From the United Nations News Centre: a UN human rights experts says that freedom of expression is under attack.

David Kaye, UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression, says that some governments are attempting to silence reporters, and to limit the flow of expression and ideas.  He says in part: “I am especially concerned that many governments assert legitimate grounds for restriction, such as protection of national security or public order or the rights of others, as fig leaves to attack unpopular opinion or criticism of government and government officials...Many times governments provide not even the barest demonstration that such restrictions meet the legal tests of necessity and proportionality.” 

October 21, 2016 | Permalink

Cambridge University Study Notes That Censorship on the Internet Is Widespread, Threatens Access to Information

University of Cambridge researchers have released results of a study into censorship on the Internet that reveals that it is "rampant, with more than 60 countries engaging in some form" of it.

The researchers note in part:


Those censoring might raise objections to material on the basis of offensiveness or incitement to violence (more than a dozen people died in Pakistan following widespread protests over the video uploaded to YouTube in 2012). But when users aren’t able to access a particular site, they often don’t know whether it’s because the site is down, or if some force is preventing them from accessing it. How can users know what is being censored and why?

“The goal of a censor is to disrupt the flow of information,” says Sheharbano Khattak, a PhD student in Cambridge’s Computer Laboratory, who studies internet censorship and its effects. “internet censorship threatens free and open access to information. There’s no code of conduct when it comes to censorship: those doing the censoring – usually governments – aren’t in the habit of revealing what they’re blocking access to.” The goal of her research is to make the hidden visible.

She explains that we haven’t got a clear understanding of the consequences of censorship: how it affects different stakeholders, the steps those stakeholders take in response to censorship, how effective an act of censorship is, and what kind of collateral damage it causes.

Because censorship operates in an inherently adversarial environment, gathering relevant datasets is difficult. Much of the key information, such as what was censored and how, is missing. In her research, Khattak has developed methodologies that enable her to monitor censorship by characterising what normal data looks like and flagging anomalies within the data that are indicative of censorship.


October 21, 2016 | Permalink

Graber on the Future of Online Content Personalization

Christoph B. Graber, University of Zurich, Faculty of Law, has published The Future of Online Content Personalisation: Technology, Law and Digital Freedoms as i-call Working Paper Series (University of Zurich). Here is the abstract.

As online information is increasingly tailored, or “personalised”, to the user, it has been praised by some as a pragmatic response to information overload, while criticised by others as creating an echo chamber that threatens deliberative democracy. The unsettling question is whether the latest wave of innovation in online content personalisation technologies has shifted decision-making power from humans to computers. The paper argues that a thorough understanding of personalisation technologies is necessary to critically evaluate their normative effect and impact on social values. It reflects on the differences between regulation by code and regulation by law, exploring how code affects individual and social autonomies, and considering whether meta-rules regulating code are appropriate. The aim of this paper is to detail the constitutive features of the digital world and elucidate how these create norms that regulate the Internet.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

October 21, 2016 | Permalink

Tuesday, October 18, 2016

Shipley on Droit de Suite, Copyright's First Sale Doctrine, and Preemption of State Law

David E. Shipley, University of Georgia Law School, is publishing Droit De Suite, Copyright’s First Sale Doctrine and Preemption of State Law in the Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal. Here is the abstract.

The primary focus of this article is whether California’s forty-year old droit de suite statute; the California Resale Royalty Act (CRRA), is subject to federal preemption under the Copyright Act. This issue is now being litigated in the Ninth Circuit, and this article concludes that the CRRA is preempted under section 301(a) of the Copyright Act and under the Supremacy Clause because it at odds with copyright’s well-established first sale doctrine. The basic idea of droit de suite is that each time an artist’s work is resold by a dealer or auction house, the artist is entitled to a royalty, typically five percent, on the resale price even though he or she has not retained copyright to the art object let alone ownership. France has granted its artists this right since the 1920s, the EU harmonized droit de suite in 2001, and about 70 countries now have resale royalty laws but not the United States even though resale royalty legislation has been introduced in Congress sporadically since the late 1970s. Resale royalty legislation was introduced in 11 states but California is the only state to have passed such a law. This statute, enacted in 1976, withstood a preemption challenge under the Copyright Act of 1909 in Morseburg v. Balyon, a 1980 ruling by the Ninth Circuit. Everything then remained relatively quiet until 2011 when Sotheby’s and other art dealers were sued by artists seeking their royalties under the statute. The Ninth Circuit ruled in 2015 that the CRRA violated the dormant Commerce Clause by attempting to regulate transactions outside of California but it treated the CRRA’s sections regulating in-state sales as severable. After the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari the case was remanded to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California which held earlier this year in Estate of Robert Graham v. Sotheby’s, Inc. that the remaining sections of the CRRA were preempted under section 301 of the Copyright Act. Notwithstanding the law of the circuit doctrine the court also concluded that recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit had so eroded Morseburg that it no longer represented a binding interpretation of copyright’s first sale doctrine and the California statute. Accordingly, the CRRA was preempted under the Supremacy Clause because it conflicted with first sale. The Estate of Robert Graham decision certainly will be reviewed by the Ninth Circuit and it could eventually find its way to the U.S. Supreme Court. The high court has not addressed a preemption issue in the general field of intellectual property since the Bonito Boats decision in 1989, and it has never addressed a preemption issue arising under section 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976. The focus of this article is not about whether the United States should implement droit de suite. Rather, it concentrates on two relatively narrow questions: (1) whether the CRRA is preempted under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause (conflict preemption) because it disrupts Congress’s efforts to balance the interests of copyright right owners and consumers; and, (2) whether it is preempted under section 301 of Copyright Act (express preemption). This article concludes that although the federal district court might have overstated the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s first sale decisions and failed to consider several arguments supporting the California statute, it still got things right: California’s droit de suite statute is preempted under section 301 of the Copyright Act and under conflict preemption analysis because it frustrates the purposes of copyright’s well-established first-sale doctrine.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

October 18, 2016 | Permalink

Saturday, October 15, 2016

ABA Forum on Communications Law Accepting Applications From Law Students For Scholarships To Attend Forum's 2017 Annual Conference

From the ABA:


The ABA Forum on Communications Law will award two or three full-ride scholarships to law students to attend the Forum's Annual Conference and the Media Advocacy Workshop, February 9-11, 2017 at Hilton New Orleans Riverside, New Orleans, Louisiana. The scholarship includes your registration fee (including meals), lodging for the Forum conference and the Media Advocacy Workshop, airfare, and ground transportation.


More here.


The application deadline is November 30, 2016.

October 15, 2016 | Permalink

Tuesday, October 11, 2016

Kim Kardashian Sues Website For Claiming That She "Faked" Robbery At Paris Hotel

Reality star Kim Kardashian is suing website for defamation over its statements that she "faked" the recent robbery at a private Paris hotel in which two men assaulted her and stole million dollars' worth of her jewelry.  Ms. Kardashian has now returned to the U.S. but is reportedly keeping a low profile. More here on the aftermath from CNN.  More here from People Magazine.

More on the lawsuit here from The Hollywood Reporter, here from

October 11, 2016 | Permalink