Media Law Prof Blog

Editor: Christine A. Corcos
Louisiana State Univ.

Friday, September 4, 2015

Re-evaluating the Supreme Court's Approach to Defamation, Privacy, and IIED

Cristina Carmody Tilley, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law, has published Tort, Speech, and the Dubious Alchemy of State Action at 17 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 1117 (2015). Here is the abstract.

Plaintiffs have historically used private law torts like defamation, privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress to vindicate their dignitary interests. But fifty years ago in New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court took an unprecedented approach to state action doctrine in order to recast these causes of action as public-private law hybrids that explicitly privileged speech over dignity. In constitutional challenges to private law disputes, the Court had for decades defined the state action under review to include just the contested verdict at issue. In Sullivan, it broke with that practice and defined the relevant state action to include the entire body of private law that had produced the verdict. This approach aggrandized the Court’s authority to replace state generated common-law tort rules with its own quasi-statutory scheme that tied tort liability to the identity of the plaintiff. The less public the plaintiff, the less important the speech about him was presumed to be, and the greater the tort recourse for injuries that the speech caused. This Article suggests the Sullivan scheme is failing. As the boundaries of the “public” plaintiff category have expanded, tort liability for genuine speech injuries has grown elusive and private law is increasingly understood to signal that speakers have no duty of care towards those they discuss. Further, the Court’s desire to create more robust civic speech has been thwarted as the media has used its constitutional latitude to fixate on celebrity coverage at the expense of hard news. The Article concludes that a more modest state action approach in Sullivan could have prohibited the judicial enforcement of verdicts that imposed local community speech norms onto the nation without destabilizing centuries of dignitary tort law to dubious effect.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

September 4, 2015 | Permalink

Thursday, September 3, 2015

Canadian Whistle-Blowing Legislation

Frederic St-Martin has published Measuring the Effectiveness of Canadian Whistleblowing Law as his master's thesis (International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA)). Here is the abstract.

Due to the increasing complexity of modern organizations, one of the most powerful ways to address corruption is to allow insiders to report relevant information to a recipient who will ensure it is used in the public interest. Paradoxically, many organizations instead exercise reprisals against whistleblowers, for what they perceive as a lack of loyalty to the organization. This thesis seeks to analyse how the law can lead to cultural changes in public and private organizations that will create the right environment for reporting behaviour that is against the public interest, by undertaking an analysis of comparative literature as well as semi-structured interviews with key Canadian stakeholders. To begin with, this thesis will propose a set of criteria that may be used to measure whistleblowing effectiveness quantitatively, and then discuss the best means for whistleblowing law to achieve effectiveness in promoting the public interest. It will argue that whistleblowing is effective in promoting the public interest when (1) investigations are launched when appropriate; (2) the wrongdoing comes to an end; and (3) the organization takes steps to change its policies or procedures when necessary. This thesis will then demonstrate in what ways Canadian whistleblowing law departs from the proposed model, and how investigative journalism has mitigated the deficiencies in Canadian whistleblowing law by holding relevant organizations accountable when there was no other way to do so. The thesis concludes by proposing measures to address deficiencies identified in Canadian whistleblowing law and further research areas on whistleblowing.

Download the thesis from SSRN at the link.

September 3, 2015 | Permalink

Australia's Data Retention Law

Graham Greenleaf, University of New South Wales, Faculty of Law, has published Going Against the Flow: Australia Enacts a Data Retention Law at 134 Privacy Laws & Business International Report 26-28 (2015). Here is the abstract.
After the 2014 decision of the EU Court of Justice in the Digital Rights Ireland Case data retention laws in many European countries have been declared invalid, or laws redrafted in an attempt to reconcile them with fundamental rights as identified by the Court. In contrast, on 26 March 2015 Australia enacted the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015 (‘Data Retention Law’). This is the end of the line for legal opposition to the law. Australia does not have a Bill of Rights or any other constitutional protections capable of invalidating an overly-broad or otherwise repressive data retention law. This article analyses key features of the Data Retention Law, including the continuing difficulties of defining ‘metadata’, the limited obligations to delete data after the retention period, encryption requirements, the extent of access without warrants permitted, the attempted civil litigation exemption, and additional protection for journalists. As part of the political trade-off to get the Bill through, the government accepted a recommendation by the PJCIS to introduce a mandatory data breach reporting (MDB) scheme by the end of 2015, but with no commitments concerning the content of the Bill. This legislation gives the impression of being only a first step, not the last word. There are many aspects of the Bill where Ministerial declarations can be used to expand its scope, able to be used in response to alleged emergencies, which will lapse after 40 days only if the opposition at the time has the spine to refuse to enact legislation making them permanent. This is a recipe ripe for government exploitation by national security and law-and-order campaigns.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.

September 3, 2015 | Permalink

Public Institutions and the Law of Defamation

Hilary Young, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, Faculty of Law, has published Public Institutions as Defamation Plaintiffs. Here is the abstract.
It is reasonably well settled in Canadian common law that governments cannot bring defamation actions against citizens. That said, uncertainty remains about the scope of the rule (i.e, what counts as government for the purposes of the rule) because of a lack of case law, and because cases rely on different rationales, including the chilling effect of defamation actions on democratic discourse, the public nature of a government’s reputation and the fact that governments generally have the ability to speak out to try to correct misinformation about them. This article examines the law in other common law countries and Canada with two goals in mind: first, to understand the current Canadian law with regard to governments’ and other public bodies’ ability to sue in defamation; and second, to ground a normative analysis. Specifically, I assess how the rule against government defamation actions should be applied to public institutions such as school boards, police forces and crown corporations. I propose that like governments, public institutions should be prohibited from suing in defamation. As a starting point, public institutions are institutions subject to access to information requests under federal and provincial law. I justify this admittedly broad prohibition with regard to the nature of public institutions’ interest in reputation, the importance of speech about such institutions, the limitations of defamation defences in protecting speech on matters of public interest, and the ability of public institutions to communicate with citizens to try to correct misinformation.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.

September 3, 2015 | Permalink

Wednesday, September 2, 2015

Balancing Free Speech and Privacy in the US and the UK

Neil M. Richards, Washington University in Saint Louis School of Law and Kirsty Hughes, University of Cambridge, are publishing The Atlantic Divide on Privacy and Speech in Comparative Defamation and Privacy Law (Andrew T. Kenyon, ed.; Comparative Defamation and Privacy Law, Cambridge Press, 2015). Here is the abstract.
When does a right to privacy become a right of censorship? Conversely when does freedom of speech become a carte blanche to violate the dignity and autonomy of others? Discussions of privacy throughout the world frequently boil down to these questions. Despite the parallel relationships between privacy and speech in the United Kingdom and America, and despite their shared legal heritage, the two legal systems have struck the balance in radically different ways. In the United States, decisions balancing privacy and the First Amendment have invariably favoured the free speech interest, at least where a press defendant published lawfully-obtained “newsworthy” content. Thus, the publication of names of rape victims or the transcripts of illegally intercepted phone conversations have been protected against privacy claims as “matters of public concern”. By contrast, numerous English cases under the Human Rights Act have protected privacy interests against press disclosure even when the facts alleged constituted front-page news. Our purpose in this paper is to make some sense of this divergence. How could two similar legal systems apply rules sharing a common origin and reach such different results? Our methodology is explanatory and comparative. We conclude that the divergence is a function of at least two factors. First, the cultural power of the First Amendment in the United States as it has emerged from defamation law has meant that American judges have been particularly reluctant to trust themselves in ruling in ways which might infringe on freedom of speech. This reluctance is especially pronounced when the press is before the court as a defendant. By contrast, English judges actively engage in balancing the two rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights. Ironically enough, the English approach is much truer to the method Warren and Brandeis suggested 125 years ago as the best way to manage this tension. We develop our argument in three parts. First, we show how the American position is a function of political commitments made initially in the context of defamation cases involving issues of racial equality in the 1960s. Second, we show how the position in English law is a product of UK involvement with European Human Rights Law. Third, we examine these differences through a series of case studies mapping out how each jurisdiction deals with the publication of stories involving (i) government officials; (ii) celebrities; (iii) private individuals; and (iv) video footage and photographs. We conclude by offering some options by which we could transcend the divide, and we argue that bridging the divide is essential as international conversations about privacy in a wide variety of contexts take on an increasing critical political and economic importance.
Download the essay from SSRN at the link.

September 2, 2015 | Permalink

Turkey Arrests UK Journalists For Terrorism

Turkish officials have arrested two Vice Media journalists and accused them of terrorism. The reporters were in Turkey covering clashes between Kurdish separatists and the Turkish government. An Iraqi citizen working with the two journalists, who are both UK citizens, has also been arrested. More here from the New York Times.

September 2, 2015 | Permalink

Monday, August 31, 2015

Post-Mortem Moral Rights

Jani McCutcheon, University of Western Australian Faculty of Law, is publishing Death Rights: Legal Personal Representatives of Deceased Authors and the Posthumous Exercise of Moral Rights in the Intellectual Property Quarterly. Here is the abstract.

In numerous jurisdictions, moral rights last for many decades after the death of the author, and are exercised by the deceased author’s legal personal representative. This article is the first thorough examination of a plethora of questions and problems concerning post-mortem moral rights and the author’s legal personal representative. The article considers the identity of the author’s legal personal representative (LPR), the scope of their duties and powers when exercising the author’s moral rights, and how any dereliction of duty can be challenged. It then explores the problem of “orphan” moral rights, caused by their posthumous longevity, the difficulty of identifying the author, the LPR and the author’s works, and of understanding the deceased author’s views and the scope of the moral right. The problems identified in the article threaten to negate the efficacy of post-mortem moral rights. The article analyses these problems, and recommends reforms designed to ameliorate them and enhance the effectiveness of post-mortem moral rights.

The full text is not available from SSRN.

August 31, 2015 | Permalink

DIgital Media and Its Future

Mira Burri, University of Bern Law School & World Trade Institute, has published Public Service Broadcasting 3.0 in Publishing Service 3.0: Legal Design for the Digital Present (Routledge, 2015). Here is the abstract.
The digital media environment is characterized by an abundance and diversity of content, a multiplicity of platforms, new modes of content production, distribution and access, and changed patterns of consumer and business behaviour. This has challenged the traditional model of public service broadcasting (PSB) in diverse ways. This book explores whether and how PSB should adapt to reflect the conditions of the digital media space so that it can effectively and efficiently continue to serve its public mandate. Drawing on literature on media governance in media and communication science, public international law as well as discussions on cyberlaw, Mira Burri maps and critically analyses existing policy and scholarly debates on PSB transformation. She challenges some of conventional rationales for reform, identifies new ones, as well as exposes the limitations placed upon existing and future policy solutions by global media governance arrangements, especially in the fields of trade, copyright and Internet governance. The book goes on to advance a future-oriented model of Public Service Media, which is capable of matching an environment of technological and of governance complexity. As a work that explores how public interest objectives can be pursued efficiently and sustainably in the digital media ecology, this book will be of great interest and use to students and researchers in media law, information technology law, and broadcast media studies, as well as to policy-makers.
Download the chapter from SSRN at the link.

August 31, 2015 | Permalink

Friday, August 28, 2015

Canadian Government Suspends, Begins Investigation of Scientist Who Recorded Song Critical of Prime Minister

The Globe and Mail reports that an Environment Canada scientist has been suspended for composing and recording a song that critizes current Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper.  Scientist and folk singer Tony Turner wrote "Harperman," which apparently does not sit well with Mr. Harper.  Among the "objectionable" lyrics: Mr. Turner wrote that "Harperman" has “no respect for environment / Harperman, it’s time for you to go”, and “no more cons, cons, cons / we want you gone, gone gone”.  Mr. Turner is currently being investigated for breaching the ethics code that applies to Canadian public servants.

Hear a performance of "Harperman" here (YouTube).

 

More here from the Ottawa Citizen,  here from the Globe and Mail.

August 28, 2015 | Permalink

Wednesday, August 26, 2015

Novelist Mario Vargas Llosa Complains To NYT About Information Included In Book Review

Via the Guardian: The celebrated writer Mario Vargas Llosa has complained to the New York Times via a letter to the editor that a recent review of his new book, Notes on the Death of Culture, included incorrect information that the novelist had announced news of his relationship with Isabel Preysler on Twitter and had sold photos and a story to Hola! magazine. Wrote Mr. Vargas Llosa,

According to the review, a few days before the publication of my book I announced my new relationship with Miss Isabel Preysler on my “official Twitter account” and sold photos as well as the “exclusive” story to Hola! magazine in Spain for 850,000 euros. I have never had a Twitter account, and I have never posted and never will post anything on any Twitter account. I have never sold a photo or story to Hola! magazine or any other outlet in connection with any relationship or personal matter.

 

 

 

 As it turns out, the reviewer used a Daily Mail article as the source for his statements about Mr. Vargas Llosa's Twitter announcement and relationship with Hola!.  The New York Times has agreed that “Using such information is at odds with the Times’s journalistic standards, and it should not have been included in the review.'"

August 26, 2015 | Permalink

A Bibliographic Literature Survey of IP Standard-Setting Organizations

Jorge L. Contreras, University of Utah College of Law, is publishing Patents, Technical Standards and Standards-Setting Organizations: A Survey of the Empirical, Legal and Economics Literature in 2 Research Handbook on the Economics of Intellectual Property Law (Peter Menell and David L. Schwartz, eds.; Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming). Here is the abstract.

Despite their potential efficiency benefits, voluntary consensus standards have over the past decade become the subject of significant private litigation, regulatory enforcement and policy debate. Much of the controversy centers on the perceived proliferation of patents covering standardized technologies, potentially abusive enforcement of such patents against manufacturers and users of standardized products, and the terms on which patent holders may be required to license the use of those patents to others. This chapter offers a brief overview of the legal and economic literature concerning interoperability standards and standards-setting organizations, with a focus on empirical studies and contemporary patent and patent licensing concerns.

Download the essay from SSRN at the link.

August 26, 2015 | Permalink

The Copyright Jurisprudence of the ECJ

Marcella Favale, Bournemouth University & University of Glasgow, Martin Kretschmer, University of Glasgow, and Paul L. C. Torremans, are publishing Is There a EU Copyright Jurisprudence? An Empirical Analysis of the Workings of the European Court of Justice in the Modern Law Review (2015). Here is the abstract.

The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) has been suspected of carrying out a harmonising agenda over and beyond the conventional law-interpreting function of the judiciary. This study aims to investigate empirically two theories in relation to the development of EU copyright law: (i) that the Court has failed to develop a coherent copyright jurisprudence (lacking domain expertise, copyright specific reasoning, and predictability); (ii) that the Court has pursued an activist, harmonising agenda (resorting to teleological interpretation of European law rather than – less discretionary – semantic and systematic legal approaches). We have collected two data sets relating to all ECJ copyright and database cases up to Svensson (February 2014): (1) Statistics about the allocation of cases to chambers, the composition of chambers, the Judge Rapporteur, and Advocate General (including coding of the professional background of the personnel); (2) Content analysis of argumentative patterns in the decisions themselves, using a qualitative coding technique. Studying the relationship between (1) and (2) allows us to identify links between certain Chambers/ Court members and legal approaches, over time, and by subject. These shed light on the internal workings of the court, and also enable us to explore theories about the nature of ECJ jurisprudence. The analysis shows that private law and in particular intellectual property law expertise is almost entirely missing from the Court. However, we find that the Court has developed a mechanism for enabling judicial learning through the systematic assignment of cases to certain Judges and AGs. We also find that the Court has developed a “fair balance” topos linked to Judge Malenovský (rapporteur on 24 out of 40 copyright cases) that does not predict an agenda of upward harmonisation, with about half of judgments narrowing rather than widening the scope of copyright protection.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

August 26, 2015 | Permalink

The Copyright Act and the Protection of Pantomine

Brian L. Frye, University of Kentucky College of Law, has published Copyright in Pantomime. Here is the abstract.

Why does the Copyright Act specifically provide for the protection of “pantomimes”? This article shows that the Copyright Act of 1976 amended the subject matter of copyright to include pantomimes simply in order to conform it to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. It further shows that the Berlin Act of 1909 amended the Berne Convention to provide for copyright protection of “les pantomimes” and “entertainments in dumb show” in order to ensure copyright protection of silent motion pictures. Unfortunately, the original purpose of providing copyright protection to “pantomimes” was forgotten. This Article argues that copyright protection of pantomimes is redundant on copyright protection of “motion pictures” and “dramatic works,” and reflects the carelessness of the drafters of the 1976 Act.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.

August 26, 2015 | Permalink

Data Sources Available In IP

David L. Schwartz, Northwestern Law School, and Ted M. Sichelman, University of San Diego Law School, are publishing Data Sources on Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Other Intellectual Property in 2 Research Handbook on the Law & Economics of Intellectual Property (Peter S. Menell, David L. Schwartz, and Ben Depoorter, eds.; Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016). Here is the abstract.

In this book chapter, we provide a roadmap of the sources of data on the various forms of intellectual property protection. We first explain what data is available about patents, copyrights, trademarks, and other types of intellectual property, and where to find it. Then we identify and analyze data sources specifically relating to intellectual property licensing and litigation, growing areas of research by scholars and lawyers.

Download the chapter from SSRN at the link.

August 26, 2015 | Permalink

Copyright As Speech

Derek E. Bambauer, University of Arizona College of Law is publishing Copyright = Speech in volume 65 of the Emory Law Journal (2015). Here is the abstract.
Expression eligible for copyright protection should be presumptively treated as speech for First Amendment purposes. Both copyright and the First Amendment share the goal of fostering the creation and dissemination of information. Copyright’s authorship requirement furnishes the key link between the doctrines. The Article examines where the two areas of law align and conflict in offering or denying protection. Using copyright law as a guide for the First Amendment offers three benefits. First, many free speech problems can be clarified when examined through copyright’s lens. Second, this approach makes the seeming puzzle of non-human speakers understandable. Finally, it can help end technological exceptionalism in First Amendment doctrine.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.

August 26, 2015 | Permalink

Monday, August 24, 2015

Free Speech, Democracy, and Video Images

Justin F. Marceau and Alan K. Chen, both of the University of Denver College of Law, have published Free Speech and Democracy in the Video Age as University of Denver Legal Studies Research Paper No. 15-42. Here is the abstract.

The pervasiveness of digital video image capture by large segments of the public has produced a wide range of interesting social challenges, but also presents provocative new opportunities for free speech, transparency, and the promotion of democracy. The opportunity to gather and disseminate images, facilitated by the reduced expense and easy access to camera phones and other hand-held recording devices, decentralizes political power in transformative ways. But other uses of this technology represent potentially significant intrusions on property rights and personal privacy. This tension creates a substantial dilemma for policymakers and theorists who care about both free speech and privacy. Because of these putative social interests, laws governing video image capture are becoming more widespread across a number of different regulatory regimes, from Federal Aviation Administration regulations of drone recordings to bans on recordings of police officers performing their duties to so-called Ag-Gag laws, which criminalize the video recording of incidents of animal abuse at commercial agricultural facilities. In this Article, we examine constitutional theory and doctrine as applied to emerging government regulations of video image capture and propose a framework that will promote free speech to the fullest extent possible without presenting unnecessary intrusions into privacy interests. The Article first argues that video recording is a form of expression or, at the very least, is conduct that serves as a necessary precursor of expression such that it counts as speech within the meaning of the First Amendment. We continue with the novel argument that none of the features that make video recording a form of speech apply differently when the recording takes place on private property. Next, we examine under what circumstances video recording is constitutionally protected. We claim that video recording in public places or on private property with the consent of those recorded is presumptively protected speech under the First Amendment. But we also argue that the right to record attaches even when the recording is nonconsensual and occurs on private property, as long as the material recorded is a matter of public concern. While we acknowledge that the First Amendment does not limit the enforceability of generally applicable prohibitions on access to private property, we nonetheless suggest that a recording of activity that is a matter of public concern and is done by someone who is lawfully present on that private property is protected speech. That is not to say that all regulation of such recordings violates the First Amendment, and we therefore address when countervailing governmental interests might justify limitations on the right to record, including tangible property interests and reasonable privacy expectations. Throughout this part, we draw on examples of laws regulating video recordings to suggest how our proposed model for a right to record would apply in context. The First Amendment model developed in this.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

August 24, 2015 | Permalink

Re-Examining the Legal Basis of the "Right To Be Forgotten"

Miquel Peguera, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC) & Stanford Univesity Law School Center for Internet and Society, has published The Shaky Ground of the Right to Be Delisted. Here is the abstract.

It has long been discussed whether individuals should have a “right to be forgotten” online to suppress old information that could seriously interfere with their privacy and data protection rights. In the landmark case of Google Spain v AEPD, the Court of Justice of the European Union addressed the particular question of whether, under EU Data Protection Law, individuals have a right to have links delisted from the list of search results, in searches made on the basis of their name. It found that they do have this right – which can be best described as a “right to be delisted” – when some conditions are met. The ruling, which imposes on search engines the duty to assess and accommodate delisting requests, has proven to be highly controversial. Strong feelings have been expressed either in favor or against it, in what may be seen as a clash between the values of personal data protection and freedom of expression. This article does not delve into this underlying debate. Instead, it aims to explore the solidness of the ground on which the right is based. It begins by providing an overview of the relevant elements of EU data protection law so as to allow readers not familiar with its nuances to properly follow the discussion. After presenting the facts of Google Spain, both at national and EU level, the article discusses how the ‘right to be delisted’ was crafted by the CJEU. It argues that it is based on shaky ground, as it is premised on the characterization of search engines as “data controllers,” which is arguably at odds with their intermediary role and – in the absence of specific safeguards – makes their activity largely incompatible with the data protection legal framework. Moreover, the article discusses how the Court failed to devise a proper balance of the different rights at stake, particularly that of freedom of expression and information. It suggests that the intermediary role of generalist search engines should be adequately protected, both under the data protection legal framework as well as under the liability limitation scheme established by the E-Commerce Directive. This, however, is not likely to be achieved in the near future. A careful approach by national courts and data protection authorities is thus suggested as a way to fix some of the shortcomings identified in the ruling.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

August 24, 2015 | Permalink

Photographer Claims Mel Gibson Spit, Swore at Her When She Took His Photograph

New South Wales police are now investigating allegations by a Daily Telegraph reporter that actor Mel Gibson abused her both verbally and physically when she took his photograph as he and his girlfriend left a Sydney, Australia, movie theater on August 23.  The photographer, Kristi Miller, says the actor swore at her, spit at her, and called her names. Mr. Gibson denies her claims.  (Via the Hollywood Reporter). More here from The Age, here from the Daily Telegraph.

August 24, 2015 | Permalink

Defenses to Injury to Reputation In the Chinese Legal Regime

Yik Chan Chin, Hong Kong Baptist University, is publishing Privilege and Public Opinion Supervision Defences in China's Right to Reputation Litigation in the September 2014 issue of the Media & Arts Law Review. Here is the abstract.

This article examines the Chinese court’s application of two defences (qualified privilege and public opinion supervision) to a claim for injury to reputation in the context of publication in the written media, and considers the implications of different applications for freedom of expression in China. For the media to effectively utilise the qualified privilege defence, China’s Supreme People’s Court needs to clarify that the publication of a follow-up or correction report by the media should be triggered by the alleged victim’s notification. The lack of legal rigour effectively deems the defense of public opinion supervision meaningless, as no special protection to the right has been consistently granted. The issue for Chinese law and the judiciary administering that law is to establish a clear, specific and coherent legal framework governing the protection of the right to reputation and the right to freedom of expression, which will operate to guide the courts and limit their discretion.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.

August 24, 2015 | Permalink

Thursday, August 20, 2015

The Misuse of Private Information Tort In English Law

Apostolos Pelekanos, University of Sussex, has published Misuse of Private Information in English Law. Here is the abstract.

The protection of information in English law has been a matter of debate for many years. The introduction of the “misuse of private information” tort fueled the intensity of this debate rather than offering a satisfactory solution. This essay will present a brief history of how privacy rights have been protected in this jurisdiction and why privacy is difficult to be defined; how the transmutation from “breach of confidence” to “misuse of private information” occurred and the characteristics of the new tort as well as some critique to its current application. It will also display and dispute the arguments against a standalone privacy tort and it will introduce the latest developments in other common law jurisdictions in order to predict the legislative developments in the UK. Lastly, it will briefly refer to the new technologies, namely the internet, and how it might affect the future course of privacy rights before presenting a personal view on the matter.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

August 20, 2015 | Permalink