Friday, March 13, 2009
Muzzammil Hassan, the Bridges TV exec accused of killing his wife days after she filed for divorce, has pled not guilty. Officers found his wife beheaded at the television station after he turned up at a local police station telling them she was dead. A judge has ordered him returned to jail pending the start of his trial.
In recent decades, American courts have held that public hate speech, such as the Nazi march in Skokie, must be protected under the First Amendment because there is no principled way to distinguish that speech from other forms of political expression. Many American constitutional scholars take the same view. In this essay, which is a contribution to an international symposium on Extreme Speech and Democracy, I offer an alternative understanding of hate speech, public discourse, and freedom of expression. In Part I, I outline a general theory of the First Amendment. On this view, free speech is rooted in respect for the autonomy and dignity of human beings. But the same values that justify freedom of speech also give rise to other fundamental rights which are entitled to protection under the law. Speech that infringes these rights may be regulated by narrowly drawn laws, except in situations where the value of the speech is sufficient to justify the injuries it causes. Part II applies this approach to political hate speech like the Nazi march. I begin by arguing that this form of speech invades its targets' rights to personal security, personality, citizenship, and equality. The crucial question then becomes whether this form of speech nevertheless should be protected because of its political character. The answer to this question turns on our conception of political speech. After criticizing two of the leading theories in this area - Justice Holmes's vision of the marketplace of ideas and Robert C. Post's theory of public discourse - I argue that political speech is best understood as discourse among individuals who recognize one another as free and equal persons and members of the political community - a view that derives support from classic theorists such as Locke and Hegel as well as from contemporary theorists such as Meiklejohn and Habermas. By denying recognition to its targets, political hate speech violates the fundamental ground rules that should govern political debate. For these reasons, I contend that, in principle, this form of speech should not receive constitutional protection. Interpreting the First Amendment in this way would not only allow American law to reconcile the competing demands of free speech and human dignity, it would also bring that law into harmony with the approach to political hate speech that is taken by many other liberal democratic nations and the international community.
Isn't it nonsensical to suggest, as Susan Sontag does, that "the pornographic imagination says something worth listening to?" The relationship between constitutional law and pornography is usually considered in a unidirectional way. The most common questions are what does the law say about pornography or what should the law say about it. This is nothing but a legal monologue; sometimes passionate, often judgmental, almost always self-righteous but, all in all, nothing but a monologue.
In this paper, I take the opposite road, exploring the aesthetics and narrative of pornography, its underlying anthropology and sociology, and its psychological appeal to our imagination, as an illustrative resource for some debates within constitutional theory. I call this particular reversal of the legal monologue an exercise in Political Pornography.
Free speech law seems to consist of unrelated, technical, and incoherent rules. That appearance is misleading. This Article is the first in a series that reveals the inherent structure of free speech law as entailing three judgments: one about the role of government, another about the target of government regulation, and the third a constrained cost-benefit analysis.
This Article focuses on the first of these judgments. We identify two roles government may play: (1) as regulator interfering with private speech or (2) as patron acting on its own by speaking, sponsoring speech, or managing an internal governmental function. We claim that the constraints of free speech law generally apply when government regulates private speech, but not when government acts on its own. We develop this argument by analyzing the school speech cases, paying particular attention to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Morse v. Frederick.
The work of Robert Post provides the greatest insight to date about the importance of role of government in free speech law, explaining various free speech doctrines. The final part of this Article explores both how Post's analysis can deepen our understanding of the school speech cases and how the school speech cases can refine Post's analysis.
A Warner Brothers employee, Ms. Lyle, sued the writers of the TV program, Friends, for sexual harassment because the writers used sexually explicit coarse and vulgar language during their script writing sessions for the show. In the Supreme Court of California's majority opinion regarding the suit (Lyle v. Warners Brothers Television Productions, 132 P.3d 211 (2006)), the majority held, among other things, that the plaintiff's sexual harassment claims were not supported by the facts because the discussions of the Friends writers were not "aimed at Lyle or other female employees" or "severe or pervasive" enough to constitute sexual harassment.
Further, the court concluded that the Friends writers did not treat women differently from men; both sexes were on the receiving end of the writer's crude jokes, comments, drawings, and behavior. Basically, the court considered the sexual conduct as a necessary part of the Friends writers' job; because the Friends show was a sexually explicit TV program, writing for the show was necessarily going to involve the writers discussing sexual words and conduct, including their own sexual conduct.
While the majority declined to consider whether the writers' crass words and conduct was protected by the First Amendment right of free speech; the concurring opinion tackled this issue with vigor, stating the case was more about free speech rights than sexual harassment. The judge in the concurring opinion opined that creative speech, used to create an employer's constitutionally protected work product (i.e., books, movies, television programs), is protected under the First Amendment, and can never create a hostile work environment unless the speech was directed at the plaintiff. If the speech was directed "at or about" the plaintiff, then the offending speech is not protected as creative expression under the First Amendment, and the court could then analyze whether such offending speech was sexually harassing speech.
In a more recent case, Mary Nelson, among several other female employees, filed suit against, Dov Charney, the founder of the avant guard clothing manufacturing company, American Apparel, claiming that he sexual harassed her during her employment with his company. Mr. Charney and his attorney subsequently argued, during media interviews, that his vulgar and coarse language (as well as his meetings with the plaintiff in his underwear) would be protected by the First Amendment as creative speech used to create a constitutionally protected work product (fashion instead of TV scripts) via the Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions case.
On April 28, 2008, New York Governor David Paterson signed into law the Libel Terrorism Protection Act, the nation's first legislative attempt at protecting American authors and publishers from a recent explosion of forum shopping, aptly called "libel tourism". Instead of suing American authors in the United States, wealthy litigants are increasingly filing suit in claimant-friendly countries, where the publication and the parties have little connection, but the plaintiff is more likely to win and thus stifle critical reporting. Since its enactment, New York's bold and controversial law has become a national model. Illinois passed its own libel tourism law in August, and [at the time of publication] Congress is currently considering two variations of a similar federal statute, one of which unanimously passed the House of Representatives in September 2008.
While many heralded the New York law as a victory for free speech, even its supporters have identified potential constitutional and policy problems with it. This note explores whether the problem of libel tourism merits such a legislative response and, if so, whether the law is good policy and stays within constitutional parameters. Part I describes the factors that created the forum-shopping trend and assesses the extent of the resulting chilling effect on American authors and publishers. Part II discusses how U.S. courts have responded to the phenomenon by barring enforcement of foreign libel judgments on public policy grounds. Part III considers the Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz case, which triggered a national response culminating in the New York legislature's rejoinder as well as similar federal bills. Part IV explores constitutional and policy problems posed by the New York law, including: i) jurisdictional overreaching, ii) comity concerns, iii) over-breadth, iv) vagueness, and v) redundancy and inadequacy -- since without the jurisdictional overreaching, it merely codifies the common law and fails to deter future libel tourism. Part V concludes that while the New York law provides an important first step towards protecting authors from the threat of foreign libel judgments, federal legislation should avoid its jurisdictional and over-breadth problems and model a remedy after state anti-SLAPP statutes. This would allow media defendants to recover damages from those true libel tourists who file spurious claims abroad with the purpose of chilling their speech. Such legislation, which singles out and punishes libel tourists, would deter future harassment of American authors and publishers and provide a remedy for those with assets subject to enforcement abroad.
Download the article from SSRN here.
Military Judge Rules That Qualified Privileges Applies; CBS Does Not Have To Turn Over Outtakes In Haditha Trial
A judge has refused to order CBS News to turn over unaired video of an interview with Staff Sergeant Frank Wuterich, a Marine charged in conjunction with the 2005 deaths of 24 Iraqi civilians in Haditha. The government had sought the release of the video via a subpoena. The judge, Jeffrey Meeks, ruled that a qualified newsgathering privilege applies. Read more here and here.
Hawaii's Lieutenant Governor is among those objecting to a recently aired Saturday Night Live skit that parodies locals who entertain visitors to the islands. Lieutenant Governor James "Duke" Aiona says he'll send a letter of protest to SNL executive producer Lorne Michaels telling him the bit, which has of course turned up on YouTube, was over the top, and might dissuade people from visiting the state, which is suffering from the current economic downturn. But others think the skit was either funny or fairly accurate. Read more here.
Thursday, March 12, 2009
North Carolina writer Sheri Gilbert is suing Jane Fonda, Jennifer Lopez and other involved with the 2005 movie Monster-in-Law, alleging that the film is based on her script, written in 1998. The defendants say a hostile mom-in-law from hell is nothing original and say they'll see Ms. Gilbert in federal court. Come to think of it, we've seen that script before, too. Let's see how it plays out. Read more here.
This article explores an unnoticed aspect of trademark law which in some circumstances constitutes a license to cheat. Trademark law protects consumers against the seller who passes off his product as another's (inter-brand fraud). But it does not protect consumers from a seller that uses its own trademark to misrepresent its own product (intra-brand fraud). False advertising law protects consumers against intra-brand fraud, but only if the seller uses a descriptive term. This is the license to cheat: If a seller uses a non-descriptive mark to sell its product, no cause of action arises under the law of false advertising (because the mark is not descriptive) or trademark law (because there is no passing off). The article explores how an alternative conception of the economic function of trademarks can be used to understand the informational value of trademarks and their advertising function. After identifying circumstances appropriate for legal intervention the article concludes with a proposal for a new interpretation to the Trademark Act that addresses this troubling situation. law protects consumers against the seller who passes off his product as another's (inter-brand fraud). But it does not protect consumers from a seller that uses its own trademark to misrepresent its own product (intra-brand fraud). False advertising law protects consumers against intra-brand fraud, but only if the seller uses a descriptive term. This is the license to cheat: If a seller uses a non-descriptive mark to sell its product, no cause of action arises under the law of false advertising (because the mark is not descriptive) or trademark law (because there is no passing off). The article explores how an alternative conception of the economic function of trademarks can be used to understand the informational value of trademarks and their advertising function. After identifying circumstances appropriate for legal intervention the article concludes with a proposal for a new interpretation to the Trademark Act that addresses this troubling situation. Download the paper from SSRN here.
Even though it has generated more than one thousand complaints so far, that Christian Party advertisement is staying up wherever it is. The Advertising Standards Authority considers it "electioneering material" and according to ASA codes, it is permissible even though it offends some Britons with its slogan: "There definitely is a God. So join the Christian party and enjoy your life." The words are meant as a contrast to the recent British Humanist Association's bus advertisments which read "There's probably no God. Now stop worrying and enjoy your life." Read more here.
Cearta blogger Eoin O'Dell has a long and informative post on the recently decided ECHR case of Times Newspapers v. United Kingdom. The Court considered whether the UK's law violated Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
On 8 September 1999 The Times published a report in the printed version of the newspaper headlined “Second Russian Link to Money Laundering”. This report stated:
“British and American investigators are examining the role of an alleged second Russian mafia boss over possible involvement in money-laundering through the Bank of New York.
Investigators are understood to be looking at links to [G.L.: his name was set out in full in the original article], whose company, Nordex has been described by the CIA as an 'organisation associated with Russian criminal activity'.
[G.L.]'s name surfaced in earlier money-laundering investigations which may have links to the Bank of New York affair, in which millions of dollars of Russian money are alleged to have been laundered.
The Russian-born businessman came to the attention of European and American investigators in the early Nineties. They suspected Nordex of using its former international base in Vienna as a front for a large-scale money-laundering operation. His name also figured in a British police report in 1995, known as Operation Ivan, which looked at the extent of the influence of the Russian mob in London.
[G.L.] has repeatedly denied any wrong-doing or links to criminal activity.
Nordex, which has since moved out of Vienna, is also alleged to have been involved in the smuggling of nuclear weapons and by the mid-1990s reportedly controlled about 60 businesses in the former Soviet Union and another 40 companies in the West.
The Times has learnt that these included between eight and ten off-shore companies in British jurisdictions, including the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man.
They were administered through a chartered accountant in central London whose offices and home were raided in 1996 by officers from the City of London Police.
The companies were suspected of being used to help launder money from Russia, which was then channelled through European banks. No charges were ever filed against the accountant.
At about the same time a Yugoslav associate said to have been a frontman for [G.L.] was stopped and questioned after arriving at a London airport. No charges were filed against him.
The British investigation into Nordex is believed to have failed because of the difficulty of establishing that the money funnelled through off-shore companies controlled by Nordex was linked to criminal activities.
[G.L.] is alleged to be a former business associate of Viktor Chernomyrdin, the former Russian Prime Minister, and in 1995 his name hit the headlines after it emerged that he had been photographed with President Clinton at a Democrat fund-raising event in 1993.
He is also alleged to have had business dealings with Semyon Mogilevich, the Hungarian-based mafia figure at the centre of the Bank of New York investigation.”
7. On 14 October 1999 The Times published a second article entitled “Trader linked to mafia boss, wife claims”. This report stated:
“A Russian businessman under investigation by Swiss authorities pursuing allegations of money-laundering was a friend of [G.L.], a suspected mafia boss, the businessman's wife claims.
Lev Chernoi, the aluminium magnate under Swiss investigation, was given access to staff and a chauffeur by [G.L.] when he moved to Israel, according to Lyudmila Chernoi, Mr Chernoi's estranged wife ...
If Mrs Chernoi's allegation about a connection between her husband and [G.L.] is true, it will raise further questions about Mr Chernoi. In 1996 the CIA described Nordex, a company operated by [G.L.] and alleged to have been used to launder money and smuggle nuclear weapons, as an 'organisation associated with Russian criminal activity'.
In 1996 [G.L.] triggered a row in America after a photograph was published of him with President Clinton in 1993. [G.L.] has denied any wrongdoing.”
8. Both articles were uploaded onto the applicant's website on the same day as they were published in its newspaper.
B. The commencement of proceedings
9. On 6 December 1999 G.L. brought proceedings for libel in respect of the two articles printed in the newspaper against the applicant, its editor and the two journalists under whose by-lines the articles appeared, (“the first action”). The defendants did not dispute that the articles were potentially defamatory and did not seek to prove that the allegations were true. Instead, they relied solely on the defence of qualified privilege, contending that the allegations were of such a kind and such seriousness that they had a duty to publish the information and the public had a corresponding right to know.
10. While the first action was underway, the articles remained on the applicant's website, where they were accessible to Internet users as part of the applicant's archive of past issues. On 6 December 2000, G.L. brought a second action for libel in relation to the continuing Internet publication of the articles (“the second action”). Initially, the defendants' only defence to the second action was one of qualified privilege. The two actions were consolidated and set down for a split trial on issues of liability and then quantum.
11. On 23 December 2000, the applicant added the following preface to both articles in the Internet archive:
“This article is subject to High Court libel litigation between [G.L.] and Times Newspapers. It should not be reproduced or relied on without reference to Times Newspapers Legal Department.”
C. The Internet publications proceedings
12. In or around March 2001 the defendants applied to re-amend their defence in the second action in order “to contend that as a matter of law the only actionable publication of a newspaper article on the Internet is that which occurs when the article is first posted on the Internet” (“the single publication rule”). They argued that, as a result, the second action was time-barred by section 4A of the Limitation Act 1980.
13. On 19 March 2001 the High Court refused permission to re-amend the defence, relying in particular on the common law rule set out in Duke of Brunswick v Harmer (see paragraph 20 below) that each publication of a defamation gives rise to a separate cause of action. The court held that, in the context of the Internet, this meant that a new cause of action accrued every time the defamatory material was accessed (“the Internet publication rule”).
14. On 20 March 2001 the High Court found that the defendants had no reasonable grounds for contending that after 21 February 2000 (the date on which the defendants lodged their defence in the first action) they remained under a duty to publish the articles on the Internet. As a result, the court struck out the defence of qualified privilege in relation to the second action. On 27 March 2001, judgment was entered for G.L. in the second action, with damages to be assessed. By this time the applicant had removed the articles from its website.
D. The Court of Appeal
15. The defendants appealed against the High Court's order of 19 March 2001 rejecting the single publication rule. They argued that the Internet publication rule breached Article 10, pointing out that as a result of the rule newspapers which maintained Internet archives were exposed to ceaseless liability for re-publication of the defamatory material. The defendants argued that this would inevitably have a chilling effect on the willingness of newspapers to provide Internet archives and would thus limit their freedom of expression.
16. In its judgment of 5 December 2001, the Court of Appeal, per Simon Brown LJ, dismissed the appeal against the order in the second action, stating:
“We do not accept that the rule in the Duke of Brunswick imposes a restriction on the readiness to maintain and provide access to archives that amounts to a disproportionate restriction on freedom of expression. We accept that the maintenance of archives, whether in hard copy or on the Internet, has a social utility, but consider that the maintenance of archives is a comparatively insignificant aspect of freedom of expression. Archive material is stale news and its publication cannot rank in importance with the dissemination of contemporary material. Nor do we believe that the law of defamation need inhibit the responsible maintenance of archives. Where it is known that archive material is or may be defamatory, the attachment of an appropriate notice warning against treating it as the truth will normally remove any sting from the material.”
17. On 30 April 2002 the House of Lords refused leave to appeal. The parties subsequently settled the action and the applicant agreed to pay G.L. a sum of money in full and final settlement of claims and costs arising in both actions.
The applicant complains that the Internet publication rule constitutes an unjustifiable and disproportionate restriction of its right to freedom of expression as provided in Article 10 of the Convention, which reads, insofar as relevant, as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society ... for the protection of the reputation or rights of others ...”
29. The applicant contended that the Internet publication rule restricted its ability to maintain a publicly accessible Internet archive. It pointed to the “chilling effect” that the rule had upon freedom of expression, which it said was aggravated by the fact that it had not actively sought to disseminate the information contained in its Internet archive. The applicant submitted that Article 10 required the adoption of a single publication rule.
30. The applicant contested the finding of the Court of Appeal that the maintenance of archives constituted an insignificant aspect of freedom of expression. The applicant pointed to the importance of the integrity and availability of historical records to an open and democratic society.
31. The applicant argued that since the defence of qualified privilege was a complete defence to the libel claim, it was under no obligation to publish a qualification in respect of the relevant articles until the litigation had been resolved. It pointed out that the Code of Practice of the Press Complaints Commission obliged newspapers to post a notice or qualification where a publication had been the subject of a judgment or settlement in favour of the complainant. Any other approach would require a large number of articles to be qualified. Attempts to limit qualification to those articles which were potentially libellous would be difficult: because the libellous nature of a publication may change over time, the applicant would be required to keep the entirety of its Internet archive under review. The applicant pointed out that approximately 500 items were uploaded onto its Internet archive every day.
32. The applicant argued that it was open to the Court to consider the general principle which arose, notwithstanding the specific facts of the case. Although the applicant accepted that G.L.'s rights were also engaged, it considered that a single publication rule would not constitute an excessive restriction on the right of effective access to the court.
33. The Government relied on the conclusions in the domestic proceedings that the journalists had not demonstrated the requisite standard of responsibility in respect of the two articles. They further relied on the fact that no qualification was added to the articles on the applicant's website until 23 December 2000, over 12 months after the original libel proceedings were initiated.
34. Although the Government accepted that maintaining archives had a social utility, they considered that this was not an aspect of the exercise of freedom of expression which was of central or weighty importance, archive material being “stale news”. In the present case, the Government argued that there was no evidence that the applicant had been prevented or deterred from maintaining its online archive. Furthermore, the steps required of the applicant to remove the sting from its archive material were not onerous.
35. As regards the applicant's claim of ceaseless liability, the Government observed that no question of ceaseless liability arose in the present case. The Government pointed out that the second action was contemporaneous with the first action and did not raise stale allegations many years after the event. In any case, even under a single publication rule, (1) the continued publication of articles which the applicant knew to be defamatory, which were not qualified in any way and which were not defended as true would constitute a separate actionable tort under English law; and (2) if accompanied by a statutory discretion along the lines of section 32A of the 1980 Act, the court may well have exercised that discretion to allow G.L. to bring the second action, having regard to the circumstances.
36. The Government highlighted that the present case also engaged the Article 8 and Article 6 rights of G.L. In the choice between the single publication rule and the Internet publication rule, these competing interests should be balanced. They pointed to the fact that there was no consistency of approach to this issue in other jurisdictions and concluded that, on the facts of this case, the application of the Internet publication rule was a permissible and proportionate restriction on the applicant's right to freedom of expression and did not violate Article 10.
37. The Court notes that judgment was entered against the applicants in the second action. Furthermore, the applicant subsequently agreed to pay a sum of money in settlement of G.L.'s claims and costs in both actions. The Court therefore considers that the second action constituted an interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression. Such interference breaches Article 10 unless it was “prescribed by law”, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in Article 10 § 2 and was “necessary in a democratic society” to attain such aim or aims.
38. The applicant does not contest the lawfulness of the interference, which derived from the application of the rule set out in Duke of Brunswick v Harmer as developed in the case of Godfrey v Demon Internet Limited. The Court sees no reason to hold that the interference was not lawful and therefore concludes that the interference with the applicant's right freedom of expression was “prescribed by law” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2.
39. The Internet publication rule is aimed at protecting the rights and reputation of others. It has not been disputed, and the Court also agrees, that the interference has a legitimate aim.
40. The Court reiterates that freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and in that context the safeguards guaranteed to the press are particularly important. Whilst the press must not overstep the boundaries set, inter alia, in the interest of “the protection of the reputation or rights of others”, it is nevertheless incumbent on it to impart information and ideas of public interest. Not only does the press have the task of imparting such information and ideas but the public also has a right to receive them. In this way, the press fulfils its vital role as a “public watchdog” (Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, 26 November 1991, § 59, Series A no. 216).
41. The Court observes that the most careful of scrutiny under Article 10 is required where measures or sanctions imposed on the press are capable of discouraging the participation of the press in debates on matters of legitimate public concern (Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, § 64, ECHR 1999-III). The Court further recalls that particularly strong reasons must be provided for any measure limiting access to information which the public has the right to receive (see Timpul Info-Magazin and Anghel v. Moldova, no. 42864/05, § 31, 27 November 2007).
42. However, the Court reiterates that Article 10 does not guarantee a wholly unrestricted freedom of expression to the press, even with respect to press coverage of matters of serious public concern. When exercising its right to freedom of expression, the press must act in a manner consistent with its duties and responsibilities, as required by Article 10 § 2. These duties and responsibilities assume particular significance when, as in the present case, information imparted by the press is likely to have a serious impact on the reputation and rights of private individuals. Furthermore, the protection afforded by Article 10 to journalists is subject to the proviso that they act in good faith in order to provide accurate and reliable information in accordance with responsible journalism (Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, § 54, ECHR 1999-I and Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas, cited above, § 65).
43. Finally, it should be recalled that in assessing whether the interference was justified, it is not the role of the Court to substitute its views for those of the national authorities but to review the case as a whole, in the light of Article 10, and consider whether the decision taken by national authorities fell within the margin of appreciation allowed to the member States in this area (Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, § 50, Series A no. 24).
44. The applicants maintain that they are exposed to litigation, without limit in time, on account of the adoption of the Internet publication rule instead of the single publication rule.
45. The Court agrees at the outset with the applicant's submissions as to the substantial contribution made by Internet archives to preserving and making available news and information. Such archives constitute an important source for education and historical research, particularly as they are readily accessible to the public and are generally free. The Court therefore considers that, while the primary function of the press in a democracy is to act as a “public watchdog”, it has a valuable secondary role in maintaining and making available to the public archives containing news which has previously been reported. However, the margin of appreciation afforded to States in striking the balance between the competing rights is likely to be greater where news archives of past events, rather than news reporting of current affairs, are concerned. In particular, the duty of the press to act in accordance with the principles of responsible journalism by ensuring the accuracy of historical, rather than perishable, information published is likely to be more stringent in the absence of any urgency in publishing the material.
46. The Court further observes that the introduction of limitation periods for libel actions is intended to ensure that those who are defamed move quickly to protect their reputations in order that newspapers sued for libel are able to defend claims unhindered by the passage of time and the loss of notes and fading of memories that such passage of time inevitably entails. In determining the length of any limitation period, the protection of the right to freedom of expression enjoyed by the press should be balanced against the rights of individuals to protect their reputations and, where necessary, to have access to a court in order to do so. It is, in principle, for contracting States, in the exercise of their margin of appreciation, to set a limitation period which is appropriate and to provide for any cases in which an exception to the prescribed limitation period may be permitted (see Stubbings and Others v. the United Kingdom, 22 October 1996, §§ 54-55, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV).
47. On the facts of the present case, the Court considers it significant that, although libel proceedings in respect of the two articles were initiated in December 1999, the applicant did not add any qualification to the articles in its Internet archive until December 2000. The Court recalls the conclusion of the Court of Appeal that the attachment of a notice to archive copies of material which it is known may be defamatory would “normally remove any sting from the material”. To the extent that the applicant maintains that such an obligation is excessive, the Court observes that the Internet archive in question is managed by the applicant itself. It is also noteworthy that the Court of Appeal did not suggest that potentially defamatory articles should be removed from archives altogether. In the circumstances, the Court, like the Court of Appeal, does not consider that the requirement to publish an appropriate qualification to an article contained in an Internet archive, where it has been brought to the notice of a newspaper that a libel action has been initiated in respect of that same article published in the written press, constitutes a disproportionate interference with the right to freedom of expression. The Court further notes that the brief notice which was eventually attached to the archive would appear to undermine the applicant's argument that any qualification would be difficult to formulate.
48. Having regard to this conclusion, it is not necessary for the Court to consider in detail the broader chilling effect allegedly created by the application of the Internet publication rule in the present case. The Court nonetheless observes that the two libel actions brought against the applicant concerned the same two articles. The first action was brought some two to three months after the publication of the articles and well within the one-year limitation period. The second action was brought a year later, some 14 or 15 months after the initial publication of the articles. At the time the second action was filed, the legal proceedings in respect of the first action were still underway. There is no suggestion that the applicant was prejudiced in mounting its defence to the libel proceedings in respect of the Internet publication due to the passage of time. In these circumstances, the problems linked to ceaseless liability for libel do not arise. The Court would, however, emphasise that while an aggrieved applicant must be afforded a real opportunity to vindicate his right to reputation, libel proceedings brought against a newspaper after a significant lapse of time may well, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, give rise to a disproportionate interference with press freedom under Article 10.
49. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that in the present case, the finding by the domestic courts in the second action that the applicant had libelled the claimant by the continued publication on the Internet of the two articles was a justified and proportionate restriction on the applicant's right to freedom of expression.
50. There has accordingly been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
Check out Dr. O'Dell's post for extensive analysis of the case.
[Thanks to Eoin O'Dell for alerting me to the ruling.]
Wednesday, March 11, 2009
A hot blogosphere topic this week: the website Medical Justice, which advertises that it is "Relentlessly Protecting Physicians From Frivolous Lawsuits." According to the site's founders, its purpose is to promote an agreement between physicians and patients that would deter Internet defamation.
When first seen, elective patients are asked to sign an agreement of mutual privacy. Patients agree not to post about their doctor on the Web without the doctor's permission. Patients are free to discuss their care with other doctors, family, friends, licensing boards, attorneys, and any number of institutions. In exchange, physicians grant additional privacy protections to patients above and beyond those mandated by law.
Michael J. Totten, who has written for Commentary, Reason, and the Wall Street Journal, recounts about what happened when écrivain engagé Christopher Hitchens wrote on a Syrian Social Nationist Party sign during a recent visit to Beirut, and members who saw him took exception.
San Francisco authorities appear to have had ENOUGH after a "flash mob" of up to 3000 people appeared on February 14 armed with pillows and had great fun for six hours having at one another. Participants didn't clean up, leaving the city with a $20,000 bill for feather detail. (Flash mobs are groups of people who contact one another via electronic means and suddenly show up for an event.) The authorities say they may now start requiring permits for such things, although they acknowledge that giving advance notice is a problem. Read more here and here.