Mass Tort Litigation Blog

Supreme Court Issues Two Personal Jurisdiction Decisions - Both Products Liability Cases

The Supreme Court issued its decisions in Nicastro and Goodyear.  Coverage at the civil procedure and federla courts blog and more to come.

The bottom line: no revolution in the doctrine of personal jurisdiction - its as messy as ever.  I have really enjoyed reading the decisions, however, and am looking forward to teaching them.  Goodyear is a particularly masterful opinion in terms of clear and concise writing.

ADL

Some Thoughts on the Seventh Circuit's Opinion in Randall v. Rolls-Royce Corp.

With the Supreme Court hearing oral arguments in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes last Tuesday, there's a good bit of focus from around the web on the individualized hearings aspect of Randall v. Rolls-Royce Corp., a Seventh Circuit opinion decided on March 30, 2011.  In Randall, Judge Posner affirmed the denial of class certification for a Title VII and Equal Pay class action because plaintiffs' were inadequately represented and because backpay would require individualized hearings.

What was most interesting to me about the case, however, was its tie-in to Smith v. Bayer Corp., which is still pending before the Supreme Court.  Recall that Smith v. Bayer Corp. presents the question of whether to afford preclusive effect to a federal court's decision not to certify a class.  

In Smith v. Bayer, I found two things troubling about the Eighth Circuit's opinion below (In re Baycol Products Liability Litigation).  First, the appellate court suggested that plaintiffs should've intervened in the first suit to preserve their right to appeal, but, because the class was never certified, no notice was ever sent out to the class members.  How should the plaintiffs have known to intervene without any formal notice that the lawsuit was pending?  

Second, although the class was never certified, the appellate court nevertheless claimed that the plaintiffs were adequately represented.  This is odd.  Parties can be bound to a decision when they were parties to the previous suit, in privity with those parties, or were adequately represented.  Putative class members are generally not considered parties to a suit until the class has been certified; here, the plaintiffs in the second suit were not the named plaintiffs in the first suit.  

Similarly, it's hard to see how the parties in the second suit were adequately represented in the first suit.  Can a court really conclude that a putative class was adequately represented when it chooses not to certify the class and it's the certification decision that operates to legitimize the actions of the class representatives and class counsel to act on behalf of the class?  This also raises personal jurisdiction questions.  Following the rationale from the Supreme Court's opinion on personal jurisdiction in Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, it's hard to see how the second plaintiffs would be bound by the federal court's decision not to certify the class.  In Shutts, the court likened the failure to opt out of a (b)(3) class to consent to jurisdiction.  Courts have long held that plaintiffs consent to personal jurisdiction by submitting their claims to the court.  So, by failing to opt out, the plaintiffs effectively "consented."  But in the Baycol litigation, there was no certification, thus no chance to opt-out, thus no consent.  From that, it would seem that there was no personal jurisdiction (one of the questions certified in Smith v. Bayer).  Likewise, this seems to put us quite close to the doctrine of virtual representation that the Supreme Court struck down in Taylor v. Sturgell.

The logical question that follows shows just how slippery the Eighth Circuit's reasoning was in In re Baycol and it's also the tie-in to the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Rolls-Royce: What is the preclusive effect of a decision not to certify the class when class counsel is incompetent?  Can a court really say that the class was adequately represented after it explicitly finds that adequacy isn't met?  

The Seventh Circuit in Rolls-Royce took great pains to explain how plaintiffs' counsel dropped the ball, picked poor class representatives, and did not diligently pursue the case.  Should this effort and the resulting decision not to certify the class really preclude subsequent attorneys from trying to certify a similar class?  Granted, the district court in Rolls-Royce also granted summary judgment to the defendants, so these circumstances are a bit different, but it doesn't take much imagination to see the harm that could result from the Eighth Circuit's reasoning.

ECB

The Market for Specious Claims

S. Todd Brown (Buffalo) has posted a paper entitled The Market for Specious Claims on SSRN.  It promises to be an interesting application of the adverse selection problem to our favorite subject here at the Mass Tort Litigation Blog!  Here is the abstract:

Few problems are more disruptive to the efficient operation of comprehensive mass tort settlements than over-subscription, which, at times, appears to be fueled primarily by specious claims. In settlements with opt out rights, a flood of claims can generate a market for lemons, with the weakest claims submitting to the settlement and the strongest opting out and seeking recovery at trial or in private settlement. In binding settlements, they may result in a commons problem, requiring dramatic reductions in payment that effectively transfer recoveries from those with intrinsically strong claims to those with weak claims.

This Article evaluates the history of three mass torts where specious claim practices were uncovered and identifies common themes that reflect broader lessons about the potential for over-subscription. In particular, although commentators often focus on the incentives that drive claim recruiting, this Article explains that over-subscription has its origins in claim development incentives, which may be distorted by fixed settlement criteria and encourage practices that lend themselves to specious claim filings. This dynamic is particularly likely to generate specious claim markets for low or negative expected value claims. Moreover, the manner in which this process unfolds presents special difficulties for ethical enforcement and deterrence, suggesting that other mechanisms for controlling specious claim markets may be necessary.

ADL

Tobacco Medical Monitoring Decision in Eastern District of New York

Judge Amon in the Eastern District of New York last week dismissed plaintiffs' medical monitoring claim in a proposed tobacco class action.  Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 06-CV-224 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2011).  Here's the decision.

BGS

Southwestern Law School Vancouver Summer Program at UBC & Global Tort Litigation Course

Southwestern Law School, in collaboration with the University of British Columbia (UBC) Law Faculty and the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, will host a four-week Summer Law Program in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, from May 29 to June 29, 2011.  In its 19th year, the program draws upon the collegial relationship between UBC and Southwestern, and offers a variety of academic and social experiences through (1) courses taught by prominent U.S. and Canadian law professors; (2) Distinguished Guest Lecturer, the Honorable Justice Rosalie Silberman Abella of the Supreme Court of Canada; (3) Midday Lecture Series presented by leading international scholars; (4) a part-time externship program; and (5) field excursions to local courts and other legal agencies.  Here is the brochure.

I look forward to teaching a course on Global Tort Litigation in the Vancouver program this summer.  Here's the course description: 

This course will examine tort and civil procedure issues arising in global tort litigation, with particular focus on mass tort litigation spanning multiple countries. Subjects will include comparative approaches to liability for defective products, responses to terrorism, governmental liability, class actions, attorneys’ fees, and civil litigation generally. The course will also discuss crisis management. Particular attention will be given to litigation pertaining to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, BP Gulf oil spill, Toyota automobile unintended acceleration, Agent Orange defoliant, Vioxx drug, Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, and DBCP pesticide.

Other professors teaching in the Vancouver summer program include Linda Carter (McGeorge), Bruce MacDougall (UBC), Caleb Mason (Southwestern), and Hari Osofsky (Minnesota).  Professors Gowri Ramachandran and Caleb Mason (both of Southwestern) are co-directors of the program. 

BGS 

Two Families in Fatal Toyota Accident Join to Sue Toyota for Unintended Acceleration

The family who lost a son and granddaughter in the accident has come together with the man driving the Toyota to file a suit against Toyota for unintended acceleration.  Jan Crawford of CBS has the story.

BGS

New York Jurors Find Merck Not Liable in Fosamax Bellwether Trial

Merck has won the second of three bellwether trials on Fosamax, Graves v. Merck & Co., 1:06-cv-05513 (S.D.N.Y.).  Judith Graves, a Florida resident, sued the company and alleged that Fosamax (an osteoporosis drug) caused her jawbone to deteriorate.  The jury asked the judge for the date of the first report from which Merck could have known of an association between Fosamax and jawbone problems and found that the report appeared six months after the plaintiff's problems started.  Accordingly, jurors might've decided that Merck couldn't have known about the risks in time to warn the plaintiff.

Merck faces more than 1,500 claims in federal and state courts alleging various defects in Fosamax.  So far it has won two of the three cases that have gone to a jury trial; the third awarded damages of $8 million to the plaintiff, which was reduced to $1.5 million.

The New York Times article on the trial is available here, and the Wall Street Journal article is available here.  TheStreet provides the most detailed coverage, which is available here.

ECB

Supreme Court to Consider Vaccine Case

Barry Meier of the NYTimes reports.  The issue is whether the plaintiff can bring products liability suits or whether they must bring the suit only in the vaccine court, created by the 1986 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. 

This case concerns a woman who suffered seizures as a result of a DPT vaccine administered when she was a baby and has resultant developmental problems.  But there are many parents of children with autism who believe there is a link between vaccines and autism and would like to bring their cases outside of the adminsitrative system set up by the Act.

Thomas Burke, a political scientist at Wellesley College, has written on this topic.  Click here for his website.

ADL

Supreme Court to Hear Case on the Anti-Injunction Act's Relitigation Exception

The Supreme Court granted cert in yet another class action case (Smith v. Bayer Corp., No. 09-1205) to determine whether a federal judge can enjoin plaintiffs from bringing an economic injury class action in a state court after a federal court declined to certify the class.  The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283, provides that, subject to three important exceptions, a federal court may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in state courts.  Those exceptions include where Congress expressly authorizes the injunction, where it's in necessary aid of the federal courts jurisdiction, or to protect and effectuate federal judgements.  Should one of the exceptions apply, the All Writs Act provides the positive authority for federal courts to enjoin state court proceedings.  

Some of the most famous class action injunction cases to date include:

(1) the Third Circuit's In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation, a 1998 case in which the Third Circuit refused to enjoin a Louisiana state court from certifying and settling a class where the Third Circuit had previously reversed the finding that the settlement was fair;

(2) the Fifth Circuit's decision in In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, where the Fifth Circuit approved the use of two exceptions in the Anti-Injunction Act to prevent a group of South Carolina plaintiffs from certifying similar antitrust claims in South Carolina because they attempted to escape the preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment approving the class settlement;  and

(3) Judge Weinstein's opinion in In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation in which he invoked the exceptions to effectuate a limited fund class action settlement under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).

In Smith v. Bayer Corp., the Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court's ruling that prevented Baycol plaintiffs from bringing another economic injury class action in West Virginia state court after the federal judge overseeing the MDL proceedings already denied class certification on similar issues.  Keith Smith and Shirley Sperlazza, the petitioners, argued that they weren't parties to the federal case and didn't know about the lawsuit.  They also argued that they were asserting a common-law fraud claim under West Virginia law, which the federal plaintiffs did not assert.

The BNA Class Action Litigation Report (subscription required) has a nice write-up of the issues in the case, including the injunction and personal jurisdiction issues.  Here are links to the Petition for Certiorari, the Brief in Opposition, and the Petitioner's Reply (courtesy of SCOTUSblog).

ECB 

Toyota Settles Unintended Acceleration Lawsuit

According to an article in the Wall Street Journal, Toyota has settled, for an undisclosed amount, an unintended-acceleration lawsuit involving the deaths of four persons.  The accelerator appeared to have been caught in the floormat.  The article notes that Toyota faces about 200 unintended-acceleration lawsuits.

BGS

Plaintiffs' Attorneys Jockey for Lead Position in Toyota Litigation

Today's Wall Street Journal has an article about the plaintiffs' attorneys jockeying for the lead position in the Toyota MDL.  The litigation has been consolidated in front of U.S. District Court Judge James Selna of Santa Ana, California.  The applicants listed qualifications range from receiving the key to the City of Miami to speaking to Japanese engineers 15 years ago to donating kidneys to inventing healthy doughnuts.  WSJ's Law Blog has a short post on it as well.

ECB

Remaining Pockets of Lead Poisoning

An article today in The New York Times discusses the remaining pockets of lead poisoning in urban areas, despite the nationwide trend of decreasing lead poisoning.

BGS

ACI Conference on Chemical Products Liability and Environmental Litigation

American Conference Institute will be hosting a conference on Chemical Products Liability and Environmental Litigation on April 28-29, 2010 in Chicago, IL.  I will be speaking on mass torts and ethics, with particular attention to the ethics of mass settlements.  Here's the brochure (Download ACI Brochure).  

BGS

Mass Torts & Bankruptcy Teleconference

HB Litigation Conferences will be hosting a teleconference on Mass Torts & Bankruptcy on Wednesday, April 7, from 2:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. EST.  I'll be speaking along with Steven C. Bennett (Jones Day), Sander Esserman (Stutzman Bromberg), and Mark Plevin (Crowell & Moring).

BGS

Panel on Pluralism in Tort Law and Litigation at Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities

As previously mentioned, I was part of a panel on Pluralism in Tort Law and Litigation at the annual conference of the Association for the Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities, which took place on Saturday, March 20 at Brown University.  Professor Alan Calnan (Southwestern) moderated the panel, and other participants included Professors Christopher Robinette (Widener) and Sheila Scheuerman (Charleston).  Below are the abstracts and links to audio from the presentations and Q&A.  Thanks to Alan Calnan for moderating and to all for participating.

***

I.  Prof. Alan Calnan -- Introduction (audio)

II.  Prof. Christopher Robinette -- "The Instrumentalism in Tort Reforms" (audio)

The traditional view among legal historians is that tort was largely deontic private law until the late nineteenth century.  Due to factors such as the Industrial Revolution and the advent of liability insurance, tort became (more) instrumentalist.  A survey of major tort reforms over the course of the last century provides evidence to support this view.  Each of the reforms--workers' compensation, no-fault automobile insurance, products liability, and "modern" tort reforms (such as damage caps)--is based in instrumentalism.  Furthermore, the reforms become increasingly integrated into tort law as time passed.  The earliest reform, workers' compensation, was a substitute for tort law.  By the time of the modern reforms, instrumentalism is operating within tort itself, and covers a multitude of tort cases.

III.  Prof. Byron Stier -- ""Examining Litigant Autonomy in Mass Torts: Insights from the Individualism of Ayn Rand" (audio)

Class actions and other aggregate procedural methods raise questions about the relationship of the individual to the group.  Litigant autonomy -- the litigant's interest in controlling his or her lawsuit -- has generally been considered merely one value among others in mass tort litigation, and only recently has a robust commitment to litigant autonomy been seen to call into question the entire structure of class action practice.  In looking for insight into the proper place for litigant autonomy in class actions or other management methods, we might fruitfully turn to political debates concerning the relationship of the citizen to the state, for both settings examine the rights of the individual against the perceived needs of the group or collective.  For discussion of that political question, I look to an unusual source -- outside law, to the literature of one known for her radical political individualism, Ayn Rand.  Her novel, "We The Living," which was published in 1936 and is set in the aftermath of the communist revolution in Russia, puts forth a moral argument for individualism stemming from the sanctity of one's own life, and of one's control of one's own life, for one's own ends, not the group's; she also argues that personal tragedy and systemic corruption accompany an approach that fails to respect individuals' lives and choices.  Turning back to mass tort litigation, I suggest that our notion of litigant autonomy can be informed by Rand's themes and that current class action rules show flaws similar to the collectivism that Rand critiques. Viewing litigant autonomy not merely as one value among others, but instead as an organizing principle that must be respected as a core right, I suggest that current class action rules regarding notice, opt-out, and settlement are problematic because they do not allow adequate expression of individual preference and they blunt each class member's individuality.  In addition, by avoiding individual control, the current class action rules create fertile ground for corruption and collusive settlements.

IV.  Prof. Sheila Scheuerman (audio)

In my presentation, I examine whether and when tort law should permit
"no injury" claims -- claims where the plaintiff's harm has not yet
materialized.  Examples of these suits include medical monitoring
actions, products liability claims where a known defect exists, but the
product has not yet malfunctioned, as well as consumer fraud claims
where the consumer's decision was not affected by the defendant's
alleged misrepresentation.  Recent years have seen an influx of these
suits under an array of tort and contract theories.  Traditionally,
however, tort doctrine has premised liability on an injury to an
identified party.  But is "injury" a necessary pre-requisite?  I address
whether tort values support these "no injury" causes of action.  In
other words, should "no injury" claims be actionable under the varied
rationales for the tort system and, if so, under what circumstances?

V.  Questions and Answers (audio)

***

BGS

Toyotal Lawsuits - behind the scenes at an MDL

Here is an interesting article about the JPMDL oral arguments in the Toyota lawsuits: Lawyers Play Speed-Date in Toyota Tussle.

The issue the article discusses (rather disdainfully) is who will be the lead lawyers in the Plaintiffs' Management Committee because those lawyers will lead the litigation, garner the most fees, etc.

More needs to be written about procedures to allocate power among plaintiffs attorneys as well as fees, a process that could use more process.

Note too the names raised in the article: Mark Lanier (Houston based) who tried the Vioxx cases, Mark P. Robinson Jr (who according to the article was involved in the Ford Pinto litigation in the 70's), and Mark Geragos (who is best known for representing Michael Jackson).

h/t Todd Gilbert

ADL

Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations

I have posted a draft of the last in a trilogy of articles on nonclass aggregation and thought I would provide a brief retrospective for the interested reader.  The first article in the trilogy is Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation, which explains in-depth the problems and risks presented by nonclass aggregation.  It observes that systemic legitimacy and compliance with judicial decisions hinges on ensuring procedural justice, but that our current system for handling large-scale litigation fails to provide a number of key procedural-justice components including the preference for adversarial litigation, participation opportunities, impartiality, and error correction.  These institutional shortcomings are due in large part to the trade-offs inherent in large-scale litigation.  Those trade-offs include that "litigation is no longer adversarial despite litigants’ preferences, but effective individual litigation is too costly to pursue; aggregate settlements provide few participation opportunities and no avenues for appeal or error correction despite potential conflicts, but, without aggregate settlements, cost and delay could be staggering and the relief may come too late; mediators or special masters might afford claimants additional participation opportunities, but process is then less adversarial and may suffer from legitimacy problems."  Id. at 46. 

The second article in the trilogy is Litigating Groups. In Litigating Groups, I laid the theoretical groundwork for an alternative to our current approach by borrowing insights from other disciplines—social psychology, moral and political philosophy, and behavioral law and economics—and bringing those notions of commitment, community, and groups to bear on nonclass aggregation.  By relying on the other-regarding preferences that tend to form from group membership, I argued that groups of plaintiffs may have or could be encouraged to develop organic or indigenous origins such that they form moral obligations to one another that are reinforced by social and personal norms. (I have also summarized these contentions in a short response to Judge Weinstein - A New Way Forward: A Response to Judge Weinstein.)

The current (and latest) article is the third and final piece in the trilogy.  It's titled Litigating Together, Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations.  This Article translates the theoretical foundation laid in Litigating Groups into concrete, feasible procedures for litigating together.  Although Litigating Groups maintained that plaintiffs who form groups will likely develop other-regarding preferences toward their fellow group members, it did not fully formulate procedures for promoting cooperation and group formation; decide when, whether, or how to impose sanctions when norms and moral obligations fail; contemplate incentives to join the group; or determine when exiting the group is appropriate.  Accordingly, this Article takes up those hard questions as well as the challenge of determining whether and how substantive and procedural law should enforce moral obligations once a certain level of moral interconnectedness exists.  Here's the SSRN abstract:

In a post-Class Action Fairness Act world, the modern mass-tort class action is disappearing. Indeed, multi-district litigation and private aggregation through contracts with plaintiffs’ law firms are the new mass-tort frontier. But something’s amiss with this “nonclass aggregation.” These new procedures involve a fundamentally different dynamic than class actions: plaintiffs have names, faces, and something deeply personal at stake. Their claims are independently economically viable, which gives them autonomy expectations about being able to control the course of their litigation. Yet, they participate in a familiar, collective effort to establish the defendant’s liability. They litigate from both a personal and a collective standpoint.

Current scholarship overlooks this inter-personal dimension. It focuses instead on either touting the virtues of individual autonomy or streamlining mass litigation to maximize social welfare. Both approaches fail to solve the unique problems caused by these personal dimensions: temptations for plaintiffs to hold out and thus derail settlements demanding near unanimity, outliers who remain disengaged from the group but free-ride off of its efforts, and subgroups within the litigation whose members compete for resources and litigation dominance to the group’s detriment. Accordingly, this Article has two principal objectives: one diagnostic, one prescriptive. The diagnosis is this: current procedures for handling nonclass aggregation miss the mark. Process isn’t just an exercise in autonomy or a handy crutch for enforcing substantive laws. Procedures can serve as a means for bringing plaintiffs together, plugging their individual stories into a collective narrative, making sense of that narrative as a community, reasoning together about the right thing to do, and pursuing that end collectively. Thus, the prescription is litigating together.

Along the way, I've developed a few aspects of this overall project in greater detail for various symposia:

 In Aggregation, Community, and the Line Between, I provided a more detailed account of the moral and political theory animating this "litigating together" approach.  This article contends that encouraging plaintiffs to form groups and reach decisions through deliberation relies on a mix of individual consent and moral obligation. Allowing plaintiffs to exercise their free will when deciding whether to associate with others preserves the liberal tenet of self-determination and escapes the anti-democratic criticism leveled at class actions. Yet, a purely liberal approach fails to capture the obligatory aspect of reciprocal promises to cooperate and the communal obligations that attach. Although plaintiffs voluntarily enter into the group, once they are group members and have tied together their collective litigation fates, they should not be permitted to exit when doing so violates their commitments. Of course, the community itself determines the content of its members’ rights and obligations to one another. Thus, the article concludes by explaining the rationale for group autonomy in terms of pluralism and communitarianism. 

In Group Consensus, Individual Consent (which is still very much "in progress," as they say), I explore how this project relates to sections 3.17 and 3.18 of the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation and use those principles as a lens for exploring thematic questions about the value of pluralism, group cohesion, governance, procedural justice, and legitimacy in nonclass aggregation.  Both this project and Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations are still very much in progress, so, as always, I welcome your comments. 

I'm extremely grateful for all of the helpful comments and criticisms of so many scholars in the field along the way.  I'm also looking forward to tackling new and different projects that have been waiting in the wings for some time now.

ECB

ASLCH Annual Conference and Presentation on "Examining Litigant Autonomy in Mass Torts: Insights from the Individualism of Ayn Rand"

On Saturday, March 20, I'll be speaking as part of a panel on "Pluralism in Tort Law and Litigation" at the annual meeting of the Association for the Study of Law, Culture, and Humanities, at Brown University in Rhode Island.  The panel will be moderated by Professor Alan Calnan (Southwestern), and other presenting panelists are Professors Christopher Robinette (Widener) and Sheila Scheuerman (Charleston). A podcast of the panel may later be posted on this blog.  Given the conference's focus on culture and humanities, my talk draws upon literature and political theory.  Here's the abstract for my talk:

Byron Stier -- "Examining Litigant Autonomy in Mass Torts: Insights from the Individualism of Ayn Rand"

Class actions and other aggregate procedural methods raise questions about the relationship of the individual to the group.  Litigant autonomy -- the litigant's interest in controlling his or her lawsuit -- has generally been considered merely one value among others in mass tort litigation, and only recently has a robust commitment to litigant autonomy been seen to call into question the entire structure of class action practice.  In looking for insight into the proper place for litigant autonomy in class actions or other management methods, we might fruitfully turn to political debates concerning the relationship of the citizen to the state, for both settings examine the rights of the individual against the perceived needs of the group or collective.  For discussion of that political question, I look to an unusual source -- outside law, to the literature of one known for her radical political individualism, Ayn Rand.  Her novel, "We The Living," which was published in 1936 and is set in the aftermath of the communist revolution in Russia, puts forth a moral argument for individualism stemming from the sanctity of one's own life, and of one's control of one's own life, for one's own ends, not the group's; she also argues that personal tragedy and systemic corruption accompany an approach that fails to respect individuals' lives and choices.  Turning back to mass tort litigation, I suggest that our notion of litigant autonomy can be informed by Rand's themes and that current class action rules show flaws similar to the collectivism that Rand critiques. Viewing litigant autonomy not merely as one value among others, but instead as an organizing principle that must be respected as a core right, I suggest that current class action rules regarding notice, opt-out, and settlement are problematic because they do not allow adequate expression of individual preference and they blunt each class member's individuality.  In addition, by avoiding individual control, the current class action rules create fertile ground for corruption and collusive settlements.

BGS

Albany Law Journal Symposium Issue on Off-Label Drug Prescription

The Albany Law Journal of Science & Technology has published a symposium issue on Regulating the Cure: Topics Arising Out of the Prescription of Drugs Off-Label.  My article, Promotion of Off-Label Drug Use: In Favor of a Regulatory Retreat, 19 Alb. L.J. Sci & Tec. 609 (2009), is included.

BGS

Walter Olson Attempts to Defuse the Toyota Panic

His article, Exorcising Toyota’s Demons, was published today in the National Review online.

BGS