Tuesday, June 28, 2016

Volkswagen Proposed Class Settlement for $14.7 Billion

The parties litigating over Volkswagen's emissions defeat device have submitted a proposed class action settlement to Judge Breyer for his approval.  After the parties confer with him on June 30, he'll hear arguments over whether to approve that settlement on July 26.

The proposed settlement is available here: Download 1. The settlement money available to class members is a fund of $10,033,000,000, which is based on an assumed 100% buyback of all eligible vehicles and leased eligible vehicles.

If approved, parties who wish to object or opt out must do so before September 16, 2016 (p. 27 describes the opt-out process, which will have to be approved in conjunction with the notice to class members, and p. 28 describes the objection process).  Class members must likewise complete and submit a valid claim form before September 1, 2018, and decide on their chosen remedy by December 30, 2018. Put differently, class members will need to take affirmative action to receive relief.  Failing to submit a claim or to opt out means that their claims will be extinguished under the settlement (and through general res judicata principles). 

The proposal provides VW owners with several options.  They can:

  • sell their car back to VW for the "vehicle value" (a term of art defined in the settlement on p. 16);
  • receive restitution payments calculated based on a percentage of the vehicle value (some owners are eligible for loan forgiveness up to 30% of the vehicle value and owner restitution payment) - an estimate of those settlement payments is available here -  Download 7
  • terminate their car leases with no early termination penalty;
  • modify their vehicle, which should help fix the emissions problems based on the different vehicles; 
  • or may receive both a restitution payment and a vehicle modification.

An overview of the options available to class members and proposed allocation plan is available here:  Download 2

And the proposed short form notice, which is refreshingly straightforward is available for download here:  Download 3.  The longer notice is here:  Download 4. And detailed information on the proposed 5-step claims program and administration is available here:  Download 5. 

June 28, 2016 in Class Actions, Current Affairs, Environmental Torts | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, June 25, 2016

New Book on Class Actions in Context: How Culture, Economics and Politics Shape Collective Litigation

A new book, Class Actions in Context: How Culture, Economics and Politics Shape Collective Litigation, has been published by Edward Elgar Publishing (also available on Amazon).  The editors of the book are Associate Dean Deborah Hensler (Stanford Law) and Professors Christopher Hodges (Oxford) and Ianika Tzankova (Tilburg Law).  A global group of aggregate-litigation scholars contributed to the book, including Dean Camille Cameron (Dalhousie Law, Canada); Associate Dean Manuel Gomez (Florida International Law); Professors Agustin Barroilhet (U. Chile Law), Naomi Creutzfeldt (Research Fellow, Oxford), Axel Halfmeier (Leuphana U., Germany), Kuo-Chang Huang (Member, Taiwan national congress and formerly of National Cheng-Chi U., Taiwan), Jasminka Kalajdzic (Windsor Law, Canada), Alon Klement (Tel-Aviv U., Israel), Elizabeth Thornburg (SMU Law), and Stefaan Voet (U. Leuven & U. Hasselt, Belgium); and myself.  

I authored a chapter, The promise and peril of media and culture: The Toyota unintended acceleration litigation and the Gulf Coast Claims Facility in the United States, and Professor Ianika Tzankova and I co-authored another chapter, The culture of collective litigation: A comparative analysis.    

The book was a remarkable and fascinating undertaking, with many of us contributors gathering at several conferences across the globe over recent years to discuss and compare our ongoing research.  Here is a brief description of the book:

In recent years collective litigation procedures have spread across the globe, accompanied by hot controversy and normative debate. Yet virtually nothing is known about how these procedures operate in practice. Based on extensive documentary and interview research, this volume presents the results of the first comparative investigation of class actions and group litigation ‘in action’.

Produced by a multinational team of legal scholars, this book spans research from ten different countries in the Americas, Europe, Asia and the Middle East, including common law and civil law jurisdictions. The contributors conclude that to understand how class actions work in practice, one needs to know the cultural factors that shape claiming, the financial arrangements that enable or impede litigation and how political actors react when mass claims erupt. Substantive law and procedural rules matter, but culture, economics and politics matter at least as much.

This book will be of interest to students and scholars of law, business and politics. It will also be of use to public policy makers looking to respond to mass claims; financial analysts looking to understand the potential impact of new legal instruments; and global lawyers who litigate transnationally.

We are honored that Professor Geoffrey Hazard (Emeritus, UC Hastings Law & Penn Law) offered the following comment on the book:

Class Actions in Context is a penetrating analysis of class and group actions worldwide. A group of international scholars brings to bear legal, economic, and political analyses of this evolving judicial remedy. It explores various substantive claims ranging from consumer protection to securities litigation. Drawing on case studies of practice as well as legal analysis, it demonstrates the importance of factors running from litigation finance to background cultural traditions. It is worth study in every legal system.


June 25, 2016 in Aggregate Litigation Procedures, Class Actions, Environmental Torts, Lawyers, Mass Tort Scholarship, Procedure, Products Liability, Travel, Vehicles | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, April 30, 2016

Gold on Compensation's Role in Deterrence

Russell Gold (Wake Forest) has posted his latest piece, Compensation's Role in Deterrence, on SSRN.  Here's the abstract:

There are plenty of non-economic reasons to care whether victims are compensated in class actions. The traditional law and economics view, however, is that when individual claim values are small, there is no reason to care whether victims are compensated. Deterring wrongdoing is tort law’s primary economic objective. And on this score, law and economics scholars contend that only the aggregate amount of money that a defendant expects to pay affects deterrence. They say that it does not matter for deterrence purposes how that money is split between victims, lawyers, and charities. This Article challenges that claim about achieving tort law’s primary objective and argues that there is an economic reason to care whether victims are compensated in class actions. It offers reason to think that compensating victims deters more wrongdoing than the same amount of relief in other forms, at least in damages class actions.

Put a different way, this Article contends that the primary objectives of class actions — compensation and deterrence — are intertwined in ways that scholars have not previously recognized. Compensation affects the amount of reputational harm that class actions inflict on defendants, and anticipating that reputational harm provides a source of deterrence. Because the public values compensating victims in civil litigation, if class actions were frequently to slight compensation that would undermine public perception of the class device; class actions would come to seem more like plaintiffs’ lawyers’ extortion mechanisms than legitimate means of redressing harm. Diminished procedural legitimacy makes the class action a less powerful signal about the validity of the underlying claims, which undermines reputational deterrence.

April 30, 2016 in Class Actions, Mass Tort Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, April 29, 2016

Sharkey on The BP Oil Spill Settlements, Classwide Punitive Damages, and Societal Deterrence

Cathy Sharkey (NYU Law) has posted a new piece on SSRN entitled The BP Oil Spill Settlements, Classwide Punitive Damages, and Societal Deterrence.  Here's the abstract:

The BP oil spill litigation and subsequent settlements provide an opportunity to explore a novel societal economic deterrence rationale for classwide supra-compensatory damages. Judge Jack Weinstein was a pioneer in the field of punitive damages class certification. In In re Simon II, he certified a nationwide punitive-damages-only class in a multijurisdiction, multidefendant tobacco lawsuit. Using Judge Weinstein’s innovations in In re Simon II as an analytical lens, the Article evaluates the future prospects for classwide punitive damages claims.

Specifically, the Article considers how private litigants might adopt a societal damages approach in negotiating and achieving class action settlements. Class action settlements readily accommodate the “public law” dimension of societal damages, as demonstrated by the classwide punitive damages settlement with BP’s co-defendant Halliburton. Indeed, on closer inspection, even the BP compensatory damages class settlement has a surrounding aura of societal damages. For even that ostensibly purely compensatory arrangement included an unusual (and mostly overlooked) feature: a provision for supra-compensatory multipliers applicable to certain claimants. This Article advances the new idea that these supra-compensatory multipliers are a form of classwide societal damages embedded within the settlement, and, in turn, a potential blueprint for nascent punitive damages classes of the future.

April 29, 2016 in Class Actions, Current Affairs, Environmental Torts, Mass Disasters, Mass Tort Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Aggregation as Disempowerment: Red Flags in Class Action Settlements

Our own Howie Erichson has posted his latest piece, Aggregation in Disempowerment: Red Flags in Class Action Settlements, on SSRN.  It's a great read for judges and attorneys alike and points out--as the title suggests--provisions in class action settlements that should give judges pause before approving a class settlement. 

Here's the abstract:

Class action critics and proponents cling to the conventional wisdom that class actions empower claimants. Critics complain that class actions over-empower claimants and put defendants at a disadvantage, while proponents defend class actions as essential to consumer protection and rights enforcement. This article explores how class action settlements sometimes do the opposite. Aggregation empowers claimants’ lawyers by consolidating power in the lawyers’ hands. Consolidation of power allows defendants to strike deals that benefit themselves and claimants’ lawyers while disadvantaging claimants. This article considers the phenomenon of aggregation as disempowerment by looking at specific settlement features that benefit plaintiffs’ counsel and defendants without benefiting class members. Recognizing that protection of disempowered class members lies with judges who review settlement agreements, the article identifies red flags to alert judges to problematic settlements and fee requests. By showing how certain settlement features reflect defendants’ cooption of the power of aggregation, the article offers a framework for thinking about class action power dynamics in the age of settlement.

April 29, 2016 in Aggregate Litigation Procedures, Class Actions, Mass Tort Scholarship, Settlement | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, April 21, 2016

Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation

I've spent the better part of the past year and a half analyzing the publicly available nonclass aggregate settlements that have taken place in multidistrict litigation alongside leadership appointments, common-benefit fees, and, where available, recovery to the plaintiffs.  This has given me an in-depth look at what's happening (or has happened) in Propulsid, Vioxx, Yasmin/Yaz, DePuy ASR Hip Implant, Fosamax (2243), American Medical Systems pelvic mesh litigation, Biomet, NuvaRing, and Actos.  I've also analyzed fee practices in Baycol, Ortho Evra, Avandia, Mentor Corp. ObTape, Prempro, Chantix, Pradaxa, and Ethicon Pelvic Repair.

This endeavor has been deeply unsettling for a variety of ethical, doctrinal, and systemic reasons. Professors Erichson and Zipursky's prior work on Vioxx opened our eyes to troubling provisions in that deal, but I had no idea how widespread the problems were or how they had evolved over time from deal to deal until now.  

Propulsid appears to be the primogenitor, for all subsequent deals in the data replicated some aspect of its closure provisions.  But Propulsid is extraordinarily troubling: 6,012 plaintiffs abandoned their right to sue in court in favor of settling.  Only 37 of them (0.6 percent) recovered any settlement money through the physician-controlled claims review process, receiving little more than $6.5 million in total. Lead lawyers, on the other hand, received over $27 million in common-benefit fees through a deal they negotiated directly with the defendant (and had the court approve).  Sadly, that's just the tip of the iceberg.

I posted the fruits of my labor on SSRN today in a piece titled, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation.  It's a 70+ page tomb, so I'll be covering specific aspects of it over the next few weeks in a series of blog posts.  It's not only an indictment of current practices and procedures, but it offers myriad ways for judges to improve MDL practice.  It even comes complete with handy pocket guides for judges, leadership application forms, and leadership applicant scoring sheets in the appendix.

For those of you who love data, there are several tables that may be of interest: Table 1: Provisions Benefitting Defendants Occurring within the Analyzed Settlements on p. 20; Table 2: Common-Benefit Fee Practices on p. 33; and Table 3: Common-Benefit Awards and Nonclass Claimant Recovery within the Data on p. 48.

Today's post simply introduces the paper, so here is the summary:

When transferee judges receive a multidistrict proceeding, they select a few lead plaintiffs’ lawyers to efficiently manage litigation and settlement negotiations. That decision gives those attorneys total control over all plaintiffs’ claims and rewards them richly in common-benefit fees. It’s no surprise then that these are coveted positions, yet empirical evidence confirms that the same attorneys occupy them time and again. When asked, repeat players chalk it up to their experience and skill—no one can manage and negotiate as well as they can. Off the record, however, any plaintiff’s lawyer who’s been involved in multidistrict litigation will explain repeat players’ dominance with stories of backroom deals, infighting, and payoffs. Yet, when judges focus on cooperation and consensus in selecting leaders and then defer to those leaders in awarding common-benefit fees, they dampen open rivalry and enable repeat actors to mete out social and financial sanctions on challengers. 

Anytime repeat players exist and exercise both oligopolistic leadership control across multidistrict proceedings and monopolistic power within a single proceeding, there is concern that they will use their dominance to enshrine practices and norms that benefit themselves at consumers’ (or here, clients’) expense. Apprehensiveness should increase when defense lawyers are repeat players too, as they are in multidistrict litigation. And anxiety should peak when the circumstances exhibit these anti-competitive characteristics, but lack regulation as they do here. Without the safeguards built into class certification, judicial monitoring and appellate checks disappear. What remains is a system that permits lead lawyers to act, at times, like a cartel.

Basic economic principles demonstrate that noncompetitive markets can result in higher prices and lower outputs, and agency costs chronicle ways in which unmonitored agents’ self-interest can lead them astray. By analyzing the nonclass deals that repeat players design, this Article introduces new empirical evidence that multidistrict litigation is not immune to market or agency principles. It demonstrates that repeat players on both sides continually achieve their goals in tandem—defendants end massive suits and lead plaintiffs’ lawyers increase their common-benefit fees. But this exchange may result in lower payouts to plaintiffs, stricter evidentiary burdens in claims processing, or higher plaintiff-participation requirements in master settlements.

These circumstances warrant regulation, for both multidistrict litigation and class actions are critical to redressing corporate wrongdoing. Even though judges entrench and enable repeat players, they are integral to the solution. By tinkering with selection and compensation methods and instilling automatic remands after leaders negotiate master settlements, judges can capitalize on competitive forces already in play. By tapping into the vibrant rivalries within the plaintiffs’ bar, judges can use dynamic market solutions to remap the existing regulatory landscape by invigorating competition and playing to attorneys’ strengths.


As always, your comments are welcome (the draft is still just that, a draft) - please email any comments or corrections to me eburch at uga.edu.  More soon...

April 21, 2016 in Aggregate Litigation Procedures, Class Actions, Current Affairs, Lawyers, Mass Tort Scholarship, Procedure, Products Liability, Vioxx | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, April 18, 2016

NFL Mass Tort Settlement Class Certification Affirmed

By the Third Circuit.  

h/t Adam Zimmerman. 

April 18, 2016 in Class Actions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, April 9, 2016

Briana Rosenbaum on The RICO Trend in Class Action Warfare

Professor Briana Rosenbaum (Tennessee Law) has posted to SSRN the abstract for her article, The RICO Trend in Class Action Warfare, 102 Iowa L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016).  Here's the abstract:

The class action device has been under attack for decades. Recent Supreme Court cases have further enervated class actions, and the current Congress is considering both class action and tort reform. Recently, defendants in aggregate litigation have employed an additional tactic by filing civil RICO cases against plaintiffs’ counsel alleging they fraudulently concealed a few baseless lawsuits among larger sets of claims. The predicate acts in those RICO cases consist solely of litigation activities: the filing of complaints in mass actions and related litigation documents. Members of the defense bar have made no secret of the fact that these RICO cases are part of a larger strategy to prevent plaintiffs’ attorneys from bringing large-scale class actions and other aggregate litigation. Despite the rich literature on class actions, this recent aggressive use of RICO by the defense bar and corporate interest groups to punish plaintiffs’ attorneys for the alleged fraudulent filing of aggregate litigation has gone relatively unexplored.

This Article pulls together several previously unassociated areas of law-including RICO, Rule 11, class actions, SLAPP motions, and asbestos litigation-to develop a model of the RICO trend. It then argues that holding plaintiffs’ attorneys liable under civil RICO solely for litigation activities is illegal, results in the lamentable federalization of state common law, and leads to improper forum shopping. The RICO trend also avoids legitimate state protections for litigation activity and is a thinly-veiled attempt by the defense bar to further weaken class actions by targeting the plaintiffs’ attorneys themselves. Just as critically, this use of RICO punishes the aggregate litigation device itself, rather than the underlying fraudulent conduct; as a remedy for frivolous aggregate litigation conduct, it is both over- and under-inclusive. This Article concludes by proposing several alternatives, including effectively barring any civil RICO action targeting attorneys’ pure litigation activities without systemic wrongdoing.

April 9, 2016 in Class Actions, Lawyers, Mass Tort Scholarship, Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, March 24, 2016

NFL and Big Tobacco?

The New York Times has an article today on the link between NFL and Tobacco called NFL's Concussion Research Deeply Flawed. 

What does this mean for the NFL settlement?  Should the issue be approached in the mode advocated long ago by Francis McGovern - that is, by allowing the mass tort to mature through multiple trials before a settlement is reached?  

This article also raises the question of how the law promotes and creates disincentives for entities to conduct reliable scientific studies.  For interesting takes on that question, compare Wendy Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products with Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation.  


March 24, 2016 in Aggregate Litigation Procedures, Class Actions, Science, Settlement, Tobacco | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, February 21, 2016

Joanna Shepherd's Empirical Survey of No-Injury Class Actions

Professor Joanna Shepherd (Emory) has posted to SSRN her article, An Empirical Survey of No-Injury Class Actions.  Here is the abstract:

This report empirically examines the allocation of settlements and awards in no-injury class actions among plaintiffs, attorneys, and cy pres funds. The results are based on my study of 432 no-injury class action settlements and trial awards from 2005-2015. The study finds that, on average, 60 percent of the total monetary award paid by the defendants was allocated to the plaintiffs’ class and 37.9 percent was allocated to attorneys’ fees. However, because many settlements disperse the unclaimed portion of the settlement fund to a cy pres fund, the funds available to class members at the time of settlement may significantly overstate the actual amount class members ultimately receive. Although 60 percent of the total monetary award may be available to class members, in reality, they typically receive less than 9 percent of the total. In comparison, class counsel receives an average of 37.9 percent of available funds, over 4 times the funds typically distributed to the class. A result in which plaintiffs recover less than 10 percent of the award, with the rest going to lawyers or unrelated groups, clearly does not achieve the compensatory goals of class actions. Instead, the costs of no-injury class actions are passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices, lower product quality, and reduced innovation.

February 21, 2016 in Aggregate Litigation Procedures, Class Actions, Mass Tort Scholarship, Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, January 20, 2016

Decision in Campbell-Ewald

The Supreme Court today held that an unaccepted offer of settlement does not moot a class action.  The decision is here.

January 20, 2016 in Class Actions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, January 18, 2016

Erin Sheley and Theodore Frank on Prospective Injunctive Relief and Class Action Settlements

Professor Erin Sheley (Calgary Law) and Theodore Frank (Competitive Enterprise Institute) have posted to SSRN their article, Prospective Injunctive Relief and Class Action Settlements, Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y (forthcoming).  Here is the abstract:

Despite much controversy and criticism, the class action is alive and well. In particular, the injunctive remedy, requiring the defendant to change some aspect of its business practice, has become a common feature of class action settlements. This article explores a taxonomically distinct remedial category of injunction that has, as of yet, not generally been considered by courts and scholars as such: the prospective injunctive remedy. We demonstrate how the prospective injunctive remedy operates and argue that, in light of the special policy and legal problems it creates, courts should observe a presumption against approving settlements that contain provisions for prospective injunctive relief. In Part I we show how the parties to a class action have, in general, no incentive to benefit either absent class members or society at large and therefore require courts to police them to ensure justice. In Part II we describe the public law underpinnings of prospective injunctive relief and provide three case studies of consumer class actions that demonstrate how and why courts fail to accurately police this relief in the private law context. We compare the approved relief in these cases to the regulatory regimes they disrupt to argue that courts in this way allow class action litigation to produce bad public policy. In Part III we explore the ways in which these prospective remedies likewise produce bad law: namely, through the inappropriate creation of regulatory preemption and the potential violations of attorney-client fiduciary duty, the adequacy requirement of Rule 23(a)(4), and constitutional standing requirements. In Part IV we consider counterarguments and in Part V we conclude.

January 18, 2016 in Class Actions, Mass Tort Scholarship, Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, December 22, 2015

Flint, Michigan Lead in the Water

In an environmental disaster of tragic proportions, the City of Flint, Michigan has discovered that by switching water sources to save money, it inadvertently corroded the lead pipes of the city's water system, leaching lead into the water supply.  The result is a generation of children who have been exposed to lead and likely will suffer permanent effects.  The story is reported, among other places, in this story in the Washington Post.   Residents filed a class action suit against the State and the City in mid-November - you can find the complaint here.  It is interesting in that it alleges constitutional violations - a violation of the right to bodily integrity and deprivation of property under the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. 

The Mayor declared a state of emergency this week. 

December 22, 2015 in Class Actions, Environmental Torts, Food and Drink, Lead Paint, Mass Disasters | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, October 12, 2015

Christopher Hodges on US Class Actions: Promise and Reality

Professor Christopher Hodges (Oxford) has posted to SSRN his research paper, US Class Actions: Promise and Reality, EUI Department of Law Research Paper No. 2015/36.  Here's the abstract:

The US class action is the best-known tool of civil procedure for enforcement of mass private rights. It is intended to achieve judicial and procedural economy in civil procedure, and to exert significant pressure on corporate defendants to observe the law. This piece summarises the major empirical evidence on how the mechanism works. It confirms extensive enforcement of law. It also identifies issues of selectivity of case types (especially securities cases brought by investors), high transactional costs and reductions in sums received by claimants, the risk that high economic factors distort the legal merits of settlements, the limited evidence on evaluating the legal merits of outcomes, forum shopping, and aspects of conflicts of interest that have been criticised by European politicians as abusive. The piece notes that these features are predictable consequences of the policy of encouraging widespread private enforcement of law by incentivising intermediaries and reducing risk to claimants. Various questions are noted in relation to the future of collective redress in the different context of the European legal order.

October 12, 2015 in Class Actions, Mass Tort Scholarship, Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, September 23, 2015

Trust, VW Brand Management, and Emissions Litigation

Harvard Business Review has a an article, What VW Didn't Understand About Trust, by Andrew Wilson.  As perhaps occurred in the Toyota Unintended Acceleration Litigation, VW may be motivated to settle somewhat swiftly any civil litigation or regulatory or criminal inquiries and fines, as part of a larger strategy to regain the public's trust and preserve its brand.   

September 23, 2015 in Class Actions, Products Liability, Travel, Vehicles | Permalink | Comments (0)

Growing VW Emissions Litigation, and Potential Parallels to the Toyota UAL Litigation

Monday, September 14, 2015

Howard Erichson on Judge Jack Weinstein and the Allure of Antiproceduralism

Professor Howard Erichson (Fordham Law and Editor, Mass Tort Litigation Blog) has posted to SSRN his article, Judge Jack Weinstein and the Allure of Antiproceduralism,  64 DePaul L. Rev. 393 (2015).  Here's the abstract:

In one sense of the word proceduralist — a person with expertise in procedure — Judge Jack Weinstein is among the leading proceduralists on the federal bench. But in another sense of the word proceduralist — an adherent of proceduralism, or faithfulness to established procedures — he falls at a different end of the spectrum. Looking at four examples of Judge Weinstein’s work in mass litigation, this Article considers what it means to be an antiproceduralist, someone unwilling to let procedural niceties stand in the way of substantive justice. The allure of antiproceduralism is that it eschews technicalities in favor of substantive justice, but technicalities are in the eye of the beholder, and this Article asks what is lost when a judge steers around procedural constraints.

September 14, 2015 in Aggregate Litigation Procedures, Class Actions, Mass Tort Scholarship, Tobacco | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, August 15, 2015

University of Haifa Conference on the Legal Resolution of Mass Disputes

The University of Haifa in Israel is hosting an international conference on the Legal Resolution of Mass Disputes on November 26-27, 2015.  The conference includes a remarkable gathering of  speakers from numerous countries.  Participating academic speakers include the following: Dean Gad Barzilai (U. Haifa) and Professors Arthur Miller (NYU Law), Christopher Hodges (Oxford U.), Alon Klement (IDC Herzliya), Geraint Howells (City U. of Hong Kong),  Stefaan Voet (U. Leuven), Willem Van Boom (U. Leiden), Astrid Stadler (Konstanz U.), Rhonda Wasserman (U. Pittsburgh), Rabeea Assy (U. Haifa), Ariel Flavian (U. Haifa), Morris Ratner (UC Hastings), Orna Rabinovich Einy (U. Haifa),  Linda Mullenix (U. Texas), and Hélène van​​ Lith (Sciences Po Law Paris).

August 15, 2015 in Aggregate Litigation Procedures, Class Actions, Conferences, Foreign, Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 8, 2015

Cert Grant on Statistical Adjudication

The Supreme Court this morning granted certiorari in Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo.  The questions presented are:

(1) Whether differences among individual class members may be ignored and a class action certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), or a collective action certified under the Fair Labor Standards Act, where liability and damages will be determined with statistical techniques that presume all class members are identical to the average observed in a sample; and (2) whether a class action may be certified or maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), or a collective action certified or maintained under the Fair Labor Standards Act, when the class contains hundreds of members who were not injured and have no legal right to any damages.

You can find more information on the case at SCOTUSBLOG.  

June 8, 2015 in Class Actions, Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, May 8, 2015

Class Actions Ten Years after the Enactment of CAFA

On February 27, 2015, the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice, held a hearing on the state of class actions post-CAFA.  The witnesses'  lack of ideological diversity (with Professor Moore as a single exception) is extremely troubling.  The committee heard testimony from: Andrew Pincus (Partner, Mayer Brown, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform), John Parker Sweeney (President, DRI - the Voice of the Defense Bar), Jessica D. Miller (Partner, Skadden Arps), and Professor Patricia Moore (St. Thomas Univ. School of Law).  

A video of the testimony is available here, and Professor Moore has posted her written remarks on SSRN.

May 8, 2015 in Class Actions, Current Affairs | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)