Friday, September 12, 2014

Oregon Supreme Court Applies Aggregate Settlement Rule to Clergy Abuse

On August 21, 2014, the Oregon Supreme Court embraced the ALI's definition of a non-class aggregate settlement and held that an attorney who represented victims of clergy abuse failed to get the clients' informed consent before distributing a lump-sum settlement.  In In re Complaint as to the Conduct of Daniel J. Gatti, the court noted that Gatti failed to get clients' informed consent in writing to the formula or method he devised to divvy up the defendants' lump-sum settlement payments, which violated Rule 1.8(g).  As a result, the court imposed a 90-day suspension as a sanction.

For more on the problems associated with lump-sum settlements, see Howie's article, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements.

September 12, 2014 in Aggregate Litigation Procedures, Informal Aggregation, Settlement, Sexual Abuse | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, September 10, 2014

Panel on Class Action Reform and the BP Deepwater Horizon Case

Professor Neal Katyal (Georgetown) and Theodore Olson (Gibson Dunn) take part in a Federalist Society panel on class action reform and the BP Deepwater Horizon case; the panel is moderated by Stuart Taylor (Brookings Institution).

 

September 10, 2014 in Aggregate Litigation Procedures, Class Actions, Environmental Torts, Mass Disasters, Procedure, Settlement | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, August 22, 2014

Sampling in CAFA litigation

In a recent decision authored by Judge Easterbrook, the 7th Circuit suggested that plaintiffs looking to prove that their case falls under the "home state exception" to CAFA can use sampling and extrapolation to prove their allegations.  The case is Myrick v. WellPoint, Inc., 2014 BL 229924, 7th Cir., No. 12-3882 , 8/19/14 (citation is to Bloomberg, the Westlaw cite is 2014 WL 4073065).   The case concerns allegations about a health insurance policy sold in Illinois.  

Judge Easterbrook, explaining that the burden of proving the home state exception is on the party assserting it in the 7th Circuit, explained a potential procedure as follows:

Counsel for the proposed class assumed that there were only two options: determine the citizenship of every policyholder (expensive) or rely on assumptions (cheap). But there's at least one more option: take a random sample of policyholders (100, say), ascertain the citizenship of each of these on the date the case was removed, and extrapolate to the class as a whole. If the sample yields a lopsided result (say, 90% Illinois citizens or only 50% Illinois citizens) then the outcome is clear without the need for more evidence. (The more lopsided the result, the smaller the sample needed to achieve statistical significance.) If the result is close to the statutory two-thirds line, then do more sampling and hire a statistician to ensure that the larger sample produces a reliable result.
 
 

 

August 22, 2014 in Class Actions, Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, August 4, 2014

Silver and Hyman on Medical Malpractice Litigation

Professors Charlie Silver and David Hyman have posted their latest article, "Double, Double Toil and Trouble: Justice-Talk and the Future of Medical Malpractice Litigation," on SSRN.  Their article studies the people behind the cases: the lawyers.  It examines the market for legal services and how recent economic changes have impacted that market.  Here's the abstract: 

It’s not easy being a lawyer. “Biglaw” may not be dead (yet), but major firms have dissolved, filed for bankruptcy, and shed partners and practice groups. Small and mid-sized firms and solo practitioners are facing similar challenges. Some of these developments are attributable to the financial crisis and the Great Recession. Others are the result of structural and technological changes affecting the market for legal services — and those changes have revealed new weaknesses in the business forms through which lawyers have traditionally delivered legal services. To most inhabitants of Biglaw, these changes and challenges are unprecedented, but to lawyers who do medical malpractice and personal injury litigation, market turbulence of this sort is old hat. Over the past three decades, there have been dramatic changes in the market (and demand) for such services. Some of these changes are clearly attributable to legislative action, including caps on noneconomic or total damages, and procedural hurdles such as screening panels, certification requirements, and interlocutory appeals of expert witness reports. But, even in states that have not taken such steps, there has been a long-term secular decline in the volume of medical malpractice litigation. Apart from the highly visible public brawl over the merits of damage caps, these developments have attracted little attention. However, the dynamics are clear to those who wish to pay attention to them. In this Article, we explore these trends, highlight the ways in which they have interacted with one another, and then briefly discuss why it is not helpful to analyze these developments in terms of their impact on “access to justice.”

August 4, 2014 in Lawyers, Mass Tort Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Mullenix on Compensation Funds

Professor Linda Mullenix has posted a new article titled "Designing Compensatory Funds: In Search of First Principles" on SSRN.  It takes on several high-profile compensation funds and may have something of interest to say about how GM is designing its own compensation fund.  Here's the abstract:

The World Trade Center Victims’ Compensation Fund of 2001 ushered in a new age of fund approaches to resolving claims for mass disasters in the United States. Since then, numerous funds have been created following several mass events injuring large numbers of claimants. The Gulf Coast Claims Facility, created in the immediate aftermath of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil platform explosion, represented a further expansion of fund design and operation. The funds that have been implemented since 2001, including the World Trade Center Fund, have been the object of both praise as well as criticism. Notably, all these funds have been designed and implemented after the events giving rise to a universe of mass claimants. This article suggests that the policy recommendations for future fund design largely fail to address antecedent threshold questions about the nature of the events giving rise to possible recourse to a fund for compensation of claims. Although such compensation funds have been intended to provide an alternative to the tort compensation system and to operate largely outside the purview of the judicial system, instead most fund designs have relied on tort notions of corrective justice that mimic the tort system. However, many funds have in practice entailed mixed theories of corrective and distributive justice, confusing the purpose, utility, and goals of such funds. This article asks fundamental questions about the goals of such funds and whether and to what extent disaster compensation funds comport with theories of justice. It suggests that certain types of mass disaster events ought not to be resolved through fund auspices at all, while only a limited universe of communitarian harms should give rise to such a response. Finally, a communitarian fund designed ex-ante might more fairly be based on theories of distributive justice based on an egalitarian social welfare norm.

August 4, 2014 in Aggregate Litigation Procedures, Current Affairs, Environmental Torts, Mass Tort Scholarship, Settlement | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, July 14, 2014

Linda Mullenix on Rethinking the American Class Action

Professor Linda Mullenix (U. Texas) has posted to SSRN her article, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the American Class Action, Emory. L.J. (forthcoming 2014).  Here is the abstract:

Class actions have been a feature of the American litigation landscape for over 75 years. For most of this period, American-style class litigation was either unknown or resisted around the world. Notwithstanding this chilly reception abroad, American class litigation has always been a central feature of American procedural exceptionalism, nurtured on an idealized historical narrative of the class action device. Although this romantic narrative endures, the experience of the past twenty-five years illuminates a very different chronicle about class litigation. Thus, in the twenty-first century American class action litigation has evolved in ways that are significantly removed from its golden age. The transformation of class action litigation raises legitimate questions concerning the fairness and utility of this procedural mechanism, and whether class litigation actually accomplishes its stated goals and rationales. With the embrace of aggregative non-class settlements as a primary – if not preferred – modality for large scale dispute resolution, the time has come to question whether the American class action in its twenty-first century incarnation has become a disutilitarian artifact of an earlier time. This article explores the evolving dysfunction of the American class action and proposes a return to a more limited, cabined role for class litigation. In so doing, the article eschews alternative non-class aggregate settlement mechanisms that have come to dominate the litigation landscape. The article ultimately asks readers to envision a world without the twenty-first century American damage class action, limiting class procedure to injunctive remedies. In lieu of the damage class action, the article encourages more robust public regulatory enforcement for alleged violation of the laws.

July 14, 2014 in Aggregate Litigation Procedures, Class Actions, Mass Tort Scholarship, Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Sunday, July 13, 2014

Industry Groups Seek Amendment of Rule 26 to Require Disclosure of Third Party Litigation Financing

Representatives of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform, American Insurance Association, American Tort Reform Association, Lawyers for Civil Justice, and National Association of Manufacturers have submitted a letter to Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, requesting the that Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be amended to require disclosure of third-party litigation financing.  The Institute for Legal Reform also has provided a summary of their request.

July 13, 2014 in Ethics, Lawyers, Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, July 1, 2014

Coverage of GM's New Fund

Joe Nocera has a short opinion piece on Ken Feinberg and his work in progress - the GM claims fund. You can find the piece here.  The question for Feinberg is always - is this replicable?  The answer depends on the company's tolerance for risk and desire for atonement.  

The New York Times' Danielle Ivory also covered the new fund here, explaining how the fund works.

I also recommend the Valukas report on GM. My favorite part is his description of the "GM nod."  Everyone at a meeting nods their head to a plan, nobody actually does anything to move it forward.   

July 1, 2014 in Aggregate Litigation Procedures, Informal Aggregation, Lawyers, Products Liability, Vehicles | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, May 29, 2014

Lawyers Seek MDL Status for Ignition-Switch Liability Suits Against GM

Plaintiffs' attorneys huddled in Chicago on Wednesday to strategize about where to ask the MDL Panel to send the GM ignition switch cases.   As usual, there are several things that will influence plaintffs' attorneys' pick.  

According to this morning's article in the WSJ, Elizabeth Cabraser called the litigation "a perfect storm for a class action."  Maybe.  But that will largely depend on which circuit and which judge hears the case, how GM's bankruptcy affects the pending claims, and whether attorneys forgo personal injury claims (they will likely be excluded in the class definition) to pursue product liability and economic injuries.  

Choice of procedural law, like how to apply Rule 23, can vary.  Under Chan v. Korean Airlines, Ltd. (D.C. Cir. 1989), the Van Dusen doctrine, which holds that transferee courts must apply the choice of law interpretation of the transferor circuit, may not apply to 1407 transfers.  Rather, when it comes to procedural and other federal law matters, Korean Airlines suggests that transferee courts are obligated to follow their own interpretation of the relevant law.  Several circuits follow this rationale including the Second, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh.  Other circuits, including most notably, the Seventh, have held that a transferee court should use transferor court's interpretation of federal law.

 According to Bloomberg, several plaintiffs' attorneys are pushing for a California venue before Judge James Selna, who is currently handling the Toyota acceleration MDL.  This strategy makes sense on several fronts.  The Ninth Circuit, which originally upheld (in part) the certification in Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., has shown a willingness to resolve aggregate cases through class actions.  And given that courts in the Ninth Circuit apply their own procedural law where circuit splits are concerned, this could further help plaintiffs.  Finally, Judge Selna, who certified an economic loss settlement class action in the Toyota litigation, is a logical choice.

But other plaintiffs' attorneys (and of couse GM) have other ideas about where the MDL should land.  Bloomberg reports:

Other plaintiffs want the cases to be heard in Chicago, Miami or Corpus Christi,Texas, where they have sued. GM wants the cases consolidated in the federal court in Manhattan, about a mile from where a prior incarnation of the company filed for bankruptcy in 2009. Company lawyers say proximity to the bankruptcy court trumps Selna’s experience.

While the Panel considers the forum requests by the parties, it is in no way limited to those venues.  There are several factors that it typically cites in favor of forum selection such as the location of discovery materials, convenience of the witnesses, location of grand jury proceedings, possibility of coordination with related state-court proceedings, where the majority of cases are located, knowledge of the transferee judge, and the willingness and motivation of a particular judge to handle an MDL docket.  Of these factors, the transferee judge is by far the most important.  The Panel tends to look for judges who have handled MDLs successfully in the past.  And, for better or worse, "successful" means quick settlement (see here, p. 11-12 for more).

The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigaiton is comprised of seven judges from around the country. Judge David Proctor is the Panel's newest edition and was added just this year to replace Judge Paul Barbadoro.

For more on the process that will--and should--unfold once a transferee judge is appointed and how those judges should go about appointing lead lawyers, see here.

 

 

May 29, 2014 in Aggregate Litigation Procedures, Class Actions, Current Affairs, Lawyers, Procedure, Products Liability, Vehicles | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, May 28, 2014

Tidmarsh on Trial by Statistics and Auctioning Class Settlements

As I've slowly emerged from my grading slump, I've caught up on a number of interesting articles dealing with class actions, two of which are authored by Professor Jay Tidmarsh at Notre Dame.  In case you missed them, too, I thought I'd mention them here.  

The first is a new take on auctions.  Auctions have been proposed and used to pick class counsel, but Tidmarsh proposes using them to increase settlement prices.  Once the parties reach a settlement, the court puts the class's claims up for auction.  If an entity--presumably a corporation, though perhaps a third-party financier?--outbids the settlement price, that entity purchases the class's rights to sue and can continue to litigate against the defendant.  Here's the idea in Tidmarsh's own words in his SSRN abstract

Although they promise better deterrence at a lower cost, class actions are infected with problems that can keep them from delivering on this promise. One of these problems occurs when the agents for the class (the class representative and class counsel) advance their own interests at the expense of the class. Controlling agency cost, which often manifests itself at the time of settlement, has been the impetus behind a number of class-action reform proposals.

This Article develops a proposal that, in conjunction with reforms in fee structure and opt-out rights, controls agency costs at the time of settlement. The idea is to allow the court, once a settlement has been achieved, to put the class’s claims up for auction, with the settlement acting as reserve price. An entity that outbids the settlement becomes owner of the class’s claims, and may continue to pursue the case against the defendant. A successful auction results in more compensation for the class. On the other hand, if no bids are received, the court has evidence that the settlement was fair. The prospect of a settlement auction also deters class counsel and the defendant from negotiating a sweetheart deal that sells out the class.

The Article works through a series of theoretical and practical issues of settlement auction, including the standards that a court should use to evaluate bids, the limitations on who may bid, and the ways to encourage the emergence of an auction market.

Tidmarsh's second article returns to a long-espoused notion: trial by statistics (or, as Justice Scalia used in the pejorative sense in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, "Trial by Statistics.").  Here's the abstract, which explains the idea concisely:

“Trial by statistics” was a means by which a court could resolve a large number of aggregated claims: a court could try a random sample of claim, and extrapolate the average result to the remainder. In Wal-Mart, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court seemingly ended the practice at the federal level, thus removing from judges a tool that made mass aggregation more feasible.

After examining the benefits and drawbacks of trial by statistics, this Article suggests an alternative that harnesses many of the positive features of the technique while avoiding its major difficulties. The technique is the “presumptive judgment”: a court conducts trials in a random sample of cases and averages the results, as in trial by statistics. It then presumptively applies the average award to all other cases, but, unlike trial by statistics, any party can reject the presumptive award in favor of individual trial. The Article describes the circumstances in which parties have an incentive to contest the presumption, and explores a series of real-world issues raised by this approach, including problems of outlier verdicts, strategic behavior by parties, and the parties’ risk preferences. It proposes ways to minimize these issues, including a requirement that the party who reject a presumptive judgment must pay both sides’ costs and attorneys’ fees at trial.

The Article concludes by showing that this approach is consonant with important procedural values such as efficiency, the accurate enforcement of individual rights, dignity, and autonomy.
Although, as Professor Tidmarsh notes, Justice Scalia frowned upon using statistics to resolve aggregated claims in federal court, the opinion didn't say that using statistics would violate federal constitutional due process.  That seems to leave the door open for the legislature to act and authorize statistics were it so inclined.  
 
Happy reading!

May 28, 2014 in Aggregate Litigation Procedures, Class Actions, Mass Tort Scholarship, Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, May 16, 2014

Judging Multidistrict Litigation

I posted a new article to SSRN this morning that's been a labor of love for well over a year now.  I'm excited about this new piece for a few reasons.  

First, it debuts an original data set of all lead lawyers appointed in 72 product liability and sales practices MDLs that were pending as of May 14, 2013.  As such, it's the only paper (that I know of) that includes empirical evidence on plaintiffs-side repeat players appointed to leadership positions.  (Yes, it includes a list of some of the most entrenched repeat lawyers and law firms as an appendix.)  (If this is of interest, have a look at Margaret Williams, Emery Lee, and Catherine Borden's recently published paper in the Journal of Tort Law titled Repeat Players in Federal Multidistrict Litigation, which looks at all plaintiffs' attorneys in MDLs using social network analysis.) 

I also explain why appointing a leadership group comprised of predominately repeat players can cause inadequate representation problems.  For example, repeat players playing the long game have rational, economic incentives to curry favor with one another, protect their reputations, and develop reciprocal relationships to form funding coalitions and receive client referrals.  As such, extra-legal, interpersonal, and business concerns may govern their interactions and trump their agency obligations to uniquely situated clients who could threaten to bust a multi-million dollar deal.  Non-conforming lawyers may be ostracized and informally sanctioned, which promotes cooperation, but deters dissent and vigorous representation.  Over time, expressing contrary opinions could brand the dissenting lawyer a defector, which could decrease lucrative leadership opportunities.  (Other reasons abound, which I explain on pages 25-27 of the paper.) 

Second, it provides some much needed guidance for transferee judges.  Although the Manual for Complex Litigation remains the go-to guide for transferee judges, it hasn't been updated in 10 years.  So much has changed since the fourth edition was published in 2004.  Accordingly, in "Judging Multidistrict Litigation," I suggest best practices for appointing and compensating lead lawyers.  Judges can compensate lead lawyers on a coherent and more predictable basis by distilling current theories down to their common denominator: quantum meruit.  Quantum-meruit awards would align fees with other attorney-fee decisions and compensate leaders based on the value they actually add.  

Third, as anyone familiar with the area knows, settlement review in nonclass litigation is controversial at best.  After judges expressly deny class certification they then harken back to Rule 23 and their "inherent equitable authority" to comment on settlements.  So, employing a quantum-meruit theory for awarding lead lawyers' attorneys' fees would give judges a legitimate private-law basis for scrutinizing settlements.  Because courts must evaluate the case's success to determine how much compensation is merited, it could likewise help stymie a trend toward self-dealing where repeat players insert fee provisions into master settlements and require plaintiffs and their attorneys to "consent" to fee increases to obtain settlement awards.

The article is forthcoming in N.Y.U. Law Review in April of 2015, so I still have a bit of time to tinker with it and welcome comments in the interim (eburch at uga.edu).  In the meantime, here's the formal SSRN abstract.

High-stakes multidistrict litigations saddle the transferee judges who manage them with an odd juxtaposition of power and impotence. On one hand, judges appoint and compensate lead lawyers (who effectively replace parties’ chosen counsel) and promote settlement with scant appellate scrutiny or legislative oversight. But on the other, without the arsenal class certification once afforded, judges are relatively powerless to police the private settlements they encourage. Of course, this power shortage is of little concern since parties consent to settle. 

Or do they? Contrary to conventional wisdom, this Article introduces new empirical data revealing that judges appoint an overwhelming number of repeat players to leadership positions, which may complicate genuine consent through inadequate representation. Repeat players’ financial, reputational, and reciprocity concerns can govern their interactions with one another and opposing counsel, often trumping fidelity to their clients. Systemic pathologies can result: dictatorial attorney hierarchies that fail to adequately represent the spectrum of claimants’ diverse interests, repeat players trading in influence to increase their fees, collusive private deals that lack a viable monitor, and malleable procedural norms that undermine predictability.

Current judicial practices feed these pathologies. First, when judges appoint lead lawyers early in the litigation based on cooperative tendencies, experience, and financial resources, they often select repeat players. But most conflicts do not arise until discovery and repeat players have few self-interested reasons to dissent or derail the lucrative settlements they negotiate. Second, because steering committees are a relatively new phenomenon and transferee judges have no formal powers beyond those in the Federal Rules, judges have pieced together various doctrines to justify compensating lead lawyers. The erratic fee awards that result lack coherent limits. So, judges then permit lead lawyers to circumvent their rulings and the doctrinal inconsistencies by contracting with the defendant to embed fee provisions in global settlements—a well recognized form of self-dealing. Yet, when those settlements ignite concern, judges lack the formal tools to review them. 

These pathologies need not persist. Appointing cognitively diverse attorneys who represent heterogeneous clients, permitting third-party financing, encouraging objections and dissent from non-lead counsel, and selecting permanent leadership after conflicts develop can expand the pool of qualified applicants and promote adequate representation. Compensating these lead lawyers on a quantum-meruit basis could then smooth doctrinal inconsistencies, align these fee awards with other attorneys’ fees, and impose dependable outer limits. Finally, because quantum meruit demands that judges assess the benefit lead lawyers’ conferred on the plaintiffs and the results they achieved, it equips judges with a private-law basis for assessing nonclass settlements and harnesses their review to a very powerful carrot: attorneys’ fees.

May 16, 2014 in Aggregate Litigation Procedures, Class Actions, Ethics, Informal Aggregation, Lawyers, Mass Tort Scholarship, Procedure, Products Liability, Settlement, Vioxx, Zyprexa | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, April 24, 2014

FDA to Regulate E-Cigarettes

The FDA announced its plans to begin regulating E-Cigarettes today.  According to many consumers, the proposed regulations have taken too long already.  For example, a March 23, 2014, New York Times article titled "Selling a Poison by the Barrel: Liquid Nicotine for E-Cigarettes," explained that,

These “e-liquids,” the key ingredients in e-cigarettes, are powerful neurotoxins. Tiny amounts, whether ingested or absorbed through the skin, can cause vomiting and seizures and even be lethal. A teaspoon of even highly diluted e-liquid can kill a small child.

As a USAToday article explains, even "[t]he proposed rules won't ban advertising unless the products make health-related claims nor will they ban the use of flavors such as chocolate or bubble gum, which public health officials say might attract children."  Yet, the lawsuits so far have trended in the opposite direction of what one might expect.  The most widely advertised lawsuits to date are either brought on behalf of smokers challenging New York City's ban on "vaping" e-cigarettes in public places or over e-cigarette patents.

April 24, 2014 in Current Affairs, FDA | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, April 17, 2014

Stanford Symposium on the BP Oil Spill Litigation

The Stanford Journal of Complex Litigation is hosting a symposium, "A Complicated Cleanup: The BP Oil Spill Litigation," on Thursday, May 8, 2014 and Friday, May 9, 2014, at Stanford Law School.  The keynote address speaker is Kenneth Feinberg, the Gulf Coast Claims Administrator.  Other symposium speakers will include Elizabeth Cabraser of Lieff Cabraser, Professor Francis McGovern (Duke), Professor Linda Mullenix (Texas), Professor Maya Stenitz (Iowa), and myself.  Panel moderators will include Stanford Law Professors Nora Engstrom, Deborah Hensler, and Janet Alexander. 

BGS

April 17, 2014 in Aggregate Litigation Procedures, Conferences, Environmental Torts, Lawyers, Mass Disasters, Mass Tort Scholarship, Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, March 31, 2014

Zimmerman on Presidential and Corporate Settlements

Hi everyone!  It's been a long time since I rapped at ya.  I am passing along two recent, and very interesting, papers by Adam Zimmerman of Loyola. The first concerns presidential settlements and is entitled, oddly enough, "Presidential Settlements."  Here's the abstract:

Large groups repeatedly turn to the White House to collectively resolve complex disputes, much like a class action. Such presidential settlements go back at least as far as the early republic, as well as the Progressive Era, when Teddy Roosevelt famously brokered settlements among private groups following a rash of accidental injuries and deaths in mining, rail, and even, football. More modern variants include mass compensation schemes like the Holocaust Victim Settlement, Pan Am Flight 103 Settlement, and the BP Oil Spill Settlement brokered by Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama. In each case, the President helped resolve a sprawling class action-like dispute among warring parties, while also advancing a broader executive agenda. Just as the President has extended power over the administrative state, presidential settlements demonstrate the growth of executive authority in mass dispute resolution to provide restitution for widespread harm.

But this use of executive power creates problems for victims purportedly served by presidential settlements. When the President settles massive private disputes, he resolves them like other forms of complex litigation, but without the judicial review, transparency, and participation thought necessary to resolve potential conflicts of interests among the victims. The Presidents’ other duties as the Chief Executive also aggravate conflicts with groups who may rely entirely on such settlements for relief. 

This Article recommends that the President adopt complex litigation principles to reduce conflicts of interests, to increase transparency, and to improve public participation in White House driven settlements. Envisioning the President as the “Settler-In-Chief,” this Article also raises new questions about how the coordinate branches of government, as well as actors inside the White House, may regulate executive settlement practice consistent with the Separation of Powers.

The second, "The Corporate Settlement Mill," is co-authored with Dana Remus.  Here's the abstract:

From cases involving “robo-signed” mortgages to catastrophic oil spills, the United States legal system increasingly encourages corporate wrongdoers to design and implement their own high-volume settlement programs to compensate thousands of unrepresented victims. These private settlement systems rely on corporate economies of scale to resolve massive disputes as comprehensively as a class action, but entirely outside of the court system. We call these systems “corporate settlement mills.”

Like class action settlements and “no fault” insurance options, corporate settlement mills may ameliorate many of the most commonly criticized features of individualized litigation. They offer redress to people who often cannot afford counsel, handle large volumes of claims quickly and predictably, and reduce court congestion. For those reasons such programs are increasingly required by federal laws, regulatory bodies and as a matter of complex litigation practice. 

But corporate settlement mills also have a dark side. When sophisticated corporate actors quietly settle large numbers of cases in assembly-line fashion, they threaten transparency, fair dealing, and the rule of law. We argue that this new category of dispute resolution is more dangerous than others because a single, self-interested party — the prospective defendant itself — designs and oversees the entire determination process. Corporate settlement mills thus raise fundamental questions about how far policymakers may go to privatize our public, and historically neutral, system of adjudication.

Drawing lessons from other movements to privatize government, we argue that corporate settlement mills can provide an appropriate alternative to public adjudication as long as they remain answerable to the regulators, courts, and claimants that rely on them. We therefore offer specific suggestions to make them more accountable — including targeted prospective regulation, judicial review, stakeholder participation, and ethical reform. In so doing, we broaden the debate over what constitutes mass litigation, in the hope that lawmakers realize the benefits of large private settlements, without frustrating administrative regulation or the judiciary’s authority to “say what the law is.”

Download both while they are hot!

SJC

March 31, 2014 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Sunday, March 23, 2014

2014 Vancouver Summer Law Program and Global Tort Litigation Course

I'm serving as Co-Director of Southwestern Law School's 2014 Vancouver Summer Law Program, which is offered in collaboration with the University of British Columbia Faculty of Law and the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy.  All classes will take place at the University of British Columbia's new Allard Hall, which was completed in 2011 at a cost of $56 million.  On-campus housing at St. Andrew's Hall next to the law school may also be arranged through the summer law program.  The program will run from May 25 to June 25, 2014.  Here is the brochure.  

One of the courses offered will be a course on Global Tort Litigation, which I'll be co-teaching with Professor Jasminka Kalajdzic of the University of Windsor.   Other courses include comparative criminal procedure, international environmental law, and comparative sexual orientation law; students may elect to take two courses for four units, or three courses for six units.  

We welcome applications from students in good standing at an ABA-approved or state-accredited American law school or accredited Canadian law school.  Special reduced tuition rates are available for Canadian law students.  Come join us in beautiful Vancouver, Canada!

BGS

March 23, 2014 in Aggregate Litigation Procedures, Environmental Torts, Foreign, Procedure, Products Liability, Punitive Damages, Travel | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, March 14, 2014

BP Loses 5th Circuit Appeal - Class Action Settlement Stands

In a decision issued on March 3, the Fifth Circuit held that BP must stick to the settlement it signed on to, even if it doesn't like any longer the broad approach to compensation it once agreed to.   As Professor and former Soliciter General Charles Fried said, in sum and substance, a contract is a promise.  Here is an excerpt from the Fifth Circuit opinion:

There is nothing fundamentally unreasonable about what BP accepted but now wishes it had not.  One event during negotiations in the fall of 2012 suggests reasons for just requiring a certification [instead of proof of causation]. The claims administrator, in working through how the proposed claims processing would apply in specific situations, submitted a hypothetical to BP and others. It posited three accountants being partners in a small firm located in a relevant geographic region. One of the three partners takes medical leave in the period immediately following the disaster, thus reducing profits in that period because that partner is not performing services for the firm. At least some of the firm's loss, then, would have resulted from the absence of the partner during his medical leave. BP responded that such a claim should be paid.

We raise this not for the purpose of analyzing an issue we conclude is not relevant to our decision, namely, whether BP is estopped from its current arguments. Instead, we mention it in order to identify the practical problem mass processing of claims such as these presents, a problem that supports the logic of the terms of the Settlement Agreement. These are business loss claims. Why businesses fail or, why one year is less or more profitable than another, are questions often rigorously analyzed by highly-paid consultants, who may still reach mistaken conclusions. There may be multiple causes for a loss. ... The difficulties of a claimant's providing evidentiary support and the claims administrator's investigating the existence and degree of nexus between the loss and the disaster in the Gulf could be overwhelming. The inherent limitations in mass claims processing may have suggested substituting certification for evidence, just as proof of loss substituted for proof of causation. ...

In re Deepwater Horizon, --- F.3d ----, 2014 WL 841313, *5 (5th Cir. 2014). 

Readers may also be interested in a Bloomberg News article by Laura Calkins and Jeff Feeley entitled BP Must Live with $9.2 Billion Oil Spill Deal, Court Says.  In other BP news, looks like it can drill in the Gulf of Mexico again, according to the NYTimes

ADL

March 14, 2014 in Class Actions, Environmental Torts, Mass Disasters, Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, March 12, 2014

Why the GM Litigation May Not Be Your Usual Products Case

Hilary Stout of the New York Times reports in a piece today called "Lawyers Prepare for GM Suits with Novel Strategies."    The issue may be not just products liability, but fraud in the working out of the GM Bankruptcy.

ADL

March 12, 2014 in Products Liability, Vehicles | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, March 4, 2014

SDNY Finds Ecuador Judgment Unenforceable in Chevron Environmental Litigation

Judge Lewis Kaplan entered judgment today in favor of Chevron in the long-running dispute concerning environmental liability for oil pollution in the Oriente region of Ecuador. The court, after a bench trial, found that plaintiffs' attorney Steven Donziger and his team engaged in fraud and corruption in obtaining a $9.5 billion judgment in Ecuador. Judge Kaplan ruled that the Ecuador judgment is unenforceable in the United States and that Donziger may not benefit from the judgment. Undoubtedly, this dispute isn't over, as Donziger surely will appeal to the Second Circuit. And the outcome cannot have been much of a suprise to the parties, given the clarity of Judge Kaplan's views based on his past rulings in this dispute. But by any measure, today's judgment is a huge moment in the Chevron-Ecuador litigation. 

Judge Kaplan's opinion -- all 485 pages and 1842 footnotes of it -- is attached here (Download ChevronSDNYopinion030414). And the judgment, which spells out exactly what the court ordered, is here (Download ChevronSDNYjudgment030414). Judge Kaplan found that Donziger and his team submitted fraudulent evidence, used a partisan as a supposedly impartial expert, and offered to bribe the judge. The opinion does not mince words:

Upon consideration of all of the evidence, including the credibility of the witnesses – though several of the most important declined to testify – the Court finds that Donziger began his involvement in this controversy with a desire to improve conditions in the area in which his Ecuadorian clients live. To be sure, he sought also to do well for himself while doing good for others, but there was nothing wrong with that. In the end, however, he and the Ecuadorian lawyers he led corrupted the Lago Agrio case. They submitted fraudulent evidence. They coerced one judge, first to use a court-appointed, supposedly impartial, “global expert” to make an overall damages assessment and, then, to appoint to that important role a man whom Donziger hand-picked and paid to “totally play ball” with the [Lago Agrio plaintiffs]. They then paid a Colorado consulting firm secretly to write all or most of the global expert’s report, falsely presented the report as the work of the court-appointed and supposedly impartial expert, and told half-truths or worse to U.S. courts in attempts to prevent exposure of that and other wrongdoing. Ultimately, the [Lago Agrio plaintiff] team wrote the Lago Agrio court’s Judgment themselves and promised $500,000 to the Ecuadorian judge to rule in their favor and sign their judgment. If ever there were a case warranting equitable relief with respect to a judgment procured by fraud, this is it.

 

The ruling does not purport to bar enforcement of the judgment outside the United States. Rather, it bars enforcement of the judgment in any U.S. court, and in Judge Kaplan's words, it "prevent[s] Donziger and the two LAP Representatives ... from profiting in any way from the egregious fraud that occurred here." The plaintiffs have sought to enforce the Ecuadorean judgment in Canada, Brazil, and Argentina; it will be interesting to see what effect the SDNY decision might have on enforcement of the judgment in those countries.

In the SDNY litigation, Chevron asked the court to focus on the conduct of the plaintiffs' lawyers, while Donziger wanted to focus on the company's environmental liability for harm in the Oriente region of Ecuador. Judge Kaplan, in ringing language about the integrity of the judicial process, made it clear where he stands:

The issue here is not what happened in the Orienté more than twenty years ago and who, if anyone, now is responsible for any wrongs then done. It instead is whether a court decision was procured by corrupt means, regardless of whether the cause was just. An innocent defendant is no more entitled to submit false evidence, to coopt and pay off a court-appointed expert, or to coerce or bribe a judge or jury than a guilty one. So even if Donziger and his clients had a just cause – and the Court expresses no opinion on that – they were not entitled to corrupt the process to achieve their goal.

 

The painful irony of the Chevron-Ecuador litigation is this: The plaintiffs originally brought their claims in the United States -- in the Southern District of New York. They were dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens. In other words, the U.S. legal system told the plaintiffs that they should litigate this dispute in Ecuador. Which is exactly what they did. And they won big. And today the Southern District of New York has told the plaintiffs that their Ecuador judgment is corrupt and unenforceable. As I have written elsewhere, the forum non conveniens dismissal made sense in this case. And parties must be able to challenge the enforceability of judgments on grounds of fraud and corruption. But if this is how the Chevron-Ecuador litigation ends (which remains to be seen), isn't there something deeply unsatisfying and mind-blowingly inefficient about such an ending to a two-decade litigation over serious environmental claims?

HME

March 4, 2014 in Environmental Torts, Ethics | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

LSU Symposium on Multidistrict Litigation

Louisiana Law Review is hosting a symposium on Multidistrict Litigation this Friday, March 7, 2014, that focuses on remand and may be of interest to our readers.  The title of the symposium is "The Rest of the Story: Resolving Cases Remanded by MDL Here's the link for registration and additional information.

Here's the list of Panels and Panelists:

8:25-8:30: Welcome Address & Opening Remarks

  • Chancellor Jack Weiss; LSU Law School

 8:30-9:30: Panel 1: Collaboration of Judges and Attorneys in MDL Case Management

The panel will discuss how attorneys and judges can successfully collaborate to use disaggregation as a tool of effective case management.

Moderator: Francis McGovern; Professor of Law, Duke Law School

  • Judge Eldon Fallon; U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
  • Richard Arsenault; Neblett, Beard, & Arsenault
  • James Irwin; Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore, LLC

 9:40-10:40: Panel 2: Effectively Planning for Disaggregated Discovery

The panel will discuss when discovery issues should be disaggregated for separate resolution, and the costs, benefits, and challenges of reserving issues for separate discovery. 

Moderator: Judge Lee Rosenthal; U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas

  • Mark Lanier; The Lanier Law Firm
  • James Irwin; Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore, LLC
  • Dean Edward F. Sherman; Tulane University Law School

 10:50-11:50: Panel 3: Integrating Aggregated and Disaggregated Discovery Issues

The panel will discuss various kinds of discovery (e.g., E-Discovery, expert discovery, and specific discovery), and the strategic and case management challenges each method presents in the context of MDLs, including both aggregated and disaggregated discovery issues. 

Moderator: Mark Lanier, The Lanier Law Firm

  • Judge Lee Rosenthal; U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas
  • Francis McGovern; Professor of Law, Duke Law School
  • Richard Arsenault; Neblett, Beard, & Arsenault
  • David Jones; Beck Redden, LLP

 11:50-12:10: Lunch Break

12:10-1:10: Panel 4: (Lunch Presentation) The Real Story: FJC Data on What the Empirical Data on MDL Remands Shows

Federal Judicial Center researchers will present findings from their research on multidistrict litigation. The analysis will focus on two sets of cases: (1) cases that are considered for transfer but not transferred, and (2) cases that are transferred and that are subsequently remanded back to the transferor court. Understanding these cases, and the cases that are resolved in the transferee court, may provide some insight into the effects of aggregation on various kinds of cases

Moderator: Judge Lee Rosenthal; U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas

  • Emery G. Lee, III, Federal Judicial Center
  • Margaret Williams, Federal Judicial Center
  • Catherine Borden, Federal Judicial Center

 1:20-2:20: Panel 5: When Remand is Appropriate

The panel will discuss at what stages plaintiffs, defendants, and judges perceive optimal windows to disaggregate various kinds of issues, and the factors that influence the decision and timing.

Moderator: Dean Edward F. Sherman, Tulane University Law School

  • Judge Fallon; U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
  • Professor Elizabeth Burch, University of Georgia School of Law
  • David Jones, Beck Redden, LLP

2:30-3:30: Panel 6: How Remand Should be Effectuated

The panel will discuss how judges and attorneys work together to effectuate remand of MDL cases, including methods for ensuring smooth transitioning of work product, case management, and expertise to state and federal judges upon remand. 

Moderator: Francis McGovern; Professor of Law, Duke Law School

  • Judge Fallon; U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
  • Professor Teddy Rave, University of Houston
  • Professor Elizabeth Burch, University of Georgia School of Law

 3:30-3:45: Closing Remarks

 

ECB

March 4, 2014 in Conferences, Current Affairs, Mass Tort Scholarship, Procedure, Settlement, Trial | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, March 3, 2014

Goldberg & Zipursky on the fraud-on-the-market doctrine

Torts scholars John Goldberg (Harvard) and Benjamin Zipursky (Fordham) have written a thoughtful analysis of the fraud-on-the-market issue that the Supreme Court will consider this week when it hears oral argument in Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund. They gave me permission to post their analysis here, which I thought readers would find worthwhile. By breaking down the issues in fraud-on-the-market securities class actions, Goldberg and Zipursky help clarify the link between a defendant's allegedly wrongful conduct and widespread harm that plaintiffs allege was caused by that conduct -- a link that is at the core of mass tort disputes as well as securities litigation.

HME

 

Parsing Reliance in Securities Fraud

John C.P. Goldberg, Harvard Law School
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Fordham Law School

         In Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., to be argued before the Supreme Court on March 5, the Justices could drastically curtail federal-court class-action lawsuits for securities fraud.  At issue in Halliburton is the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision in Basic v. Levinson.  Basic held that it is not necessary for investors such as the Erica P. John Fund to prove that they actually read and relied upon the particular fraudulent statements alleged to have caused the their losses.  Public misstatements by a company like Halliburton have the capacity to defraud the market as a whole and distort the prices for all investors.  Basic’s “fraud-on-the-market” theory, as it is called, affords investors who can prove that the defendant made misrepresentations about important matters a presumption that the misrepresentations negatively affected the stock’s value.    It is widely agreed that, without Basic’s presumption, securities fraud suits could rarely proceed as class actions.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          For a variety of reasons – the fact that Congress has weighed in extensively on securities fraud and left Basic untouched, the substantial pro-defendant changes that the Court and Congress have already made to securities fraud law, the expressed wishes of the S.E.C. to retain Basic because of the indirect regulatory force private actions supply, and the value of stare decisis – we think the Court would do best to leave Basic intact.    It appears, however, that while some of the Justices may be similarly inclined, others are leaning toward overruling Basic, and others may be looking for a middle ground.   With the fate of Basic in play, it is worth getting clear on some aspects of fraud-on-the-market doctrine that have typically been confused, and were in fact confused in Justice Blackmun’s Basic opinion itself.

The first and most important point to make about Basic’s so-called “presumption of reliance” is that it is not one presumption (as we have explained in a recent article offering a detailed analysis comparing securities fraud to common law fraud, see John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Fraud-on-the-Market Tort, 66 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1756 (2013)); Basic’s “presumption” is actually two presumptions (both favoring plaintiffs) and one affirmative defense (favoring defendants).   Thus, if the Court decides to rethink “the presumption of reliance,” it will actually be rethinking two or three ideas, not one.  

Basic’s first presumption allows a plaintiff to establish a legally cognizable injury by establishing that she bought or sold securities at a market price that was distorted by the defendant’s misrepresentations.  This is an important departure from common law fraud, the tort from which the law of securities fraud has evolved.  In a suit for common law fraud, it is critical for the plaintiff to establish that she, personally, made a decision in reliance on the information contained in the defendant’s misrepresentations.  This is because the core injury at the heart of common law fraud is an interference with a person’s right to make decisions free from deception.  Basic’sso called “presumption” of reliance – like many presumptions in the law – departed substantively from this aspect of the common law.  A securities fraud plaintiff need not demonstrate that she was misled into believing that certain false propositions were true.  Instead, according to Basic, she need only prove economic loss caused by the misrepresentation—that she bought or sold the defendant’s stock at a price distorted by the defendant’s misrepresentations, irrespective of whether she ever learned of the content of the defendant’s false statements.

            Basic’s second presumption is evidentiary rather than substantive.   It allows securities fraud plaintiffs to use a certain kind of circumstantial evidence to prove that the defendant’s misrepresentations in fact distorted market prices.   If a misrepresentation is “material” and disseminated to the public, and if the securities are sold on an “efficient” market, it will be presumed that the misrepresentation caused a price distortion.  Like many evidentiary presumptions, the materiality-based presumption of price distortion may be rebutted by evidence that the misrepresentation had no effect. 

            Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Basic also bundled a third idea into the so-called “presumption of reliance,” but this idea is actually an affirmative defense for the defendant, one akin to the consent defense to the tort of battery and the assumption of risk defense to the tort of negligence.   Even if it is established that the defendant’s misrepresentations caused a price distortion and a loss to the plaintiff, the defendant can nonetheless escape liability by proving that the plaintiff was actually aware of the falsity of the misrepresentation and chose to engage in the market transaction nevertheless.  Defendant Halliburton’s petition to overrule Basic has nothing to do with this third aspect of Basic.

Halliburton’s challenge to Basic’s presumption of reliance relates to the combination of the substantive and evidentiary presumptions described above.   The Court in Basic allowed that materiality (given an efficient market) was enough, from an evidentiary point of view, to create a rebuttable presumption of price distortion, and it additionally concluded – as a substantive matter – that distortion suffices to replace the impact-on-plaintiff finding that reliance fulfills in the common law tort of fraud.   It is these two ideas, taken together, that have permitted securities fraud plaintiffs to go forward without direct proof of reliance.   Crucially, although Basic itself describes the combined effect of these two presumptions as establishing indirect proof of reliance, that description is inaccurate. Taken together, they instead amount to indirect proof of distortion, not of reliance. 

            Clarifying the distinction between the evidentiary and substantive aspects of the presumption in Basic is critical for evaluating what is and what is not at issue in Halliburton.   Halliburton contends that Basic should be overruled because the efficient-market hypothesis has been rejected by economists during the quarter century since Basic was decided.   Whether the efficient-market hypothesis actually has been rejected is a highly contentious issue.  Even assuming, however, that it is unsound, that affects only the evidentiary aspect of the presumption of reliance—that is, only the part of Basic which states that material representations in an open market will be reflected in the market’s pricing of securities, and hence can be presumed to have distorted their price.  If the evidentiary side of Basic is rejected or modified, that still leaves intact the substantive side of the presumption of reliance – the side which states that price distortion caused by the misrepresentations will suffice in place of individual reliance.  

Appreciating the irrelevance of the efficient-market hypothesis to the substantive side of Basic is critically important for two reasons.   First, the substantive side of Basic has received little cogent criticism over the decades.  The courts that first recognized private rights of action under federal securities laws did so on the ground that those laws were established in the midst of the Great Depression to protect investors from losses resulting from deceptive practices.  Under these circumstances, it was eminently sensible for these courts to interpret federal law as including an individual right to be free from economic harm caused by deceptive practices, whether through price distortion or individual reliance.   And since then, both Congress and the Court have shown a steady commitment to the substantive side of Basic.

Second, price distortion is a common issue of fact in securities fraud litigation.  This means that the securities defense bar’s effort to undermine securities class actions through a critique of the efficient-market hypothesis is misconceived.   The alleged shakiness of the efficient-market hypothesis is an argument against the evidentiary side of Basic, not against its substantive side.   But the substantive side --  the move from reliance to price distortion – is what makes class actions an appropriate vehicle for 10b-5 claims.   If the Court is truly persuaded by the efficient-market hypothesis critique, and is not moved by stare decisis or any other reasons to leave Basic untouched, then it is, at most, the evidentiary side of the presumption of reliance that might bear revisiting.  Of course, new questions might then arise at or before trial as to whether event studies or other sorts of evidence will suffice to establish price distortion, but that is a different matter, unconnected to the general question of whether distortion-based 10b-5 claims can be adjudicated as class actions.   

            The wrong of causing economic loss through misrepresentations that distort market prices is not identical to common law fraud.  But it is closer to what Congress actually sought to protect in the Securities Exchange Act, it is consistent with what Congress has very thoughtfully kept alive in its more recent securities legislation, and its justifiability has nothing to do with the soundness of the efficient-market hypothesis.    So long as this wrong remains the core of 10b-5 claims, class actions will continue to be an appropriate means for resolving them.

 

 

 

March 3, 2014 in Class Actions, Mass Tort Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)