Sunday, July 28, 2013

Child of "How Not to 'Retire and Teach'"

Posted by Jeff Lipshaw

UnknownIn my last post, I mentioned the update to Memo to Lawyers:  How Not to Unknown-1 "Retire and Teach."  That was a short essay I wrote in 2006 and 2007 about the odd experience of being somebody who practiced for twenty-six years and only then set out to join a law school faculty as a tenure track professor.

This summer I've been working on the look back - Version 1.0 predates the "Great Retrenchment. I've reflected on that change as well as examples of my earlier naivete or "I didn't know what I didn't know" in "Retire and Teach" Six Years On, a draft of which is now up on SSRN.  Here's the abstract:

This is a follow up to a 2007 essay I wrote about what it might take for a well-seasoned practitioner to join a law school faculty as a tenure track professor. Having now wended my way up (or down) that track for six years plus, my intended audience this time includes the original one, those seasoned veterans of the law practice trenches who may think but should never utter out loud the words “I would like to retire and teach,” but now also my colleagues in academia who are facing what looks to be the greatest reshuffling of the system in our generation. Much of what I said in the earlier essay still holds. This essay, however, includes (a) a more nuanced look at the strange hybrid creature that is the scholarly output of academic lawyers; (b) a more respectful appreciation of what it takes to become a good teacher, with some notes about what worked for me, and (c) an attempt to reconcile the interests in scholarship and the interest in teaching after the “Great Retrenchment” of the legal profession and legal education, with some brief thoughts about the opportunities that may bring for the aging but not ossifying academic aspirant.

I suppose I ought to dedicate it to the Chief Justice because it gave me a chance to talk about the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th century Bulgaria.

Photo credit (John Roberts):  newyorker.com

July 28, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, July 24, 2013

The $1,000,000 Law Degree Kerfuffle: Getting in Touch With My Inner Kahneman

Posted by Jeff Lipshaw 

ValuefunUntil the phrase "$1,000,000 law degree" started filling my RSS feeds, I had paid about as much attention to the issue as I did to the Royal Baby (which, by the way, a new study will show shortly has a .00000000112% chance of being named "Jeff" but is twice as likely as that to be named "Geoff").

Something Brian Tamahana wrote in his most recent post caught my attention, however, so I went back and skimmed Mike Simkovic's paper just to confirm what I'm about to observe.  Brian asked in so many words, knowing this data, even if accurate, would you advise somebody to go to law school?

Funny, because I have two children in their mid- to late twenties, both of whom are in the midst of making a job or career change.  I occasionally joke about their going to law school.  (The older one had any desire to be a lawyer whipped out of her by way of the year she spent as the typical "just out of Ivy League school - going to go to law school next" litigation paralegal in a mega-mega NYC based firm that will remain unnamed.)  I think I said, "Only go if you go to Harvard, Stanford, or Yale."  That reflects mostly elitism and arrogance on my part, and not my inner Kahneman, which I've gotten in touch with, but unless I've missed something (let me know if I have) I don't see in the discussion that anybody has gotten in touch with theirs.

 The point is that even if we take all of Mike's data as saying what he purports it to say, it still doesn't say anything about how people look at the prospects of gain (income) and debt (loss).   I'm a skeptic about whether understanding prospect theory actually helps you make a decision (i.e., if I understand my own heuristics, will that counter the bias and cause me to calculate my expected utility - I don't think so), but I don't think you can debate this issue with at least acknowledging that people don't make decisions involving prospective risk or loss by stepping back and viewing the final outcome - the expected utility - over their entire lives.

I will let others, if they want, spend more time explaining the relevance of the above graph to the issue, but it has to do with how being risk-adverse or risk-seeking affects your decision depending on whether you are faced with high probabilities of losses relative to gains, or high probabilities of gains relative to losses.  (The exercise I do every year with my students is take a secret ballot vote on whether they would prefer $1,000 in cash or a one in ten chance of $10,000 at the end of class - risk aversion being such that invariably close to 100% chose the former even though the expected utility is exactly the same.)

I've been noodling around with my update to How Not to "Retire and Teach," and have been thinking the odd hybrid of explanation and advocacy that arises when lawyers argue either about what is or what should be.  The fancy phrase is that all knowledge beyond pure perception is theory-laden; the equivalent is "lies, damned lies, and statistics."

July 24, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (3)

Tuesday, July 23, 2013

Me on Gilson and Ribstein

Posted by Jeff Lipshaw

Images-1Earlier this summer, I posted elsewhere about two of my summer projects, writing essays for symposia this coming academic year (1) at Illinois in October honoring the memory of Larry Ribstein (left), and (2) at AALS in January commemorating the 30th anniversary of Ron Gilson's (right) publication of his iconic Value Creation by Business Lawyers article in the Yale Unknown Law Journal. I've finished readable (I think) drafts of both, and have posted them on SSRN.  What inspired my particular spin in both essays was physicist Lee Smolin's new book, Time Reborn, in which he criticizes the aspect of timelessness in the mathematical models that physicists use.  Both Gilson and Ribstein based much of their work on transaction cost economics.  I perceived similar issues of timelessness both in what transactional lawyers see themselves doing, and how law professors go about describing it in economic models. 

The piece about Value Creation is entitled What Is It Like to Be a Beetle?:  The Timelessness Problem in Gilson's Value Creation Thesis.  Here is the abstract:

This is a contribution to the 2014 mini-symposium honoring the thirtieth anniversary of the publication of Ronald Gilson’s seminal article Value Creation by Business Lawyers. In it, he coined two powerful metaphors: that of lawyers as "transaction cost engineers" and as beetles studied by their entomologist brethren in the legal academy. As a former lawyer-beetle and a current academic-entomologist, I am quite sure that the transaction cost economics he used to explain why business lawyers stay in business missed something important about the subjective and real world experience of being a lawyer-beetle. In this essay, I (a) summarize two different but significantly related critiques of theory, (i) the physicist Lee Smolin’s powerful argument for the unreality and therefore timelessness of algorithmic models of the universe – i.e., why physics as generally practiced is "physics in a box," and (ii) the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre’s controversial argument for the unreality of modern conceptions of utility, rights, and efficiency, (b) borrow from both critiques in order to understand the difficulties in transposing timeless economic and legal conceptions ("utility" and "rights," respectively) to real transactions that occur in real time, (c) criticize the tendency of the legal profession, in both the academic and practicing arms, to teach and practice a scientific "law in a box," and (d) suggest a vision of what it means for a wise business lawyer not to be so constrained.

The piece for the Ribstein conference is entitled Trust and Law (In a Box):  Do Organizational Forms Make a Difference?  Here is the abstract:

In this contribution to the University of Illinois College of Law’s 2013 Larry Ribstein Memorial Symposium, I assess Professor Ribstein’s approach to both to trust and the “uncorporation.” My thesis is that his disciplinary commitment to a transaction cost economics model resulted in an overstatement of the extent to which business association forms matter in the real world. In contrast to Professor Ribstein’s view that mandatory law (which includes corporate law) “crowds out” trust (implicitly making uncorporations more amenable to trust), I see the orderliness of modern and abstract business structures (of any kind) as distinct from, yet operating at the same time and in the same space as, the usual gamut, for better or worse, of human emotions. Even if, as a matter of economic theory, uncorporations do a better job of corporations in permitting owners to control manager agency costs, the theory leaves out (for otherwise good reasons inherent in doing any kind of rigorous science) virtues like trust and vices like greed, fear, panic, all of which seem just as likely to operate in the uncorporate as the corporate setting.

July 23, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, July 3, 2013

Conditional Scholarships and Scholarship Retention for 2011-12

             As a result of the ABA’s revisions to Standard 509, Consumer Information, there is now a much greater universe of publicly available information about law school scholarship programs, specifically conditional scholarship programs and scholarship retention.  Based on a review of law school websites conducted between March 19 and May 29, 2013, I have compiled a complete list of schools with conditional scholarship programs, with only one-year scholarships, with good standing (or guaranteed) scholarships and with only need-based scholarships. 

            The availability of this data now gives each admitted scholarship recipient some meaningful basis for assessing the likelihood that any given scholarship will be renewed.   (That said, within a given cohort of conditional scholarship recipients at a given school, those at the top end of the entering class profile likely retain their scholarships at a higher percentage than reflected in the law school's overall data while those further down the class profile likely retain their scholarships at a lower percentage than reflected in the law school's overall data.)

            What do we know about the conditional scholarship programs in place for students entering law school in 2011-12?  There were 140 schools with conditional scholarship programs.  The average retention rate across all law schools was 69%.  In total, 12,735 students who entered law school in the fall of 2011 and continued into their second year of law school at the same school entered with conditional scholarships and 4,387 students lost those scholarships, a retention rate across individual students of 66%. Across the 194 law schools on which I compiled data, the Fall 2011 entering first-year class totaled 46,233, so roughly 27.5% of the students in the Fall 2011 entering first-year class were on conditional scholarships and roughly 9.5% of the students in the Fall 2011 entering first-year class failed to retain their conditional scholarship as they moved into the second year of law school.

            The distribution of scholarship retention rates by deciles across all 140 schools reporting conditional scholarship programs is set forth in Table 1.  Table 1 shows the largest number of law schools grouped around the overall average retention rate, with 30 law schools in the 60-69% range and 24 law schools in the 70-79% range; nearly 40 percent of law schools with conditional scholarships fall in these two ranges.  Interestingly, the decile range of 90% or better is the second largest decile range, with 26 law schools (nearly half of which are ranked 50 or better in the USNEWS ranking).  Notably, 23 law schools had scholarship retention rates of less than 50%.

 Table 1: Number of Law Schools Reporting Retention Rates by Decile Range 

Retention Rate

Number

Brief Description

Less than 40%

8

Four of the eight were law schools ranked alphabetically

40-49%

15

Eight of the 15 were law schools ranked between 50 and 99

50-59%

20

16 of the 20 were law schools ranked 100 or lower, while only two were in the top 50

60-69%

30

23 of the 30 were law schools ranked 100 or lower, while only one was in the top 50

70-79%

24

13 of the 24 were law schools ranked in the top 100, but only three of those were in the top 50

80-90%

17

12 of the 17 were law schools ranked between 50 and 145

90% or better

26

12 of the 26 were law schools ranked in the top 50

             As shown in Table 2, law schools ranked in the top-50 in the U.S.News 2012 Rankings had the smallest percentage of law schools with conditional scholarship programs, with only 20 law schools – 40% -- having conditional scholarship programs, directly impacting only 1,674 students who had conditional scholarships (12.8% of the 13,109 first-year students at these law schools) and only 192 who failed to retain their scholarships (11.5% of the 1674 conditional scholarship recipients and only 1.5% of the 13,109 first year students).   By contrast, across the balance of law schools, over 80% of the law schools had conditional scholarships with 11,061 of the 33,124 first-year students (33.4%) having conditional scholarships and 4,195 (37.9% of those on scholarship and 12.7% of first-years at the balance of law schools) losing their scholarships after their first-year of law school.

 Table 2: Number and Percentage of First-Year Students in 2011 Having Conditional Scholarships and Losing Conditional Scholarships by US News Rankings Categories 

 

Top 50 Law Schools

Law Schools Ranked 51-100

Law Schools Ranked 101-146

Law Schools Ranked Alphabetically

Total Number of Law Schools

50

50

46

48

Number (%) of Law Schools with Conditional Scholarship Programs

20 (40%)

40 (80%)

36 (78.3%)

43 (89.6%)

Total First-Years at These Law Schools

13,109

11,592

9,293

12,239

Number (%) of First-Years with Conditional Scholarships

1,674 (12.8% of all first-year students in top-50 schools)

4,176 (36% of all first-year students in schools 51-100)

2,754 (29.6% of all first-year students in schools 101-145)

4,131 (33.6% of all first-year students at alphabetically-ranked schools)

Number (%) of Conditional Scholarship Recipients NOT Retaining Scholarships

192 (11.5% of conditional scholarship recipients and 1.5% of first-years)

1,454 (34.8% of conditional scholarship recipients and 12.5% of first-years)

1,044 (37.9% of conditional scholarship recipients and 11.2% of first-years)

1,697 (41% of conditional scholarship recipients and 13.7% of first-years)

            A number of law schools switched to non-conditional scholarship programs for 2012-13 or will be switching to non-conditional scholarship programs for the 2013-14 academic year. As a result, for the 2013-14 academic year, there will be 131 law schools with conditional scholarship programs, five law schools with non-renewable one-year scholarships, four that only offer need-based scholarships, and 54 law schools with good standing (or guaranteed) scholarships.  Of the 194 schools on which I was gathering information, therefore, as of the 2013-14 academic year, 70% will have conditional or one-year scholarship programs (136/194), while nearly 28% will have good standing (or guaranteed) scholarships (54/194), with 2% (4/194) having only need based scholarship assistance. (Note that some law schools with conditional scholarship programs also offer some scholarships on a non-conditional basis and/or offer some need-based assistance.)

            Those who might be interested in a more detailed analysis of conditional scholarship programs, may want to look at the draft article I have posted on SSRN – Better Understanding the Scope of Conditional Scholarship Programs in American Law Schools

[posted by Jerry Organ]

July 3, 2013 in Data on legal education, New and Noteworthy, Scholarship on legal education | Permalink | Comments (0)