Saturday, August 23, 2014

New Trial For Prosecutorial Misconduct

From the web page of the Tennessee Supreme Court

The Tennessee Supreme Court has ordered a new trial for Noura Jackson, a Shelby County woman convicted of the second degree murder of her mother, Jennifer Jackson, because the Court found there were constitutional errors made in the course of the proceedings.

The Court explained that during the 2009 trial, the lead prosecutor impermissibly commented upon the defendant’s exercise of her state and federal constitutional right to remain silent and not testify at trial. In addition, the Court said the prosecutor violated the defendant’s right to due process by failing to turn over to the defense a statement a key witness gave to law enforcement officers investigating the murder. The Court concluded that the State had failed to establish that these constitutional errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jennifer Jackson was stabbed to death on June 5, 2005, in the bedroom of the home she shared with the defendant. Around 5:00 a.m. that day, the defendant reported to neighbors and the police that she had discovered her mother’s body. After the defendant gave police conflicting statements about her whereabouts at the time of the murder and about how she sustained a cut to her hand, the police began investigating the defendant.

The defendant was charged with first degree murder, but she never admitted involvement in the crime, and no DNA evidence or scientific evidence implicated her. The prosecution’s case was based on circumstantial evidence alone.

The jury acquitted the defendant of first degree murder but convicted her of second degree murder. The defendant appealed. Although the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction, the three judges on the panel did not agree on the rationale for their decision. One judge found no constitutional error. The other two judges found the lead prosecutor had violated the defendant’s constitutional right to remain silent but concluded that the error did not prejudice the defendant.

The Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution had violated two of the defendant’s constitutional rights: her right to remain silent and not testify at trial, and her right to due process of law. The Court explained that when constitutional errors occur in criminal trials, a new trial is required unless the State establishes that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court concluded that the State had failed to make this showing, and as a result, the defendant is entitled to a new trial.

The Supreme Court expressed concern that the prosecutor had violated the more than 100-year-old legal rule prohibiting Tennessee prosecutors from commenting on a defendant’s exercise of the right to remain silent. The Supreme Court reiterated a statement first made in 1984, which is that“the subject of a defendant’s right not to testify should be considered off limits to any conscientious prosecutor.” The Supreme Court also cautioned prosecutors in the Thirtieth Judicial District to comply fully in the future with the 50-year-old legal rule requiring disclosure of material evidence to the defense.

Read the unanimous opinion in State v. Noura Jackson, authored by Justice Cornelia A. Clark.

(Mike Frisch)

August 23, 2014 in Professional Responsibility | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, April 23, 2014

Practice Pointer: If Your Case Settles, Tell The Court

The New Jersey Appellate Division sharply criticized counsel who had failed to timely advise the court that the case had settled.

We were on the eve of filing a comprehensive opinion on the many issues raised in this appeal when, on April 9, 2014, respondent's counsel advised the matter had settled. Upon further inquiry, we learned the parties reached a settlement months ago. Despite our discretion to file an opinion when notified at such a late hour, we have decided not to file our opinion on the merits and now write to dismiss the appeal with the emphatic reminder that counsel must advise this court in a far more timely manner of a settlement or serious settlement discussions so that scarce judicial resources are not needlessly wasted.

But no sanctions

Because of the enormous amount of time needlessly expended in this matter, we have seriously considered the imposition of sanctions against both counsel pursuant to Rule 2:9-9, but instead have determined that the publication of this decision is sufficient deterrent to repetition. It is within our discretion to issue an opinion when notified of a settlement shortly before an opinion is scheduled to be released, and we have done so many times. We nonetheless dismiss this appeal.

(Mike Frisch)

April 23, 2014 in Professional Responsibility, The Practice | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, February 24, 2014

Willfully Failing To Learn Of Conflict

The Virginia State Bar seeks comment on a proposed revision to the Imputed Conflicts Rule:

Pursuant to Part Six: Section IV, Paragraph 10-2(C) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, the Virginia State Bar’s Standing Committee on Legal Ethics (“Committee”) is seeking public comment on a proposed amendment to Rule 1.10 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

RULE 1.10

This proposed Rule amendment is intended to avoid a situation in which a lawyer avoids the imputation of a conflict of interest by avoiding the knowledge that another lawyer in the firm has a conflict as to the representation. Under the current standard of “knowing” that another lawyer in the firm is prohibited from undertaking the representation, a lawyer can avoid the application of Rule 1.10(a), which would impute a conflict to him, by willfully failing to learn the information that establishes the existence of the conflict. The proposed Rule amendment imputes a conflict if the lawyer “knows or reasonably should know” that another lawyer in the firm is prohibited from representing the client. The proposed amendment adds a new Comment [2a] to explain that the failure to maintain or use a system for identifying conflicts may be deemed a violation of Rule 1.10(a), if proper use of the system would have identified the conflict.

My comment --a good idea. (Mike Frisch)

February 24, 2014 in Law & Business, Professional Responsibility | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, February 13, 2014

DOJ Sends Critical Letter to Louisiana Supreme Court re its Bar Admission Process

Dane Ciolino (Loyola-New Orleans, Law) has blogged on the recent letter of warning the DOJ sent the state's supreme court and chief disciplinary counsel about the civil and disability rights of its applicants. The 10-page, supported letter is linked by Dane here. As he quotes it:

[W]e find that Louisiana’s attorney licensure system discriminates against bar applicants with disabilities by: (1) making discriminatory inquiries regarding bar applicants’ mental health diagnoses and treatment; (2) subjecting bar applicants to burdensome supplemental investigations triggered by their mental health status or treatment as revealed during the character and fitness screening process; (3) making discriminatory admissions recommendations based on stereotypes of persons with disabilities; (4) imposing additional financial burdens on people with disabilities; (5) failing to provide adequate confidentiality protections during the admissions process; and (6) implementing burdensome, intrusive, and unnecessary conditions on admission that are improperly based on individuals’ mental health diagnoses or treatment.

Dane adds, "The irrational methods and procedures Louisiana uses to evaluate the character and fitness of bar applicants have long been questionable. It is refreshing to see that someone else has noticed and may—and can—do something to fix them."

My ethics classes have been watching these C&F issues bubble up lately in this state, including complaints to and involvement by the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division. One student recounts the tale of a friend whose admission was granted conditionally in such a way that her name is published with all the history and conditions. Anyone googling her will quickly find that she self-reported her emotional issues and read the bar's detailing of that and its specific treatment conditions. Had they just admitted her there'd be no public record of her mandatory disclosures on her bar application; by granting conditional admission and publishing it, all the world gets to essentially read her candid C&F form.

This is no way to act professionally when the bar is supposed to be the gatekeeper of professionalism! I agree with Dane that the involvement of the DOJ may stir some serious introspection with the bar apparatus and Court to make its procedures and disclosure comply with the civil rights of the applicants. (Thanks to Lauren Michel and Alston Walker for sending me Dane's link, as well as other students.) [Alan Childress]

February 13, 2014 in Bar Discipline & Process, Professional Responsibility | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, January 29, 2014

Ethics Of Private Adoptions

A recent opinion from the District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Committee:

Lawyers who represent clients, whether birth parents or prospective adoptive parents, in private or independent adoption proceedings in the District of Columbia must ensure their conduct conforms to the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct. Private adoptions frequently give rise to a number of significant ethical obligations, not the least of which are duties arising under conflict of interest rules, that the lawyer must squarely address with his or her client or clients, often at the onset of the representation. In many instances, a lawyer will be required to obtain the informed consent of one or more clients, and in some circumstances that of former clients, regarding certain aspects of the representation, in order to commence or continue representation. Private adoption practitioners should be particularly mindful of ethical duties attendant to communications with unrepresented persons, as well as duties of confidentiality owed to both current and former clients.

(Mike Frisch)

January 29, 2014 in Clients, Current Affairs, Professional Responsibility | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, January 2, 2014

No Sanction For Paralegal Firm Switch Notice Violation

Sanctions imposed on plaintiffs' counsel in a medical malpractice case were vacated by the Connecticut Supreme Court.

The problem at issue was a paralegal who left the defendants' law firm and went to work for the plaintiffs' firm a year later. Defendant counsel sought assurances that the paralegal would not share information about the case. The sought-after assurances were not forthcoming.

The defense then sought disqualification.

The trial court denied the motion, finding that the paralegal had been properly screened but that the plaintiffs' counsel failed to comply with screening notice requirements. As a sanction, counsel was ordered to pay counsel fees for the motion.

The court here agreed that the notice obligation had been breached but found "no useful purpose in  remanding the case" for a fee calculation would be served.

The fees incurred for the motion were paid by the defendant's insurance carrier and collection had not been sought. (Mike Frisch)

January 2, 2014 in Professional Responsibility | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, December 31, 2013

Immigration Advice To Criminal Defendant Deemed Sufficient

From the web page of the Tennessee Supreme Court, reporting on a December 23 opinion

The Tennessee Supreme Court today upheld the conviction of a man who said he wasn’t aware that his guilty plea would result in his deportation or adversely affect his future eligibility to return legally to the United States.

In 2011, Juan Alberto Blanco Garcia, an alien illegally residing in the United States, pled guilty to the felony of neglect of a child under six years of age. With the aid of an interpreter in court, Blanco Garcia said he understood the charges, the sentence possibilities and that his guilty plea was made freely and voluntarily.  The trial court did not advise the defendant of the immigration consequences of the plea or inquire whether his attorney had done so. 

Before he entered the plea, however, Mr. Blanco Garcia’s attorney told him that he would be deported based on his status as an illegal alien and the guilty plea. The attorney also told Mr. Blanco Garcia that the guilty plea could adversely affect his future eligibility to return legally to the United States, but she advised him to consult an immigration lawyer for more specific information about the issue.

After his conviction, Mr. Blanco Garcia filed a petition alleging that his attorney was ineffective and his plea involuntary because he was not informed of the future immigration consequences of the guilty plea.

The Supreme Court determined that the attorney fulfilled her obligation of effectively representing Mr. Blanco Garcia by advising him that he would be deported upon pleading guilty and that the guilty plea could have future adverse immigration consequences.  The Court explained that this general warning was sufficient because federal law did not clearly and succinctly describe the effect Mr. Blanco Garcia’s guilty plea would have on his future eligibility to return legally to this country. 

As to Mr. Blanco Garcia’s claim that his plea was unknowing and involuntary, the Court declined to decide whether the federal or state constitution requires courts to advise a person pleading guilty of the immigration consequences of the guilty plea.  The Court explained that, even assuming the trial court’s failure to advise Mr. Blanco Garcia of the immigration consequences of his plea amounted to constitutional error, the error was harmless because Mr. Blanco Garcia’s attorney had already informed him of the immigration consequences of his plea.

Read the Opinion in Juan Alberto Blanco Garcia v. State of Tennessee, authored by Justice Cornelia Clark.

(Mike Frisch)

December 31, 2013 in Clients, Professional Responsibility | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, October 28, 2013

Awardees of Zacharias Prize announced

Samuel Levine of Touro Law Center and chair of the prize committee has announced that the "winners have been selected for the fourth annual Fred C. Zacharias Memorial Prize for Scholarship in Professional Responsibility.  The Prize will be awarded to Dana Remus, for Out of Practice: The Twenty-First Century Legal Profession, 63 Duke Law Journal __  (2013).  An Honorable Mention will be awarded to Norman Spaulding, for The Privilege of Probity: Forgotten Foundations of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 26 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 301 (2013). The awards will be presented in January at the Section Breakfast of the AALS Section on Professional Responsibility." [Alan Childress]

October 28, 2013 in Professional Responsibility, Teaching & Curriculum | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, September 5, 2013

Bruce Green on the Lawyer's Independence

Recently posted to SSRN is a new paper by Bruce Green (Fordham), entitled Lawyers’ Professional Independence: Overrated or Undervalued? It is an article for the Akron Law Review. Here is a summary:

This article explores the concept of lawyers’ "professional independence" in the literature of the U.S. legal profession. It begins with some reflections on the conventional meanings of professional independence, which encompasses both the bar’s collective independence to regulate its members and individual lawyers’ independence in the context of professional representations, including independence from clients, on one hand, and independence from third parties, on the other. The article suggests that the professional conduct rules are overly preoccupied with protecting lawyers’ professional independence from the corrupting influences of other professionals. The article then turns to an aspect of professional independence that has largely dropped out of lawyers’ discourse but that deserves more attention, namely, lawyers’ independence from the courts. This includes: (1) freedom to criticize judges; (2) freedom to disobey arguably unlawful court orders; and (3) freedom to resolve certain ethical dilemmas for oneself, as a matter of professional conscience. The article maintains that as the bar has become strongly identified and allied with the judiciary, motivated by the interests in securing judicial protection from other government regulation and in securing the bar’s own institutional influence over individual lawyers, the bar has ignored this understanding and redefined professional independence consistently with a strong judicial role in regulating lawyers.

[Alan Childress]

September 5, 2013 in Abstracts Highlights - Academic Articles on the Legal Profession, Professional Responsibility | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, May 20, 2013

Mandatory Pro Bono Proposed For New Jersey Bar Admission

The New Jersey Supreme Court has asked for comments on a report of a Working Group that calls for mandatory pro bono as a condition for admission in the Garden State.

The report identifies three primary goals: increase pro bono hours for underserved populations, give admittees real-life experience and "instill in future attorneys a desire to continue pro bono work throughout their legal career - the habit of doing good."

Query: does forced service really meet the last articulated goal?

The report calls for 50 hours of required service. (Mike Frisch)

May 20, 2013 in Professional Responsibility | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, April 15, 2013

Georgia Upholds Right To Conflict- Free Defense Counsel

The Georgia Supreme Court has issued an opinion approving the conclusion of the State Bar Formal Advisory Opinion Board concluding that it is impermissible for attorneys employed in the circuit public defender office to represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would be prohibited from doing so.

The court found that the board's opinion was correct in light of the constitutional right to conflict-free counsel and the construction of Georgia's ethical rule concerning imputed conflicts. (Mike Frisch)

April 15, 2013 in Professional Responsibility | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Saturday, January 12, 2013

Confidentiality Issues When Former Client Claims Ineffective Assistance

A recently issued opinion of the District of Columbia Bar's Legal Ethics Committee deals with the issue of confidentiality when a former client claims ineffective assistance of counsel:

When a former client challenges a criminal conviction or sentence on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”), D.C. Rule 1.6(e)(3) permits the lawyer to disclose client confidences and secrets only insofar as reasonably necessary to respond to the client’s specific allegations about the lawyer’s representation. Where appropriate, the lawyer should take steps, such as seeking a judicial protective order or entering into an agreement with the prosecutor, to limit the use of such disclosures to the IAC proceeding.

The committee's conclusion:

D.C. Rule 1.6(e)(3) permits a defense lawyer whose conduct has been placed in issue by a former client’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim to make, without judicial approval or supervision, such disclosures of information protected by Rule 1.6 as are reasonably necessary to respond to the client’s specific allegations about the lawyer’s performance. Even so, a lawyer should reflect before making disclosures of protected information to prosecutors, courts, or others. A lawyer’s confidentiality obligations to her former client are broader than the attorney-client privilege. Although the former client’s claim likely waives the evidentiary privilege, that alone does not eliminate the broader confidentiality obligation owed under Rule 1.6. Nor does the limited “self-defense” exception to confidentiality in Rule 1.6(e)(3) open the door to unlimited disclosures to prosecutors, courts or others of protected information. The rule allows a lawyer to disclose protected information only to the extent “reasonably necessary” to respond to “specific allegations” by the former client. Reasonableness is a fact-bound issue about which others may later disagree. Lawyers who are uncertain about the permissibility of disclosing protected information in response to an IAC claim should consider seeking independent advice or judicial approval of the disclosure.

(Mike Frisch)

January 12, 2013 in Clients, Professional Responsibility | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, December 28, 2012

Probation Revocation Ineffective Assistance Claim Remanded

The Kansas Supreme Court has held that a defendant in a probation revocation proceeding is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel.

The case involved allegations of a conflict in interest. The attorney who represented the defendant also served as the victim's guardian ad litem. He briefly noted the conflict in a proffer to the probation revocation court. No objections were lodged and the court did not conduct any inquiry.

The court here remanded for either a fresh revocation hearing with conflict-free counsel or a hearing into whether the conflict created an adverse effect on the representation. (MIke Frisch)

December 28, 2012 in Clients, Professional Responsibility, The Practice | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, October 23, 2012

"Pure Hearts And Empty Heads"

The Delaware Supreme Court has affirmed a trial court holding applying an objective standard to the determination whether a Rule 11 violation has taken place.

The court extended an earlier decision "to bar judges from sanctioning attorneys except where the attorney's conduct prejudically disrupts the administration of justice in a particular case."

The trial court had issued two sua sponte orders to show cause to an attorney concerning his representations to the court in representing a client in an asbestos suit. A $25,000 penalty was imposed on the attorney.

The court here reaffirmed the objective standard: "Delaware demands more from attorneys than pure hearts and empty heads."

However, the trial court did abuse its discretion in imposing sanction. The first contempt order involved his incorrect citation of a case, where he relied on a faulty memory; the second a failure to make a "thorough" argument.

Neither lapse rose to a sanctionable level: "The practice of law imposes many informal penalties on attorneys who do not make thorough arguments. Rule 11 sanctions are not among them."

The court vacated the sanction, noting that its holding "is not intended to leave a judge confronted with an attorney's problematic behavior without recourse. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel is well equipped to investigate attorneys and recommend appropriate action."  (Mike Frisch)

October 23, 2012 in Bar Discipline & Process, Professional Responsibility | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, August 30, 2012

Attorney May Appeal Denied Motion To Withdraw As Counsel

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals has held that an attorney may appeal an interlocatory order denying his motion to withdraw as counsel. The court held that the denial of the motion was an abuse of discretion and remanded the case to the Circuit Court with instructions to grant the attorney's motion.

The case involved unpaid legal fees and a motion filed five weeks before a scheduled trial.

The court here held that there was no injustice to the client; rather, denying the motion was an injustice to the attorney:

...the circuit court's order, effectively compelling [the attorney] to continue representing [the client], without reasonable likelihood of compensation, imposed an unreasonable financial burden on him.

(Mike Frisch)

August 30, 2012 in Clients, Professional Responsibility | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, August 20, 2012

Call for Nominations of Papers for Zacharias Prize in Legal Ethics

From Samuel Levine (Law, Touro) comes this announcement/reminder of a worthy award honoring the very worthy memory of Fred Zacharias:

Submissions and nominations of articles are now being accepted for the third annual Fred C. Zacharias Memorial Prize for Scholarship in Professional Responsibility. To honor Fred's memory, the committee will select from among articles in the field of Professional Responsibility with a publication date of 2012. The prize will be awarded at the 2013 AALS Annual Meeting in New Orleans. Please send submissions and nominations to Professor Samuel Levine at Touro Law Center: slevine@tourolaw.edu  

The deadline for submissions and nominations is September 1, 2012.

[Alan Childress]

August 20, 2012 in Professional Responsibility | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Saturday, August 11, 2012

Son May Represent Father In Divorce Against His Mother

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that the son of a divorcing couple is not disqualified from representing his father in the litigation:

This original petition for a writ of mandamus raises two novel issues regarding attorney disqualification: should an attorney who represents one of his parents in a divorce action between both parents be disqualified either (1) because the attorney’s representation will constitute an appearance of impropriety or (2) because representing the parent will violate the concurrent-conflict-of-interest rule in Nevada Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 1.7?  Because appearance of impropriety is no longer recognized by the American Bar Association, and we have not recognized the appearance of impropriety as a basis for disqualifying counsel except in the limited circumstance of a public lawyer, we reject that conclusion when the alleged impropriety is based solely on a familial relationship with the attorney.  We also conclude that absent an ethical breach by the attorney that affects the fairness of the entire litigation or a proven confidential relationship between the nonclient parent and the attorney, the nonclient parent lacks standing to seek disqualification under RPC 1.7.

The court reversed the trial court, which had disqualified the son.

The Las Vegas Review-Journal noted that the representation might be contrary to common sense, if not legal ethics. (Mike Frisch)

August 11, 2012 in Clients, Hot Topics, Professional Responsibility | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Saturday, July 7, 2012

No Law Firm Liability For Seizure Of Electronic Files From Opposing Party

The Utah Supreme Court has held that the judicial proceedings privilege applies to an attorney's course of conduct as well as to statements made in the course of litgation.

The law firm represented an employer who had sued a former employee for misappropriation of trade secrets and violation of a non-compete agreement. The firm sought and was granted a civil discovery court order authorizing its entry into the employee's home to seize electronic files from his computer and other electronic devices.

A firm attorney attended the execution of the order. The employee's fiancee (the employee was not there) objected. A second, ex parte order was obtained and she relented.

The employer-employee litigation settled. The employee did not raise the issue of the seizures in the litigation.

The employee then sued the law firm for on a variety of theories for the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

A lower court had applied res judicata principles based on the settled case and found the claims were barred.

Here, the court found res judicata inapplicable but nonetheless affirmed on the judicial proceedings privilege. The law firm had acted pursuant to a court order that had not been obtained by fraud or other improper means. (Mike Frisch)

July 7, 2012 in Law Firms, Professional Responsibility, The Practice | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, June 14, 2012

Secret Recordings No Longer Inherently Unethical in Ohio

From the web page of the Ohio Supreme Court:

In  an advisory opinion issued last week, the Supreme Court of Ohio Board of  Commissioners on Grievances & Discipline found that a legal but secret  recording of a conversation by a lawyer is not inherently unethical. A previous  advisory opinion issued on the topic has been withdrawn because it found the  action to be misconduct.

The  board based its new approach on the American Bar Association (ABA) reversing  its position on the issue in 2001, case law from Ohio and other states, and a  “diminished expectation of privacy given advances in technology.”

Opinion  2012-1 centers on Rule 8.4 (c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,  deceit, or misrepresentation) of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct.

The  advisory opinion includes several caveats for lawyers engaging in this  activity.

“Although  the Board is fashioning a new standard for surreptitious recording by Ohio  lawyers, the Board is not in any way indicating that a lawyer cannot be  disciplined for conduct involving such recording,” the opinion states.

“The  mere act of surreptitiously or secretly recording a conversation should not be  the impetus for a charge of misconduct. Instead, the totality of the  circumstances surrounding the recording must be evaluated to determine whether  a lawyer has engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or  misrepresentation in violation of Prof. Cond. R. 8.4 (c).”

In  addition, the board noted it “agrees with the ABA’s general admonition against  surreptitious recording of client conversations.” The board found that lawyers  generally should not record their conversations with clients and prospective  clients without consent.

Read the complete text of the opinion.

(Mike Frisch)

June 14, 2012 in Ethics, Professional Responsibility | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, June 12, 2012

Keeping Old Client Files

A recent Nebraska Ethics Advisory Opinion overrules an earlier opinion regarding retention/disposal of client files. The new opinion relies on changes in the rules of conduct.

The opinion concludes that client files may be destroyed five years after the end of the representation. The attorney is obligated to make reasonable efforts to contact the client before the files are discarded, which may include Facebook and Goggle searches. If there are documents of value, it may be appropriate to hire a private investigator or attempt to contact the client by publication.

The effort required to contact the client is "proportionate with the value and importance of the file materials..." (Mike Frisch)

June 12, 2012 in Clients, Professional Responsibility | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)