Tuesday, August 11, 2015
The Ohio Supreme Court found an attorney in contempt for failure to comply with an earlier court order.
The court ordered that the stayed two-year suspension revoked and imposed the actual suspension.
This report of the Board of Commissioners on Admissions and Grievances describes his background
Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in the state of Ohio on November 9, 1974. Respondent is a graduate of the University of Michigan Law School. Respondent is 64 years old. Respondent has been a domestic relations magistrate for 33 years, serving in Crawford and Morrow counties and currently in Delaware County.
He is a "highly motivated public servant"
Respondent manages a busy case docket, including highly contentious and emotional domestic litigation. Respondent estimates that counting divorce trials, post decree matters, civil protection orders, child support enforcement agency matters, and other miscellaneous matters, he conducts approximately 1,000 hearings per year. Respondent prides himself on quick turnaround of his written decisions. Respondent enjoys his work and would like to work one or two more years after he turns 65 this year.
But, as like all of us, no one is perfect
Certain of the character letters also mention other aspects of Respondent's character that are somewhat consistent with Respondent's behavior in the Davis/Spriggs and the Krawczyk matters. Specifically, some of the letters describe Respondent as quick-tempered. Respondent is also described as having a quirky or unusual sense of humor that he sometimes uses to break the tension.
One matter that led to the misconduct
The Davis/Spriggs matter involved a former wife's motion to hold her former husband in contempt of court for distributing nude pictures over the internet of the former wife in violation of the divorce decree. The litigation lasted over two years resulting in numerous discovery disputes and a five-day trial on the merits. Respondent's misconduct consisted of several isolated incidents occurring at various times during this bitterly contested litigation...
On several occasions during status conferences and motion hearings, Respondent conducted himself in an unprofessional and undignified manner and treated the wife and her lawyer with extreme disrespect. During a status conference regarding the logistics of the wife's expert examining the husband's computers, Respondent mockingly imitated the voice of the wife's attorney over the telephone in her presence. After that hearing, Respondent walked into the hallway where the wife was seated and "slowly ogled" the wife "from head to toe in a demeaning and degrading fashion." Respondent later told the wife's attorney that she would need to provide Respondent with a CD containing intimate photos of Davis' then current girlfriend. At the hearing, Respondent explained that the photos of the girlfriend were relevant to the proceeding, but he acknowledged that in asking for them. "I probably said some wise thing." Stipulation 20, 23, 26; Hearing Tr. 29-36.
Respondent acknowledged that all of the above comments were inappropriate. Respondent admitted that he was "'being a wise ass, and not thinking before you talk." Respondent acknowledged that his looking at the wife in a manner that she perceived to be degrading was "stupid" on his part. Id. 21, 32.
During a discovery motion hearing regarding the lawyers' having withheld requested discovery, Respondent lost his temper stating: "This is so goddamn simple. If you give the discovery and don't do all this bullshit, I don't have to sit here for hours and listen to this crap. So everybody's excused. Goddamn it. Comply with the discovery and shut up once in awhile. You make 17 hairline things, we'll do 8 of them but not these 9. Stupid, All Franklin County attorneys are stupid." Stipulation 29; Ex. 5.
While the wife's attorney was addressing Respondent in a pretrial conference regarding recently filed motions, Respondent allowed the husband's attorney to repeatedly throw paperclips at Respondent's head with one or more striking Respondent on the forehead. Respondent took no action to stop the lawyer from creating this disruption. Stipulation 31.
Later during the trial, and just before the wife was to take the stand for crossexamination, Respondent jokingly told the husband's attorney that Respondent would give the husband's attorney a dollar if he could make the wife cry during her cross-examination. At the same time, Respondent removed a dollar bill from his wallet and placed it on the bench.
Monday, August 10, 2015
A North Carolina attorney was sanctioned as recounted on the State Bar web page
The DHC suspended Wallace Respess of Lenoir for two years. Respess had sex with a client, loaned money to the client, and communicated with an opposing party who was represented by counsel. After serving six months of the suspension, Respess may apply for a stay of the balance.
The Hickory Record had the story of the disciplinary charges in April 2014
Lawyers are allowed to have sex with a lot of people. Current clients are not among them.
Lenoir attorney William Wallace Respess Jr. is alleged to have had sex with a client and lied while under oath, according to a complaint filed by the Disciplinary Hearing Commission of the North Carolina State Bar.
» L.B in 1999.
» M.C. in 1988.
» P.H. from 1982-83.
At a deposition Nov. 20, 2013, during his representation of Mrs. E.S., Respess testified under oath that the only clients with whom he had had sexual relations were Mrs. E.S. and L.B., the complaint states.
While Respess represented Mrs. E.S., the complaint states he made a down payment and financed the purchase of a car for her, and a made a loan of $5,000 to her for a payment due on her condominium. The loans were not reduced to writing, he did not advise her to seek independent legal counsel, and she did not consent in writing to the loans, the complaint states.
Respess also spoke over the phone with Mrs. E.S.’s husband about the still-pending visitation schedule involving the couple’s two children, knowing Mrs. E.S.’ husband was being represented by a lawyer, the complaint states.
The N.C. State Bar alleges grounds for discipline against Respess include:
» He had a sexual relationship with Mrs. E.S. while she was his client.
» His false testimony under oath at the deposition was dishonest, fraudulent, deceitful or misrepresentative.
» He made loans to Mrs. E.S. while she was his client that involved a concurrent conflict of interest.
» He entered into business transactions with Mrs. E.S. while she was a client without her informed written consent.
» He knowingly engaged in communication with a person represented by counsel when he spoke with Mrs. E.S.’ husband.
Respess referred the Hickory Daily Record to his lawyer, Winston-Salem attorney Dudley Witt, for comment. Witt declined to comment about specific allegations in the complaint, but said he is working on an answer to the complaint.
Witt said he will file the answer by Thursday.
A hearing before the Disciplinary Hearing Commission is scheduled for Aug. 21-22. A three-member panel composed of two lawyers and one layperson will determine whether Respess violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, and if so, whether discipline is warranted.
News Topic.net had the rest of the story
Lawyer William Wallace Respess Jr. admits he violated several rules of professional conduct in a divorce case he was handling, but it was because he fell in love with his client, according to a document submitted last week to the N.C. State Bar.
And while it is true that Respess had sex with two clients in the 1980s, at the time that did not violate the rules governing lawyers' behavior, so he was not lying under oath when he denied previous "inappropriate" relationships, the document said.
Evette Lynn Setzler (now Rockett) filed a complaint against Respess in March saying that he violated the Bar's rules of professional conduct by having sex with her, loaning her money and once talking directly with her estranged husband about the divorce case instead of talking to his lawyer. The Bar is the state agency responsible for regulating the practice of law in North Carolina, and it may discipline lawyers for violating the rules.
Setzler hired Respess in a divorce proceeding brought by her then-husband, John Bryan Setzler, shortly after her release from a drug rehabilitation facility on May 14, 2012.
The official complaint against Respess and his response refer to Setzler only by the initials E.S., but one of the documents from her divorce was filed as an exhibit in support of Respess' request for most of the complaint to be dismissed.
"It is admitted that during the course of his representation with Mrs. E.S., defendant (Respess) fell in love with her and before he withdrew from representing her, they engaged in a consensual sexual relationship," Respess' response says, admitting that violated professional rules and may merit discipline by the Bar.
Respess withdrew as Setzler's lawyer in June 2013.
Respess' response says of the money he loaned Setzler, which the complaint alleges constituted an inappropriate business relationship with a client, that they were made "under the mistaken impression that he was merely helping an individual with whom he had developed a close personal and emotional relationship and as of September 3, 2013, was his fiancee."
And the response says that when Respess spoke on the phone with John Setzler, he already had withdrawn as Evette Setzler's lawyer.
The response has a more nuanced dismissal of the portion of Setzler's complaint alleging that Respess lied under oath at a deposition in November 2013 when asked whether he ever had sex with other clients before Setzler. Respess' response says that what Respess actually was asked at the deposition was whether there were "any other clients you may have engaged in an inappropriate relationship with."
But at the time that he had sex with two clients -- one in 1982-83 and the other in 1988 -- the rules of professional conduct did not prohibit it, Respess' response says. The rule prohibiting lawyers from having consensual sex with clients was not adopted until 1997.
Respess was married from June 7, 2003, to April 21, 2014, when a divorce was granted in Alexander County. A phone call to Respess was not returned Monday.
An Illinois Hearing Board proposes a 90-day suspension of an attorney
This matter arises out of the Administrator's one-count Amended Complaint, filed on January 3, 2014. Respondent represented a client who had a dispute with another regarding the ownership of one lot and personal property located on that lot and on a second lot. Without obtaining court authorization and over the objections of persons listed in recorded deeds as owners of the first lot, Respondent, his client, and others went onto the lots, loaded numerous items of personal property onto semi-trucks, and removed the personal property to another location.
Respondent was charged with engaging in dishonesty and deceit by misleading a law enforcement officer and others into believing that Respondent had a court order allowing him to go onto the real property and remove personal property; knowingly counseling or assisting a client in criminal acts of trespass and theft; making a false statement of material fact, and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
The evidence showed that Respondent planned with his client Ronald Hanson to go onto properties located at 357 and 411 Railroad Street in Cameron, with a crew of men and trucks, and remove numerous items of personal property. In fact, Respondent provided Hanson with the name of a person, Doug Reiners, who had the "means and the ability to assist [Hanson] in moving his equipment." Without obtaining any court authorization, Respondent was present at those properties and assisted Hanson in carrying out the plan on September 26, 2009,
Prior to September 26, 2009, Respondent knew that Dennis Gulseth, who had power of attorney for Thomas Wilson, had recorded a deed in March 2009, identifying Gulseth as the owner of the 357 Railroad Street property. Respondent also knew that Wilson had previously recorded a deed for the 357 property in May 2008. The previous deed showed that Ronald Hanson had conveyed the 357 Railroad Street property to Wilson. Wilson testified that he added the name of Randy Brown to the deed as co-owner. Additionally, Respondent knew that both Gulseth and Wilson objected to Respondent and Hanson being on the 357 Railroad Street property. Furthermore, there was a no trespassing sign posted on the gate of the 357 Railroad Street property, and Respondent knew of that sign.
Despite the fact that there was a recorded deed showing the 357 Railroad Street was owned by someone other than Hanson, Respondent assisted Hanson in carrying out the plan to go onto the 357 Railroad Street property and remove equipment and other items over the objection of the recorded owners and without any court authorization to do so. Based upon the clear and convincing evidence, we find that Respondent and Hanson committed the crime of Criminal Trespass to Real Property, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/21-3.
The clear and convincing evidence also showed that the building on the 357 Railroad Street property was the residence of Wilson, and that both Respondent and Hanson entered into that residence without authority. Thus, we find that both Respondent and Hanson committed the crime of Criminal Trespass to Residence, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/19-4.
The attorney had prior discipline but significant mitigation. The board nonetheless rejected a lesser sanction than suspension. (Mike Frisch)
The Ohio Supreme Court has reinstated an attorney suspended as a result of a felony conviction.
The Morning Journal reported on the charges
Lorain County Common Pleas Judge James Burge was indicted Sept. 24 by a grand jury from Ohio Attorney General Mike DeWine’s office.
Burge, 67, is facing three counts of falsification, three counts of tampering with records, three counts of soliciting improper compensation and three counts of having an unlawful interest in a public contract...
According to the indictment, on Jan. 24, 2012, Burge allegedly made a false statement or “knowingly swear or affirm the truth of a false statement previously made, when the statement was in writing on or in connection with a report or return that is required or authorized by law.”
The indictment states that Burge allegedly tampered with records Jan. 24, 2012, of a 2011 Ohio Financial Disclosure Statement “and the writing, data, computer software or record was kept by or belonged to a local, state or federal government entity.”
It further alleges that Burge tampered with a 2010 Ohio Financial Disclosure Statement and a 2012 disclosure statement.
He allegedly solicited improper compensation from Feb. 1, 2011, to June 7, 2011, while serving as a public official by knowingly soliciting or accepting contributions, according to the indictment.
The indictment also charges Burge with having an unlawful interest in a public contract. The indictment stated that Burge did “knowingly authorize or employ the authority or influence of his office to secure authorization of any public contract in which he, a member of his family, or any of his business associates had an interest.”
Six of the charges are felonies.
The Chronicle- Telegram reported on his conviction by jury and efforts to regain his law license.
The court's order did not explain its reasoning for the reinstatement.
See comment below: conviction on which suspension was based has been vacated. (Mike Frisch)
The Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct ordered a 36-month suspension of an attorney who neglected a client's criminal appeal petition.
Magnolia Reporter.com reported on the client's case involving the theft of five horses from Southern Arkansas University
[The jury] found Cox guilty of four counts of theft of property between $5,000 and $25,000 involving three horses and a horse trailer, two counts of theft of property more than $25,000 for two of the horses, and two counts of theft of property between $1,000 and $5,000, involving horse tack.
Testimony from the student victims during the sentencing phase of the trial had some members of the audience and jury in tears. The most powerful testimony came when Shaun Smith, whose horse, Credit Card, was slaughtered, described the impact on the animal he described as his "teammate."
On Tuesday, jurors heard about the mistreatment of four horses and the death of a fifth during the theft trial of Cox, 38, of Howorth, Oklahoma.
Cox is the first person to go on trial in Arkansas for the Nov. 3, 2011 theft from Southern Arkansas University’s Mulerider Stables. The emaciated condition of the four rodeo-competition horses that were found tied to trees almost two weeks after their abduction, and the slaughter of student Shaun Smith’s horse, Credit Card, enraged horse fanciers across the nation.
Cox is charged with four counts of theft of property worth less than $5,000, and two counts of theft of property of more than $5,000. Butler said that if convicted of the maximum on all counts, Cox could be sentenced to up to 92 years in prison.
The Cox trial was moved to Union County on change of venue from Columbia County.
Butler, through the testimony of state witnesses, laid out for the jury of nine women and three men a story that painted Cox – the mother of former SAU student Jaci Jackson – as a woman who manipulated others to get what she wanted.
Apparently manipulated the most was William “Billy” Hamilton, who testified that he was Cox’s boyfriend. Hamilton admitted stealing cattle in Little River County and using most of the proceeds to purchase an engagement ring. He also admitted driving to Magnolia to steal the horses owned by Smith, Ashley Mills, Ty Lester, Hope Shelton and D.J. Dickinson, with the intent of reselling them.
But according to testimony, the plan to profit from the crime committed in the early hours of Thursday, Nov. 3, 2011 began to fall apart by 10 a.m. when Cox’s youngest daughter, Jade Jackson, told her that she recognized the still-living Credit Card from the region’s tight-knit rodeo circuit – making the horse in her mother’s mind too hot to sell and too obvious to keep alive. With McCurtain County, Oklahoma sheriff’s deputies already poking around, Cox, Hamilton and Jaci Jackson looked for means to hide or and move the horses and other evidence away from Cox’s property with little success.
It also spelled Credit Card’s doom.
It appears that the suspension only prohibits the attorney from handling appeals as he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of appellate law before the Arkansas Appellate Courts for a period of THIRTY-SIX (36) MONTHS for his conduct in this matter. Further, Mr. Kearney shall complete an approved course of instruction on Arkansas appellate practice. Mr. Kearney shall notify current and future clients of his suspension from appellate practice.
His prior discipline was a factor. (Mike Frisch)
A serious case of misconduct in North Carolina is reported on the State Bar web page
Peter C. Capece of Lincolnton surrendered his license and was disbarred by the Wake County Superior Court. Capece admitted that he misappropriated in excess of $1.5 million he held as trustee and guardian for a minor.
The Charlotte Observer reported on the matter
Capece worked in the Denver, N.C., office of the Lincolnton-based Jonas law firm, whose high-profile lawyers include former N.C. House Minority leader Johnathan Rhyne. Rhyne served in the role when Republicans were in the minority.
Capece signed the affidavit surrendering his law license on May 13, according to a copy of the affidavit obtained by the Observer.
He admitted to misappropriating the money between December 2009 and February 2015, according to the affidavit.
In a consent order of disbarment filed in Wake County Superior Court on Monday, Judge Donald Stephens ruled that Capece misappropriated about $706,000 as legal guardian of an estate and about $817,000 as trustee of a related living trust.
Capece misappropriated another $62,200 from a general trust account he maintained at BB&T Bank, the judge found.
The order does not say how Capece spent the money.
Capece is barred from asking to have his law license reinstated for at least five years, the judge ordered.
Capece was executor of the estate of Fritz Detmers of Denver, N.C., court records show. Detmers died at age 78 in 2009.
On LinkIn, an online business-oriented social networking service, Capece lists himself as project manager at Capital Conservation Group Inc. in Denver, N.C., for the past three months. A spokesman for the firm said Thursday that Capece had been a lawyer for the firm but was not employed there.
Capece says on LinkedIn that he worked for the Jonas law firm from April 2008 to February 2015 and at the Denver, N.C., law firm of Kennedy & Wulfhorst from December 2002 to April 2008.
In a statement Thursday, the Jonas law firm said Capece had been fired and that it was “dismayed that a former employee, a person we invited into our firm and treated as one of our own, would betray the trust of a client. Such an egregious breach of ethics and violation of the law is a betrayal of every standard we have worked hard to uphold over the decades.”
The firm said it continues “to work hard to be effective and ethical advocates for our clients. That is what we have been doing since Charles A. and Harvey Jonas first opened this practice in 1912.
The Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct ordered a 36-month suspension of an attorney admitted in 2007.
Since her admission, the attorney has faced a series of criminal charges and convictions for drug and driving offenses, as well as violation of probation.
The committee noted
At no point in time did any prosecuting attorney or any court report the conduct of Burris to the Office of Professional Conduct, as required by Section 15.A of the Supreme Court’s Procedures. When the criminal convictions were discovered, a formal complaint was prepared and served upon her. Burris filed a response to the formal complaint and admitted that she had been dealing with drug addiction issues for years and that she now believes that she has those issues under control.
The attorney's license has been suspended for years.
Burris’ license to practice law was suspended by the Arkansas Continuing Legal Education Board in 2009 and was never reinstated. Her license to practice law was suspended on March 2, 2009 for failure to pay her annual license fee and she did not pay her license fee for the years 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014.
Self-regulation depends on fulfilling reporting obligations. See Rule 8.3(a). (Mike Frisch)
Sunday, August 9, 2015
A North Carolina tax attorney has been suspended from practice as a result of criminal charges in South Carolina
WRAL.com had the story
A 39-year-old Cary man, who has worked as a tax attorney in Raleigh, is accused of holding his ex-girlfriend hostage at a South Carolina grocery store.
The Isle of Palms Police Department has charged Robert Howell with attempted murder, kidnapping and first-degree burglary in the incident, which happened Wednesday.
Investigators said Robert Howell followed Autumn Yee, 29, of Cary, to Isle of Palms, where she was vacationing. Howell allegedly took Yee to Hudson's Market, where she alerted one of the clerks by silently mouthing "call police."
In a 911 recording, the woman can be heard speaking to an emergency operator about the situation.
Isle of Palms police Capt. Kimberly Usry said Yee tried to keep herself and her assailant in public places so someone could see them. At some point, she jumped over the counter to try to get away. Howell grabbed her, ran out of the store toward the beach and was arrested, Usry said.
Police said Yee, who suffered minor scratches in the incident, had gone to Isle of Palms to flee from Howell a day after he allegedly assaulted and threatened her in her Cary home.
"Officers responded and found that a subject and been harassing the victim there," Cary police Capt. Randall Rhyne said.
In a 911 call that day, Yee told dispatchers she arrived home and found him pacing back and forth in the road, staring at her. She said she was frightened and asked the call-taker to stay on the line until help arrived.
"I'm just afraid to get out of the car," she said in the recording released Monday. "I just want a cop to escort me to my door and ask him to leave."
Robert Howell and his estranged wife, Sarah Howell, are locked in a contentious custody battle over their three children. According to court documents, Sarah Howell had subpoenaed Yee in the custody case.
A day after Yee was held hostage, Sarah Howell sought a protective custody order against her husband, citing the kidnapping as proof that he posed a danger to her and her children.
Cary police said they are now working with South Carolina authorities to serve Robert Howell with additional warrants.
"We take domestic violence very seriously," Rhyne said. "We have a pro-arrest policy for these type of offenses. We try to get them adjudicated to the full extent of the law."
Bo Demster, a managing partner at Poynter & Spurill in Raleigh, confirmed that Howell worked as a tax attorney at the firm from 2013 until this April. The terms of his departure were not disclosed.
"This was a real surprise to all of us who have worked with him," Demster said of Howell's arrest.
The Wake County Superior Court ordered the suspension. (Mike Frisch)
The case recounted below from Pennsylvania demonstrates that disbarment is not necessarily a permanent condition.
Rather, with a proper showing of rehabilitation, a disbarred attorney can be restored to the practice of law.
These same principles animate a recent order of reinstatement from Massachusetts, where the court accepted a favorable recommendation from the a Hearing Panel.
The attorney had been suspended for a criminal conviction and later resigned
The professional misconduct that resulted in the petitioner's discipline, spanning roughly ten years, ended around 1999, and he has been disbarred since 2000. We are, of course, mindful that the mere passage of time is not enough to demonstrate current moral fitness.
He then appears to have turned his life around
Starting around 2001, and in the course of his work as a lobbyist, the petitioner has impressed his colleagues as a "straight shooter" even when that was not to his advantage, and they never had cause to question his honesty. The clients and colleagues to whom the petitioner disclosed his disbarment have found it inconsistent with the character they know.
The petitioner's supporting witnesses describe him as a person of great drive and initiative, always prepared to help, and an inspiration. His drive and initiative were on display when, despite his disbarment, he pursued business opportunities to support himself and his family. He continued his business as a lobbyist, we discuss other businesses below. The petitioner has also demonstrated good moral character by standing by friends and providing support in times of crisis or difficulty.
The misconduct that resulted in the petitioner's resignation and disbarment spiraled out of his attempt to handle a client's matter when- he candidly admits -- he was not competent to do so.
The panel was also impressed by the petitioner's community involvement, charitable activities and learning in the law
In light of our findings above, we need say no more to conclude that the petitioner's return to practice is consistent with precedent and the even-handed administration of justice, and it will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or to the public interest. Still, we add that we are favorably impressed that, in response to bar counsel's inquiries about restitution, the petitioner placed $18,000 in escrow with his counsel, to be distributed to the estate heirs in the matter that resulted in his resignation and disbarment and constituting return of his legal fees in that matter, and that he charged his counsel with locating the heirs to receive that distribution. On a petition for reinstatement, "making restitution ... is an outward sign of the recognition of one's wrongdoing and the awareness of a moral duty to make amends to the best of one's ability. Failure to make restitution, and failure to attempt to do so, reflects poorly on the attorney's moral fitness." Matter of McCarthy, 23 Mass. Att'y Disc. R. 469, 470 (2007).
We recommend that as a condition on his reinstatement, if the petitioner establishes a practice which requires a trust account, he consult with the Law Office Management Assistance Program concerning the establishment and maintenance of trust accounts, and adopt its recommendations.
Citations to record omitted throughout. (Mike Frisch)
Saturday, August 8, 2015
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has granted reinstatement to an attorney suspended since 2010.
The misconduct involved a third DUI and mishandling of estate assets.
He offered persuasive evidence that alcoholism had led to the misconduct and that he has been sober and active in recovery programs since 2008.
The Disciplinary Board
Petitioner is not currently at risk for relapse, based upon his history of treatment and recovery, including the diagnosis of full sustained remission after 15 months of sobriety, as well as his ability to tolerate and cope with significant facts involving loss and an increase in stress without reverting back to addictive behaviors and/or addictive use...
Petitioner presented the testimony of his former wife, two adult children, attorneys and friends, all of whom credibly testified concerning Petitioner's addiction, acts and omissions, the consequences and ramifications of his conduct, and the steps he has taken to confront his addiction and redress his transgressions, as well as his ongoing recovery...
Despite the fact that his actions resulted in a great number of negative consequences in his life, such as alienation from family, incarceration, health problems, financial issues and suspension from the legal profession, Petitioner considers himself lucky because he has been given the gift of sobriety as a result. N.T. 252-253.
Petitioner regrets the harm that resulted from his actions, and accepts it as being the necessary consequence of the misconduct. N.T. 260. Concerning the matter involving the client estate from which he converted funds, Petitioner sought to contact the executor, who is a Catholic priest and longtime friend of Petitioner, and expressed remorse for his actions and a willingness to make restitution. N.T. 283-285
As a result of his sustained efforts, he is ready to return to practice
By all accounts, Petitioner has been tireless and unwavering in his efforts to address his addiction and regain control of his life. The record is replete with evidence of Petitioner's significant progress, starting from the time he sought assistance from LCL in 2008 and continuing to the time of the reinstatement hearing. Petitioner has actively participated in inpatient and outpatient treatment, and has displayed consistent and continued attendance at and involvement in AA and LCL. Petitioner's testimony is very persuasive as to his readiness to resume the practice of law. He credibly described his transformation from addict to recovering addict. Not only has Petitioner actively worked his own recovery, he has transitioned to a place where he is able to assist other addicts. Petitioner is so dedicated to helping others achieve recovery that he was inspired to pursue a new life's work in the field of addiction counseling. His work at Mirmont Treatment Center is extremely important to him and will remain so after reinstatement, as he hopes to combine his legal expertise with his counseling work.
Petitioner has accepted full responsibility for his misconduct and has demonstrated sincere remorse and regret. Petitioner suffered many negative consequences as a result of his addictive behavior; however, he views these consequences as necessary in that he was able to achieve sobriety. Petitioner has worked to mend fractured relationships with his family, particularly his adult sons, and to be more accountable in his life. Petitioner's sobriety remains his first priority in life, as he is cognizant that a relapse could signify the loss of hard-won achievements. The record demonstrates that Petitioner has been an effective father, employee, LCL volunteer and member of society since his suspension.
Petitioner's witnesses wholeheartedly endorse his reinstatement, as they have observed first-hand the extraordinary changes he has made in his life. None of the witnesses have observed a relapse of Petitioner's sobriety, and each believes that Petitioner will properly balance his legal career with his recovery and be an asset to the legal profession.
The public policies that underpin Rule 1.13(b) do not protect a whistleblowing attorney's job, according to a recent opinion of the Utah Supreme Court.
This case requires us to determine whether rule 1.13(b) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct reflects a clear and substantial public policy of the kind sufficient to prevent companies from terminating in-house legal counsel for reporting illegal activity to management. David K. Pang, an attorney, filed a complaint against his employer alleging that he was terminated for refusing to ignore the company‘s violation of several states‘ usury laws. He asserted that the company had effectively asked him to violate the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct in order to keep his job. The district court dismissed his complaint, concluding that Mr. Pang was an at-will employee and that his firing did not violate a clear and substantial public policy of the State of Utah. We affirm the district court‘s decision. Rule 1.13(b) does not constitute a clear and substantial public policy that prevents the termination of an at-will employee. And even if it did, other rules of professional conduct evince strong policy choices that favor allowing clients to terminate the attorney-client relationship at any time, including firing an inhouse lawyer with whom an organizational client disagrees.
Between 2009 and 2012, Mr. Pang worked as a compliance officer for Internal Document Services (IDS) and Progressive Finance. Resource Management Incorporated (RMI) also hired Mr. Pang in 2012, becoming a ―co-employer‖ with the other two companies. IDS promoted Mr. Pang to in-house counsel in 2011, making him responsible for its compliance with state regulatory requirements in several different jurisdictions. Mr. Pang apparently worked in this same capacity for the other two companies. Because the relationship between these three entities is not relevant to the merits of the issues presented on appeal, we will refer to them collectively as ―the Company throughout this opinion.
Beginning in September 2011, Mr. Pang became concerned that the Company was violating "usury laws in numerous states by charging an interest rate above statutory limits and not registering as a loan institution." He warned the Company‘s owners ―repeatedly "that these oversights ―rendered their out of state practice illegal." Mr. Pang ―made a final attempt to convince "the Company of its ―illegal lending practices" in May 2012. He ―printed, and took home, loan contracts from different states in order to develop a spreadsheet report to show the specific number of . . . usury violations." Two weeks later, the Company fired Mr. Pang ―for taking home documents, "citing a provision of the employee handbook that prohibited such conduct. ―[A]t the time of his termination," Mr. Pang learned ―for the first time "that ―the owners were aware of the problems but did not plan to correct" them. And he ―was told to ignore " the Company‘s ―non-compliance."
We affirm the district court‘s decision. Even though the court erroneously denied Mr. Pang‘s request for a hearing, the error was harmless. Mr. Pang fails to invoke a clear and substantial public policy that would have prohibited the Company from terminating him. The specific allegations in his complaint do not support the assertion that he was terminated for refusing to commit an illegal act, and rule 1.13(b) does not, standing alone, reflect the type of public policy that qualifies as an exception to the at-will employment rule.
Friday, August 7, 2015
An attorney admitted in Virginia and the District of Columbia has an application pending for Maryland admission.
Unfortunately, the Maryland Court of Appeals has disbarred her before they barred her.
This attorney disciplinary proceeding involves a lawyer, unlicensed to practice law in the state of Maryland, assuming the role of “Managing Attorney” in a Maryland law firm and meeting with clients in the firm’s Maryland office.
The misconduct involved unauthorized practice that led to a laundry list of ethics violations.
Not only did the hearing judge make no findings as to mitigation, but, as Petitioner points out, Respondent engaged in a variety of misconduct. Respondent’s misconduct stems from her ineffective supervision of the firm’s attorney trust account and her engagement in the unauthorized practice of law in Maryland. Although Respondent maintains that her misconduct was unintentional, in some instances her misconduct led to harmful consequences to clients, and that harm was not remedied. By inadequately supervising the attorney trust account, Respondent harmed clients in failing to ensure that unearned attorneys’ fees were being held in trust, and by failing to issue refunds when work was not performed. In addition, though Respondent signed retainer agreements promising services to clients and initial letters on behalf of clients in furtherance of those promised services, several clients’ matters were either not completed or not undertaken at all.
Finally, one crucial feature of the instant case is Respondent’s role as “Managing Attorney.” When an attorney engages in managerial conduct like Respondent’s, from which a reasonable client could conclude that the attorney is in some real way responsible for the client’s matter and the legal matters of the firm generally, then that attorney has adopted a significant set of responsibilities. That Respondent took no reasonable steps to ensure that client matters were handled correctly is a serious violation. As noted, in cases involving the unauthorized practice of law, one of the factors we consider is deterrence. Here the misconduct evolved from an arrangement between an unlicensed attorney and a nonlawyer, whereby the unlicensed attorney agreed to manage a law firm for the nonlawyer. Although the primary duties and responsibilities of the unlicensed lawyer related to the management of the law firm’s attorney trust accounts, Respondent’s ineffective management led to the firm’s deposit of unearned client fees into the firm’s operating account before performing any meaningful client services. Taking all of this into account, the appropriate sanction is disbarment.
Judge McDonald would suspend rather than disbar. (Mike Frisch)
Thursday, August 6, 2015
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals found that there was not an obvious miscarriage of justice in imposing reciprocal discipline based on an attorney's disbarment in Alabama.
The court concluded that her failure to participate in the proceedings waived her rights and disbarred her.
When neither the respondent nor Bar Counsel opposes identical reciprocal discipline, “the imposition of identical discipline should be close to automatic, with minimum review by both the Board and this court.” In re Childress, 811 A.2d 805, 807 (D.C. 2002) (quoting In re Cole, 809 A.2d 1226, 1227 n.3 (D.C. 2002). At most, the reviewing body should examine “the foreign proceeding sufficiently to satisfy itself that no obvious miscarriage of justice would result [from] the imposition of identical discipline—a situation that we anticipate would rarely, if ever, present itself.” In re Spann, 711 A.2d 1262, 1265 (D.C. 1998).
Although we have often repeated these words, we have yet to provide much guidance for assessing whether an obvious miscarriage of justice will result. We do so here and conclude that this is not one of those very rare cases where an obvious miscarriage of justice will result from imposing identical reciprocal discipline.
The court rejected the Board on Professional Responsibility's call for a short suspension
the Board found that disbarment is substantially different from the sanction that would have been imposed had Caffey’s misconduct occurred in the District. It therefore recommends that we impose a ninety-day suspension but require Caffey to demonstrate her fitness to practice law before she may be reinstated. Bar Counsel takes exception to that recommendation, arguing that the Board failed to accord appropriate deference to Alabama’s decision and unnecessarily complicated its review in an uncontested case “by applying the typical exceptions to reciprocal discipline” available to attorneys who contest identical discipline. Although we appreciate the Board’s assistance, we agree that it erred by analyzing this case as if it were a contested proceeding.
The facts of this case readily demonstrate that this is not the “rare” case where such an obvious miscarriage of justice will result. Caffey received notice and was given an opportunity to be heard in the Alabama disciplinary proceeding. The Board does not dispute that if it had occurred in the District of Columbia, Caffey’s behavior would have violated our Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rule 1.1 (b) (duty to serve a client with skill and care); Rule 3.5 (impartiality and decorum of the tribunal); and Rule 8.4 (d) (serious interference with the administration of justice). Caffey’s misconduct has been deemed contemptuous and prejudicial to her client by forcing a mistrial. She was found to have acted dishonestly and with selfish motive...
We do not act unfairly by assigning such significant weight to Caffey’s failure to oppose identical reciprocal discipline. There is no doubt that she had notice of the instant proceedings. She requested, and was granted, additional time to file a brief with the court.9 We recognize that, in some circumstances, physical or other forms of incapacitation may prevent an attorney who has received notice from participating in disciplinary proceedings. But Caffey has never claimed that she was hampered by incapacity.
As I blogged when the board filed its recommendation, I find disbarment based on the Alabama proceeding deeply troubling and quite likely an obvious miscarriage of justice. I think the board got this one right.
The disbarment involved her conduct during a single state court criminal trial.
The Alabama order (which I have been unable to find on line) quotes from the transcript extensively. The attorney may well have crossed the often difficult to discern line from zealousness to argumentative, but no more so than I have frequently seen in hotly-contested criminal and civil trials.
The trial court found the attorney in contempt and declared a mistrial.
After the trial, the attorney made a comment to a television station "that there was an intolerance by white judges to show respect to black attorneys and that the judge was embarrassed by all the lies the State told during the trial."
The prosecutor filed the bar complaint.
After the Alabama disbarment, the attorney sued a host of defendants including the Alabama Supreme Court.
The suit was dismissed on immunity grounds.
...as a blogger who surfs state court and bar web pages for disciplinary orders, I would rank Alabama as the very worst jurisdiction in terms of online transparency. Lack of transparency (which is not limited to Alabama) makes me wary of any disciplinary regime. If anyone knows how to find Alabama disciplinary orders on line, please educate me.
District of Columbia Bar Counsel supports disbarment.
As an assistant bar counsel, I argued many times in opposition to a downward departure from identical discipline recommendation by the BPR. My position was premised in the idea that the Board often inappropriately either minimized the misconduct found or second-guessed the disciplining tribunal's sanction.
Here, the Alabama proceedings just give me pause that I rarely, if ever, have felt in a reciprocal matter.
I predict that the Court of Appeals will not impose such a harsh sanction.
If you are keeping score, that would be a wrong prediction.
I think the court correctly was concerned by the attorney's lack of interest in these proceedings. This may have led here to a subtle miscarriage of justice. (Mike Frisch)
An unpublished recommendation for disbarment of the California State Bar Court Review Department rejected a number of charges because the evidence was presented by declaration rather than live
This is respondent Lorraine Dickson’s second disciplinary proceeding. It involves our evidentiary rules, on the one hand, and Dickson’s serious misconduct, on the other. During the first part of Dickson’s trial, the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar (OCTC) presented its case in six client matters by relying on direct testimony from witnesses and documentary evidence. After a break of several months, and over Dickson’s objections, OCTC presented its case in the remaining matters by relying on declarations, in lieu of live testimony, and other documentary evidence. Ultimately, the judge found Dickson culpable of 44 counts of misconduct, and further found five factors in aggravation (prior record, multiple acts/pattern of misconduct, dishonesty and concealment, significant harm, and indifference) and one factor in mitigation (emotional/physical difficulties). The judge recommended disbarment.
After independently reviewing the record (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.12), we find that the judge erred in relying solely on the witness declarations in lieu of testimony to support his findings in eight client matters. We dismiss those matters, and the counts therein, with prejudice. Nevertheless, we affirm the judge’s disbarment recommendation because Dickson is culpable of 21 counts of misconduct, which is serious in its breadth and reveals an ongoing disregard for the public, the courts, and the legal profession.
The change in procedure came at a break in the proceedings
Over six days in the fall of 2012, OCTC presented its case in six client matters through the testimony of witnesses, including Dickson, and documentary evidence. In turn, Dickson cross-examined the witnesses. The trial was then continued to May 2013 because Dickson underwent emergency surgery.
Thereafter the evidence consisted of declarations, which led the Review Board to conclude
the judge did not err in admitting the declarations. Admission was proper under rule 5.104(C) because the statements are relevant, and signed declarations are the type of evidence relied on in serious matters. Nevertheless, as out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the matters stated, the declarations are hearsay evidence, not direct testimony, even though the judge gave Dickson an opportunity for cross-examination...
Further, in the eight at-issue matters, the charges were based on clients’ disputed versions of events. Without direct testimony, the judge did not have the opportunity to observe the clients’ demeanor or evaluate their credibility — essential information where a complaining witness’s version of events is the basis for the allegations...
As such, we find the judge improperly relied on declarations “to support a finding.” (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 5.104(D).) He could only “use” this hearsay to explain or supplement “other evidence.” (Ibid.) The evidence in the following matters is comprised almost exclusively of hearsay declarations and other hearsay documentary evidence...
The few exhibits containing evidence that is admissible over objection in civil actions, such as party statements, do not provide clear and convincing proof of Dickson’s culpability.
This strikes me as a significant decision.
Can California readers tell us the reason why so few disciplinary decisions are published? (Mike Frisch)
An attorney who broke into the home of her ex-husband, stole a $13,000 diamond ring and his present wife's Rolex watch and sold the stolen items to Diamond Distributors for $2,700 should be suspended for a year and a day, according to a report of a Louisiana Hearing Committee.
She used the proceeds to gamble.
The attorney had self-reported the arrest and admitted the charged ethical violations.
The committee considered that she is seeking treatment for a previously undiagnosed bipolar disorder. (Mike Frisch)
Wednesday, August 5, 2015
The New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department affirmed the dismissal of a defamation action
This defamation action arises out of a wholly accurate news report stating that federal authorities raided The Cheetah Club (Cheetah's), a midtown Manhattan strip club, which they alleged to be "run by the [M]afia" and at the center of an underground immigration ring that brought Russian and eastern European women into the United States, forcing them to work as exotic dancers. On November 30, 2011, federal agencies charged seven alleged members and associates of the Gambino and Bonanno crime families with, inter alia, transporting and harboring illegal aliens to work as dancers in New York area strip clubs. The indictment alleged that organized crime defendants controlled certain strip clubs and forced women who had been trafficked from eastern Europe to dance at the clubs. As the women would be placed in sham marriages for citizenship purposes, the federal operation was called "Operation Dancing Brides."
The conduct of the defendants
After the raid at Cheetah's, defendant CBS News broadcast the event during its noon news broadcast. Reporter Kathryn Brown (in front of Cheetah's) broadcast the following:
"[S]ources tell CBS-2 News this bust is being dubbed Operation Dancing Brides,' and this strip club here, Cheetahs in Midtown, they say is at the center of the operation. Cheetahs advertises exotic women and the
. . . federal authorities say it is run by the mafia. They have been here — feds have been here all morning. They conducted an early morning raid and they've been here for hours inside collecting evidence. They are still inside right now. Meantime, earlier this morning, agents with the immigrations and customs enforcement arrested 25 men described as ringleaders of this entire operation. Many of them they say are members of the Gambino and Bonanno crime families. They say the men were involved in an elaborate operation to recruit women from Russia and eastern Europe into the U.S. . . . [to] force the women to work as dancers in strip clubs across New York City, including Cheetahs . . . This is still a developing story and we will have much more on this tonight on CBS-2 News at 5:00."
At 5:00 p.m., defendants broadcast a news program called The Evening Report, which contained, inter alia, the following segment:
"Federal authorities carried out boxes of evidence from this Midtown strip club during an early morning raid. They say the club, Cheetahs, is one of several at the center of an underground immigration ring that stretches from Times Square to the heart of Russia. Investigators say Russian and Italian mobsters were working together in the elaborate scheme to bring Russian and eastern European women to the U.S., then funnel them to strip clubs to work as exotic dancers."
The Report then showed Kathryn Brown interviewing a federal law enforcement official, the director of the National Organization for Women, and David Carlebach, an attorney for Cheetah's. Carlebach was broadcast saying, "There is absolutely no La Cosa Nostra, as you say, connection."
No case, says the majority
The suggestion that the individual plaintiffs are necessarily identified as members of organized crime because they are employees of entities that provide management services to Cheetah's — reported to be "run" by the Mafia — is simply not logical. It is based on innuendo and constitutes an attempt to enlarge the concept of managerial services to include domination and control of an organization by force, whether actual or threatened, in contravention of the rule set forth in Tracy.
There is a dissent.
Bonus points to whoever gets the title reference. (Mike Frisch)
In contrast to the District of Columbia Board on Professional Responsibility, the California State Bar Court Review Department holds that an attorney's four alcohol-related driving offenses involved moral turpitude and warrants a meaningful sanction of actual suspension
After independently reviewing the record (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.12), we agree with the hearing judge that the facts and circumstances surrounding Guillory’s convictions involve moral turpitude. We base our conclusion on the following facts: (1) Guillory attempted to use his position as an assistant deputy district attorney to avoid arrest; (2) his cousin died in one of his alcohol-related driving incidents; (3) he repeatedly drove with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) well above the legal limit; and (4) he violated his criminal probation by driving on a suspended license at the time of his two most recent arrests for DUI.
From the start of his career, Guillory has been on notice that the State Bar considers alcohol-related driving convictions to be a serious matter. His first conviction occurred while he was in law school, and it affected his admission to the Bar. He promised the Moral Character Committee (Committee) during the admissions process that he would not drink and drive again. Nevertheless, he did so repeatedly after becoming an attorney, evidencing a lack of concern for public safety and respect for the legal system. Given these circumstances, as well as the serious aggravation (multiple acts and indifference) and lack of mitigation, we affirm the hearing judge’s recommendation of a two-year actual suspension with conditions, including proof of his rehabilitation and fitness to practice law.
The accident that had killed his cousin took place prior to admission and had been disclosed.
He had difficulty acknowledging he was an alcoholic but had some mitigation
As for his personal problems, we accept that Guillory’s emotional and financial difficulties contributed to his alcohol abuse and DUIs. But absent evidence of a sustained commitment to sobriety, he is at risk of committing misconduct if faced with future stressors. (Std. 1.6(d) [must prove that problems no longer pose risk that attorney will commit future misconduct].) Also, the two attorney witnesses who testified to his good character do not represent a wide range of references in the legal and general communities required to demonstrate extraordinary good character.
Unlike the D.C. case, the offenses were misdemeanors and he did not flee the scene of an accident.
The Review Department nonetheless concludes that a two-year suspension is appropriate.
The Review Department was less sympathetic to the attorney that the D.C. Board had been for an attorney who seriously injured another motorist and fled the scene.
Unlike in D.C., the regular practice of driving around blind drunk was treated as an aggravating rather than mitigating factor
Guillory claimed that his DUIs caused no harm because they did not result in actual bodily harm or property damage. This attitude shows a lack of insight into the inherent danger in drinking and driving, and the evasive action required by motorists to avoid his reckless driving.
The D.C. BPR apparently shares that lack of insight. (Mike Frisch)
A North Carolina Central State chemistry professor who had retired after 38 years of teaching expected to be accorded professor emeritus status.
He did not get it.
He sued but lost in an affirmance of the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
In the instant case, at no point before or after retirement did Plaintiff actually acquire the specific benefit of Professor Emeritus status. He was merely “nominated.” No alleged facts, even when taken as true, indicate nomination results in automatic approval. To the contrary, Plaintiff’s complaint forecasts that conferral of the status is a discretionary university decision; the nomination must pass several stages of approval by multiple committees. Such a discretionary conferral process cannot give rise to more than a “unilateral expectation” of the status.
The professor had no property interest protected by state or federal law
The absence of any record or legal support underlying Plaintiff’s claim to a “due process property interest” in Professor Emeritus status compels us to conclude his section 1983 causes of action premised solely thereupon must fail...It is therefore unnecessary to address Plaintiff’s contention that the change in NCCU’s nomination procedure—which appears now to include a faculty deliberation of a nomination outside of a candidate’s presence without a “name-clearing” hearing—deprived him of that alleged interest.
His defamation claim also was dismissed. (Mike Frisch)
Tuesday, August 4, 2015
The District of Board on Professional Responsibility has recommended that an attorney who had misappropriated entrusted funds and failed to participate in the disciplinary proceedings be disbarred.
Nothing remarkable about that result but my attention was drawn to the following footnote
We note that Bar Counsel charged Respondent with violating Rule 8.4(c) (dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation) in both the Mills and Anderson Matters. The Court has held that each of the four terms encompassed by Rule 8.4(c) “should be understood as separate categories, denoting differences in meaning or degree.” Each category of misconduct under Rule 8.4(c) thus requires different elements of proof. See In re Romansky, 825 A.2d 311, 315 (D.C. 2003). Notwithstanding the clear holding of Shorter, Bar Counsel declined to identify the element or elements of Rule 8.4(c) on which it relied to establish a violation, when the Hearing Committee invited it to do so at the conclusion of the hearing. Tr. 263-64. In its post-hearing brief, Bar Counsel explained that “classifying which type of dishonesty occurred  would not change the fact that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c), or affect the appropriate sanction,” because Respondent had committed each of the four types of misconduct “[a]t some point.” See Bar Counsel’s Post-Hearing Brief at 46 (emphasis in original). Yet, Bar Counsel still failed to specify the facts that supported each of the elements of Rule 8.4(c). As a result, the Hearing Committee was left to sift through the evidence on its own, concluding that Bar Counsel proved that Respondent committed dishonesty, deceit and misrepresentation, but not fraud, in the Anderson Matter, and that Respondent committee all four types of misconduct in the Mills Matter. See H.C. Rpt. at 39-43; 59-62. Bar Counsel’s reluctance at the outset to specify the elements underlying the Rule 8.4(c) charges, and its eventual failure to identify the facts underlying each element of a violation in its brief, raises potential due process concerns for respondents, although we find none here; Respondent made no attempt to participate in this disciplinary proceeding and should be disbarred under Addams in any event, regardless of any violation of Rule 8.4(c). At the least, Bar Counsel’s failure to clarify its theory of prosecution created a burden for the Hearing Committee, which diligently matched the facts to the Rule 8.4(c) elements.
Pardon my broken record, but this is nonsense.
These are not criminal proceedings. If it was a criminal proceeding, crimes can be charged in the alternative and are subject to lesser-included offense provisions.
As the Court of Appeals explained years ago in rejecting a board order of dismissal on speedy trial grounds
A disciplinary sanction differs from a criminal conviction. Although both protect the public, they do so in different ways. Most importantly, an attorney is in a continuing position of trust toward clients, the courts, and society in general. A member of the bar has accepted the onerous responsibility of participating in the administration of justice. We grant the license to practice law as a privilege, not as a right, and we do so only on the strict condition that the attorney aspire to the highest standards of ethical conduct.
Simply out, the board wants to enforce a procedure that forces Bar Counsel to do something unheard of in disciplinary law - elect the subsection of a rule that clearly describes gradations of the same type of misconduct.
If the attorney violates the rule in any respect, sanction follows. That is what the Shorter case holds.
And if Bar Counsel gets it wrong (something the board treats as the rule, not the exception), does the lawyer go free because the misconduct involved dishonesty but not misrepresentation?
The only thing driving this assault on commonsense is a desire to make Bar Counsel's job harder and create rights for lawyers that no one else has in any adjudicatory forum. These proceedings exist to protect the public and the integrity of the profession.
Creating procedures to make enforcement a hide-the-ball game is directly contrary to the reason the board is supposed to exist.
As the Connecticut Supreme Court aptly held
In attorney disciplinary proceedings, two interests are of paramount importance. On the one hand, we must not tie the hands of grievance committees and trial courts with procedural requirements so strict that it becomes virtually impossible to discipline an attorney for any but the most obvious, egregious and public misconduct. On the other hand, we must ensure that attorneys subject to disciplinary action are afforded the full measure of procedural due process required under the constitution so that we do not unjustly deprive them of their reputation and livelihood.
This is just the kind of "procedural requirement" that Connecticut justly condemned.
Because neither the attorney or Bar Counsel will likely appeal the recommendation, going forward the board will cite this footnote as authority for requiring Bar Counsel to engage in all sorts of "elections" in dishonesty, conflicts and misappropriation cases.
The case is In re Jerome Clair. (Mike Frisch)
Monday, August 3, 2015
The report of the District of Columbia Board of Professional Responsibility in the case of Wayne Rohde, Board Docket No. D347-05, has been filed.
You may remember the case - it involves an attorney who drove from the District of Columbia to Virginia after a night of heavy drinking. He struck and seriously injured another motorist, fled the scene but left his car bumper with license plate affixed behind.
He pled guilty and was sentenced in 2005 to felony criminal charges in Virginia.
The D.C. disciplinary system began its processes that same year.
The board found that the conduct did not involve moral turpitude because the attorney was suffering from an "alcoholic blackout" when he committed these crimes.
The effect of the "blackout" was a subject of conflicting expert testimony
[Bar Counsel expert] Dr. Blumberg disagreed with [respondent's expert] Dr. Whitfield concerning the effects of an alcoholic blackout. In his opinion, a person suffering an alcoholic blackout can still access his long term memory and is able to distinguish right from wrong; the person still knows when his or her behavior is illegal or unethical. FF 90. Applying these principles to this case, Dr. Blumberg testified that at the time of the collision, Respondent was aware of the collision and understood that it was wrong to leave the scene, even if he later did not remember having such knowledge or awareness. FF 92. Dr. Blumberg opined that Respondent did not lose the ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law and that he retained the ability to form the specific intent to stop and render aid to Ms. Banks. Although Respondent’s judgment was impaired, he did not lose the capacity to choose the proper course of action. FF 93. In support of his opinion, Dr. Blumberg observed that Respondent was able to perform a number of other tasks during his alcoholic blackout, including paying his bar tab, with a tip, retrieving his car from the parking garage, and driving to the scene of the collision and then home after colliding with Ms. Banks. FF 94. Respondent’s ability to drive home suggested an awareness that he was involved in an accident and that he was choosing to leave the scene. FF 95. Dr. Blumberg agreed with Dr. Whitfield that, but for Respondent’s intoxication, he would not have left the scene of his collision with Ms. Banks. FF 96. The determination of the credibility of the experts was central to the Hearing Committee’s findings. The Hearing Committee found that it was a “close question,” FF 105, but ultimately credited Dr. Whitfield’s testimony in its entirety.
So let me get this straight. An attorney practices at a major law firm and there is not a hint of evidence that he functions below par at work. His practice is to get loaded night after night near work and drive home drunk to Virginia. Like a random bullet from a gun, the inevitable happens. Fortunately, he causes major injury but not death. He flees the scene.
No real disciplinary consequences because he'a an alcoholic?
If it's a "close question," why not protect the public and uphold the integrity of the legal profession?
While the board found ethical violations, it was a treated as a mitigating factor that he was an alcoholic when he was driving drunk.
It found distinguishable the Tidwell case, where the court disbarred the attorney for causing a death while driving drunk and fled the scene. Likewise the Hoare case, where the court imposed a two-year suspension for a vehicular homicide where the attorney did not flee, played no role in the sanction analysis.
Rather, the proposed sanction is probation without suspension for a single day
we recommend that Respondent be suspended for two years with a requirement to prove his fitness to practice as a condition of reinstatement, and that the suspension be stayed in favor of a three-year period of supervised probation, subject to the conditions set forth by Hearing Committee Number Three in its Report and Recommendation. We further recommend that Respondent not be required to provide his clients notice of the probation.
For nearly killing someone and fleeing the scene.
They note that the incident happened eleven years ago and never (unless I missed it) acknowledge that seven years of that time involved their own hearing committee's disgraceful delay.
And he doesn't need to tell his clients about it - it's double secret probation.
By coincidence, he's a big firm lawyer.
It's another day in the the world of the D.C. bar disciplinary system.
The Board report can be found at this link by entering the attorney's name. (Mike Frisch)