Wednesday, August 13, 2014
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has reversed an order dismissing a legal malpractice case.
The court held that there is no per se rule that requires a legal malpractice plaintiff to offer expert testimony
...the trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss because "the plaintiff . . . failed to disclose an expert capable of establishing the standard of care and the breach of that standard of care as well as the proximate cause of the alleged injuries." The trial court based its decision on a categorical rule that, "[b]ecause the extent to which an attorney, in the exercise of due care, should investigate a claim to file a timely action is not a matter of common knowledge, a jury would not be able to evaluate the adequacy of the attorney’s actions without the aid of expert testimony." (Quotation omitted.) Because we have not adopted such an unqualified rule, the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting the motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Carbone, 151 N.H. at 528-29 (explaining case was not "one of those exceptional cases where [the defendant’s] breach of the standard of care was so obviously the legal cause of [the plaintiff’s] injuries that expert testimony was not required"); Wong, 148 N.H. at 374 (affirming dismissal of legal malpractice claim for lack of expert testimony because evidence of negligence was not "so patent and conclusive that reasonable persons c[ould] reach only one conclusion" (quotation omitted)).
The underlying case was brought by the plaintiff against a defendant wjo was alleged to have removed timber from his property. That case was dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. (Mike Frisch)
Tuesday, August 5, 2014
Collection of papers on "Jews and the Law" and in the legal profession: now published as a book and ebook
Collecting essays presented in a conference held at Cardozo Law School a few years ago, editors Ari Mermelstein, Victoria Saker Woeste, Ethan Zadoff and Marc Galanter have published a new book on Jews and Judaism in the legal profession and law. Called Jews and the Law, it is a book of legal history and current insights about the profession, law firms, networks, assimilation, and antisemitism. Here is a story about it by Dan Ernst on Legal History Blog. It was published through my Quid Pro Books publishing project, and so it no longer sits as a collection of unpublished papers from a conference but is now -- I am proud to say -- a resource that can be read by anyone or recommended to a library to acquire. Its Amazon page for the paperback is here, and it can also be bought at many other places and in ebook sites such as Apple, Play, Kindle and Nook. [Alan Childress]
Monday, July 28, 2014
The District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Committee has a new opinion on an important real-world issue
When a lawyer is seeking employment with an entity or person adverse to his client, or with the adversary's lawyer, a conflict of interest may arise under Rule 1.7(b)(4) if the lawyer’s professional judgment on behalf of the client will be, or reasonably may be, adversely affected by the lawyer’s own financial, business, property, or personal interests (for purposes of this Opinion, a lawyer’s own financial, business, property, or personal interests are collectively referred to as a “personal interest conflict”). Both subjective and objective tests must be applied to determine whether a personal interest conflict exists.
There is no “bright line” test for determining the point during the employment process when a personal interest conflict arises, and that point may vary. There are a number of factors to consider in determining whether a personal interest conflict exists, including whether the individual lawyer is materially and actively involved in representing the client and, if so, whether the lawyer’s interest in the prospective employer is targeted and specific, and/or has been communicated to, and reciprocated by, the prospective employer.
Where the prospective employer is affiliated with, but separate and distinct from, the entity adverse to the job-seeking lawyer's client, there may be no personal interest conflict in the first instance, because the adversary and the prospective employer may be separate entities for conflicts purposes.
If a personal interest conflict arises, there are three possible courses of action that may be available to the individual lawyer, each of which is subject to applicable requirements of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct: (a) disclosing to the client the existence and nature of the personal interest conflict and the possible adverse consequences of the lawyer's representation of the client and obtaining the client's informed consent to the representation; (b) withdrawing from the representation; or, (c) discontinuing seeking employment with the client's adversary or the adversary's lawyer until all pending matters relating to that potential new employment have been completed.
The personal interest conflict of an individual lawyer in a law firm, nonprofit, or corporate legal department is not imputed to the other lawyers in the law firm, nonprofit, or corporate legal department, so long as the personal interest conflict does not present a significant risk of adversely affecting the representation of the client by such other lawyers. The imputation rule does not apply to a government agency.
A subordinate lawyer who discusses a potential personal interest conflict with his supervisory lawyer, and acts in accordance with the supervisory lawyer's reasonable determination of whether the subordinate lawyer has a personal interest conflict and follows the supervisory lawyer's recommended course of action, will not be held professionally responsible even if it is subsequently determined that the supervisory lawyer's determination of whether there was a personal interest conflict, and/or the recommended course of action, were incorrect under the Rules.
I have found this issue to arise with some frequency. Guidance always is helpful. (Mike Frisch)
Tuesday, July 1, 2014
The New York Court of Appeals has answered a question posed by the United States Court of appeals for the Second Circuit as follows
We hold that pending hourly fee matters are not partnership "property" or "unfinished business" within the meaning of New York's Partnership Law. A law firm does not own a client or an engagement, and is only entitled to be paid for services actually rendered.
The litigation involved trustee claims against Thelan and Coudert Brothers.
The notion that law firms will hire departing partners or accept client engagements without the promise of compensation ignores commonsense and marketplace realities. Followed to its logical conclusion, the trustees' approach would cause clients, lawyers and law firms to suffer, all without producing the sought-after financial rewards for the estates of bankrupt firms.
Treating a dissolved firm's pending hourly fee matters as partnership property, as the trustees urge, would have numerous perverse effects, and conflicts with basic principles that govern the attorney-client relationship under New York law and the Rules of Professional Conduct. By allowing former partners of a dissolved firm to profit from work they do not perform, all at the expense of a former partner and his new firm, the trustees' approach creates an "unjust windfall," as remarked upon by the District Court Judge in Geron (476 BR at 740)...
Ultimately, what the trustees ask us to endorse conflicts with New York's strong public policy encouraging client choice and, concomitantly, attorney mobility...
Tuesday, June 3, 2014
The civil claims of an associate attorney against her former firm may proceed in some respects, according to a decision issued today by the New York Appellate Dvision for the First Judicial Department.
In January 2008, plaintiff Ji Sun Jennifer Kim was hired as an associate attorney in the tax certiorari department of defendant law firm Goldberg, Weprin, Finkel, Goldstein, LLP. In January 2009, plaintiff learned she was expecting a child and informed the law firm of her pregnancy. In June 2009, while visibly pregnant, plaintiff was reprimanded by a partner at the law firm for allegedly reading a book during work hours. According to plaintiff, the partner stood extremely close and screamed at her, causing plaintiff to fear that she would be hit.
Plaintiff promptly emailed a complaint about the incident to defendants Arnold Mazel and Barry Zweigbaum, both partners in the law firm. In that complaint, plaintiff alleged that two other attorneys, both male, were engaging in similar behavior at the same time but were not admonished. Plaintiff's email expressed concern that she was singled out and treated unfairly due to her pregnancy. Defendant Andrew Albstein, the law firm's managing partner, wrote an email to plaintiff reiterating that reading a book during work hours was inappropriate, and denying that plaintiff was reprimanded due to her pregnancy. Plaintiff also alleges that Mazel told her that she made her situation worse by complaining.
In September 2009, plaintiff took 12 weeks' maternity leave. Upon her return to work in December 2009, plaintiff began to express breast milk at the office. At some point in February 2010, Zweigbaum, within earshot of plaintiff, is alleged to have made an inappropriate gender-based comment. The next day, plaintiff complained to Zweigbaum and another partner about the offensive remark. Plaintiff alleges that after she complained, Zweigbaum barely spoke to her.
At around the same time, plaintiff asked if she could work a reduced schedule so she could take care of her baby at home, but Mazel denied the request. According to Mazel, February was the tax certiorari department's busy season, and firm policy did not allow lawyers to work a reduced work schedule. Albstein confirmed that in the previous 10 years, the law firm had never allowed any associate attorney to work part-time. In April 2010, the law firm terminated plaintiff's employment, purportedly for budgetary reasons.
The court affirmed the dismissal of claims of gender discrimination and hostile work environment.
The retaliation claim can go forward.
Law360 had this earlier report. (Mike Frisch)
Monday, May 12, 2014
An interesting decision last week from the Georgia Supreme Court on disqualification premised on a non-attorney employee
We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that a conflict of interest involving a nonlawyer can be remedied by implementing proper screening measures in order to avoid disqualification of the entire law firm. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that a nonlawyer’s conflict of interest can be remedied by implementing proper screening measures so as to avoid disqualification of an entire law firm. In this particular case, we find that the screening measures implemented by the nonlawyer’s new law firm were effective and appropriate to protect against the nonlawyer’s disclosure of confidential information. However, we remand this case to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether the new law firm promptly disclosed the conflict.
The case involves a wrongful death action brought by the estate of a person who was shot and killed at an apartment complex. The paralegal was the plaintiff 's primary contact and worked on the fact investigation before moving (with an intervening stop at another job) to the firm that represented the defendant apartment complex.
The conflict was not discovered when the paralegal first moved to the defendant's firm, as suit had not yet been filed and the paralegal did not know that the firm represented the defendant.
Screening was implemented after the conflict was discovered.
The court set forth a test for disqualification under the circumstances
...the new firm will be disqualified where (1) the nonlawyer has already revealed the confidential information to lawyers or other personnel in the new firm; (2) screening would be ineffective; or (3) “the nonlawyer necessarily would be required to work [or has actually worked at the new firm] on the other side of the same or a substantially related matter on which the nonlawyer [previously] worked.”
Justice Nahmias concers but has concerns about the state of screening in Georgia
It should be noted... that this is yet another case that raises questions about whether Rule 1.10, and in particular its implicit rejection of the use of screening measures to avoid imputed disqualification of an entire law firm when one of their lawyers would be disqualified, should be reconsidered and amended or at least clarified. After all, the rules already allow the use of screening to avoid conflicts imputed from some lawyers – former government lawyers, judges, and arbitrators. See Rules 1.11 (a) and 1.12 (c). And many of the factors that the Court discusses in support of our conclusion that screening measures, rather than imputed disqualification, may be appropriate for nonlawyers also apply to many other lawyers – especially associates. In addition, we should acknowledge that, as in the rest of our economy, it is becoming far less common for lawyers and their nonlawyer assistants to remain with the same firm for an entire career, whether by choice or due to layoffs or merger and dissolution of firms. This Court can continue deciding – or avoiding deciding – the impact of Rule 1.10 on a case-by-case basis, but the process for amending the Bar Rules provides opportunities for greater and broader input from those whose interests may be affected by imputed disqualification as well as consideration of facts and circumstances beyond those presented in the record of a particular case. That seems a preferable way to address these issues.
Wednesday, April 30, 2014
The Minesota Supreme Court has remanded the order that had disqualified Covington & Burling in civil litigation
This case presents several issues regarding disqualification of legal counsel because of a violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.9(a) arising from a conflict of interest with a former client. These issues include who has standing to appeal a district court order granting a motion to disqualify, the legal standard for determining whether Rule 1.9(a) has been violated, and whether the right to seek disqualification can be waived. Appellant State of Minnesota retained appellant Covington & Burling, LLP (Covington) to represent it in a natural resource damages (NRD) case against respondent 3M Company involving the manufacture and disposal of perfluorochemicals (PFCs). Covington previously had represented 3M in legal and regulatory matters related to 3M’s fluorochemicals (FC) business from 1992 to 2006. Covington first appeared on behalf of the State in this action in January 2011. In October 2012, the district court granted 3M’s disqualification motion. Both the State and Covington appealed. The court of appeals dismissed Covington’s appeal for lack of standing and affirmed the disqualification of Covington. We granted Covington’s and the State’s respective petitions for review. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the district court.
Here, the district court concluded, based on the evidence in the record, that Covington obtained confidential information in its prior representation of 3M, and the district court presumed that the information was shared with all Covington attorneys. But the district court did not meaningfully assess Covington’s claims that this information was no longer confidential either because the information had been disclosed to regulatory authorities and the public or because 3M waived the attorney-client privilege by initiating a separate, concurrent lawsuit against Covington for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract. The district court also did not analyze whether there is a substantial risk that any remaining confidential information would materially advance the State’s position in the NRD case. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider all legally relevant factors before concluding that the matters are substantially related...
Because we conclude that the district court did not consider legally relevant factors in conducting its disqualification analysis under Rule 1.9(a) and we conclude that a party can waive the right to seek disqualification of opposing counsel, we remand this case to the district court for its full consideration of these issues in a manner consistent with this opinion. The decision whether to reopen the record on remand rests within the discretion of the district court.
The ABA Journal had reported the trial court's order. (Mike Frisch)
Friday, January 17, 2014
A law firm organized in and with its main office in Maine (hah!) also has an office with resident partners in Concord, New Hampshire.
The law firm filed a Freedom of Access Act request with the Maine Revenue Service "for documents containing methodologies, formulas, or calculations relating to apportionment of Maine income tax liability for nonresident partners of a professional services partnership entity based in or with a significant business presence in Maine."
The service denied the law firm's request. The decision was affirmed in Superior Court and in a decision issued yesterday by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. (Mike Frisch)
Wednesday, January 8, 2014
The date of termination of representation was the key issue in an appeal of a trial court determination that declined to dismiss a legal malpractice claim on statute of limitations grounds.
The law firm represented the client in a matrimonial matter.
The client sent the firm an e-mail on August 7, 2008 questioning the handling of her matter. The representation was formally terminated on August 19.
The client sued for legal malpractice by complaint filed August 9, 2011.
The firm claimed that the e-mail ended their representation and that the former client was SOL (here, a polite way of saying that the three-year statute had run).
The New York Appellate Division for the Second Judicial Department agreed with the trial court
Here, the plaintiff's email message dated August 7, 2008, does not conclusively contradict the allegation, set forth in paragraph 103 of her complaint, that the defendants were not discharged as her counsel until August 19, 2008. The email message makes demands and accusations but does not necessarily or unequivocally terminate the parties' attorney-client relationship. The email message states, inter alia, that, "without the judgment being signed, I have no money with which to pay," which suggests the need for further legal work to be performed, and also states that since the plaintiff and counsel both attend the same synagogue, "it will be a pity to have bad blood between us." In light of those statements, and the Consent to Change Attorney that was not executed until August 19, 2008, the defendants failed to conclusively establish that the attorney-client relationship did not continue until the latter date. Accordingly, the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint was properly denied.
Clarity on such matters favors the attorney. (Mike Frisch)
An order dismissing a legal malpractice claim based on allegedly erroneous tax advice was reversed by the New York Appellate Division for the Second Judicial Department.
The facts of the alleged malpractice
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages allegedly sustained as a result of the defendants' legal malpractice. As alleged in the complaint, the plaintiff retained the defendants to represent it in connection with the sale of certain real property and a related exchange of "like-kind property" pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code (see 26 USC § 1031). According to the allegations in the complaint, the plaintiff, based upon the defendants' advice, selected LandAmerica 1031 Exchange Services, Inc. (hereinafter LandAmerica), as the qualified intermediary to hold a portion of the sale proceeds, totaling $5.5 million, for the exchange of like-kind property pursuant to 26 USC § 1031. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the defendants negligently represented the plaintiff inasmuch as they reviewed, and advised the plaintiff to execute, an agreement with LandAmerica, under which the exchange funds were to be held in a commingled account and not a qualified escrow account or trust. Soon after the sale proceeds were transferred to LandAmerica, its parent corporation, LandAmerica Financial Group, Inc., declared bankruptcy. According to the complaint, the plaintiff's funds were frozen for several years during the bankruptcy proceedings, and the plaintiff lost a portion of the funds because they were not held in a qualified escrow account or trust. The complaint further alleged that the plaintiff could not defer the taxes on the capital gains from the initial sale, as it did not have access to its funds to purchase a replacement property within the required 180-day period.
The defendant law firm failed to demonstrate that dismissal was appropriate
Here, construing the complaint liberally, accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, as we are required to do, the plaintiff stated a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice (citations omitted) The plaintiff alleged in the complaint that the defendants were negligent in failing, inter alia, to advise it to keep its exchange funds in a qualified escrow account or trust, and that this negligence was a proximate cause of its damages. The defendants' contentions that it was the conduct of the plaintiff's manager and unforeseeable events that were the proximate causes of the plaintiff's damages, and that the defendants did not depart from the standard of care, concern disputed factual issues that are not properly raised and resolved on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7).
Tuesday, November 5, 2013
Tuesday, October 15, 2013
The Tennessee Court of Appeals has reversed and remanded an order dismissing claims brought against a Washington, D.C. attorney by a Memphis law firm.
The D.C. attorney sought the assistance of the Memphis firm in connection with a lawsuit filed in Maryland. A contract was entered into for the attorney and the firm to serve as co-counsel.
The Memphis firm sued the attorney for not paying one-half of the expenses, as provided for in the contract.
The trial court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court here disagreed and reinstated the suit. (Mike Frisch)
Thursday, September 19, 2013
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has affirmed an order to arbitrate a dispute between a former partner of K &L Gates and the firm.
The attorney had filed suit against the firm in California. The firm invoked arbitration and forum selection clauses in the firm partnership agreement, and moved in the D.C. Superior Court to compel arbitration.
The Superior Court ordered the parties to arbitrate the dispute. The attorney appealed the order.
The court here entertained the appeal and concluded that the dispute must be arbitrated.
The attorney had signed a supplement to the firm's partnership agreement when Kilpatrick & Lockhart merged with Preston, Gates & Ellis that bound him to the agreement "as amended."
The attorney (who was a partner at the Preston firm) agreed to the supplement when he chose to become a K &L Gates partner. The agreement provided for arbitration of disputes that arose between him and the firm and chose the District of Columbia as the forum.
The court rejected a host of contentions, including the suggestion that the firm engaged in fraud in having the agreement signed. The court held that the arbitration agreement broadly covered all issues in dispute between the attorney and the firm.
Associate Judge McLeese wrote the opinion. There are concurring opinion from Senior Judge Ferren, joined by Associate Judge Easterly.
The issue of the concurrences involved footnote four of the opinion. The concurring opinion proposes an alternate version.
Judge McLeese defended the footnote in a concurring opinion. (Mike Frisch)
Tuesday, July 2, 2013
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has affirmed the dismissal of a civil action brought by an attorney against his former law partners.
The firm breakup took place in 1999. The suit alleged intentional interference with prospective contractual relations, defamation, breach of fiduciary duty and corporate opportunity doctrine.
Judgment for the defendants as a matter of law was entered after a seven day trial.
The court noted earlier related litigation and concluded:
In 2003 - ten years ago - the trial justice cautioned that "[i]t is now time for each of the unhappy former partners to put this matter aside * * * rather than participating in an endless maze of pro se litigation." (citation omitted) In 2010, this Court observed that it was "especially unfortunate that, despite the trial justice's admonition at an early stage, the instant litigation has been prolonged for an additional seven years." Now, fourteen years after the dissolution of the law firm and the filing of this complaint, we lay this case to rest.
Tuesday, May 28, 2013
The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to two attorneys sued under a variety of theories including violation of the state's unfair trade practices law.
The basis was the failure of the plaintiff to "identify any evidence of ascertainable loss."
One of the defendants had been employed by attorney Meo as an associate. Meo was the sole proprietor of the law firm.
Meo was hospitalized in October 2005 and remained so until his death in April of the following year. The clients were managed by the asociate during his illness. Eventually, the attorney left the Meo firm and 51 of 53 clients retained him to complete their cases.
The suit here was filed by the widow Meo individually and as administrix of the estate. (Mike Frisch)
Friday, May 24, 2013
The New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department has remanded a matter involving legal fees charged to and gifts received from a wealthy widow in an estate matter:
Beginning in 1983, defendant law firm represented the family of Sylvan Lawrence in litigation concerning the administration of his estate. In 1998, Alice Lawrence, Sylvan's widow, paid three of the firm's partners, the individual defendants, a bonus or gift totaling $5.05 million and also paid the firm $400,000 as a bonus or gift. By the end of 2004, the widow had paid, approximately $22 million in legal fees on an hourly fee basis.
In the hope of reducing her anticipated legal fees in the ongoing litigation, the widow entered into a revised retainer agreement with the law firm in January 2005. The revised retainer agreement provided, inter alia, for a 40% contingency fee. In May 2005, the estate litigation settled with a payment to the estate of more than $111 million and, in accordance with the revised retainer agreement, the firm sought a fee of 40% of that amount. When the widow refused to pay the 40% contingency fee, this litigation resulted, in which, among other relief, the return of the gifts the widow made in 1998 is sought.
The court held
The revised retainer agreement is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable (Lawrence v Graubard Miller, 48 AD3d 1, 6 [1st Dept 2007], affd 11 NY3d 558 ). The evidence shows that the widow believed that under the contingency arrangement, she would receive the "lion's share" of any recovery. In fact, as it operated, the law firm obtained over 50% of the widow's share of proceeds. Thus, the law firm failed to show that the widow fully knew and understood the terms of the retainer agreement — an agreement she entered into in an effort to reduce her legal fees...
In considering the substantive unconscionability of the revised retainer agreement, the Referee correctly considered such factors as the proportionality of the fee to the value of the professional services rendered, the sheer amount of the fee, and the risks and rewards to the attorney upon entering into the contingency agreement. With regard to the last factor, the law firm had internally assessed the estate's claims to be worth approximately $47 million so that the contingency fee provision in the revised retainer would have meant a fee of about $19 million. Contrary to the law firm's assertion, on this record it seems highly unlikely that the firm undertook a significant risk of losing a substantial amount of fees as a result of the revised retainer agreement's contingency provision. Rather, the Referee accurately characterized this attempt by the law firm to justify its action as "nothing but a self-serving afterthought."(citations omitted)
The amount the law firm seeks ($44 million) is also disproportionate to the value of the services rendered (approximately $1.7 million) (see Lawrence v Graubard Miller, 11 NY3d at 596). The record shows that the law firm spent a total of 3,795 hours on the litigation after the revised retainer agreement became effective, resulting in an hourly rate of $11,000, which, as the Referee stated, is "an astounding rate of return for legal services."
However, the remedy recommended by the Referee and adopted by the Surrogate — namely, a new "reasonable" fee arrangement for the parties — was improper. Where, as here, there is a preexisting, valid retainer agreement, the proper remedy is to revert to the original agreement. For the reasons found by the Referee, we reject the firm's suggestion that it receive a reduced contingency fee. Accordingly, the matter is remanded for the determination of the fees due the law firm under the original retainer agreement. Given that the firm is entitled to fees under the original retainer agreement, it is also entitled to prejudgment interest from the date of the breach. (citations omitted)
Because the individual defendants acted alone, and in secret from the rest of the law firm, with respect to the gifts, we decline to rule that such conduct by the individual defendants results in the firm's forfeiture of its lawful fees from the date the individual defendants received the gifts.
The Surrogate's Court (opinion linked here) had awarded the law firm fees in the amount of $15,837,374.02 but found that the gifts solicted by the attorneys (concealed from their law firm and the widow's children) emanated an "odor of overreaching too potent to be ignored." (Mike Frisch)
Monday, May 6, 2013
In a lawsuit involving a dispute between lawyers over the legal fees in a complex medical malpractice case, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals has held that
...we will apply the general rule that the termination of a contingency fee agreement terminates the fee-sharing agreement predicated on it. Because PGA [the law firm of Orioles owner Peter Angelos] is not entitled to a contingency fee, there is no contingency fee for Mr. Brault to share. Accordingly, to the extent the circuit court factored in the fee-sharing agreement, the circuit court's ruling must be vacated and remanded for further proceedings.
We stress that our decision in this case does not mean that Mr. Brault is not entitled to compensation for his work while the contingency arrangement was in effect. Like PGA, howver, his claim would be for the reasonable value of his services.
The case involved an attorney (Mr. Gately) who while with PGA undertook the representation of the client with assistance from other firm attorneys. Mr. Brault was brought in as co-counsel and a favorable verdict was obtained. The verdict was overturned on appeal.
Mr. Gately was then discharged from PGA. The client followed him and Mr. Brault. The case later settled for an undisclosed amount. PGA sued to enforce its lien. The disputed funds remained in escrow.
Mr. Gately acknowledged that no post-verdict effort had contributed to the settlement, which he attributed to an act of God.
The court here held that PGA had behaved ethically and was not deprived of it entitlement to fees.
The court also held that the discharged attorneys may properly sue successor counsel. (Mike Frisch)
Wednesday, May 1, 2013
From the web page of the Tennessee Supreme Court:
The Tennessee Supreme Court has sent a dispute between a Memphis law firm and a former partner and paralegal back to the trial court to determine whether arbitration is appropriate.
The law firm of Glassman, Edwards, Wyatt, Tuttle & Cox, P.C. filed a lawsuit against B.J. Wade, a former partner, and Shannon Crowe, a former paralegal, alleging fraud and breach of their duties to the firm. Mr. Wade and Ms. Crowe both asked the trial court to send their cases to arbitration, as required by agreements they maintain govern resolution of each case. The firm, however, asserts that none of the agreements require arbitration.
The trial court consolidated the cases and initially ordered the parties to proceed with limited discovery to determine whether the cases were subject to arbitration. When disagreement arose, however, the trial court expanded the scope of discovery to include “all necessary documents to conduct a meaningful attempt at resolution of this matter.” The trial court also ordered the parties to mediation in an attempt to resolve all of their disputes. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the request of Mr. Wade and Ms. Crowe for an immediate appeal.
In a unanimous opinion issued today, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in ordering discovery without limiting the scope of discovery to the issue of the enforceability of the arbitration provisions and erred in ordering the parties to mediation in an effort to resolve all aspects of their disputes.
The Supreme Court ordered that the case be returned to the trial court to determine whether arbitration was required of any dispute between the parties under any of the agreements at issue. The Court also held that discovery must be limited to the issue of whether the arbitration clauses contained in the agreements are enforceable.
The court's opinion is linked here.
Wednesday, April 24, 2013
From the web page of the Ohio Supreme Court:
The Ohio Supreme Court Board of Commissioners on Grievances & Discipline no longer advises that a lawyer may not practice with more than one firm in Ohio at the same time, according to an advisory opinion.
Finding “substantial justification for a new perspective on practice in multiple firms” and considering “the context of current rules and modern practice,” the board concluded in Opinion 2013-1 that practice in multiple firms can occur in compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The board withdrew three previous advisory opinions on the issue. The reasoning behind the update includes, among other things, the fact that other jurisdictions have ruled that the practice is permissible, an expanded definition of “firm,” and financial considerations for lawyers in smaller communities who work more than one part-time job.
The opinion’s syllabus gives the following guidance.
“A lawyer who engages in simultaneous practice in multiple firms must recognize the potential ethical issues connected with such practice. The lawyer has to be diligent in avoiding conflicts of interest, and the imputation of conflicts will apply across all associated ‘firms.’ The lawyer is also required to scrupulously maintain client confidentiality and professional independence. As part of the lawyer’s duty to refrain from false, misleading, or nonverifiable communications about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services, the lawyer must inform his or her clients of all multiple firm associations."
Wednesday, February 27, 2013
An attorney represented an organization in defense of several employment matters from 2002-2004. The relationship ended when the client sued the attorney for malpractice.
The organization moved for disqualification in a pending case in which the attorney represented a plaintiff suing it in an employment matter. The trial court denied a motion to disqualify.
The South Carolina Supreme Court held that interlocutory appeal of the denial is not an available remedy. The issue can be addressed on appeal of the judgment. (Mike Frisch)